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ABSTRACT 
This thesis offers a detailed examination of aspects of Conservative education 
policies between 1976 and 1997. While developments during this period 
generated considerable amounts of contemporary discussion and analysis, this is 
the first historical study to cover the period as a whole. Drawing on a series of 
interviews with many of the participants, particular attention is paid to the two 
major developments that affected schools during the period - the introduction of 
a national curriculum and Grant Maintained schools. 
After an introduction that includes a discussion of the methodology, the 
typology used within the thesis, and a related literature review, the thesis follows 
a narrative structure in analysing the course of Conservative education policies 
between 1976 and 1997. Both the origins and the context of how the various 
policies emerged are discussed and analysed, as well as how and why there was a 
radical break with the previous pattern of educational policy making and 
discussion. 
The two issues that characterise the period are the politicisation of the 
policy-making process, and the consequences of that politicisation on 
implementing the actual policies. Attention is drawn to the increasing 
encroachment of politics and ideology into the field of education during the 
1970s and 1980s, and how this encroachment created a new `space' between 
policy proposals and practice. While this development was responsible for the 
political triumph of the 1988 Education Reform Act, it proved less successful in 
translating that triumph into a sustainable and coherent set of policies during the 
implementation stage. 
The process of politicisation had introduced a degree of interference by 
individual politicians and their advisers that was a new development in the field 
of education policy, and it is argued that the conflicts generated by this over- 
dependence and over-reliance on individuals to make decisions about education 
policy, rather than ideological incoherence or bureaucratic or professional 
opposition, was the primary factor that adversely affected the course of 
Conservative education reforms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Research questions 
The author's intention is to investigate the course of Conservative education 
policies towards schools between 1976 and 1997, particularly relating to the 
impact of key personalities who were involved, and the political and policy 
context in which they operated. With the 1988 Education Reform Act acting very 
much as the `hinge' of the period in question, this study addresses important 
questions about the educational policy-making process between 1976 and 1997. 
Those traditionally involved in education policy displayed similar characteristics 
to the `village' or `policy' community that Heclo and Wildavsky described in 
their 1974 study of the Treasury. Much depended upon `the personal 
relationships between major political and administrative actors - sometimes in 
conflict, often in agreement, but always in touch and operating within a shared 
framework'. ' Within this community, power and influence was seen as diffused, 
albeit not always equally, between central government, local government and 
individual institutions. From at least 1976 there was a shift away from this 
model, culminating in a radical break in the lead up to the 1987 election. How 
much strain was that model under, internally and externally, prior to 1979? What 
model of policy making replaced the tripartite community model? How effective 
was this model in providing new policies? How did these policies `emerge'? 
Who were the participants in the process and how was power and influence 
distributed among them? What role remained for the previous `partners'? 
In the post-1988 period, other questions emerge. Despite the apparent 
triumph of 1987, key policies failed to achieve the ambitions of their political 
sponsors. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of the twin pillars of 
the 1988 Education Reform Act, the introduction of a national curriculum and 
Grant Maintained schools. As described in one study, `By 1991, the National 
I Heclo, H. and Wildavsky, A. (1974) The Private Government of Public Money. London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., p. xv. 
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Curriculum was undergoing implementation and revision simultaneously'. 2 By 
1997, following an unbroken series of controversies and revisions, culminating in 
the test boycott by teachers in 1993, the National Curriculum, introduced with 
such fanfare in 1988, was largely discredited and effectively off limits for the 
then Conservative government. The parallel attempt to transform the 
organisational structure of the schools system through the introduction of Grant 
Maintained schools had petered out, with only just over a thousand schools 
having become Grant Maintained, the majority of those having done so during 
the first few years of the initiative. How was it that successive Conservative 
governments were unable to achieve greater success in such key areas of 
education reform? How much did the changing personnel involved in education 
policy affect the progress of education policies after 1988? Can we trace a `cause 
and effect' factor to the period prior to 1988? Why was there such a destructive 
cloud of ambiguity and confusion surrounding the course of Conservative 
education reforms to such an extent that key policies began to falter almost as 
soon as they were introduced? Can ideological ambiguities alone provide 
sufficient explanation? Was there a reassertion of power by the traditional 
`partners', and if so, did this entail a `hijacking' or `subversion' of some policies 
as claimed in some quarters? Are there any continuing issues or concerns for 
current or future administrations apparent from the experiences of the Thatcher 
and Major administrations? 
While many of the policy proposals in this period emerged from outside 
the traditional educational policy-making community, some, such as the National 
Curriculum, were already on the educational agenda. What was different, 
however, was that all policy proposals were increasingly taken on board and 
mediated by politicians. In terms of the degree of intervention and interest by 
politicians, this was a new phenomenon. One stimulus behind this was the 
insularity to change of many within the existing policy community. One 
consequence of this was the temporary displacement of that policy community, 
with little conscious effort to replace it with any alternative model. Another 
related consequence was the creation of a new additional `space' between 
2 Willan, P. (1995) `The National Curriculum: the natural evolutionary product of two decades of 
debate and development? Or a device for keeping the world Tory? ' University of London: Ph. D. 
thesis, p. 36. 
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proposals and practice. This was a `space' that was, inevitably, highly politicised, 
and which unsurprisingly led to the charge from some quarters of the 
`politicisation' of the policy process or of education in general. Education had 
always been political. It was just that the politicians never took much interest in 
it. This study, of how the conflict between those interests that occupied this new 
`space' - political, ideological and bureaucratic - affected the course of 
education reform, provides an analysis that challenges existing accounts. While 
full use has been made of the available published sources, this thesis also 
incorporates an invaluable and untapped range of oral sources, based upon 
interviews with many of the participants and observers. 
Methodology and Sources 
(a) Narrative of progress 
This investigation arose out of an earlier study for a Master's Degree between 
1992 and 1994 that examined the influence of a small group of right-wing 
activists associated with the 1988 Education Act. Drawing on the data from a 
series of five interviews, as well as published sources, the conclusion of that 
study was that those individuals, dubbed `The believers', had a disproportionate 
influence on aspects of the 1988 Act. 3 After a break of four years from study, the 
author picked up the thread of that conclusion to carry out further research into 
how much influence the broader spectrum of New Right groups were able to 
exert on the course of education policy in general, during the period of the 
Conservative administrations. Although a fascinating portrait of the `sub-culture' 
of pressure groups, think tanks and advisers, and the influence they believed they 
had, emerged when gathering the data, other questions began to overtake the 
original stimulus for investigation. 
While it appeared from the initial data that at certain points and at certain 
times during the policy process, these groups may have had a strong directional 
influence, this was not necessarily a determining influence. This posed the 
questions as to whom possessed, and where exactly, could this determining 
3 Callaghan, D. (1994) `The Believers. Politics and Personalities in the making of the 1988 
Education Act'. University of London, M. Sc. dissertation. An edited version of the dissertation 
was published in History of Education, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 1995. pp. 363-385. 
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influence be located. A parallel course of inquiry was that while the earlier study 
had concluded with the apparent political and ideological triumph of the 1988 
Education Reform Act, the feeling was very different immediately post-1997 
after the drift and bitterness apparent during Gillian Shephard's time as Secretary 
of State. For the Conservatives, education policy had become almost a liability in 
electoral terms. Significant policies had failed to make the impact hoped for. The 
1997 manifesto proposals, heavily influenced by John Major, which focussed on 
a return to grammar schools and selection, displayed an atavism and 
regressiveness that many of his own colleagues found irrelevant. 4 This further 
demonstrated the sense of frustration and wasted opportunities during the 
preceding years. Recrimination was in the air. As the focus of investigation 
shifted to include what might have gone wrong for the Conservatives, further 
data began to be gathered, looking at a broader swathe of literature, and a much 
broader sample of people, including officials and politicians. Eventually, a total 
of 49 interviews were completed, the last of which took place in April 2002. 
Initially, no clear picture emerged. The Labour politician Aneurin Bevan 
once remarked how, in his elusive search for the locus of `power', every time he 
thought he had arrived at the right place, always he `saw its coat-tails 
disappearing round the corner'. 5 So it proved initially when trying to find the 
answers to some of the research questions. Part of the challenge in 
contextualising and analysing the data was the relative fragmentation of the 
existing data. While there are numerous studies of particular initiatives or 
particular aspects of the period under investigation, no single account of the 
entire period was available. While various other studies have examined aspects 
of Conservative education policies between 1976 and 1997, this is the first full- 
length study of the period as a whole. To provide the backbone or chronology, 
the two most useful publications were the weekly Times Educational Supplement 
(TES) and the journal Education, 6 with the former, in particular, being influential 
4 `The 97 manifesto was awful. John Major's version of his 1950s black and white movie'. 
Michael Fallon interview, 17 February 1998. 
5 Morgan, K. (1987) Labour People. Leaders and Lieutenants: Hardie to Kinnock. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 205. 
6 Education ceased publication in 1996. 
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in its own right, `both a chronicler and persuasive shaper of events'. ' The 
broadsheet newspapers also provided solid reporting from a slightly different 
perspective to that of the `trade' journals. John Clare, in the Daily Telegraph, 
proved the most interesting and informative of the education correspondents. 
This was not only for the access to Conservative politicians he enjoyed, but also 
for his fiercely independent and thoughtful analysis of education issues, 
regardless of their political origins. Various tabloid newspapers, especially the 
Daily Mail, although suffering from predictability in their approach, were also 
useful for insights into the mind-sets or tactics of those who provided the stories, 
more often than for the stories themselves. 
Some published studies were particularly helpful, though for differing 
reasons, when looking at certain periods. Clyde Chitty's Towards a New 
Education System and Christopher Knight's The Making of Tory Education 
Policy in Post- War Britain were most often returned to for the period up to the 
mid-1980s, as was Brian Simon's Education and the Social Order. 8 
Unsurprisingly, there was a `bulge' of publications on events during the late 
1980s, the most useful of which were Stephen Ball's Politics and Policy Making 
in Education and Richard Johnson's Education Limited. Apart from Denis 
Lawton's The Tory Mind on Education and Education and Politics in the 1990s, 
that decade has not been well served with publications. 9 Kenneth Clarke's two 
biographers, Malcolm Balen and Andy McSmith, provide some useful 
background to his time at education, while Mike Baker's Who Rules Our 
Schools? is excellent on John Patten's time. 10 Anthony Seldon's political 
biography of John Major is essential for much of the 1990s. A less substantial 
work, but a good introduction to the rancourousness of the later Major years, is 
7 Davies-Griffith, C. C. (1999) `Developments in the making of policy in education in the 
twentieth century: the 1902,1918,1944 and 1988 Education Acts'. University of Birmingham: 
Ph. D. thesis, p. 28. 
8 Chitty, C. (1989) Towards a New Education System. The Victory of the New Right. Lewes: The 
Falmer Press; Knight, C. (1990) The Making of Tory Education Policy in Post-War Britain 1950- 
1986. Lewes: Falmer Press; Simon, B. (1991) Education and the Social Order 1940-1990. New 
York: St. Martin's Press. 
9 Ball, S. (1990) Politics and Policy Making in Education. London: Routledge; Johnson, R. 
(1991) Education Limited. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd.; Lawton, D. (1992) Education and 
Politics in the 1990s. Conflict or Consensus? Lewes: Falmer Press; Lawton, D. (1994) The Tory 
Mind on Education. 1979-94. London: The Falmer Press. 
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Hywel Williams' Guilty Men. " Butler and Kavanagh's election series provided a 
moving snapshot of political and psephological analysis, while various academic 
education journals punctuated the study with useful insights and arguments on 
various aspects of policy. On the dangers and opportunities of interpreting and 
using qualitative data, McPherson and Raab's introduction to their Governing 
Education was useful, as indeed were contributions in edited volumes by 
Walford, Researching the Powerful in Education, and Halpin and Troyna's 
Researching Educational Policy. 12 In particular, Stephen Ball's warnings and 
admonitions regarding the use of oral sources in his contributions to these latter 
studies were also ever present, if not entirely heeded. 
(b) Typology 
In gathering, organising and presenting the data, a particular thread or typology 
appeared to run through the period 1976 to 1997. Writing in 1984, Denis Lawton 
identified three competing groups within the central authority in the education 
system. These groups he identified as the `politicos (ministers, political advisers, 
etc. ), bureaucrats (DES officials) and the professionals (HMI)'. 13 Lawton put 
forward his proposal in the wake of increased activity and attempted intervention 
by the DES and HMI in the curriculum, but prior to the intense period of political 
lobbying that eventually led to the 1988 Reform Act, which brought new 
pressures and new interests into play. Adapting Lawton's typology, it might be 
suggested that the individuals or interests, who between them comprised the 
main determinants on the course of education policy in this new expanded arena 
or space, can also be divided into three groups. These could be described as the 
irregulars, the regulars and the politicos, with the competition and conflict 
10 Balen, M. (1994) Kenneth Clarke. London: Fourth Estate; McSmith, A. (1994) Kenneth 
Clarke, A Political Biography. London: Verso; Baker, M. (1994) Who Rules Our Schools? 
London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
II Seldon, A. (1997) John Major: A Political Life. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Williams, 
H. (1998) Guilty Men. London: Aurum Press. 
12 McPherson, A. and Raab, C. (1988) Governing Education. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press; Walford, G. (ed. ) (1994) Researching the Powerful in Education. London: UCL Press; 
Halpin, D. and Troyna, B. (1994) (eds. ) Researching Education Policy: Ethical and 
Methodological Issues. London: Falmer Press. 
13 Lawton, D. (1984) The Tightening Grip. Growth of Central Control of the School Curriculum. 
London: Institute of Education, p. 16. 
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between these three groupings providing the context in which policies were 
developed and implemented. 
The irregulars comprised a fluid combination of pressure groups, think 
tanks and advisers once completely outside the traditional loop of educational 
policy making. Membership of this group was clearly linked to certain roles or 
positions held by individuals, but a more useful criteria was attitudinal, rather 
than positional. Operating within an ad hoc system, using what one participant 
described as `a loose nexus of individuals, linked by friendship and 
association', 14 they did not see themselves as in any way part of the `educational 
establishment', which they distrusted, and their constituency was the 
`consumers' of education - parents, children and, occasionally, employers. The 
regulars were generally professionals working within the education system, 
primarily DES officials, with an occasional supporting cast for others such as 
HMI, and also increasingly the majority of the members in the newly-created 
education quangos that proliferated in the wake of the 1988 Act. Secretaries of 
State, their advisers, junior ministers and both Margaret Thatcher and John Major 
comprise the politicos. 
With a rapid turnover of actors within the ranks of the irregulars, 
regulars and politicos, existing secondary accounts can only fill so much of the 
gap in our understanding of educational change during the Conservative 
administrations of the 1980s and 1990s. There are few first-hand sources 
available in the public domain. An application was made to the Departmental 
Record Officer at the Department for Education and Skills requesting 
`privileged access' to the departmental papers covering the period. These have 
not, as yet, been passed on to the National Archive and would subsequently be 
subject to a 30-year closure. The papers from the National Curriculum Council 
(NCC) and the School Examinations and Assessment Council (SEAC) were 
passed onto the National Archive in 1997, with the former subject to a 10 year 
closure, and the latter subject to a 30 year closure. Thus, with much of what 
occurred during the period still very much in the realm of contemporary history, 
we are largely left with a combination of textual analysis and reportage. 
15 While 
14 John Barnes quoted in Knight, C. (1990) The Making of Tory Education Policy in Post War 
Britain 1950-1986. Lewes: The Falmer Press, p. 98. 
15 See for example, Simon, Education and the Social Order and Johnson, Education Limited. 
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the public accounts that are available, such as policy studies, memoirs, Hansard 
and media reports, are important to this study, the primary investigative tool used 
for this thesis was the interview. 
(c) Using Oral Sources 
Gathering and using first-hand oral accounts, particularly elite accounts, raises a 
number of methodological issues. One of the most obvious potential pitfalls in 
adopting such an approach was described by Fernand Braudel. Braudel suggested 
that there were different kinds of historical `time', and that `time moves at 
different speeds', operating at different levels. At the top level were political 
events where things happened quickly if unevenly. These events were merely 
`surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong 
backs'. The `tides of history' operated at a different level, at a different speed, 
and were the `slow moving social and economic trends, often imperceptible to 
contemporaries.. . social structure and state systems'. 
16 In using oral sources as a 
methodological tool, Ball warned against the dangers of being seduced by those 
more closely involved with these `surface disturbances', suggesting that although 
the purposes and intentions of political actors were important, they could not 
provide `a sufficient basis for the interpretation of policies and policy making'. 17 
While it was obvious that the `tides of history' - economic, social, educational 
and political - were also flowing strongly during the period under investigation, 
and are equally deserving of studies regarding their impact on education policy, 
they do not tell the whole story. Perhaps more so than any other period in the 
history of British education, the period between 1976 and 1997 cannot be fully 
explained, nor understood, without placing the impact of elite politics and 
personalities centre stage. 
Once the hurdle of obtaining access to the desired interviewees had been 
accomplished, the course and content of the interview itself also required careful 
consideration. The word that best described the whole process of interviewing is 
`manipulation'. From one perspective, the interviewer must quickly respond to 
16 Braudel in Evans, R. (1997) In Defence of History. London: Granta Books, p. 154. 
17 Ball, S. `Researching Inside the State: Issues in the Interpretation of Elite Interviews', in 
Halpin and Troyna, Researching Education Policy, p. 108. 
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the expectations and assumptions of the interviewee. Ball noted how, in some 
interviews, he would deliberately present himself `as more or less knowledgeable 
or more or less naive as seemed tactically appropriate'. 18 Gewirtz and Ozga 
described how they did not threaten the self-confidence of their interviewees: 
`We were informed, interested and to a certain degree cast by our informants in 
the role of audience'. 19 With regard to the interviewee, Ozga noted that her 
particular interviewees `were all capable, active and engaged with education, 
even in retirement, and were very aware of their place in the narrative that they 
constructed'. 20 This self-conscious `self-presentation' can clearly distort 
individual roles and motivations, something that is particularly acute when 
interviewing politicians who are likely to be practised in the art of managing an 
interview and, in all probability, considerably more practised than most 
researchers. Yet to contradict elements of any oral or indeed written recollections 
is not necessarily to suggest that the interviewees or authors were in any sense 
being deliberately misleading, or were not recounting the objective truth as they 
saw it. Phillip Williams described how interviewees can respond with what he 
described as `honest opinions mistakenly held'. 21 This does, however, increase 
the potential for the interviewer being misled. If there is no conscious effort to 
mislead, this can make the recollection all the more convincing. The interview 
data from one individual thus need to be correlated as far as possible by accounts 
from other sources, including the perspective of other individuals on the same 
aspect of policy. 
While this can go some way towards minimizing the possibility of 
distortion on the part of the interviewee, the possibility of distortion can also 
arise in the case of the interviewer. According to Gardner, an oral history 
interview has `an inescapably dialogical character', whereby the emergence of 
18 Ball, S. `Political interviews and the politics of interviewing', in Walford (ed. ), Researching 
the Powerful in Education, p. 99. 
19 Gewirtz, S. and Ozga, J. `Interviewing the education policy elite', in Walford (ed. ), 
Researching the Powerful in Education, p. 193. 
20 Ozga, J. (2000) Policy Research in Educational Settings: Contested Terrain. Buckingham: 
Open University Press, p. 126. 
21 Williams quoted in in Seldon, A. and Pappworth, J. (1982) By Word of Mouth. London: 
Metheun, p. 18. 
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testimony is the result of `a joint product of conversational exchange '. 22 In 
preparing for and participating in this `conversational exchange', the interviewer 
will also bring their own personal and professional baggage and body of opinions 
to the interview. There is often a thesis to be proved or disproved, or if the 
starting point of a study is a predetermined model of behaviour, there is also the 
danger of addressing, or only following through, on responses that support the 
prejudices of the interviewer. 
Despite these methodological concerns, the use of oral history has an 
independent validity vis-a-vis other methodologies. `Oral history', wrote Paul 
Thompson, `can be a means for transforming both the content and the purpose of 
history. It can be used to change the focus of history itself, and open up new 
areas of inquiry'. 23 The original starting point for this study was a line from 
Richard Johnson's Education Limited. In his description of how the original 
voucher concept was unpacked after 1983 into the various elements that found 
their way into the 1988 Act, Johnson makes skilful use of contemporary 
reporting in the media to weave an account of what might have happened. In 
addressing the possible influence of individuals such as Oliver Letwin, Bob 
Dunn and Stuart Sexton, particularly on Mrs Thatcher, Johnson posed the 
question `Had she grasped the Dunn-Sexton-Letwin point? ' Given the 
inaccessibility of Mrs Thatcher, it seemed a good idea to try to answer that 
question by asking Dunn et al. what their opinions were, and correlate them with 
what was already known or conjectured. 24 The use of oral evidence from sources 
such as these can, as described by Anthony Seldon, `be particularly effective in 
supplying information about relationships, because how relationships function in 
practice is often very different from how they are supposed to work'. 
25 Such 
information, according to another historian, `does not get into official records'. 
26 
22 Gardner, P. (2003) `Oral history in education: teacher's memory and teachers' history'. 
History of Education, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 176. 
23 Thompson, P. (1978) The Voice of the Past. Oral History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
2. 
24 Johnson, Education Limited, p. 61. In a slightly similar vein, Heclo and Wildavsky had 
suggested that `The cure for ignorance about how something gets 
done is to talk with those who 
do it'. Heclo and Wildavsky, Private Government of Public Money, p. xiii. 
25 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, p. 39. 
26 Ibid., p. 40. 
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(d) Gathering and using the data 
While the researcher is likely to be in control of how and when secondary 
sources are reviewed, this is not the case with interviews. For part-time students, 
there is the added difficulty of simply accommodating the time and location 
which interviewees make available alongside domestic and work commitments. 
While gaining access to the interviewees did not generally prove as difficult as 
anticipated, a more acute problem was not being able to schedule the interviews 
in such a way as to provide the most effective sequence for gathering the data. 
This did not invalidate any of the data, but opportunities were missed to follow 
particular lines of questioning. 
Those interviewed fell roughly into the three categories already 
identified: politicos, regulars and irregulars. Some individuals fall into more 
than one category, while some commentators and academics, interviewed to 
provide an additional perspective are not intended to fall into any. Only one 
interviewee requested the questions in advance, and none embargoed any area or 
type of questions. All were happy to be quoted except where they so indicated 
during the course of the interview. The first interviews were those conducted for 
the earlier study in 1994, with a final total of 49 interviews, a figure which 
includes two individuals who were interviewed twice. Inevitably, there were 
some individuals who were unavailable or unwilling to be interviewed. These are 
indicated in the bibliography. Twenty-eight interviews were conducted in the 
interviewees' place of work, eight each in the House Of Commons and in the 
interviewees' home, three in the Education Department, one in my place of work 
and one through correspondence. The length of the interviews varied from half 
an hour to just under four hours. 
The approach adopted towards the interviews themselves was very much 
as described by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, that of `a conversation with a 
purpose'. 27 Each interview was the subject of meticulous preparation with 
specific questions and areas to be covered. As with the experiences of other 
researchers, the tone and sequence of the interview had to mould itself to the 
responses of the interviewee. Significant attention was given, both in preparing 
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the questions and during the course of the interview, to what Daniel McHugh 
refers to as ' "the sociology of the interview": knowing enough of the insider's 
semantics, and yet having an outsider's detachment' . 
2$ Some questions, generally 
the opening ones, were deliberately non-contentious in order to put the 
interviewee at ease. This was perhaps of particular importance with officials, and 
also provided the opportunity to obtain a sense of whether the interviewees were 
willing to be more forthcoming in their replies than the Civil Service tradition 
would generally allow. With all the interviewees, these types of questions, on 
occasion, would have to be abandoned fairly quickly if there was a sense that the 
interviewee felt that he or she was not being sufficiently `challenged'. 29 Equally, 
they would have to be returned to with equal speed if the course of questioning 
was becoming too contentious. The questions for the initial interviews were 
based on available secondary sources, but increasingly the data gathered from the 
interviews themselves were used as a basis for subsequent interviews. Responses 
were recorded through the use of notes and shorthand and were transcribed the 
same day. Although not, perhaps, as `efficient' as the use of electronic 
equipment, this method did have the advantage of providing the interviewer with 
a slight `breathing space' between questions to consider both the interviewee's 
response and the interviewer's next line of questioning. It also had the significant 
advantage, where time and courtesy allowed, of reviewing the responses near the 
end of the interview and seeking further clarification or returning to points 
already made. 
While there was no deliberate effort or design on the part of the 
interviewer to encourage the interviewees to be indiscreet, in some respects the 
more `successful' the interview, in the sense of having been offered a particularly 
revealing or indiscreet piece of data, the greater the ethical dilemma or the 
tendency towards self- censorship. 30 While all the interviewees were aware of the 
27 Webbs quoted in Burgess, R. `The Unstructured Interview as a Conversation', in Burgess, R. 
(ed. ) (1982) Field research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual. London: Allen & Unwin, p. 107. 
28 McHugh, J. D. `The Lords' will be done: interviewing the powerful in education', in Walford 
(ed. ) Researching the Powerful in Education, p. 63. 
29 Commenting on the interviews they undertook, Heclo and Wildavsky noted how `The moment 
the interviewer shows unfamiliarity with the subject (though why else would he be there), he will 
begin to feel himself on the smooth slipway to the outer office'. Heclo and Wildavsky, Private 
Government of Public Money, p. lxvii. 
30 McPherson and Raab noted that when they felt interviews had been granted, often in busy 
schedules and where the researcher was treated, sometimes in people's homes, with courtesy and 
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nature and context of the research, even with this `informed consent', there 
remains with the researcher a `duty of confidentiality'. As described by the Oral 
History Society, this `can arise without the supplier of information explicitly 
stating that it be treated as confidential'. 3 1 Given the central emphasis on the 
impact of, and often the clashes between, personalities, there were numerous 
judgements as to when replies were overtly personal and not entirely relevant, or 
whether, despite elements of vindictiveness, they also helped to illustrate some of 
the tensions and confusions surrounding questions of policy. The overtly 
libellous responses have been omitted, while other quotes have been paraphrased 
or not directly attributed to an individual, without, hopefully, losing the essence 
of the data. Even so, there are also voices, some officials and politicians that are 
not directly heard. Where their contributions or actions are discussed within the 
text, wherever possible, the author has attempted to balance criticisms with any 
positive or supportive comments that were offered by other interviewees. 
Like Fitz and Halpin, it is also possible to contend that, in some cases, the 
factual information garnered through the interview process can occasionally be 
of less importance than the knowledge gained about the social and political 
context of policy making at an elite level. 32 Sharing these contexts and conflicts 
through the use of first-hand accounts also helps make the history of the period 
become more `democratic'. This is not in the generally-accepted sense associated 
with oral history of `bringing recognition to substantial groups of people who had 
been ignored', 33 or `to recover neglected or silenced accounts of past 
experience'. 34 Rather, for the general, as well as the academic reader, the 
reporting of the course in education policy, no more than in other policy areas, is 
littered with phrases such as `Sources close to' and `According to senior 
officials'. Putting names and faces to some of these individuals also helps to 
reframe some of the assumed relationships and contributions to policy, and helps 
hospitality, they felt an almost instinctive need for reciprocal good manners. In their case, `this 
has influenced all our decisions in the presentation of evidence'. McPherson and Raab, 
Governing Education, p. 62. 
31 Ward, A. (2003) Is your oral history legal and ethical? 'Available at: www. ohs. org. uk/ethics/, 
8. 
2 Fitz, J. and Halpin, D. `Ministers and Mandarins: educational research in elite settings', in 
Walford (ed. ), Researching the Powerful in Education, p. 49. 
33 Thompson, Voice of the Past, p. 7. 
34 Perks, R. and Thomson, A. `Advocacy and empowerment: introduction', in Perks, R. and 
Thomson, A. (1998) The Oral History Reader. London: Routledge, p. 183. 
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to provide a more open account of what may have transpired. In so doing, this 
study also draws on oral sources not conventionally heard, such as senior 
officials, many of whom appeared comfortable to talk about events which had 
lost a degree of their confidentiality with the passing of time and 
administrations. 35 A particularly rich seam of insight and information that had 
also been untapped in previous studies was that of ministerial special advisers 
and junior minsters, many of whom were close enough to events to illuminate 
what may have happened, yet were sufficiently detached to retain some degree of 
objectivity. 36 
`Words', argued Paul Thompson, `breathe life into history'. 37 Yet 
sometimes transcripts of interviews can fail to convey messages that can be 
picked up through body language, or through a change in tone, or a sudden 
froideur when a particular topic or individual is discussed. Throughout this 
study, the author has allowed the words of the interviewees speak for themselves 
as in the style of a script, so that, as far as possible, readers can almost hear the 
range of dissonant voices and personalities involved from among the regulars, 
the irregulars and the politicos. The information and opinions gleaned from this 
rough form of first hand `triangulation' has, in turn, been used in tandem with 
whatever information was already available in the public domain. In reviewing 
this literature, the author has broadly attempted to match the sources with the 
typology already identified. 
Published sources 
One of the more remarkable aspects of education reform during the Conservative 
administrations was that, on occasion, it appeared that influence and power over 
policy choices had been sub-contracted out to a phenomenon almost totally 
35 Franklin also drew attention to the degree to which the application of Official Secrets Act and 
the `Radcliffe Principles' have waned somewhat in recent years with the increasing use of 
interviews and first hand accounts in ministerial memoirs and academic studies, but also the very 
public inquiries into episodes such as the `Arms for Iraq' affair, BSE, and more recently and 
spectacularly, Lord Hutton's Inquiry into the death of the government scientist, Dr David Kelly. 
Franklin, K. (2001) `The MSC, the DES and the Origins of the TVEI'. University of Sheffield: 
Ph. D. thesis, pp. 30-31. 
36 Stuart Sexton, who has been extensively interviewed and quoted elsewhere, is the exception to 
this pattern. 
37 Thompson, Voice of the Past, p. 15. 
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unknown until then, what I have termed the irregulars. This high-profile 
combination of advisers, think tanks and pressure groups was a particular feature 
of Conservative politics since the 1970s and has generated its own sub-genre of 
literature on both sides of the Atlantic. In the case of think tanks, their nature and 
purpose in general, but of those in Britain in particular, must be treated with 
caution. Largely derived from the American experience, where the `sheer number 
and diversity of private research groups hampers accurate definition', three broad 
categories have been identified - `universities without students', `contract 
research organisations', and `advocacy tanks'. It is the third category, `advocacy 
tanks', described as groups having `a strong policy partisanship (often derived 
from an equally determined ideological position) and who campaign aggressively 
on current policy issues', which are of most interest to and most closely resemble 
the British experience. 38 
The role played by the think tanks during the Conservative governments 
was also related to how the nature of advice, other than that provided by 
permanent officials had developed. Following the demise of the Central Policy 
Review Staff in 1983, advice to the centre of government increasingly depended 
on a strengthened Number Ten Policy Unit and a wide range of ad hoc unofficial 
advisers and bodies outside of government. This trend was further exacerbated 
within the Conservative governments by the lack of status of any internal 
advisory bodies, such as the Conservative Research Department, which had 
largely been bypassed by Mrs Thatcher and her acolytes since the establishment 
of the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). According to John Barnes and Richard 
Cockett, `The think tanks really form part of the outer ring (of decision makers) 
38 Descriptions taken from Denham, A. and Garnett, M. (1996) `The Nature and Impact of Think 
Tanks in Contemporary Britain', in Gamble, A. et al. (1996) Ideas and Think Tanks in 
Contemporary Britain, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., pp. 44-45. For some, the `strong policy 
partisanship' of advocacy tanks disqualifies them from the status of `real' think tanks. This `pure' 
version of what think tanks should or might be, contrasts with that of Hayek who described think 
tanks as `second hand dealers in ideas'. Desai suggests that they were second hand in the sense 
that they `were typically not intellectual originators but served to collect, distil and preserve 
certain strands of ideas and to diffuse them more widely'. Desai, Radhika. (1994) `Second Hand 
Dealers in Ideas: Think Tanks and the Thatcherite hegemony'. New Left Review, 203, Jan/Feb, 
pp. 31- 32. 
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and have filled a void which was not being filled by the existing party 
machinery'. 39 
While the access that all of these irregulars enjoyed at the highest levels 
of government during the Conservative administrations of the 1980s and 1990s is 
unquestioned, what must be considered is whether access is equivalent to 
influence. Certainly not, as far as the politicians are concerned. Oscar Wilde's 
biographer noted how many of Wilde's contemporaries shunned him when he 
was alive, but `entertained him gladly in their memoirs'. 40 The irregulars, in 
general, have suffered the same fate in reverse at the hands of their political 
masters. Few accounts acknowledge their existence, let alone their influence. Yet 
absence of evidence from this quarter cannot be taken as evidence of absence or 
indeed influence. Their assumed influence certainly figures prominently in much 
of the secondary literature on education reform during the 1980s and 1990s. `In 
the overall shaping of policy', wrote Whitty and Menter in 1988, `what has 
emerged more and more clearly over recent months is the effectiveness of small 
but well organized right-wing pressure groups'. 41 In 1992, the newly-departed 
HMCI, Eric Bolton, was moved to `savage the government's education policies 
and accused ministers of being overly influenced by political right-wingers'. 42 
The government, Bolton said, did not listen to its specialist advisers but `It does 
listen to John Marks and the Adam Smith Institute. . . It 
does listen to the Centre 
for Policy Studies and a small group of independent school heads. ... '43 
On the face of it, one could almost choose at random from the many of 
the publications put out by the most well-known think tanks and pressure groups 
on education policy and observe what appears to be a clear and obvious link to 
44 subsequent actions and statements by ministers. Yet to accept a casual 
39 Barnes, J. and Cockett, R. `The Making of Party Policy', in Seldon, A. and Ball, S. (1994) 
Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
380. 
40 Ellmann, R. (1987), Oscar Wilde. London: Penguin, p. xiii. 
41 Whitty, G and Menter, I. (1988) `Lessons of Thatcherism: Education Policy in England and 
Wales 1978-1988'. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1,1988, p. 58. 
42 Times Educational Supplement (hereafter TES), 24 July 1992. 
43 Bolton, E. `Imaginary Gardens and Real Toads'. Address to annual conference of LEAs, 20 
July 1992, reprinted in Chitty, C. and Simon, B. (eds. ) (1993) Education Answers Back: Critical 
Responses to Government Policy. London: Lawrence and Wiseheart, p. 15. 
44 See e. g. Adam Smith Institute (1984) Omega Report: Education Policy. London: Adam 
Smith 
Institute; 0 Keeffe, D. (ed. ) (1986), The Wayward Curriculum. Exeter: Social Affairs Unit; 
Sexton, S. (1987), Our Schools: A Radical Policy. Warlingham: Institute of Economic Affairs; 
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correlation between position papers put forth by various think tanks and 
individuals on subsequent public policy would be rash. As one study of think 
tanks, by Diana Stone, has remarked, 
Establishing the progenitors of policy ideas is not easy to discern. The 
forces that converge to influence policymaking often shroud any casual 
nexus that may exist between think tanks and policy. 45 
Their overall contribution, then, to the British experience remains ambiguous. 
Despite the breathless, if largely uncritical accounts, such as that of Richard 
Cockett, 46 other studies such as that by Simon James have concluded that `The 
impact of think tanks on Britain's policy-making system has been marginal 
rather than structural'. 47 Within the literature on the irregulars, little middle 
ground appears between the inflated claims by and for some of the groups, and 
the scepticism and dismissiveness of politicians and academics. The difficulty in 
using published sources to try and judge the extent of this influence is that even 
an ambiguous description such as `casual nexus', no more than that of `loose 
nexus', ascribes almost a formality to arrangements, that, in many cases, simply 
did not exist, whether with think tanks or individual advisers in general. On one 
celebrated occasion it was reported how Kenneth Clarke had `taken advice' from 
Lord Griffiths, his newly-appointed chairman of SEAC, on possible limits for 
coursework marks for GCSE examinations. The meeting in question was, in the 
words of Lord Griffiths, an `informal dinner'. The TES was mightily 
unimpressed that `somewhere between the soup and the cheese SEAC seems to 
Burchill, J. (1991), Inspecting Schools: Breaking the Monopoly. London: Centre for Policy 
Studies. 
45 Stone, D. (1996) Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process. 
London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., p. 110. 
46 Cockett, R. (1993) Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter- 
Revolution 1931-1983. London: HarperCollins. 
47 James, S. `The Idea Brokers: The Impact of Think Tanks on British Government'. Public 
Administration, Vol. 71, Winter 1993, p. 504. The verdict of another study of both British and 
American think tanks was that, `There is virtually no example of any legislation on either side of 
the Atlantic that was entirely and uniquely due to one individual think tank'. 
Hames, T. and 
Feasey, R., `Anglo-American Think Tanks under Reagan and Thatcher', in Adonis, A. and 
Hames, T. (eds. ) (1994) A Conservative Revolution? The Thatcher-Reagan Decade in 
Perspective. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 231. 
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have arrived at limits on coursework of 20 to 30 per cent for the core subjects, 48 
Although firmly in the irregular camp, as chairman of SEAC, Lord 
Griffiths was one of those individuals whose role briefly overlapped with those 
identified as being the regulars. Something rarely acknowledged was that, since 
the 1970s, there had been and continued to be a deal of common ground between 
elements among the irregulars and the regulars, particularly senior officials 
within the DES. While the common ground may have been more on the 
diagnosis of a general malaise within the school system rather than on the 
remedies, the irregulars did appear in some respects to have an unlikely ally. 
Although there was clearly going to be conflict with the neo-liberal or free- 
market approach, according to one account by Salter and Tapper, at many other 
points during the 1980s there would be `a happy marriage of the Conservative 
Party's educational ideology and the Department's centralising instincts'. 49 
`Centralising instincts' was certainly a description that would have been difficult 
to apply to the DES with much conviction prior to 1976. Cushioned by 
favourable economic circumstances and a relatively non-controversial policy 
area, the Department and its deficiencies had been able to remain distant from the 
spotlight and unperturbed. The Yellow Book and Callaghan's Ruskin speech 
marked a crossroads from that position. The era of growth since 1944 had ended 
and, with it, `non-control' of the curriculum was also coming to an end. The 
subsequent attempts by the DES towards increased central direction of the 
curriculum during the period between 1976 and the `watershed' of 1986-87 is 
well documented by writers such as Lawton, Chitty and Salter and Tapper. 
50 In 
their 1981 study, Salter and Tapper argued that a `bureaucratic dynamic' was 
48 TES, 4 November 1991. George Walden also recounted another occasion when matters 
educational were decided over dinner. During what was also described as an `informal 
dinner', 
this time between Sir Edward Boyle and Lady Plowden, the latter is reported to have told Sir 
Edward that `she wished something could be done about "our primary schools"', and found 
herself immediately appointed as chairwoman of the subsequent inquiry. Walden described this 
episode as providing `a remarkable insight into the casual, clubby way the educational 
destiny of 
the children of others can be decided'. Walden, G. (1996) We Should Know Better. 
Solving the 
Education Crisis. London: Fourth Estate Limited, pp. 134-5. 
49 Salter, B. and Tapper, T. (1981) Education, Politics and the State. London: Grant Macintyre, 
p. 229. 
50 See e. g. Salter and Tapper, Education, Politics and the State; Salter, B. and Tapper, 
T. (1985) 
Power and Policy in Education. Lewes: The Falmer Press; Lawton, The Tightening 
Grip; Chitty, 
Towards a New Education System. 
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driving the DES to gain exclusive control over education policy making. Despite 
newer interventions from outside agencies, such as the Manpower Services 
Commission, they argued in a further study, in 1985, that the Department was 
continuing in its efforts `to create a web of Departmental controls'. Although 
Ball and Chitty argued that the changing role of the DES was occurring, or was 
largely a readjustment of roles within the context of the traditional `partnership' 
relationship, writing in 1995, Fletcher suggested that the extent of and the 
reaction to increasing DES intervention might be leading to `a new educational 
partnership being forged' .51 
While Ball has challenged the absence of any ideological perspective to 
Salter and Tapper's arguments, 52 other accounts of the 1986-87 period have 
tended to overemphasise political and ideological motivations. This is often to 
the detriment of the continued degree of influence that certain officials within the 
DES and individuals such as Kenneth Baker were able to exercise on the course 
of education reform. A corrective to this view was provided in accounts by 
Duncan Graham, the first Chairman and Chief Executive of the National 
Curriculum Council (NCC), and Tony Taylor. 53 The latter argued that Baker, 
strongly aided and abetted by his senior officials, was able to thwart the more 
minimalist ambitions of Mrs Thatcher and her advisers over curriculum reform. 
Duncan Graham's account, written with the journalist David Tytler, illustrates 
the absolute determination of senior officials to then maintain control over `their' 
subject-based National Curriculum. Although Graham was critical of the 
domineering role of officials when dealing with the NCC, other accounts, 
particularly by some of the irregulars, are more overtly scathing about their role 
and motivations. The title of one account, The Empire Strikes Back, subtitled, 
The `Creative Subversion ' of the National Curriculum, deliciously captures the 
51 Fletcher, J. (1995) `Policy Making in DES/DfE via Consensus and Contention'. Oxford Review 
of Education, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 146. 
52 Ball, Politics and Policy Making in Education. 
53 Graham, D. with Tytler, D. (1993) A Lesson For Us All; The Making of the National 
Curriculum. London: Routledge. Also useful, partly as series of `outtakes' from A Lesson, is 
Graham, D. (1996) The Education Racket. Who Cares about the Children? Glasgow: Neil Wilson 
Publishing. Taylor, T. `Movers and shakers: high politics and the origins of the National 
Curriculum'. The Curriculum Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, summer 1995. 
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suspicions and the fears of the reformers that their efforts were being undone by 
perfidious officials. 54 
If, through these accounts, it appeared sometimes that the regulars were 
in control, sometimes the irregulars, at other times, it appeared that no-one was 
in control. This certainly appeared to apply to those who were theoretically in 
charge, the politicos. With regard to the 1988 Education Act, Davies-Griffiths 
has argued that there was `a fundamental change in the process (of educational 
policy making)' with `politicisation' the dominant feature and one that was likely 
to continue. 55 While ministers are included in this process of politicisation, there 
is little sense of the likely effects of this politicisation, or the relative distribution 
of power and influence between them and the other interests involved in this 
process, and the difficulties they faced or would face. In many respects, 
successive ministers were hoist by their colleagues' petards. Since the 1970s, 
Conservative politicians had been neither slow nor scrupulous in tapping into a 
reservoir of public antipathy or prejudices regarding aspects of the school system 
for their own ends. But if it was unsurprising that political opportunism with the 
occasional accompaniment of political principle should have provided the critical 
mass necessary to embark on radical education reform, once `the legislative 
whirlwind of 1988 to 1993' was unleashed, 56 it should not have been surprising 
that politicians found themselves struggling to contain and control its 
consequences. Geoffrey Fry has written that `British political parties are only 
properly organised to compete for office. They are organised for slogan making, 
but not for policy preparation'. 57 So it was to prove as regards education policy 
following the elections of 1979,1983,1987 and 1992. Since the 1970s, this was 
due as much to a party political failure as to personal shortcomings. Aside from a 
tiny minority, interest within the Conservative Party towards education, never 
mind state education, was minimal. The account by Christopher Knight, The 
Making of Tory Education Policy in Post-war Britain 1950-1986, trains not so 
54 Marshland, D. and Seaton, N. (1994) The Empire Strikes Back: the `Creative Subversion' of 
the National Curriculum. York: Campaign for Real Education. 
55 Davies-Griffith, `Developments in the making of policy in education in the twentieth century', 
p. 236. 
56 Barber, M. (1994) The Making of the 1944 Education Act. London: Cassell, p. ix. 
57 Fry, G. (1981) The Administrative `Revolution' in Whitehall: A Study of the Politics of 
Administrative Change in British Central Government since the 1950s. London: Croom Helm, p. 
180. 
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much a spotlight as a microscope upon the inner workings of the Tory party in 
attempting to get to grips with its stance on education. With such a tight focus, 
the degree of permeation or interest within the Party towards its new formulation 
can be distorted. Knight's book uncritically charts the exertions of a tiny 
minority of activists, themselves part of a minority within the Party, who had an 
interest in education and were successful in providing a platform on which to 
construct an education policy. Yet even this small minority was itself further 
fragmented. While Knight himself uses the umbrella term `Conservative 
Educationists', the members of this group broadly concur with Dale's typology 
of Conservative educationists consisting of Industrial Trainers, Old Tories, 
Populists, Moral Entrepreneurs and Privatizers. 58 
With many of the political participants in this study still active in politics 
and elsewhere, there are few first-hand accounts available. The notable exception 
can be found in Kenneth Baker's The Turbulent Years. 59 Written in a similar 
style to his spoken pronouncements, Baker glides effortlessly through his time at 
the DES, always with an eye to the main chance, always at the centre and always 
apparently in control of events. This is very much contradicted in Mrs Thatcher's 
own account, where Brian Griffiths plays a leading role, 60 while Baker's role and 
influence was also very much denigrated by his Cabinet colleague, Nigel 
Lawson. 61 Unlike Baker's memoirs, Gillian Shephard's are much less 
forthcoming, but in many respects are much more unintentionally informative 
through their omissions. In Shephard's Watch, Shephard attempted something a 
bit grander than memoirs and sought `to explore the nature of power in 
politics'. 62 For someone who was keen to write about the exercise of power in 
politics when out of office, she was notoriously reluctant to use it when in office. 
As a work of political analysis the book is, in the rather unkind description in 
58 Knight, Tory Education Policy, p. 150. Dale, R. `Thatcherism in education', in Ahier, J. and 
Flude, M. (1983) Contemporary Education Policy. Beckenham: Croom Helm , p. 
237 and 
passim. 
59 Baker, K. (1993) The Turbulent Years. London: Faber and Faber. 
60 Writing of this `crucial area' of the manifesto proposals for the 1987 election, Mrs Thatcher 
wrote that she `was clear what these should be. . . largely as a result of the work 
done by Brian 
Griffiths'. Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street Years. London: HarperCollins, p. 570. 
61 Lawson, N. (1992) The View from No. 11. London: Bantam Press, p. 606. 
62 Shephard, G. (2000) Shephard 's Watch. Illusions of Power in British Politics. London: 
Politicos Publishing, p. 7. 
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Roth's Parliamentary Profiles of the author herself, `a bit of a souffle-). 63 Given 
that her time at Education was the pinnacle of her ministerial career, in charge of 
arguably the fourth great office of State, her comments about this time are few, 
rancorous, and much more disingenuous than those of Baker. According to 
Shephard, John Patten's, and presumably her own, misfortunes were the fault of 
permanent officials, `a failure by Whitehall to recognise that it had not equipped 
itself to deal with the change of culture and activity implicit in the Government's 
education reforms'. 64 John Major's account of his attempts at education reform is 
equally exculpatory with he and his Secretaries of State beset by the `complacent 
ideologues of the education establishment', `devotees of progressive education' 
and `strong official resistance,. 65 In her memoirs, Mrs Thatcher retained her 
distaste for Civil Servants in general and the DES in particular, while also 
displaying her credentials as the frustrated radical in berating her own ministerial 
appointees. 66 
The personalities and traits of the individual Secretaries of State between 
1979 and 1997 are also well to the fore in Radical Educational Policies and 
Conservative Secretaries of State, a series of interviews conducted by Peter 
Ribbins and Brian Sheratt. 67 Although very much non-confrontational, the 
interviews do reveal insights into the mindset of the various individuals. In the 
context of this study, what emerged unspoken from the interviews was the sheer 
diversity and divergence of approaches to education reform taken by Baker and 
his colleagues, with very little sense of continuity or understanding between 
changes of personnel. Although the interviews themselves are a valuable source 
of information, what was not attempted, or what was left for others to do, was to 
correlate the responses with what was known from other sources to provide a 
more useful context for examining the course of education policy under the 
various ministers. 
63 Roth, A. and Griddle, B. (2000) Parliamentary Profiles, S-Z, 1997-02. London: Parliamentary 
Profiles Services Ltd., p. 1939. 
64 Shephard, Shephard's Watch, p. 109. 
65 Major, J. (1999) John Major. The Autobiography. London: HarperCollins, p. 255, p. 394, p. 
255. 
66 See e. g. Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street Years. London: HarperCollins, p. 151, p. 
589, and Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 161. 
67 Ribbens, P. and Sherratt, B. (1997) Radical Educational Policies and Conservative Secretaries 
of State. London: Cassell. 
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While individuals drawn from across the typology of regulars, irregulars 
and politicos figure in various degrees in most of the secondary accounts of 
education policy, they are very much written about and analysed at arms length. 
They are seen to act or react within the confines of respective political and 
ideological roles, in very much deterministic fashion, with an almost curious 
detachment from each other. In his detailed and informative study, Power and 
Politics at the Department of Education and Science, Ian Lawrence examines the 
post-war evolution of the DES. 68 In many respects Lawrence's account sits 
comfortably within the `traditional' Whitehall analysis genre. His conclusions, in 
terms of many of the more general problems and dilemmas that the Civil Service 
faced and is facing, are pertinent not just to the Education department. Although 
Lawrence comments upon the personnel involved, little more than biographical 
details are provided, while their remarks are analysed in almost strict policy and 
operational terms. There is little sense of any internal political or personal 
dynamic or conflict between those involved, and the role of senior officials and 
advisers in education reform is certainly examined less than that of other actors. 
Accounts by Conservative politicians take an almost wholly negative or critical 
view of the role played by officials, 69 while academic studies on various policy 
initiatives such as Grant Maintained schools and the City Technology Colleges 
tend to tread lightly on the sensibilities and possible motivations of officials. 
Only in Duncan Graham's and Marshland and Seaton's accounts do we get much 
of a sense of highly pro-active officials intervening strongly to shape policy. 70 In 
their turn, the series of interviews by Sheratt and Ribbins are tightly focussed on 
the personalities and motivations of the Secretaries of State, with little or no 
reference to the role or contribution of other participants such as junior ministers 
or officials. 
Taking the literature on the irregulars, regulars and politicos as a whole, 
what generally emerges are a series of parallel sources. Accounts tend to focus 
primarily on one of the groups with others having walk-on parts. Where the 
68 Lawrence, I. (1992) Power and Politics at the Department of Education and Science, London: 
Cassell. 
69 See for example Baker, Turbulent Years, Shephard, Shephard's Watch, Boyson, R. (1995) 
Speaking My Mind. London: Peter Owen. 
V The critical account of the role of Civil Servants in Melanie Phillips' highly publicised All 
Must Have Prizes draws heavily on Marshland and Seaton's work. 
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combined impact or roles of regulars, irregulars and politicos are discussed, the 
accounts tend to focus on individual episodes or single-strand accounts. They are 
introduced to provide a context or introduction to the main focus of the studies, 
which is often on the impact of the policy itself. Arguably, this almost 
unconscious separation of the roles of these newly-identified groups involved in 
the policy process reflected the fact that, however imperfect the previous policy 
community had been, there had been some sense of joint obligation or endeavour 
or `shared framework' between the participants. This was rarely the case between 
the irregulars, regulars and politicos. So much so that it would be difficult to 
describe them as constituting a policy community. Temporary alliances might 
form over particular aspects of policy, but as Lawton described the system 
associated with his typology mentioned earlier, it remained at its most civil, a 
`tension system'. Arguably, more often than not, it resembled a `conflict system'. 
Groups and individuals were often highly antagonistic toward each other, and 
there was little by the way of shared interest of values. 7' 
This thesis provides a longitudinal `, joined-up' account where the 
combined impact of these groups and individuals is analysed, and where the 
conflicts between them are often seen as determining the course of policies 
themselves. In essence, people matter. In the case of Conservative education 
policies between 1976 and 1997, it was not that politics and personalities were all 
that mattered. Rather, the problem was that they mattered too much. 
Organisation 
While certain themes, or aspects of policy, run through this study, the data has 
been organised and presented within a narrative rather than a thematic structure, 
with the period between 1979 and 1997 divided into chronological packages, 
punctuated by the arrival and exit of successive Secretaries of State. This 
approach has an underlying validity, other then convenience, in that it was the 
Secretary of State who was in the cockpit of the Department, who prioritised the 
policies and set the tenor for much of the public debate during their period of 
71 While accepting that there would be some degree of overlap and common perspectives 
between members of the groups on certain issues, Lawton was suggesting that `the central 
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office. Yet even such an apparently straightforward structure has its own 
potential for distortion, especially when contextualising and presenting the data. 
`Often the decisions taken have a material effect on the interpretation itself , 
wrote one historian, `What might appear to be a conventional historical narrative 
is often nothing of the kind, but the outcome of a series of aesthetic and 
interpretative choices' 
. 
72 
While such choices were no less present in this study, the narrative 
structure also allows the thesis to explore and integrate the effect of what Becker 
refers to as contingency. In the search for causation or explanation, Becker 
presents a narrative model whereby it is a process in which there is contingency, 
in the sense that at various points casual factors can intervene at different points 
in time, with the result that outcomes are not determinate or predictable, at least 
not in any strong way. 73 Thus, there are a variety of routes that events might 
follow from any starting position depending not just on the particular factors that 
operate, but also on the sequencing and timing of their operation. In applying 
Becker's model within a narrative structure, we can also see how `casual' 
personal and political factors impacted upon the course of policy in similarly 
unpredictable fashion. 74 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. The following 
chapter examines the years immediately prior to 1979 and explores the political 
and policy contexts from which emerged the groups of regulars, irregulars and 
politicos. In chapter two, the immediate impact of the newly elected 
Conservative administration on the field of education policy under Mark Carlisle 
is examined. While the arrival of Keith Joseph in 1981 marked a turning point in 
the course of education policy, chapter three suggests that this was as much 
despite, as because of, Joseph's actions when in office. Chapters four and five 
authority should be treated as a "tension system", not as a consensus'. Lawton, The Tightening 
Grip, p. 17. 
72 Evans, In Defence of History, p. 143. 
73 In the Introduction to the first volume of his biography of W. B. Yeats, Roy Foster argued that, 
while some previous studies had adopted a thematic approach to the life of the poet, he did not 
feel it was suitable for his study as `we do not, alas, live our lives in themes, but day by day'. 
Foster, R. F. (1997) W. B. Yeats: A Life. 1: The Apprentice Mage, 1865-1914. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. xxvii. 
74 Becker in Hammersley, M. (2001) Educational Research. Policy Making and Practice. 
London: Paul Chapman Publishing, pp. 89-90, and Becker, H. (1998) Tricks of the Trade. How 
To Think About Your Research While Doing It. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 26. 
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examine the legacy of Kenneth Baker. The former chapter offers an account of 
the political background to his formulation of the 1988 Education Reform Act; 
the latter chapter then examines specifically how the proposals for a national 
curriculum and Grant Maintained schools were developed under Baker. 
For Baker's successors, the 1988 Act would prove an indigestible pot- 
pourri of conflicting and competing aims. None more so than for Baker's 
immediate successor, John MacGregor. Chapter six examines the reasons why 
MacGregor was moved out of education after only 16 months in office. The 
almost simultaneous arrival of Kenneth Clarke at Education and John Major in 
Downing Street, as detailed in chapter seven, provided an additional ratchet to 
the turmoil in an already pressurised area of policy, and whose ultimate 
conclusion during John Patten's time is examined in chapter eight. Chapter nine 
charts the efforts of Major and his new Secretary of State, Gillian Shephard, to 
retrieve the initiative in education policy in the run up to the 1997 election. In the 
final chapter, conclusions are drawn. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1976-1979: No longer `positive, helpful, worthy and dull' 
Introduction 
Prior to 1979 criticisms of the schools system had begun to coalesce around the 
issue of comprehensivisation and its perceived consequences. Many of these 
concerns were first brought to wider public attention through the intervention of 
James Callaghan and his Ruskin College speech of 1976. In examining the cause 
and effects of Callaghan's intervention, we can establish the political and policy 
inheritance for the different strands of opinion and personalities on the advent of 
the first Thatcher administration of 1979. From where did the irregulars emerge? 
Were there tensions already in evidence between the different strands of opinions 
that comprised this grouping? How much was the partnership metaphor already 
under strain prior to 1979? What were the strains within the existing policy 
community? What was the political response to these developments? 
The Road to Ruskin - The Irregulars 
Stuart Sexton has suggested that the pivotal event in the emergence of a new 
agenda `not just in education, was the turning away from Heath-minded 
conservatism, to the re-emphasis on individual freedom and the market'. ' This 
`neo-liberalism', or `economic liberalism', formed one strand or faction within 
the irregulars as it did in the phenomenon that was termed the `New Right'. 
While some studies would question just how `new' the New Right was, 2 it was 
the Conservative Party that became the central focus for the subsequent package 
of New Right philosophies. Within the Party, Sir Keith Joseph would prove the 
most influential individual in bringing these arguments to the heart of the British 
1 Quoted Ball, Politics and Policy Making, p. 23. 
2 See for example, Greenleaf, W. (1983) The British Political Tradition. London: Metheun. 
According to Geoffrey Hodgson, all that occurred during the 1970s was `bringing out into the 
open a Tory tradition that has been there all along if you knew in which sheltered pools to look 
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political system. In his writings and speeches from the mid-1970s onwards, Keith 
Joseph both tapped into and contributed to a broader trend, whereby the 
intellectual high ground, what he termed `the battle for ideas', once the 
unchallenged domain of the left, was subject to challenge from a renewed and 
increasingly self-confident right. `There are signs', wrote the Conservative 
historian, Lord Blake, in 1976, `of one of those rare and profound changes in the 
intellectual climate which occur only once or twice in a hundred years. . . There is 
a wind of change blowing through Britain and much of the democratic world - 
and it comes from the right, not the left'. 3 
Allowing for a degree of hyperbole, there was a noticeable shift in `the 
intellectual climate', even if the overall numbers involved remained surprisingly 
small. In the preface to the second edition of Mill and Liberalism, Maurice 
Cowling suggested that of the five overlapping movements or `faces' he 
identified as constituting the New Right, the process was `conducted by about 
fifty people,. 4 For the Conservatives these also entailed `a harvest of intellectual 
refugees from the left.. . and the many school and university teachers who were 
being driven rightwards by disillusion with progressive methods and left wing 
intolerance'. 5 Of particular importance, in terms of education policy, would be 
Caroline Cox, John Marks and Rhodes Boyson, each of whom made the journey 
rightwards. By then, the centre of gravity of the education debate was certainly 
beginning to move away from the left of centre position. Essential to the force 
and eventual degree of acceptance of such a shift, initially in the economic 
sphere but eventually filtering through to other areas such as education, was how 
the arguments and influence of the new `intellectual climate' were disseminated 
through a range of think tanks, pressure groups and individuals. 
James Cornford has described think tanks as `the performing fleas of the 
body politic, constantly seeking that critical moment when a small sting may 
for it'. Hodgson, G. (1984) `Now is the time for all Right-thinking men... ', The Sunday Times 
Magazine, 4 March 1984, p. 52. 
3 Bradley, I. `A wind of change blows from the academic right'. Times Higher Education 
Supplement (THES) 29 October 1976. Lord Blake was commenting on the series of essays 
written by young Oxford dons - 
inlcuding John Patten - and published as The Conservative 
Opportunity. 
Cowling, M. (1990) Mill and Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xxxvi. 
5 Harrison, B. `Mrs. Thatcher and the Intellectuals'. Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 5, 
No. 2,1994, p. 219. 
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goad the beast in the right direction' .6 This description would prove particularly 
apt as regards education policy with two institutions in particular - the Institute 
of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). These were 
to be far and away the most prominent in `goading the beasts' that were the 
Thatcher and Major governments toward their preferred solutions, once the 
opportunities presented themselves. Founded in 1955, the IEA was run by Arthur 
Seldon and Ralph Harris. Through his links with Harris, an important bridge 
between the IEA and the education reformers would be Rhodes Boyson, who has 
described the IEA as `the lighthouse for the legitimate right'. ' Arguments for the 
increased use of market forces in education were contained in IEA pamphlets 
such as Education for Democrats in 1963 and Experiment in Choice in Education 
in 1975. These, in turn, would be echoed in the Black Papers, of which Boyson 
was latterly co-editor, and his own Battle Lines for Education in 1973 and 
Parental Choice in 1975.8 The IEA would also house the National Council for 
Educational Standards (NCES), the Social Affairs Unit (SAU), and an Education 
Unit under Stuart Sexton. It would also assist in setting up the No Turning Back 
Group of Conservative MPs during the 1980s. 
The Centre for Policy Studies was founded by Keith Joseph and Margaret 
Thatcher. While the IEA was detached from the Conservative Party, the CPS was 
never more than semi-detached and was always going to be `a very different 
creature, part agent and part actor'. 9 According to one account of think tanks, the 
CPS would end up as `a sort of clearing house for the deposits and borrowings of 
ideas'. 1° How it was used by Mrs Thatcher and some of her ministers as a 
`clearing house', was primarily through the use of study groups, with the 
Education Study Group under Caroline Cox and John Marks, having the most 
significant impact on the education debate. 
6 Cornford, J. (1990) `Performing Fleas: Reflections from a Think Tank', Policy Studies, Vol. 10, 
No. 4, p. 22. 
7 Boyson used the phrase during a seminar at the IEA, `New Thoughts on the Educational 
Voucher', 17 February 1998. 
8 Griggs, C. `The New Right and English Secondary Education', in Lowe, R. (1989) The 
Changing Secondary School, Lewes: Falmer Press, p. 107. 
9 Barnes, J. and Cockett, R. `The Making of Party Policy', in Seldon, A. and Ball, S. (1994) 
Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
381. 
10 Desai, Radhika. (1994) `Second Hand Dealers in Ideas: Think Tanks and the Thatcherite 
hegemony'. New Left Review, 203, Jan/Feb, p. 51. 
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While both the IEA and the CPS were proponents of the economic or 
neo-liberal arguments, they represented only one strand in the emergence of a 
new political and intellectual agenda. The low-church fervour of the `economic 
evangelicals' in attacking post war economic settlement, would be more than 
matched by the high church contumely of the `neo-conservatives' or `cultural 
restorationists' in attacking what was perceived as a parallel moral decline. " 
Typical among these groups would be the Conservative Philosophy Group 
(CPG), formed in 1975 by John Casey and Roger Scruton, colleagues of Maurice 
Cowling at Peterhouse College, Cambridge. Less overtly activist than their neo- 
liberal counterparts, the neo-conservatives managed the neat trick of striking a 
populist chord while despising everything populist. According to Scruton, the 
Group was to be `anti-permissive'. It was established at a time when the 
Conservative Party appeared to be `floundering around' and was concerned to 
revive and renew Christian morality in Conservative Party thinking. 12 Their 
house journal was the Salisbury Review, in which Scruton was to write how `The 
importance of regaining the commanding heights of the moral and intellectual 
economy has got to be clearly perceived by the partisans of conservatism'. 13 
While this dichotomy in New Right thought between the moralists and the free- 
marketeers would have a prominent and ultimately damaging role in the later 
education reforms of the 1980s, both standpoints achieved almost 
disproportionate prominence during the 1970s, partly through the success of the 
series of Black Papers. The first Black Paper was published in 1969 and much of 
their subsequent content was set up in antithesis to what the writers saw as the 
consequences of the `comprehensive experiment' and the misguided search for 
equality. 14 Predating Keith Joseph's and the Adam Smith Institute's later 
analysis, education, it was alleged, had become a vast `interest' in which the 
11 The phrase, `economic evangelicals', was used by William Keegan to describe the coalition 
of interests that initially `hijacked' the economic policy of the Conservative 
Party. See Keegan, 
W. (1984) Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment. London: Allen Lane, p. 33 and passim. 
`Cultural restorationists' is used by by Stephen Ball in Ball, Politics and Policy 
Making, p. 6 and 
passim. 
2 Quoted in Knight, Tory Education Policy, p. 123. 
13 Quoted in Salter and Tapper, Power and Politics, p. 171. 
14 Maurice Cowling identified `the educational movement which derives from the Black Papers' 
as one of the `five faces' of the New Right, attracting 
`attention from school teachers and the 
media and, while having virtually no organisation and making no 
impact on policy, had a 
considerable impact on public 
debate'. Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, p. xxiii. 
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concerns of educationalists, administrators and politicians had developed their 
own dynamic, which carried on regardless of the experiences and views of pupils 
and parents. 
The polemic of the New Right in general has been characterised as 
`populist... an indigent retreat into common sense, a dislike of experts, Civil 
Servants, do-gooders, and intellectuals'. 15 The Black Papers were the epitome of 
these traits, with a deliberate attempt to make them accessible to a wide 
readership. 16 They were essentially short, accessible essays. Although many of 
their specific claims were refuted, these were never really essential to the Black 
Papers' popular impact, whose simplistic assertions struck home far more 
effectively than the often laboured and lugubrious refutations subsequently 
printed. The authorship of the Papers had also emerged from and encouraged the 
phenomenon that would reappear with a vengeance during the 1980s, the 
`networking' of various pressure groups, think tanks, and individuals, which 
overlapped each other, and also both wings of the burgeoning New Right within 
and without the Conservative Party. 17 Despite the often impressive and official- 
sounding names of many of these groups, they were basically `mutual support' 
agencies, with a small core of people setting up or supporting a plurality of 
organisations with similar ideologies and membership lists. The degree of 
`activism' of these groups can vary and most participants vehemently deny any 
attempt at co-ordination. As Rhodes Boyson claims, `the left has always been 
better linked than the right' 18 and there is a sense of some being, as described by 
John Barnes, simply `a loose nexus of persons, linked by friendship and 
association'. 19 Dennis O'Keeffe, author of pamphlets for both the Social Affairs 
Unit and the Adam Smith Institute, suggests that even this was haphazard. 
According to O'Keeffe, their association `certainly wasn't planned, even as a 
15 O'Gorman, F. (1986) British Conservatism. New York: Longman, p. 56. 
16 This was not always the case with `counter-revolutionary' arguments. In the economic sphere, 
writers such as Peter Jay in The Times were little concerned to connect with a wider audience. 
The story is told about a sub-editor on The Times who questioned whether one of Jay's articles 
would be fully understood by readers, only to be met with the withering reply that 
his (Jay's) 
article `was written for three people and you are not one of them'. The Times, 
7 February 1998. 
17 The composition and background to many of these groups can be found in, 'Pressure 
Groups: 
Right Thinking People', Labour Research, February 1984; Griggs, 'The New Right and English 
Secondary Education', pp. 99 - 128; Knight, Tory Education Policy; P. Wilby and S. Midgley, 
'As the New Right wields its power', The Independent, 23 July 1987. 
18 Rhodes Boyson interview, 25 January 1994. 
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"loose nexus". It was more a case of a beleaguered and sympathetic group of 
intellectuals who often found themselves working towards the same ends' . 
20 
One of the main influences in bringing the themes of these nascent 
groupings of irregulars to greater public attention was the media campaign in the 
1970s which appeared to portray the education system as being in `crisis'. 
According to Ball, `By the early 1970s, fuelled by press and television "horror 
stories", the level of "public concern" about the state of the nation's schooling 
had reached the level of moral panic'. 21 In Britain, this sense of `moral panic' 
was part of a broader concern termed `The Debate about Standards'. 22 Rhodes 
Boyson's The Crisis in Education appeared in 1975, as did the fifth Black Paper, 
and The Rape of Reason by Caroline Cox, John Marks and Keith Jacka, about 
their experiences in the Polytechnic of North London. 1975 also witnessed the 
furore over the William Tyndale Primary School. Such a high-profile scandal 
provided an almost indefensible indictment of a style of progressive education, 
albeit one that had been taken to extremes. 23 It also proved grist to the mill of 
individuals such as Rhodes Boyson, who could claim with some justification, 
even before Callaghan's Ruskin speech, that `the forces of the right in education 
are on the offensive. The blood is flowing from the other side now'. 24 
19 Knight, Tory Education Policy, p. 98. 
20 Dennis O'Keeffe interview, 29 October 1998. As an earlier example of this, Crook describes 
how, despite the appearance of the Black Papers, which further highlighted the gap that had 
opened between the right of the Conservative Party and Edward Boyle, their spokesman on 
Education, Boyle's `ideological opponents were less coherent and organized than is often 
supposed'. In a letter to Boyle, Brian Cox, co-editor of the first Black Papers, wrote that `Most of 
the B. P. contributors have never met each other. . .. 
We are free men expressing our views freely'. 
Crook, D. `Edward Boyle: Conservative champion of comprehensives? ' History of Education, 
1993, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 59. 
21 Ball, S. (1984) Comprehensive Schooling, A Reader. Lewes: Falmer Press, p. 6. 
22 This debate, as with many other later developments, had direct parallels with the experience in 
the United States. Ira Shor has described the groundswell of public disquiet and unease that led to 
what he described as the `conservative restoration' in education in the States. `In education', 
wrote Shor, `as in any other part of society subjected to restoration, there is a conservative 
ideology underlying the reversal of the 1960s... The conservative language for this reversal pits 
"quality" against "equality". Restoration policy promotes itself as the defender of "excellence" 
and "high standards"'. Shor, I. (1986) Culture Wars. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul plc., p. 
7. For an excellent account of the `Debate about Standards' in Britain at this time, see Whitehead, 
P. (1985) The Writing on the Wall. Britain in the Seventies. London: Michael Joseph Limited, 
especially Ch. 10. 
23 `The progressives', wrote Stuart Maclure, `got too far ahead of the game and opened the door 
for the education reactionaries whose strident voices struck a chord in public and political 
opinion'. Maclure, S. (1985) `40 Years On'. British Journal of Educational 
Studies, Vol. 23, No. 
2, June, p. 121. 
24 TES, 21 May 1976. 
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The Road to Ruskin - the Regulars 
A powerful central authority within the education system was not so much 
emasculated by the 1944 Act as stillborn. In policy analysis terms, for at least 
two decades after the 1944 Education Act, the interplay between the Education 
department, the LEAs and the teacher unions strongly resembled a `clientelist' 
system, with two latter participants exerting the major influence on policy. 
Although the majority of central government departments in Britain `were and 
have remained non-executant units', with very much `hands-off control of 
services, 25 the extent to which the DES was subservient to what were, in effect, 
its client groups, meant that even within the Whitehall `village', education was 
perceived as a different kind of berth. Maurice Kogan, a former Assistant 
Secretary, noted how, 
Within the Civil Service it is regarded as a little separate, having the 
appearance of a vice royalty, something akin to the style of the British raj 
in India, a prestigious part of the main system but somewhat remote from 
it... the Civil Servants in the Department have not been in the mainstream 
of Whitehall. 26 
Not only were the officials in the Department seen as not being in the 
mainstream, but there was also the suspicion that, as described by one official, 
they were `in cahoots with the LEAs in a conspiracy against the laity'. 
27 By 
common consent, the majority of senior officials within the Department were 
`very intellectual, very bright, and delighted in submitting very erudite 
submissions to ministers'. 28 This latter trait, described by one official as `literacy 
practised to a fault', 29 was of course not necessarily viewed with admiration by 
25 Rhodes, R. A. `Changing Intergovernemntal Relations', in Cloke, P. (1989) (ed. ) Policy and 
Change in Thatcher's Britain. Oxford: Pergamon Press, p. 56. 
26 Kogan, M. (1978) The Politics of Educational Change. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press p. 150. 
27 John Hedger interview, 18 February 1999. 
28 Jennifer Bacon interview, 28 May 1998. 
29 Owen interview. 
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all who came into contact with it. `Ulrich could weave a short little minute into a 
two hour All Souls Seminar', complained one junior minister. 30 This obfuscation 
may have been frustrating, but was hardly unique to the DES. Of more serious 
import was the lack of initiative, or even the scope for initiative, within the 
Department. According to Geoffrey Holland, Permanent Secretary between 1992 
and 1993, `It (the DES) was very good at criticising and critical analysis, but it 
simply had no idea of how to get anything off the ground. It was lacking in any 
understanding or experience of actually making things happen' . 
31 The major 
contributing factor to this state of affairs and what set Education apart from other 
Whitehall departments, was the continued lack of overt political content in the 
Department's work, and its lack of control and influence over what in other 
departments would be seen as client groups. 
For much of the post-war period the main priority of the DES had been 
that of providing `roofs over heads'. As described by Walter Ulrich, Deputy 
Secretary at the DES between 1976 and 1988, 
During the period between the end of the war and the early 1970s the 
government saw its principal role and aim the provision of school places. 
.. No one really 
disputed this policy and the consensus meant that the 
LEAs, the Churches and the teacher unions could largely work amicably 
together. The main divisive issue in this process was of course the 
structure of secondary education... governments were little concerned 
with what was taught in schools or even with standards of pupil 
attainment. 32 
In the above description by Ulrich, it is revealing that, by omission, the 
government and by extension the DES, appear above or outside the `consensus' 
operated by the other 'partners'. Absorbed as it was with issues of resource 
allocation, the lack of influence inherent in the DES may have been less apparent 
30 Fallon interview. Walter Ulrich was a Deputy Secretary at the DES between 1976 and 1988. 
31 Geoffrey Holland interview. 10 August 1998. One Under Secretary who joined the DES from 
the much more hands on Manpower Services Commission 
in the mid 1980s recalled how the 
DES was seen in the rest of Whitehall as the Department that operated 
by the use of `rubber 
levers'. Bacon interview. 
32 Walter Ulrich correspondence. 7 November 1997. 
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during the period when the policy-making process was described as that of `elite 
accommodation'. This process, in the oft-quoted description of Vernon 
Bogdanor, suggested that policy decisions were the fiefdom of `a troika 
consisting of Sir William Alexander, Secretary of the Association of Education 
Committees (AECs), Sir Ronald Gould, General Secretary of the NUT, and the 
Permanent Secretary at the Department for Education'. 33 This accommodation, 
notwithstanding the strong element of caricature acknowledged by Bogdanor in 
the preceding description, did not long survive the 1960s, with the different 
`partners' beginning to stretch in different directions. 34 While Godwin has 
argued that, from this period, the DES was not as passive or as subservient on 
issues where it felt it could successfully intervene and gather power to the 
centre, 35 successive studies indicated the extent to which the LEAs had come 
adrift from central control, 
not only on matters of style - for example, type of secondary education 
provided, the content of the curriculum and the age of transfer from 
primary. but also in terms of the amount of resources used in the 
education service, for example, teaching staff, age and standard of 
buildings, equipment and facilities. 36 
33 Bogdanor, V. (1979) 'Power and Participation', Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 
161. 
34 A number of factors contributed to breaking up this tight knit community. The dominant 
position held by the NUT with regard teacher representation was undermined by other unions. 
The role of the AECs was to close as Local Authorities sought to provide and control their own 
brokerage with central government through bodies such as the education committees of the 
Association of County Councils (ACC) and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA). 
Changes in the grant funding arrangements with the introduction of General Grant (later to be 
superseded by the Rate Support Grant) ended the close scrutiny by the Department of LEA 
current expenditure. 
35 Writing of the erosion of `myth' of the post-1944 Act's pluralist system, and in particular the 
Department's role in the National Advisory Council on Teacher Supply and Training, Godwin 
suggests that `already in the Act's second decade the (pluralist) myth was coming under strain. 
The main consultative machinery for education policy started to malfunction in 1958 and 
imploded in 1965. Godwin, C. D. `Policy-making without partners: the NACTST and its demise 
1965-73'. History of Education, 2003, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 81. See also Godwin, C. D. `The origin 
of the Binary System', History of Education, 1998, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 171-191. 
36 William Pile quoted in Ranson, S. `Changing Relations between Centre and Locality in 
Education', in McNay, I. And Ozga, J. (1985) Policy-Making in Education. The Breakdown of 
Consensus. Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp. 103-123. 
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Mirroring the lack of control exerted by the central authority of the localities, 
LEAs in turn, effected little control with regard to the key future battleground of 
the curriculum, where it was assumed that lesson content and appropriate 
teaching methods were the professional responsibilities of teachers in schools. 
Writing in 1980, Denis Lawton described this cascading of responsibility: 
The DES now has little formal control over the curriculum... LEAs, 
although technically responsible for the curriculum of schools, have 
traditionally (that is since 1945) left the control of the curriculum to 
governors who have normally left it to the headteachers who may or may 
not leave it to their assistants. 37 
So everybody and nobody was in charge. This was often disguised or more 
accurately unquestioned within the various models that were used to describe 
educational policymaking. In 1976, Briault added a further development to the 
`partnership' model inherent in the 1944 Act, by suggesting that the 
administration of schools could now be viewed as a `triangle of tension' between 
central government, local government and the individual schools. This model 
was not necessarily antipathetic to the `partnership' model. It merely recognised 
that there was or could be `tension' or conflict between the partners. Even so, 
where there was conflict, the primary cause was the allocation of resources. 
The Ruskin speech would publicly mark what would prove to be the start 
of a new phase in education policy, with the government now wishing to redefine 
its role and that of its main agent in the world of education, the DES. While it 
should always be borne in mind that the DES is not `a thing, an entity in itself, 
but rather a changing amalgam of particular Civil Servants and inspectors', it is 
also the case that `factions develop around particular issues'. 
38 From 1976, there 
was a definite push from very senior officials for the Department to carve out a 
new, more authoritative role for itself. The first prominent figure to be identified 
with a new role for the DES was James Hamilton. Described as `something of a 
whiz kid from the boffin rooms of aircraft research', Hamilton joined the DES 
in 
37 Lawton, D. (1980) The Politics of the School Curriculum. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
pp. 8-10. 
$ Ball, Politics and Policy Making, p. 137. 
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1976 from the Cabinet Office where he had impressed Bernard Donoghue in the 
Policy Unit as `engagingly positive'. 39 Hamilton's unorthodox Civil Service 
career and approach also impressed Callaghan who probably felt that his 
outsider's perspective and his dynamic approach were things that could be put to 
good use in the DES. Hamilton's immediate experience on joining the 
Department was unswervingly typical. On arriving, he found it `full of "lifers"', 
officials who looked inward in the sense of looking to local authorities 
much more than to the rest of Whitehall, from which it was emotionally 
and geographically separate. They had spent their whole lives in the DES 
and there was a great tendency to look back in history and when 
something was proposed someone would inevitably say, "Oh we tried 
that back in whenever and it didn't work then and it wouldn't work now. " 
What was needed was people who were less bewitched by the local 
authorities. The great seachange had to be moving power from the local 
40 authorities into the DES. 
Nor was Hamilton reticent at the time in expressing his intentions. In his first 
public announcement at the Conference of the Association of Education 
Committees in 1976, he stated that his department would be taking `a much 
closer interest' in what was taught in schools, `in the curriculum in its widest 
sense, the assessment of performance, and even the relationship of teaching 
methods to performance'. 41 
A key document in this strategy was the Yellow Book. In preparing the 
ground for Ruskin, in May 1976 Callaghan had asked Fred Mulley, then 
Education Secretary, to have his department prepare a report on particular areas 
of concern: the teaching of the three Rs in the primary school, the curriculum 
for 
older children in comprehensive schools, the examination system and the general 
difficulties facing 16-19 year olds. On arriving at the DES the following month, 
39 Fletcher, J. (1995) `Policy Making in DES/DfE via Consensus and Contention'. Oxford 
Review of Education, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 139. Hennessey 
described Hamilton as `the first 
professional post-Fulton to tread that open road to the very 
top' and `that rare phenomenon 
among Civil Servants, a man as good on paper as on 
his slide rule'. Hennessey, P. (1989) 
Whitehall. London: Fontana Press edition, 1990, p. 203. 
40 Hamilton interview. 
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one of the first things Hamilton did was to set the preparation for the report in 
motion. The subsequent Prime Minister's Memorandum, dubbed the Yellow 
Book, formed the briefing paper for the Ruskin speech. Having been involved 
initially in setting this hare running at Cabinet Office, Hamilton had to try and 
make sure that it would not be sidetracked in his new department. Controlling the 
contents of the report would be crucial. `What I was able to do', recalled 
Hamilton, `was to provide a very clear brief as to what we wanted. I was then 
able to check on its progress having told the officials writing the Yellow Book to 
be totally open and frank, as they had been used to writing guarded notes for fear 
of upsetting their superiors, or their clients, or both'. 42 
The officials certainly took their new Permanent Secretary's wishes to 
heart. Starting with primary schools, the memorandum first pointed the finger at 
the `child centred' approach, suggesting `the time is almost certainly ripe for a 
corrective shift of emphasis'. 43 Nor were secondary teachers to be spared. As 
well as too many teachers not having the right qualifications, `In an almost 
desperate attempt to modify styles of teaching and learning so as to capture the 
imagination and enlist the co-operation of their more difficult pupils, some 
(teachers) have possibly been ready to drop their sights in setting standards of 
performance'. Further concern was expressed regarding `the variation in the 
curriculum followed by pupils in different schools or parts of the country'. `The 
time has probably come', said the memorandum, `to try and establish generally 
accepted principles for the composition of the secondary curriculum for all 
pupils, that is to say a "core curriculum"'. The final paragraph of the Yellow 
Book, proposing the next steps was unequivocal, one could almost say 
Hamiltonian: `It will also be good to get on record from Ministers and in 
particular the Prime Minister, an authoritative pronouncement on the division of 
responsibility for what goes on in schools. . . 
The climate for a declaration on 
these lines may in fact now be entirely favourable. Nor need there be any 
inhibition for fear that the Department could not make use of enhanced 
opportunity to exercise influence over curriculum and teaching methods'. 
44 
41 TES, 2 July 1976. 
42 Hamilton interview. 
43 DES (1976) Prime Minister's Memorandum, p. 7 and passim. 
44 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Although DES officials were responsible for the Yellow Book, senior 
members of Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI) were also heavily involved. 45 It is 
not difficult to imagine that there was a great deal of accord between the DES 
officials and the HMIs. Both had a vested interest in changing the status quo, and 
indeed, the Yellow Book stated that assisting in the `enhanced opportunity to 
exercise influence over curriculum and teaching' would be none other than Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate. Described as `without doubt the most powerful single 
agency to influence what goes on in schools', HMI were to have `a leading role 
to play in bringing forward ideas in these areas and is ready to fulfil that 
responsibility'. 46 Work already begun to try and achieve this by HMI and Sheila 
Browne in particular, who had been appointed Senior Chief Inspector in 1974. In 
an interview with the TES soon after her appointment, the first occasion on which 
a senior HMI had done so, she talked of the `basic educational right of all 
children' and expressed the view that while supporting the work of the 
professionals, `At the same time we can feed the evidence and our interpretations 
into policy makers - though it may be hard to get the policy makers to hear what 
they don't want to know'. 47 In the short term this latter point was of little concern 
although it would eventually come back to haunt Browne's successor as SCI, 
Eric Bolton. In the meantime, planning work began on new national surveys, one 
on primary schools and one on secondary, the results of which would provide 
further impetus and justification for intervention by the centre. 
The contents of the Yellow Book, which were leaked to the press, were 
almost as significant in their own way as Callaghan's subsequent speech. Peter 
Wilby, then a correspondent on The Times, remembered how, 
During the 1960s and into the 70s there was a feeling that education 
belonged on the women's pages. There were stories to be found about 
individual schools rather than about education at a macro level. There 
45 Dunford, J. (1998) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Schools since 1944. Standard Bearers or 
Turbulent Priests? London: Woburn Press, p. 154. 
46 DES, Prime Minister's Memorandum, p. 15. In what would seem a not unreasonable criticism, 
a much aggrieved chairman of the Schools Council, Sir Alex Smith, suggested 
that `were I the 
recipient of this report, my immediate reaction would be to ask what, 
if the weakness in schools 
summarised in the report exist, this "most powerful single agency". . . 
has been doing during the 
decade or two during which these weaknesses have been 
developing'. Quoted in Dunford, 
Standard Bearers or Turbulent Priests? p. 154. 
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was little need to talk to people at the Department for Education and 
Science. Nor for that matter was education seen even as a matter for 
parents. I once proposed to Frank Giles a leader page on the school 
curriculum but was told that it was really a matter for schoolmasters. The 
Black Papers helped to change all that. Along with the Black Papers was 
there was also the leaking of the Yellow Book in which it appeared that 
for the first time Her Majesty's Inspectorate were suggesting that all was 
not well in schools. Until then, whatever coverage there had been was by 
and large positive, helpful, worthy and dull. 48 
Combined with the impact of the Ruskin speech, after 1976, it was increasingly 
unlikely that education coverage would remain `positive, helpful, worthy and 
dull'. Not only that, but it appeared that the irregulars had discovered an unlikely 
ally in their desire to instigate education reforms. 
The Road to Ruskin - the Politicos 
On 18 October 1976, James Callaghan delivered his well-documented speech at 
Ruskin College, Oxford. In the speech, Callaghan called for schools to pay more 
attention to preparing pupils for working life, to reconsider the curriculum and 
teaching methods, and to be more willing to share curriculum concerns with 
parents and the public. It also called for a core curriculum, a more interventionist 
role for the DES and the HMI, and more lay influence through governing 
bodies. 49 The speech itself was an accurate reflection of the convergence of 
concerns about the schools system that had been gaining momentum during the 
previous years. While many of these concerns shared a general diagnosis that 
something was rotten with the state of education, their suggested remedies, more 
central control or more free market `discipline', appeared difficult to reconcile. It 
47 Ibid., p. 143. 
48 Peter Wilby interview, 25 February 1998. Frank Giles was then editor of The Times. 
49 How radical Callaghan's intervention in the area of the curriculum alone can be judged 
by the 
fact that even as the speech was in gestation, a study of the Schools Council, at that time the most 
influential body on curriculum matters, was published which confidently asserted that, `It 
is 
remarkable how firmly entrenched now is the pure twentieth century dogma that the curriculum 
is a thing to be planned by teachers and by other educational professionals alone and that 
the 
50 
would be the responsibility of the politicians to provide a coherent and resolute 
way forward. Past performance did not yield much cause for optimism. 
The anomalous and unenviable position `of a Department without its own 
policy and without the means to implement policy'50 tended to lessen the appeal 
of the DES to ambitious politicians. So much so that Maurice Kogan remarked 
how `No politician worth his salt could contemplate office in the Ministry of 
Education for long because it lacked 
... newsworthiness' . 
51 Between 1944 and 
1976,17 Secretaries of State came and went at the Department, an average of 15 
months each. Prior to Sir Keith Joseph in 1981, only one of these incumbents had 
made any serious attempt to get to grips with the lack of control and direction 
endemic in the school curriculum. During his first term at the Department from 
1954 to 1957, the Conservative, Sir David Eccles, soon `received the impression 
that there had been an increase in the scale of education but not in its quality 52 
Two years after he returned, in 1962, and without any prior consultation, he 
established a Curriculum Study Group within the Ministry. Despite the earlier 
rhetoric, and although perhaps radical for its time, Eccles' vision for the Group 
was not a grand one. Led by HMIs, it was to have been `a relatively small 
"commando-like unit", making raids into the curriculum'. 53 It was not to be. 
State's first duty in this matter is to maximise teacher autonomy and freedom'. Quoted in Simon, 
Education and the Social Order, pp. 311-2. 
50 Lawton, D. (1986) `The Department of Education and Science: Policy Making at the Centre', 
in Hartnett, A. and Naish, M. (eds. ) Education and Society Today, p. 23. 
51 Kogan, M. (1975) The Politics of Educational Change. London: Fontana, p. 29. For someone 
with as keen a sense of newsworthiness and career enhancement as Roy Jenkins, even the lure of 
promotion into the Cabinet as Education Secretary was insufficient. In his memoirs, Jenkins 
recalled how, following the reshuffle caused by Patrick Gordon-Walker's failure to win the by- 
election in Leyton in January 1965, he was offered the post of Education Secretary. At that time 
Jenkins had a post outside the Cabinet as Minister for Aviation and had been hoping for better 
things. Writing of his meeting with Harold Wilson when the offer was made, Jenkins described 
how `After my brief j ourney through the sky in the Foreign Office comet I was inevitably in a 
mood of let-down and disappointment. Independently of this, however, I was not vastly attracted 
by the Department of Education. My mind was not on its problems and I was not stimulated by 
the thought of them'. After thinking the offer over, Jenkins declined, with Anthony Crosland 
eventually accepting the post. Jenkins, R. (1991) A Life at the Centre. London: Macmillan, pp. 
169-70. 
52 Quoted in Gordon, P, Aldrich, R, Dean, D. (1991) Education and Policy in England in the 
Twentieth Century. London: The Woburn Press, p. 65. It was Eccles who first used the term 
`secret garden' to decribe the school curriculum, a phrase which was consciously echoed 
by 
James Callaghan and James Hamilton in 1976. In his speech to the AECs in 1976 Hamilton said 
that he believed `the so-called secret garden of the curriculum cannot be allowed to remain so 
secret after all, and that key must be found and turned'. TES, 2 July 
1976. 
53 Manzer, R. (1970) Teachers and Politics: The Role of the National Union of Teachers in the 
Making of National Educational Policy in England and 
Wales since 1944. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, p. 91. 
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Faced with the implacable hostility of the unions and the LEAs, Eccles' 
successor, Sir Edward Boyle, replaced the Curriculum Study Group with the 
teacher-dominated Schools Council. 
However limited, Eccles' attempt at intervention was positively dynamic 
compared to the approach of many of his successors. In their celebrated 
interviews with Maurice Kogan, both Anthony Crosland and Edward Boyle were 
at pains to insist just how unpoliticised were certain aspects of education policy. 
Speaking of the Secretary of State's impact on the internal organisation of 
schools and the curriculum, Crosland told Kogan that `The only influence is an 
indirect one that is exercised through HMIs' and through sponsored research 
projects. . . The nearer one comes to the professional content of education, the 
more indirect the minister's influence is', adding, `and I'm sure this is right . 
54 
His shadow on the Conservative side, Edward Boyle, was equally tentative when 
it came to a strategic view of the Department. Although slightly tinged with blue 
around the edges on issues such as selection, Boyle was essentially non- 
doctrinaire in his approach. So much so that he has been described as `the best 
example of a Conservative who pushed rational pragmatism so far that many 
condemned him for ceasing to be a Conservative'. 55 Such an approach infuriated 
his colleagues in the Conservative Party who wished to try and stem what they 
perceived as the pernicious tide of progressive education and its attendant decline 
in standards. Although not the most temperate of observers, Sir Rhodes Boyson 
described Boyle as `the most permissive minister he ever knew' and so violent 
were their disagreements that he eventually `couldn't bear to be in the same room 
as him'. 56 
Boyson himself was appointed junior education spokesman for the 
Conservatives in 1976. `During the 1970s', he recalled, `there were no set aims 
other than to kick back instinctively'. 
57 Even so, the kicking began to get a good 
54 Kogan, M. (1971) The Politics of Education. Edward Boyle and Anthony Crosland in 
conversation with Maurice Kogan. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
Ltd., p. 172. Even the 
famous Circular 10/65 `requested' rather than `required' local authorites to go comprehensive 
and was written after discussions with the local authority associations. 
Ibid., p. 45. 
55 Lawton, D. (1994) The Conservative Mind on Education. 1979-94. London: The Falmer Press, 
p. 30. For an account of Boyle's difficulties with the right of 
his Party over his stance on 
comprehenisve reorganisation, see Crook, `Edward Boyle: 
Conservative champion of 
comprehensives? ' pp. 49-62. 
56 Boyson interview. 
57 Ibid. 
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deal more vigorous after 1974 when Norman St John Stevas replaced Edward 
Boyle as shadow Education Secretary. Stevas was a high Tory on most issues, 
except education, where he held views deemed to be right wing: 
I was sceptical about the advantages claimed for comprehensive 
education, believed in the upholding of high standards, the preservation 
of the grammar schools and the affording of opportunities to the bright 
child of modest background through the network of direct grant schools. 58 
Even so, Stevas' ambitions were much too modest for his junior spokesman. 
Presaging later conflicts between Conservative ministers, the Boyson-Stevas 
partnership - no more than the Boyson-Boyle and later Boyson-Carlisle and 
Boyson-Keith Joseph partnerships - was not a happy one. Boyson was and would 
remain an unreconstructed populist, intolerant and dismissive of those not 
completely in tune with his view. He was made for opposition. Stevas later 
recalled that `We did not work happily together and, looking back, I regret that I 
did not make greater efforts if not to bridge the gap, then at least to narrow it'. 59 
Stevas, the `colourful' high Tory, no doubt found Boyson's unremitting and 
increasingly-strident populism at the very least distasteful, and certainly disloyal. 
By 1979, Stevas had had enough of the education world. He later wrote that `I 
spent five years on it (education policy) going into questions of standards etc. Of 
course I could have become Secretary of State for Education but I'd really had 
enough if it - you know how obsessive education people are'. 
60 Although 
Boyson's `obsessiveness' was pretty extreme, the disputes between him and 
Stevas, and later with Carlisle and Keith Joseph, were early symptoms, even in 
opposition, of the lack of clarity in Conservative policy. 
To her undying chagrin, Mrs Thatcher herself had remained a good and 
faithful servant to the status quo, even if her tenure as Education Secretary 
between 1970 and 1974 was punctuated by a series of nods and winks to the 
burgeoning right wing counter-revolution. 
61 Even her swift replacement of 
58 St John-Stevas, N. (1984) The Two Cities, London: Faber and Faber, p. 16. 
59 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
60 The Guardian, 16 October 2001. 
61 See Knight, Tory Education Policy, p., 62 and passim. 
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Circular 10/65 with Circular 10/70 was described as `a declaratory gesture of 
little practical consequence', 62 with many local authorities already in the 
advanced stage of planning for comprehensivisation. The tenures of Reg Prentice 
and Fred Malley between 1974 and 1976 probably marked the apotheosis of 
ministerial inertia and disinterest. Mulley told his newly-appointed Permanent 
Secretary in 1976, James Hamilton, that `the 1944 Act only gave the Secretary of 
State one power, which was to demolish air raid shelters in schools', 63 a power 
that was not in great demand in the mid-1970s. Callaghan quickly become 
convinced that Mulley was not the right person to lead on education and replaced 
him with Shirley Williams. 64 
Once talked of as possibly Britain's first female Prime Minister, if anyone 
was ever presented with a platform on which to display her credentials for the top 
job, it was Shirley Williams, in 1976. Into her lap would fall a populist initiative, 
launched by the Prime Minister, and with a sympathetic and dynamic Permanent 
Secretary already installed in her department, ready and eager to do battle. That 
she would apparently fail to grasp her big opportunity was largely due to 
personal and political failings, although she certainly did not have much of a 
template on which to work in terms of being a reforming Secretary of State for 
Education. She herself was described as displaying an `inability or unwillingness 
to appropriate opportunities or channel the considerable political and 
governmental interests in education towards consolidation into wide ranging 
schemes'. 65 Less prosaically, James Callaghan was reported to have felt that 
Williams was `warm, sincere, invariably eager to see the best in everybody, but 
in the end lacking in ruthlessness'. 66 
62 Campbell, J. (2000) Margaret Thatcher. Volume One: The Grocer's Daughter. London: 
Jonathan Cape, p. 223. As proof that fate does have a sense of humour, Mrs Thatcher wrote to a 
supporter on her departure in 1974 that she would `always retain my interest in education, and I 
hope that one day I may be able to do something for it once again'. Ibid., p. 256. 
63 Hamilton interview. 
64 Callaghan later recalled that when he told Mulley he intended to make a contribution to the 
public disquiet on education by making a big speech: `Fred rather blanched. He went back to 
his 
department and got even more upset'. TES, 11 October 1996. 
65 Batteson, C. (1997) `A Review of Politics of Education in the Moment of 1976'. British 
Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, p. 372. 
66 Ibid., p. 373. 
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Conclusion - The Road from Ruskin 
The subsequent `Great Debate' initiated by Callaghan in 1976 was invariably 
described as neither `great' nor a `debate', although it did provide a stream of 
documents, many of which laid the groundwork for the eventual decision to 
legislate for a national curriculum. The least interesting of the documents was 
perhaps the Green Paper, Education in Schools; A Consultative Document. 67 A 
key suggestion in the Green Paper however, was `the intention of the Secretary 
of State to ask local authorities and teachers' associations to review curricular 
arrangements in each local authority area'. In November 1977, Circular 14177 
was duly published. The replies eventually received from the LEAs to Circular 
14/77, many of which were described at the time as `politely worded nil 
returns', 68 while probably expected, were none the less depressing for it. `On the 
evidence of the replies', noted the DES with nice understatement, `many 
authorities need to increase their working knowledge of what goes on in their 
schools'. 69 HMI were then `invited' to `formulate a view of a possible 
curriculum' to be circulated in early 1980. Other `pieces of groundwork' were 
also put in place with HMI reports on primary and secondary schools. 
Despite the hard evidence that was beginning to accumulate, with this 
great paper chase, without the political will to act, it would be to little avail. 
Recalling one instance, when, on the back of the evidence from HMI about the 
parlous state of teachers' skills and qualifications, James Hamilton described 
how 
67 While the preparation of the Yellow Book was very much an in-house affair and closely 
controlled by Hamilton, he was unable to exercise the same control over Education in Schools. 
`Shirley Williams sent up the draft of the Green Paper against my better judgement', recalled 
Hamilton, `Bernard Donoghue then rang up and said he wasn't happy either. I of course agreed 
with him and the Paper was sent back'. Hamilton interview. 
68 Maw, J. `National Curriculum Policy: coherence and progression? ' in Lawton, D. and Chitty, 
C. (eds. ) (1988) The National Curriculum. (Bedford Way Paper 33). London: Institute of 
Education, p. 51. 
69 DES (1979) Local Authority Arrangements for the School Curriculum: Report on the Circular 
14/77 Review. London: HMSO, p. 2. A nice irony related to Circular 14/77 was that only one 
LEA, Kingston-upon-Thames, refused to answer the questionnaire, stating that `some questions 
were about things the DES had no real need to know and cut across local autonomy'. The 
Chairman of the Education Committee at the time was none other than Angela Rumbold, later 
Minster of State at the DES during the formulation and passage of the 1988 Reform Bill. 
Dunford, Turbulent Priests, p. 158. 
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I got Shirley Williams to put her name to a Bill allowing the Department 
to ear mark funds for in-service training but it was defeated by the local 
authorities using political pressure. I told them that they had won the 
battle but they would lose the war. And so it was to prove, but it would 
take a change in the political climate to achieve this. 70 
In the interim, the skirmishing would continue. Although frustrated, the regulars 
could bide their time. `There was no time frame involved', said Hamilton, `We 
had to play it by ear given the politics and relationships between central and local 
government at that time. I was very conscious that we would fail in whatever we 
were trying to do if the local authorities were to "withdraw their labour". All we 
could do was to keep the thing moving along'. 71 
The TES described the arguments that were put forward in the Yellow 
Book as demonstrating that the DES was fairly ruthlessly placing itself `squarely 
among the mixed bag of critics and predators' bent on destroying the power of 
the post-war "partners" in education policy, the local education authorities, and 
the teachers'. 72 Callaghan's subsequent speech had given a legitimacy to the 
faultlines that had appeared in the education settlement and its critics, the 
irregulars, would not be slow in attempting to exploit them. Although few major 
changes were immediately discernible, `a significant ideological shift had been 
achieved. There was a new kind of consensus in political discussion about 
education, a consensus of concern which spanned conventional left-right 
divisions'. 73 Within the ranks of the irregulars, this consensus was still centred 
upon criticisms of the existing system rather than alternatives. 
74 
Prior to 1979, many of the contradictions surrounding the rhetoric of 
Conservative education policy did not really matter. In many ways, they were a 
source of strength. When the focus was on opposition to the status quo, the more 
70 Hamilton interview. 
71 Ibid. 
72 TES, 28 April 1983. 
73 Whitty and Menter, 'Lessons of Thatcherism', p. 43. 
74 According to Knight, `Until 1979 the role of the Conservative Educationists in promoting 
quality in education and parental choice of school had 
been largely restricted to populist 
exhortations', with the demands for `educational excellence' seen 
`as more a defence of the 
citadels of academia rather than a serious contribution to 
improving the school system'. Knight, 
Tory Education Policy, p. 135. 
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avenues of attack available, the better. The attack on comprehensives may have 
been sufficient to unite the disparate elements in and around the Conservative 
Party that were interested in education, but it was a potentially fissiparous unity. 
John Barnes characterised the situation in saying that `By 1979 the main strands 
within the Party had reached an accommodation. This was more of a settlement 
rather than a consensus'. 75 It remained to be seen as to whom, if anyone, could 
provide some flesh on the bones of this settlement. 
The experience of the education policy community from the mid-1970s 
onwards, was, in many respects, not that different from other policy 
communities. Writing of central and local government relations in general during 
this period, Rhodes described how `With deeping economic decline, an 
increasingly unstable external support system and a shift in central elite ideology, 
there was a quantum leap in politicisation'. 76 Education, however, had a few 
extra twists: as well as the straightforward neo-liberal argument for cutting 
public spending, comprehensive schooling, one of the central planks of education 
policy, provided a strong focal point for ideological attacks. In formulating these 
attacks, the combined role of the irregulars, albeit a relatively small number of 
groups and individuals, was not dissimilar to that of an `issue network'. As 
described by Heclo, this was `a communications network of those interested in 
policy in some area ... 
A lively issue network constantly communicates criticisms 
of policy and generates ideas for new policy initiatives'. 
77 This emergence of 
indeed a very `lively' and very hostile `issue network' also coincided with the 
attempt by a central government agency, the DES, for a somewhat different set 
of reasons, to increase its influence within the policy community. With the 
election of a self-proclaimed radical government in 1979, the combination of this 
confluence of pressures all indicated the ending, or, at very least, a redefinition of 
the process of expansion and partnership that characterised the post-war period. 
75 John Barnes interview, 22 February 2000. 
76 Rhodes, `Changing Intergovernmental Relations', p. 69. 
77 Heclo quoted in Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. `Policy 
Networks in British Politics: A Critique of 
Existing Approaches, ' in Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. (eds. ) (1992) 
Policy Networks in British 
Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 7. 
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CHAPTER 3 
May 1979-September 1981: At the margins 
Introduction 
Given the challenges that she faced both within and without her Party in 1979, it 
was probably inevitable that Mrs Thatcher would have appointed a middle of the 
road, Mark Carlisle-like figure, as Secretary of State for Education. This was 
partly due to the attention of the new government being focused on its economic 
policy. Indeed there was nothing in the 1979 manifesto to suggest that a 
significant alteration of the structure of education was intended, with the aims for 
education being subsumed as part of a broader section under the title of `Helping 
the Family'. 1 This chapter examines how much progress the emerging agendas 
for education reform of both the irregulars and the regulars were able to make 
between 1979 and 1981. How far were the `populist exhortations' by those on the 
right translated into something more concrete? How effective were advocates of 
reform, such as Stuart Sexton and Rhodes Boyson, now that they had official 
positions within the DES? While the stream of post-Ruskin documents continued 
uninterrupted during this period, how much impact were they having in term of 
addressing the issues raised by Ruskin? 
The 24th and fourth ministers 
Mark Carlisle the new Secretary of State for Education in 1981 was described at 
the time as a `tall, florid, utterly straightforward lawyer from the North of 
England'. 2 Whatever Carlisle's ability in his capacity as a barrister, it is unlikely 
I The 1979 Conservative Manifesto is available at hftp: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/edu. 
In the autumn of 1978, when it was generally believed that James 
Callaghan was going to call a 
general election, the Conservatives had prepared a draft manifesto, 
The Right Approach to 
Government. It had more robust proposals for education and asserted that parents will 
`have more 
say in the education of their children and that much more is 
done to raise standards in our 
schools' (p. 7) through `the extension of parental influence and choice'. 
The possibility of a 
voucher scheme was openly mentioned and the manifesto welcomed 
`local experiments to study 
the practical problems and potential advantages of the scheme' 
(p. 41). The only surviving copy 
of the 1978 document is available on the Thatcher Foundation website at 
http"//www margaretthatcher. org/. 
2 Sunday Times, 6 May 1979. 
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that he would have made a good witness for the defence. When addressing the 
incongruity of a Secretary of State for Education who chose a private education 
for his own child, Carlisle asserted that he saw `absolutely nothing incompatible 
about supporting state education and sending your own children to a private 
school. For my own part, I always argued that I was lessening pressure on the 
state system by educating my daughter privately'. 3 While the headteacher of 
Carlisle's local comprehensive was no doubt grateful for the extra space made 
available by the new Secretary of State's magnanimity, his political mistress 
would prove less gratified at his other decisions. Interviewed in 1997, Carlisle 
himself was still uncertain about why he was eventually moved by Mrs Thatcher. 
While accepting her political reasons, 
I never understood what it was she was unhappy about ... the Prime 
Minster never did come to the Department while I was there. She was 
planning to come at one stage, but something went wrong and the visit 
fell through... What I did say, and repeat again, is that I do not know what 
it was within the Department that had happened to cause any displeasure. 
4 
It was, perhaps, not so much what had happened at the Department that caused 
Mrs Thatcher's `displeasure', as what had not happened. A decent, traditional 
figure, with little or no experience of the education system, Carlisle `like the 
good lawyer he was could present an efficient brief but without conviction'. 
5 
Like John MacGregor, later on, he never really got to grips with the strong 
political and ideological undercurrents that had begun to swirl 
beneath the 
surface of education policy. Equally like MacGregor, it could 
be argued that Mrs 
Thatcher knew what type of figure she was appointing. It was therefore 
surprising that she was surprised when they behaved like everyone 
knew in 
advance they would behave. There is little evidence, other than 
indirectly 
through the appointment of figures like Boyson, that Mrs 
Thatcher gave much 
weight to education as an issue during the early years of 
her first administration. 
3 Ribbins & Sheratt, Radical Educational Policies, p. 63. 
4 Ibid., pp. 66-69. 
5 Sexton interview. 
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She certainly gave little attention to her Secretary of State. Reports back from 
Cabinet meetings gave rise to the joke within the Department that Carlisle `spoke 
24th in a Cabinet of 23'. 6 
If Carlisle is entirely honest with himself in suggesting that he did not 
know what caused Mrs Thatcher's `displeasure', then he must have been 
extraordinarily naive, given the noises that Sexton as his adviser and Boyson, one 
of his junior ministers, were making. Even Mrs Thatcher, despite not visiting the 
Department, or willing to intervene directly, was not shy in dropping hints as to 
where her preferences lay. John Barnes recalled receiving a note from Downing 
Street. `Dear John', it read, `I'm sending Mark Carlisle down to see how you do 
things in Kent. Margaret'. 7 Kent was one of the local authorities that pioneered, 
albeit on a small scale, some of the initiatives that would eventually influence 
future education reform. While authorities like Cambridgeshire were 
experimenting with devolved budgets to schools, Kent had introduced a trial 
voucher scheme. The outcome was indecisive at best. Even if there were not to 8 
be a revolution in one county, the main provisions of the 1980 Education Act did, 
however, point in the direction of future reforms. Little commented upon at the 
time, in the shadow of its more controversial clauses, were the changes 
introduced relating to school governing bodies. Although these did not much 
effect governors' powers, they did ensure that each school should have a 
governing body, and also set out new bases for membership with a minimum of 
two parents on each governing body. With hindsight, this can be seen as a first 
small step towards establishing an autonomous body, independent of the local 
education authority, which, in the future, could be responsible for running a 
school. Equally significant was that schools now had to publish examination 
results. In a speech in December 1980, Boyson defended the policy in strong 
neo-liberal terms. Published examination results were `the company ballot sheets 
of every school... available to parents who were investing in their children's 
6 David Forrester interview. 24 April 2002. 
7 Barnes interview. John Hudson, Deputy Secretary at the time, described how Thatcher used to 
give Carlisle a rough time, chiding him that he had `been listening to those people 
in the 
Department. I know what they are like'. Interviewed in Davies-Griffith, `The development of 
education policy', p. 154. 
8 `We tried to put some of the building blocks for vouchers in place by breaking up catchment 
areas', said Barnes, `but a big problem was that the key to choice 
in rural areas was transport. 
Eventually Kent got slightly cold feet as there was no underpinning by central government. 
We 
would have liked half a dozen local education authorities to put their 
heads over the parapet and 
introduce vouchers'. Barnes interview. 
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academic future'. 9A third change was that parents had the right to appeal 
against a council's choice of school for their children, as well as the right to send 
their children across local authority boundaries. Although this would have little 
immediate practical effect for the vast majority of families, it did identify the 
direction in which education reforms might go. It also helped to raise the political 
temperature and profile of education, as MPs' postbags began to reflect parental 
frustration. `The political pressure over parental choice was enormous', recalled 
James Hamilton, `and one of the Department's main activities was actually 
dealing with appeals'. 10 
Of much greater controversy at the time, however, was the introduction 
of the Assisted Places Scheme (APS). The Scheme introduced a means-tested 
scholarship that allowed bright students from state schools to take up places at 
fee-paying schools. In their respective accounts of the Scheme, both Salter and 
Tapper, and Edwards et al. trace its origins outside the party political network to 
the heads of the direct grant schools during the 1960s and early 1970s. 11 Salter 
and Tapper recount how, early in her term as Education Secretary, Mrs Thatcher 
was approached by members of the Direct Grant Joint Committee (DGJC) with a 
proposal for an Assisted Places Scheme. Not unreasonably, given the soundings 
she was making elsewhere, they felt that she would be sympathetic. Yet their 
proposal came to naught. While the representatives of the DGJC would not be 
the first to encounter Mrs Thatcher's brand of political pragmatism, at the time, it 
was felt that their rebuttal was the handiwork of DES officials, whose `gloomy 
armour plate' appearance was noted in the minutes of the meeting. 
12 As the 
subsequent Labour administration proceeded to abolish direct grant schools, 
many of which `fled' into the private sector, there was `frequent contact between 
the representatives of the independent sector and the Conservative Party. This 
resulted in a formal commitment by the Party to establish an APS that was 
incorporated into the 1979 General Election Manifesto'. 13 The final version of 
9 Education, 19 December 1980. 
10 Hamilton interview. 
11 Edwards, T., Fitz, J. & Whitty, G. (1989) The State and Private Education. An Evaluation of 
the Assisted Places Scheme. Basingstoke: The Falmer Press, p. 6; Salter and Tapper, 
Power and 
Policy, pp. 186-88. 
12 Salter and Tapper, Power and Policy, p. 188. 
13 Ibid., p. 190. 
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the Scheme was then passed into statute as part of the 1980 Education (No. 2) 
Bill. 
The most obvious pointer within the Scheme was the message that its 
very existence sent out, having set up a direct link between central government, 
private schools, and individual parents, in which local authorities had no part at 
all to play. This was an important qualitative shift in the parameters of the debate 
on policy. The Scheme also demonstrated how, on certain policy issues, both 
`wings' of New Right educationists could find common ground, allowing them, 
despite their ideological differences, to present an effective front against any 
opposition. Aside from the common disdain for local authorities, in this case, 
there was also the veneration of the private sector. Yet even where there was this 
apparent agreement as to the efficacy of the private sector, one did not have to 
scratch very deeply to expose the fault-lines between the neo-liberals and neo- 
conservatives. This difference became more apparent after the 1988 Act and later 
took the form of arguments about whether the government should be 
concentrating on `structures' or `standards'. Broadly speaking, for neo- 
conservatives, standards simply could not be left to any `invisible hand', whether 
it was the market or otherwise. Moreover, standards were definable and known. 
Whether canons of literature or morals, they should be part of children's 
education and often these standards were best preserved and/or transmitted 
through schools such as grammar schools and the ex-direct grant schools. 
Caroline Cox, whose support for a voucher-type scheme was seen as a way of 
strengthening the hand of parents rather then freeing schools, expressed some 
doubt as to `the limits of applicability of the market'. 14 Given a choice between 
anarchy of an unregulated market or the `powerful tool' of a national curriculum, 
she supported the latter on the basis that `The National Curriculum was the lesser 
of two evils'. 15 
For the neo-liberal reformers, those who preferred the wholesale 
introduction of market forces into the education system, `standards' were merely 
a function of `structures'. Standards in schools would never rise, or rise 
sufficiently, unless the organising structure of education moved towards that of 
the free market. For this group, the operation of private schools provided the 
14 Caroline Cox interview, 5 April 1994. 
15 Boyd, A. (1998) Baroness Cox. A Voice for the Voiceless. Oxford: Lion Publishing. p. 410. 
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ideal model. Viewed as straightforward businesses, offering a service and 
responsive to market demands, if private schools failed to satisfy, or meet 
customer expectations, they went out of business, consistent with Hayek's 
`creative destruction'. The fact that there were high academic standards in some 
of these schools was a factor of the competition in the market place. `Standards', 
in this case, were not absolute or known. They were simply whatever the market 
demanded. So long as the school could find customers for their services, it did 
not matter what those services were. For someone like Stuart Sexton, `The 
emphasis placed on independent schools was always about more than money. It 
was about management, about how they had to compete'. 16 
Such nuances were little commented upon during the early 1980s, and the 
APS found a niche for itself as a small, but significant totem in the rhetoric of 
education reform. Its practical impact may have been small but its existence 
symbolised `a very clear demonstration of a lack of faith in state secondary 
schools and in the possibility of their being improved to the level of private 
schools'. 17 From 1979, this message, or discourse, was now being carried on 
from within the DES itself, in particular through the appointment of Stuart 
Sexton as adviser to Mark Carlisle. 18 Although he worked closely with Rhodes 
Boyson in opposition and in government, and shared many of his aims, Sexton 
was to prove much more politically astute than Boyson in working to secure 
change. Sexton had been an elected councillor in Croydon in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s: 
In those days `dry' Conservatives were interested in highways and `wets' 
were interested in education and social services. I thought we ('dry' 
Conservatives) should become interested in these things even if only from 
the point of view of budgets, as education was the largest. 
'9 
16 Sexton interview. 
17 Edwards et al., The State and Private Education, p. 1. 
18 In 1973, Sexton wrote without success to Chris Patten, then Director of the Conservative 
Research Department, to ask for a position on the education desk. Two years later, after sending 
unsolicited advice on education policy to Stevas, Stevas appointed 
him in September 1975 as his 
education adviser, a role he would keep until 1986 under Mark Carlisle and 
Keith Joseph. During 
the period 1976-78 Sexton's role was divided between acting as `official' adviser 
to Stevas and 
`unofficial' speechwriter to Boyson. Details from Sexton interview; Knight, 
Tory Education 
Policy, p. 108 and Edwards et al. The State and Private Education, p. 
34. 
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Sexton's association with the APS went back at least as far as 1976 when he was 
responsible for drafting an unsuccessful amendment to Labour's 1976 Education 
Bill that proposed the idea of a scheme. The notion was flagged up by Sexton 
again, writing under his own name, in the final Black Paper of the following 
year. Salter and Tapper describe Sexton as having had `a strong personal 
commitment' to the APS and `although the eventual scheme cannot be said to be 
his personal product he undoubtedly left his mark. His role is best described as 
that of the intellectual broker'. 20 Perhaps even more than an `intellectual broker', 
Sexton also brought a strong ideological advocacy and clear-sighted commitment 
that was singularly lacking in his Secretary of State, and which many of his 
successors would also lack. `What was new since 1979', recalled Peter Wilby, 
`was there began to appear an actual debate about the type of education system 
we should have. Sexton was absolutely crucial in this .3.21 
For the researcher, Sexton can be a bit of a mixed blessing. While he is as 
indiscreet as he is disparaging about his former colleagues, he also has a strong 
tendency to claim for himself the decisive degree of influence on any particular 
aspect of education reform with which he was connected. Despite this, his 
contribution to influencing the direction of education reform was significant. He 
was unique among policy advisers in that he was in post almost continuously for 
over a decade, which provided him with a degree of expertise and insider 
knowledge, unequalled by his successors. While he was, in that sense, a 
specialist adviser, Sexton was also intensely political. This was both in the sense 
that he was ideologically committed to the application of market forces in 
education, but also, as described by John Clare, Sexton `was very influential 
partly because he had an excellent idea of what was politically possible'. 
22 On 
occasion, what Sexton felt was `politically possible' was not always felt to be 
politically desirable by his political bosses. Peter Wilby recalled that `Sexton was 
much more than what we now call a "spin doctor". He had his own agenda and 
had a subtle way of letting you know that he disagreed with his minister while 
not being disloyal'. 23 
19 Sexton interview. 
20 Salter and Tapper, Power and Policy, pp. 197-8. 
21 Wilby interview. 
22 John Clare interview, 14 November 1998. 
23 Wilby interview. Keith Joseph's exasperation with Sexton surfaced briefly in an interview with 
Stephen Ball. `He (Sexton) was involved in everything', said Sir Keith, `And seldom content with 
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Such subtlety, combined with frequent less subtle interventions, meant 
that Sexton was cordially disliked by officials at the DES. Aside from the actual 
policies that he would advocate, his relations with officials were also soured by 
their perception that his single-minded political approach made him essentially 
`unsound', someone who could not be not be trusted to play by traditional 
Whitehall rules. Relationships with officials would also not have been helped by 
the fact that, in 1979, Sexton had loosely organised what he calls an `advisers' 
Mafia'. This involved many of the politically-appointed advisers to ministers 
within the Conservative government meeting each month in Sexton's offices in 
Dean's Yard to informally discuss what was happening to government policy as a 
whole. 24 Sexton's single-minded pursuit of his own agenda also irritated anyone 
else trying to get the ear of ministers. Madsen Pirie, Director of the Adam Smith 
Institute, well aware of the key role of advisers in establishing a conduit to 
ministers, described the problem whereby `the higher the profile of the adviser, 
the more they have an agenda of their own, the less effectively we can operate'. 25 
Sexton certainly had an agenda of his own and one academic who interviewed 
him in connection with the Assisted Places Scheme felt that `Sexton was the 
most hands-on adviser. He described himself as "the fourth minister" and 
operated as such' . 
26 As an example of a committed hands-on adviser in 
operation, Clive Saville, the Civil Servant who, as Registrar for Independent 
Schools would be the most closely involved in drafting the legislation, described 
how 
We were given a copy of the outline Assisted Places Scheme on day one. 
On day three I got hold of the original top sheet which made explicit that 
the policy was so devised to stop the "lefties" in the Department from 
obstructing ministers' wishes. 27 
For a decade, from 1975, Sexton was at the centre of many debates and 
developments. His influence and activity was perhaps at its zenith during this 
what I did, seldom content'. Ball, `Political interviews and the politics of interviewing', pp. 
107- 
8. 
24 Sexton interview. 
25 Pirie interview. 
26 Geoff Whitty interview, 29 May 1998. 
27 Saville interview. In a recent letter to The Times Sexton described how he `wrote the Assisted 
Places Scheme , 
but it was the Secretary of State , not me, who 
instructed the Civil Servants to 
flesh out the detail and prepare the legislation'. The Times, 
17 September 2003. 
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period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, operating under the pliable Carlisle. 
Some observers felt Sexton's influence very early after his arrival in the 
Department and that this was buttressed by having friends in high places. 
According to Wilby, `he (Sexton) was trusted by the Prime Minister and 
recognised as the carrier of the one true way'. 28 The impression that it was 
Sexton, rather than Boyson, who was seen as `Mrs Thatcher's man' in the 
Department, is further reinforced by John Hoskyns, Head of the Number Ten 
Policy Unit at this time. When he was later asked about education policy, 
Hoskyns replied that, `When I was at the Policy Unit we did not deal with 
education policy at all. I think therefore you would get the information you 
require from Stuart Sexton). 29 Yet the plight of Sexton was that, without the 
political will to back up expressions of support, for much of the time he was little 
better than a fifth columnist, a one-man ginger group within the Department. His 
successors would take a much less ambitious view of their role, and would 
neither be as knowledgeable nor as committed as he was to a radical education 
agenda. 
The unbiddables 
While Sexton operated from within the DES, the early 1980s also witnessed the 
further development of a 'networking' process that had begun during the 1970s. 
A number of what Robert Dunn, junior minister at the DES from 1983 to 1988, 
called the "believers", now began to infiltrate what were still the outskirts of the 
policy-making process. 30 In Thatcherite parlance, to be a `believer' was to be 
`one of us' or `sound' with regard to education policy. Unsurprisingly, it was 
through the channel of the Centre for Policy Studies that some of these 
individuals first had an impact. Although the CPS Education Study Group would 
play host to a wide and fluid array of people, the two most prominent members 
who were in a position to influence the Thatcher governments would prove to be 
John Marks and Caroline, later Baroness, Cox. Before they both joined the 
Conservative Party in 1977, Caroline Cox had been a `Fabian socialist' while 
28 Wilby interview. 
29 Knight, Making of Tory Education Policy, p. 148. 
30 Robert Dunn interview. 31 January 1994. 
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John Marks, had been a `Gaitskellite member of the Labour Party,. 31 The 
turbulent times they shared as academics at the Polytechnic of North London 
(PNL) led them to join the Conservative education campaign. Both adopted the 
Conservative cause with a zeal and unperturbability that only converts tend to 
exhibit. A 1988 profile in The Times commented on the zeal and energy of Lady 
Cox: `All the most formidable and mysteriously named little groupings are to be 
found on the right [and] Lady Cox seems to be on the steering committee of 
almost every one of them... Lady Cox is one of the "link people" among the new 
Party groups. She represents a fresh and unbiddable element in the character of 
her Party'. 32 
The same could be said of John Marks, who probably vies with Michael 
Fallon as the person who was most disliked by the education establishment. Even 
at the PNL, his billing was `the most dislikable man in the Polytechnic'. 33 While 
Fallon was disliked for his abrasiveness unalloyed to any useful knowledge of 
education, Marks was disliked for his abrasiveness, combined with an in-depth 
knowledge of the education system. This allowed him to be a constant thorn in 
the side of officials and academics, while providing a constant challenge to 
prevailing orthodoxies. Described by one his colleagues as the `Solzhenitsyn of 
British education', 34 Marks remained an important influence with successive 
ministers through the 1980s and 90s. During the 1970s, both Cox and Marks 
were beginning to reach the same conclusions about schools as HMI were 
confirming in their national surveys, namely that, `standards were too low and 
too variable'. 35 The main dilemma in addressing this perceived problem was the 
lack of hard evidence. There were little data available and a great reluctance of 
the part of anyone to release any more. According to Marks, 
Within the system as a whole there was complacency about the changes 
that had taken place during the 1970s. As a parent and school governor 
any questioning was pretty unwelcome even at school 
level. When I 
asked at a meeting of the governing body for details of the examination 
31 Knight, Tory Education Policy, pp. 114-115. 
32 The Times, 5 May 1988. 
33 Boyd, Voice for the Voiceless, p. 45. 
34 O'Keeffe interview. 
35 John Marks interview, 23 March 1998. 
67 
results at the school at which I was governor, there was a shocked 
36 silence. 
What was to change all this was the clause in the 1980 Education Act that 
required the publication of results. `This was absolutely crucial', said Marks. 
Although the Department fought against it, `The requirement to publish 
examination results in the 1980 Bill was pushed through by Rhodes Boyson on 
the back of a speech by Mrs Thatcher which he was able to use against the Civil 
Servants. Everything turned on that requirement to publish, as prior to that you 
had to scrabble around for data'. 37 The first fruits of this research would be 
Standards in English Schools published by the National Council for Educational 
Standards in 1983. 
Although much of Cox and Marks' research, including Marks' later work 
on his own, can stand independent of politics, political affiliation with one party 
inevitably clouded how their work was perceived. Peter Wilby recalled that, `It 
was difficult to take them seriously at the time as they did not come at education 
from a schools sense. Marks was utterly charmless, utterly paranoid but good 
with figures. Both were seen as terribly marginal'. 38 For Civil Servants, they 
were contaminated by the same infection as Stuart Sexton. `I disliked the pair of 
them', was the opinion of one senior official, `They had such an ideological way 
of expressing everything' . 
39 
A more overtly party political contribution was the culmination of the 
work of the Education Study Group at the CPS. Published in 1982, The Right to 
Learn consisted of 14 chapters by members of the Group on various aspects of 
education. Although described by Cox and Marks as `a document designed to 
serve as the basis for discussion on Conservative education policy for the mid- 
eighties', 40 the balance of the book concentrated more on criticism than 
creativeness, containing little in terms of anything new or distinctive. While the 
editors acknowledged that there had been no identifiable Conservative Party 
approach to education in the way that could be said of other areas, such as the 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Wilby interview. 
39 Unattributed interview material. 
40 Cox. C. and Marks. J. (eds. ) (1982) The Right to Learn: Purpose, 
Professionalism and 
Accountability in State Education. London: Centre for Policy Studies, p. 1. 
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economy or law and order, if anything, the book highlighted the continued dearth 
of new ideas at the heart of the Conservative thought on education. Its contents 
relied heavily on contributions from many former Black Paperites such as 
Professor Anthony Flew, Fred Naylor, Lawrence Norcross and Professor Arthur 
Pollard. The most interesting consequence of the book was the raised profile it 
was to give to the editors, and to Caroline Cox, in particular. The following year, 
she was summoned for an interview with Mrs Thatcher, who informed her that, 
I've been reading some of your books on education and I'm preparing a 
list of names to give Her Majesty the Queen for recommendations for life 
peerages. May I put your name on that list? I hope you will support us on 
education. I know you don't always support us on health. 41 
Cox presumed the peerage was largely for her contribution to The Rape of 
Reason, the account of the affair at the Polytechnic of North London and which 
Mrs Thatcher had reportedly read. John Marks, however, believed that `a more 
important factor' was The Right to Learn, a copy of which Mrs Thatcher had 
been given three months before awarding Cox her peerage. 42 Whatever the 
reason, the episode clearly demonstrated that, although still very much detached 
from direct involvement, Mrs Thatcher was certainly maintaining an awareness 
of what was happening in education and of who could be relied upon as `one of 
us'. It could also be seen as a mark of gradually-increasing frustration at the 
apparent lack of progress on the education front in general and with her first 
Secretary of State for Education in particular, despite the presence of Rhodes 
Boyson within the Department. 
`Marginalised' minister 
Without direct Prime Ministerial intervention in education, and failing the 
appointment of an `ideologically' committed minister as was generally to 
be the 
case during the 1980s, the traditional resort of Prime Ministers was to shadow 
ideologically-suspect ministers with juniors who were 'one of us'. Examples of 
41 Boyd, Voice for the Voiceless, p. 51. 
42 Ibid., p. 53. 
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this saw the appointment of Boyson as junior minister under Carlisle, while 
Angela Rumbold, Michael Fallon and Emily Blatch were junior ministers under 
Kenneth Baker, John McGregor and John Patten respectively. How effective they 
were or were meant to be is difficult to judge. Indeed, the first of these 
appointments, that of Boyson, who was arguably one of the most influential 
critics outside government, was probably the least effective while at the 
Department of Education. No less than Sexton, Boyson had a clear, if dogmatic, 
view of the type of education system he preferred. What he did not have was 
either the temperament to play the Whitehall game, or, despite expressions of 
sympathy, little direct support from the Prime Minster, even for securing the key 
responsibility for schools. 43 
The appointment of Carlisle's ministerial team in 1979 saw this 
responsibility given to Lady Young, who was also appointed Minister of State, or 
official second in the Department. Described as `determined and persuasive and a 
personal friend of Mrs Thatcher', Lady Young was reported to have `pulled rank 
and won a disaster area - schools', an appointment said to be `an unexpected 
tonic for the local education authorities' . 
44 Boyson, on the other hand, was made 
Parliamentary Under Secretary, with responsibility for higher education. In his 
memoirs, Boyson wrote how he `had hoped to be a Minister of State and I was 
slightly disappointed and asked who the other ministers were ... I 
felt I was being 
marginalised and that the Department did not want me in schools'. 45 Boyson laid 
the blame for his `marginalisation' at the door of James Hamilton, whom he 
claims `got at' Carlisle. 46 Sexton's opinion was that Boyson was at that time 
already too well known as a radical on schools, and he was doubly dangerous 
from the point of view of the Civil Servants, being both `committed and 
knowledgeable', having been a headteacher within the state system. 
47 Such 
judgements are borne out almost verbatim by Hamilton's own recollections, 
which also showed the depth of Boyson's `slight disappointment' : 
43 While it was reported that Mrs Thatcher recognized Boyson's opinions as 
`diamond-sharp', it 
was also felt that she `may think him somewhat too rough a 
diamond in style for her taste'. The 
Times, 29 April 1986. 
44 Education, 11 May 1979. 
45 Boyson, Speaking My Mind, p. 146. 
46 Boyson interview. 
47 Sexton interview. 
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I knew Mark Carlisle was going to have a difficult time as he would be 
up against the one person who knew all about education and the 
Department. He (Carlisle) was a nice man but he was not an experienced 
practitioner. With two ministerial posts to fill and Rhodes Boyson by 
reputation too radical and too knowledgeable about schools, I persuaded 
Mark Carlisle of the merits of appointing Lady Young as Schools 
Minister. Boyson threatened to refuse the higher education post and 
resign, which I was not too worried about. My main worry was what Mrs 
Thatcher's reaction would be if he did. 48 
Boyson himself later recalled being summoned to the meeting with Carlisle and 
Hamilton. `We thought you'd like a change', was how they started the meeting, 
before offering him the higher education brief. Boyson refused and said he would 
have to discuss the offer with colleagues, after which he recanted and accepted 
the post `only under pressure from my constituency chairman'. 49 If for nothing 
else, Boyson's acceptance of his post was of immense symbolic importance, as it 
was with the other Thatcherites who would later hold junior posts within the 
Department. Their totemic presence was a symbol of sorts to those outside 
pushing for reform, even if it was equally an indication of tensions and differing 
expectations of those involved in reform. 
Outside his specific ministerial responsibilities, Boyson's speeches 
remained clarion calls to the right. In a strange kind of way he would also play a 
useful role for officials in that he was a political touchstone for many policies, 
often providing the Party political perspective that would normally have been the 
role of the special adviser, but which Sexton was often uninterested in taking on. 
Hamilton described how Boyson `was very much dominated by parish pump 
politics and you did have to listen to him very carefully and you ignored him at 
your peril if he said that the Party will not wear this'. 
5° Yet outside of the 
publication of exam results, Boyson's personal impact as minister on major areas 
48 Hamilton interview. 
49 Boyson, `New Thoughts on the Educational Voucher'. 
50 Hamilton interview. Hamilton recalled one instance when, `In 1980 we proposed to change 
the 
distance requirements for claiming travel passes from 
local authorities. Boyson warned of the 
danger from Roman Catholic schools who had been given assurances in 1944 that 
if they built 
schools outside cities their travel would be subsidised. 
I ignored his advice and found myself 
visited by Lord Butler and the Archbishop among others. 
The Bill went through the Commons 
but when it went to the Lords it suffered the 
biggest defeat ever. Lady Young was furious. ' 
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of policy was negligible. Although he spent considerable time during the first 
two years working on a student loans scheme, his final proposal was shelved by a 
Cabinet sub-committee for political reasons. The accession of Keith Joseph, who 
then gave Boyson responsibility for schools, appeared to indicate that education 
was finally to be the subject of radical change, and certainly from the right of the 
party, the Keith Joseph-Boyson combination was seen as a `dream ticket'. The 
outcome, however, fell far short of expectations. In his memoirs, Boyson 
described the schools section of the Department as having `a departmental view 
on almost all issues that could be changed only with the firm, specific and 
continued backing of the Secretary of State'. 51 Without, as Boyson pointedly 
described, this `firm, specific and continued backing of the Secretary of State' or, 
indeed, of the Prime Minister, and without the political nous or personal 
willingness to try and chart an alternative course, Boyson's tenure at the 
Department would end in disappointment and disillusion. 
No, minister 
Unlike the irregular agenda, which appeared to have only inched forward 
between 1979 and 1981, the regular drift towards tighter control of the 
curriculum set in train after the Ruskin speech continued undisturbed during the 
early years of the first Thatcher administration. Starting with The Curriculum 11- 
16 (1977), through A Framework for the School Curriculum (1980), A View of 
the Curriculum (1980) and The School Curriculum (1981), the silhouette of a 
national curriculum was outlined by both the DES and HMI, although the distinct 
features contained within their respective outlines differed greatly. The model 
originally proposed in 1977 was further developed in 1980 by HMI and 
displayed what has been described as the `professional common-curriculum 
approach'. 52 The construction of a curriculum was to be based around `areas of 
experience', such as the aesthetic and creative, the linguistic and the scientific, 
rather than around discrete subjects. Clyde Chitty described the HMI model as 
seeking 
51 Boyson, Speaking My Mind, p. 160. 
52 Chitty, C. `Two Models of a National Curriculum: origins and interpretation', in Lawton, 
D. 
and Chitty, C. (1987) The National Curriculum, London: Institute of 
Education, p. 34. 
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... to undermine traditional subject boundaries and uses subjects to 
achieve higher level aims. It requires teachers who are well motivated, 
well-trained, and skilled in identifying any specific learning problems for 
individual pupils. It is wary of any system geared to writing off large 
sections of the school population as failures. 53 
Outside the DES, the tone in which this model was discussed, clearly made it the 
preference of the rest of the `education establishment'. Although someone like 
Denis Lawton would assert that there is no `education establishment' - `There are 
too many discordant voices, disagreeing about more than they agreed'54 - there 
were and are certain key issues around which professional support tends to gel. 
The `areas of experience' type curriculum was one of them, but its viability 
would be undermined by, among other factors, HMI's own evidence as regards 
the ability of teachers to deliver it. The alternative model, that of the DES, which 
relied on traditional subjects, led to the criticism that it was `becoming centrist 
and directive on curriculum issues in a bureaucratic, technicist, non-professional 
way'. 55 The first of the DES documents, A Frameworkfor the School Curriculum 
in 1980, provoked the greatest controversy. It specified a limited number of core 
subjects and the time allocation for each. This DES model was described as the 
`bureaucratic core-curriculum approach... concerned with the "efficiency" of the 
whole system and with the need to obtain precise information to demonstrate that 
efficiency'. 56 A truce of sorts with the HMI model was declared with the 
publication of The School Curriculum in 1981. This document talked in terms of 
both subjects and areas of experience and `could be seen to incorporate two 
views of a national curriculum framework without reconciling them'. 
57 There 
was a definite feeling that the DES was pulling in its horns `after having got 
involved in the curriculum only to realise just how complicated it was'. 
58 The 
TES, so often the mouthpiece of the established orthodoxy, described the DES 
intervention as a teacher might describe a tiresome student: 
53 Ibid. 
54 Denis Lawton interview, 26 October 2000. 
55 Lawton, The Tightening Grip, p. 8. 
56 Chitty, `Two Models' in Lawton and Chitty, National Curriculum, p. 35. 
57 Janet Maw quoted in Chitty, Towards a New Education System, p. 118. 
73 
The School Curriculum represents the liquidation of commitments to a 
core curriculum and a defined framework, which ministers entered into 
without understanding what was involved. It was not a very glorious 
retreat, but at least it gets this tiresome business out of the DES's hair and 
leaves it to the professionals. 59 
The same tone infused the pamphlet No, Minister, A Critique of the D. E. S. Paper 
`The School Curriculum', penned by 8 academics, 7 of them from the Institute of 
Education, University of London. The final paper, written by Denis Lawton, then 
Deputy Director of the Institute and later Director, was titled `Shall we try again, 
Minister? ' In it, he described A Framework for the School Curriculum, with its 
`crude quantification' as `never much of a threat anyway, and only a bit of 
bureaucratic silliness which would not have been taken seriously and could never 
have been enforced'. 60 The School Curriculum was then described as `not only a 
complacent document, but a backward looking and dangerous document as 
well'. 61 `Complacent', `backward looking' and `dangerous' were perhaps equally 
valid descriptions of the reaction to the DES proposals. The intervention of 
ministers and the DES may have demonstrated ineptness and a lack of 
perspective, but in the tone of intolerance and superiority with which they were 
received, one can also sense some of the seeds of Kenneth Baker's own later 
intolerant rush to get the 1988 Act on the statute books being sown. If the answer 
is always going to be `No, Minister', why bother asking the question at all? 
A further sting in the tail of The School Curriculum was that after two 
years, LEAs were required to report on any progress made since its publication. 
Asking for evidence of such actions from the local authorities would prove to be 
a triumph of hope over experience. In the face of continued intransigence, direct 
intervention in curriculum policies was sidelined in favour of a more indirect 
approach. In some respects, this involved no less a degree of intervention but was 
carried on through the back door of examinations and qualifications, and by no 
less a personage than the guru of non-interventionism, Sir Keith Joseph. 
58 Lawton interview. 
59 TES, 27 March 1981. 
60 Lawton, D. `Shall We Try Again, Minister? ' in White, J. et al. (1981) No, Minister. A Critique 
of the D. E. S. Paper `The School Curriculum', London: Institute of 
Education, p. 52. 
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Conclusion 
After his departure, it was to be Keith Joseph rather than Mark Carlisle for whom 
Rhodes Boyson reserved the greatest opprobrium. By contrast, Carlisle's 
departure was a cause of some regret by all those working and scheming during 
his time at the DES. Boyson wrote that he worked with Carlisle `amicably' for 
two years and `was sorry to see (him) go in the reshuffle'. 62 Sexton felt that 
Carlisle was `underrated' . 
63 His departure was also regretted by his Civil 
Servants. `He was a decent polite man', according to one, `and he listened to 
what you told him - you can't say much more of any minister than that. And in 
government terms he delivered a9 per cent cut. What did he do wrong? '64 
Carlisle's lack of leadership of the Department was being damned with faint 
praise. One even writes of Carlisle's time through the activities of others. While 
everyone could feel that they were able to manoeuvre for their own agendas, 
without too much of a tight rein from the top, the problem was that there was 
neither a tight rein nor a strong lead. In the face of LEA inertia and political 
indifference, the stream of curriculum-related documents issued in the wake of 
Ruskin by the DES and HMI would begin to dry up, with unresolved differences 
between both bodies on such questions as the nature of any national or core 
curriculum. Although champions of radical reform, such as Stuart Sexton and 
Rhodes Boyson, also now found themselves no longer in the wilderness, but 
actually making their case within the DES, their impact was also greatly reduced 
by a lack of political support. 
Despite the heat generated by some of the minor developments, the 
period 1979 to 1981 was characterised by caution and frustration for the 
Conservative reformers. By 1981, at best, a number of markers for the future had 
been laid down. In particular, the ending of the requirement for local authorities 
to go comprehensive, changes to school governing bodies, the introduction of the 
Assisted Places Scheme and the requirement for schools to publish examination 
results. Although modest in themselves, they did indicate a very different set of 
priorities and intimated a changing climate in education policy. While Boyson 
61 Ibid., p. 55. 
62 Boyson, Speaking My Mind, p. 159. 
63 Sexton interview. 
64 Education, 18 September 1981. 
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and Sexton operated from within the DES, other irregulars such as the CPS 
Education Study Group had also begun to publish their views on education. 
Even, if for the moment, these and other contributions remained inchoate and 
isolated, they were of sufficient import to bring them to the attention of Mrs 
Thatcher, whose priorities had not yet begun to encompass direct intervention 
into the area of education reform. `There were more important things on 
Thatcher's mind in the early part of her period of office', recalled Sexton, `and 
she seemed to be satisfied with what we were doing on education which was 
non-sensational but necessary'. 65 This did not prevent her from, at the very least, 
making a strong political statement about her preferences in this policy area, with 
the appointment of Carlisle's replacement, Sir Keith Joseph. 
65 Sexton interviewed in Davies-Griffith, `The development of education policy', p. 
154. 
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CHAPTER 4 
September 1981 - May 1986: Different Drummers 
Introduction 
In May 1981, Sir Keith Joseph was appointed as Secretary of State for Education. 
His appointment could not have been seen as anything other than a boost to the 
irregular agenda in education. Yet any initial optimism was soon dispelled. 
While Keith Joseph no doubt brought his own unique spin to policies, tinted by a 
right-wing perspective, he failed utterly to provide the overarching leadership that 
both his political and departmental roles required. Keith Joseph's tenure at the 
helm of education policy only served to highlight the Conservatives as a confused 
party with much to be confused about. In political terms, as far as his right-wing 
colleagues and the bulk of the irregulars were concerned, the dilemma was that 
Keith Joseph was powerful enough, certainly given his `special relationship' with 
Mrs Thatcher, to resist their demands for reform. Not only that, but he also 
started to pursue a regular or establishment agenda that they abhorred and which, 
by rights, he should have also, as the original `one of us'. ' 
It remains an intriguing question as to why Keith Joseph did not fulfil the 
expectations of his colleagues on the right. What, in particular, was behind his 
dismissal of the long-cherished education voucher, something that he himself 
was moved to describe as `a noble concept'? Did this signal the continued 
strength and influence of the regulars? Equally intriguing is what was the 
reaction of Keith Joseph's colleagues? We know that, almost immediately after 
his resignation in 1986, a host of policy suggestions erupted into public view. 
How and where had these been gestating in the interim? Were there any 
implications arising out of this process for the future development of policy? 
1 Five years after his appointment, Salter and Tapper suggested that `While the Right 
has 
succeeded in reversing the ratchet in the areas of public values and party policy, 
its impact on the 
influence of the state in education has been, ironically, to help extend that influence even 
further'. 
Quoted in Davies-Griffith, `The development of education policy', p. 135. 
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'One of Us? ' 
In attempting to balance the conflicting demands of his own personal beliefs, 
those emanating from various quarters within and around the Conservative Party, 
and his duty as Secretary of State for Education, Joseph would prove to be, `A 
reluctant dragon ... who is constantly being forced back, against his will, to his 
responsibilities under the Education Acts'. 2 Joseph's dilemma was clear for all to 
see in his speech to the Conservative Party conference in 1981. `So here we are', 
he told his audience, `with over 85% of secondary pupils in comprehensive 
schools. . . For the sake of all the children in all those schools, or are to go into 
them, we need to make the best of them enthusiastically'. 3 For his colleagues, the 
disappointment that would flow from this judgement was all the more acute 
given that, as a free marketeer and one in favour of minimal government, much 
was expected from the right following his appointment. 4 The omens had 
appeared favourable. It was an appointment he had himself wanted, 5 and one of 
his first acts in office was to swap ministerial posts within his team, at last giving 
the pro-voucher Boyson the Schools portfolio, and doing so without taking any 
advice from his officials. 6 For many on the right, that was as good as it got over 
the next four-and-a-half years. 
The first problem was soon encountered. Despite his intellectual 
radicalism, Joseph had a reputation for being a `soft touch' for his officials. 
Alfred Sherman at the CPS had been aware of this from Joseph's time as 
2 TES, 24 June 1983. 
3 Quoted in Halcrow, M. (1989) Keith Joseph. A Single Mind. London: Macmillan, p. 170. 
4 During an interview over lunch with an education journalist, Keith Joseph laid out 
his 
reductionist views on the efficiency of the free market. `Look around you, ' 
he said, `This is a 
good restaurant, and it's full - because it's giving people what they want. 
If it were a bad 
restaurant, it would go out of business'. TES, 14 September 2001. 
5 `When I knew that Mark Carlisle would be going', he later recalled, `I went to Mrs Thatcher to 
ask if I could have the job. And after her experiences at the DES 
in the early 1970s, I think she 
was surprised that anyone should want to go there'. Ribbins and 
Sherratt, Radical Education 
Policies, p. 80. 
6 Hamilton interview. 
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Minister under Heath. Sherman's conclusion was that Joseph had `simply been 
eaten alive by his Civil Servants'. 7 Stuart Sexton was more caustic: 
Keith Joseph was a ditherer. He loved the debate but not the decision. He 
thought someone like Nick Stuart was a good fellow because he could 
argue well, a fellow "fellow" as it were. He always accepted officials as 
experts and clearly felt that anybody at Deputy Secretary level was bound 
to be an "honest chap". 8 
Sexton had reason to be sharp. At the same time as Boyson was given the 
Schools portfolio, Joseph, on the advice of his officials, then proceeded to 
jettison Sexton as his special adviser. Although James Hamilton felt that the 
main reason Sexton was originally let go was because `Keith Joseph had no 
regard for Sexton's intellectual abilities', 9 there was little doubt that officials 
would have been glad to see the back of the freewheeling Sexton. `It was Rhodes 
Boyson who saved the day', said Hamilton of Sexton's return, `but I had made 
clear my concern that he (Sexton) played by the rules'. 10 It was a concern that the 
punctilious Keith Joseph was happy to reinforce. According to Robert Balchin, 
`When Sexton was reinstated Keith Joseph used to refer to him as "my right-wing 
conscience" yet he was always quick to remind him that "You were not 
elected"'. " Sexton himself acknowledged the change in climate: 
The strength of the adviser is dependent on the support he gets from his 
Minister. Mark Carlisle always backed me and in some respects I had 
more clout during his time. Keith Joseph was more discriminating, more 
independent, and more indecisive. 12 
7 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, p. 275. Joseph's performance at the Department of Industry 
since 1979 had done little to allay such fears. One account, written 
in 1980, described how, within 
a month of his appointment, `his senior Civil Servants were confident that they 
had got the guru 
under control'. Maurice Stephenson quoted in Halcrow, Keith Joseph, p. 
135. 
8 Sexton interview. 
9 Hamilton interview. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Robert Balchin interview, 28 July 1998. 
12 Sexton interview. 
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But if the Secretary of State's `discrimination' and `independence' in seeking out 
advice were sources of frustration for those with whom he worked, the major 
reason for discord was the charge of Keith Joseph's 'indecisiveness'. Nowhere 
was this more apparent to his colleagues than during the Departmental debate 
regarding vouchers. 
Official opposition? 
For many on the right, the failure to introduce an educational voucher during the 
early 1980s, alongside the difficulties encountered by many subsequent reforms, 
can be laid at the door of officials within the DES. If, in the early 1980s, still 
mining the seam opened by Ruskin, greater control was thought to be the long- 
term aim for the Department, it was not unreasonable to assume that few officials 
could be expected to have much sympathy for the introduction of a voucher 
system. Some key officials also appeared to have displayed a vigour for `snag 
hunting' over and above the norm. 13 One of those identified was Walter Ulrich, 
Deputy Secretary at the DES in charge of the Schools Branch, and consequently 
one of the betes noires in all subsequent accounts. 14 Ulrich had been in the Civil 
Service since 1951, before joining the Cabinet Office in 1975, from where he was 
brought into the DES as Deputy Secretary by James Hamilton, his former boss in 
the Cabinet Office. According to Hamilton, `I had known Walter for many years. 
He was extremely able, someone fresh from the outside whom I knew who would 
prick the system, would give it a dig. And that's just what he did'. 15 Brought in 
deliberately to help push the Ruskin - Yellow Book agenda both within and 
without the DES, and not a `lifer' in the tradition of many officials in the 
Department, `Ulrich and other new people were initially only accepted with a 
13 Hugh Dalton, the Labour politician, reportedly described top Civil Servants as `congenital snag 
hunters'. Hennessey, Whitehall, p. 124. 
14 On the relationship between ministers, advisers and Civil Servants in the period 
between 1982 
and 1983, both William Waldergrave and William Shelton, who were 
junior ministers at the time, 
believed that 'the most important figure on schools (was) Walter Ulrich', Knight, 
Making of Tory 
Education Policy, p. 158. 
15 Hamilton interview. 
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great deal of reluctance'. 16 This reluctance was soon overcome, as one of his 
colleagues described how Ulrich very quickly `went totally native and became 
totally obsessed with education policy', remaining in the Department until his 
retirement in 1988.17 
Affection is not one of the emotions with which Ulrich is remembered for 
his contribution to education policy. Mark Carlisle, displaying a lawyer's careful 
choice of words told one interviewer `There was that strange, perhaps "strange" 
is the wrong word, bright man, Walter Ulrich... ' 18 David Hancock, Ulrich's boss 
from 1983 also found it awkward to describe him: `Walter was a fascinating 
character. He was extremely meticulous, professionally very correct, and argued 
with great vigour. Bob Dunn thought he was a communist. I admired him a great 
deal'. 19 Others were less circumspect in their judgement. According to John 
Clare, Ulrich was highly combative, almost `a Stalinist who tolerated no dissent. 
He was ideologically very strong and it was very hard to discern any notion of 
Civil Service impartiality, immersed as he was in the education ideology from the 
progressive 1970s'. 20 Tony Kerpel, who was Kenneth Baker's special adviser, 
recalled that, 
Ulrich was exceptional and I don't mean that in a complimentary sense. 
He was exceptional in the way he saw himself. I never saw another 
Deputy Secretary act as he did and a more assertive Permanent Secretary 
would have slapped him down for some of the things he said and did. I 
21 
was astonished at what he got away with. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Saville interview. 
18 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Educational Policies, p. 66. 
19 David Hancock interview, 4 June 1998. Ulrich did not always appear to be entirely 
`professionally very correct'. In his memoirs, Kenneth Baker 
described Hancock as `the nominal 
Head of the Department but schools policy remained the 
fiefdom of those officials brought up and 
bred in the DES tradition'. Ulrich, described as `no particular fan of government policies', 
sat 
directly opposite Baker at meetings while Hancock was 
`relegated to sitting at the end of the 
table'. Baker, Turbulent Years, pp. 166-167. 
20 Clare interview. 
21 Tony Kerpel interview, 23 November 1998. 
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Ulrich would be joined at the DES in 1980 by Nick Stuart, then an Under 
Secretary, who perhaps would arguably achieve greater `notoriety' than Ulrich as 
an even sharper critic of some government policies. 22 Stuart's curriculum vitae 
was probably sufficient to warrant the suspicion of many on the right. He had 
joined the DES as Assistant Principal when it was established in 1964 and would 
remain on and off at the Department, aside from brief spells outside. These 
included acting as Private Secretary to Harold Wilson between 1973 and 1976, 
and adviser to Roy Jenkins as President of the EEC between 1978 and 1980. 
Stuart worked closely with Ulrich, so much so that he was referred to as 
`Ulrichsson' by some in the Department and would be promoted to Deputy 
Secretary on the latter's retirement. 23 He is remembered as being even more 
trenchant and combative than his predecessor. According to one commentator, 
At least you knew where you stood with Ulrich and ministers were quite 
quickly able to locate who Ulrich was and where he was coming from. 
Nick Stuart was more insidious, more self-consciously devious and 
manipulative. 24 
Another commentator felt that `Nick Stuart had an intellectual contempt that he 
found difficult to disguise. He did not suffer fools gladly and his whole manner 
was very patrician'. 25 Surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly, Stuart found an 
admirer, or at least a kindred spirit, in one junior minister, the equally combative 
Michael Fallon. According to Fallon, `Nick Stuart was smarter than Ulrich. He 
22 One of his colleagues thought that, `Whatever his personal feelings, Nick would not oppose 
something so long as all the relevant people wanted it'. Unattributed interview material. Robert 
Balchin, a government adviser who would play a significant role in Grant Maintained Schools 
policy, also revealed how Stuart was apparently `the convenor of a hitherto unknown group of 
like-minded educationists that met three times a year at All Soul's College, Oxford'. Balchin was 
invited to one of their meetings: `They didn't approve of the current government's reforms 
in 
education at all. I asked them if they ever listened to views which were unwelcome to them, and 
I 
got the distinct impression that the answer was "no". I haven't been asked back'. Phillips, M. 
(1996) All Must Have Prizes. London: Little Brown and Company, p. 161. 
23 Fallon interview. 
24 Unattributed interview material. Tony Kerpel described Stuart as someone who `had a 
particular political world view and was a very clever office politician. He was someone who 
liked 
to eat regularly in the canteen and liked to have a coterie of junior officials around 
him'. Kerpel 
interview. 
25 Wilby interview. 
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would, if pushed, make no secret that your idea was a right-wing crackpot 
scheme, but would then show you how to implement it. But then slowly the 
problems would become apparent. He was immensely impressive'. 26 While 
acknowledging that both Ulrich and Stuart `were not always easy people to 
overturn from their arguments', James Hamilton also believed that they `were 
extremely shrewd and intelligent people, tough operators who have been unfairly 
demonised' . 
27 Whatever the particular merits of the other opinions expressed 
above, and bearing in mind that some of those interviewed had their own axes to 
grind, the team of Ulrich and Stuart was clearly an extremely formidable one. 
Any set of ministers would have difficulty getting anything controversial past 
them, even assuming that the ministerial team was united, was led with 
determination, and had a fair political wind in their sails, all of which were 
lacking during Keith Joseph's tenure as Education Secretary. 
A battle lost 
From the wilder shores of TEA pamphlets during the 1960s and 1970s, to the 
marginally more respectable berth of the Black Papers, between 1981 and 1983, 
education vouchers suddenly found themselves catapulted to near centre stage 
within the DES. Despite their apparent failure, the actual time and energy given 
to the debates within the DES marked another qualitatively important, if as yet 
unavailing shift, in the parameters of the debate on education policy. In the short 
term, however, increased visibility for vouchers did not however mean increased 
viability. At the Conservative Party Conference soon after his appointment, 
Keith 
Joseph flattered to deceive with his comments. `I have been intellectually 
attracted to the idea of seeing whether a voucher might be a way of 
increasing 
parental choice even further', he told the delegates. He then immediately 
followed this by warning of the `very great difficulties in making the voucher 
deliver, in a way that would commend itself to us, more choice than the 
1980 Act 
will deliver. 28 Immediately suspecting Civil Service obstructionism, 
two 
26 Fallon interview. 
27 
Hamilton interview. 
28 Halcrow, Keith Joseph, p. 170. 
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pressure groups, the National Council for Educational Standards (LACES) and the 
Friends of the Education Voucher in Representative Regions (FEVER) wrote to 
him asking for details of the problems that needed to be resolved. Sir Keith 
replied with a paper prepared by his Civil Servants that detailed some 15 
problems. 29 Soon after, a round of internal discussions began within the 
Department on the merits of a voucher system, with the Civil Servants one side, 
Joseph's advisers and junior ministers on the other, and Joseph himself, to the 
fury of his political colleagues, refusing to intervene on their behalf. 
Boyson's verdict on this `stately quadrille'30 was that `Keith Joseph was a 
nice man but he treated vouchers as he did everything else, an intellectual 
exercise. It got so bad and his lack of commitment (to vouchers) was so clear and 
so obvious that I no longer went to those meetings). 31 While Boyson was away, 
apparently, on his own admission, reading detective novels'32 among the pro- 
voucher group, Sexton was joined from June 1983 by another adviser, Oliver 
Letwin. Letwin, ex-Eton and Cambridge, was the son of family friends of Keith 
Joseph. As Keith Joseph, according to James Hamilton, `increasingly came to 
rely on Letwin's advice', 33 his appointment and subsequent interventions were 
deeply resented by officials within the Department who referred to him as the 
`Etonian prat'. 34 Letwin described the collection of irregulars who were pushing 
at this time for a voucher scheme as `a froth of outsiders along with a cabal of 
insiders who sensed that something might actually happen' . 
35 If so, they had 
reckoned without the combination of the Secretary of State and his officials. 
Robert Dunn, who was Boyson's friend and replacement at the DES after the 
1983 election, described Keith Joseph's `Olympian detachment' with a sense of 
frustration that remained palpable after a decade. Dunn likened the opposing 
29 DES (1981) Education Vouchers: A DES Paper. London: HMSO. 
30 Halcrow, Keith Joseph, p. 173. 
31 Boyson interview. 
32 Boyson, `New thoughts on the educational voucher'. 
33 Hamilton interview. 
34 Unattributed interview material. Although it was reported at the time of his appointment that he 
`had a special interest in vouchers', (TES, 1 October 1983) Letwin himself admits that he had `no 
previous knowledge or interest in vouchers'. Oliver Letwin interview, 4 October 1994. Norman 
Tebbit has recently described Letwin, currently Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, as `Keith 
Joseph incarnate'. hap "//news independent. co. uk/people/profiles/story. 
35 Letwin interview. 
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sides at the meetings to `Holmes and Moriarty struggling over the Reichenbach 
Falls while Keith Joseph stood idly by on the hillside'. 36 
Despite his detachment, there is little doubt that Keith Joseph did spend 
enormous amounts of time and energy looking at the feasibility of vouchers. This 
was much to the annoyance of his Permanent Secretary at the time who felt that 
`The best people in the Department spent ages looking at vouchers when they 
should have been getting on with real reforms'. 37 Despite his public 
pronouncements that appeared to show continued backing to the idea of a 
voucher, 38 in June 1983 Keith Joseph was to announce that `the voucher, at least 
in the foreseeable future, is dead' and continued to assert thereafter that there 
were too many `great practical difficulties' which were 'too great to justify further 
consideration of a voucher system'. To cries of `shame' at the Party conference 
later that year, he told delegates that `After 18 months of diligent search I had to 
concede I did not see it possible to introduce the noble concept of the voucher'. 39 
The reasons as to why Keith Joseph felt obliged not to pursue further the 
`noble concept' have subsequently been the cause for much speculation. One 
suggestion was that vouchers had effectively been killed by the Chancellor, 
Geoffrey Howe, who ruled them out purely for reasons of cost. Keith Joseph 
would have none of it. `Finances didn't enter into it', he later said, 
I was a frustrated enthusiast because I was forced to accept that, largely 
for political reasons, it wouldn't be practicable. ... you would 
have very 
controversial legislation, which would take two or three years to carry 
through, with my party split, and the other parties unanimously hostile, on 
wrong grounds. And all the producer forces hostile. 
40 
36 Dunn interview. 
37 Hamilton interview. John Barnes recalled an interesting vignette of Joseph's odyssey. `Keith 
Joseph turned up at the LSE to see me', said Barnes, `He slouched down in to a chair and simply 
said, "I've come to talk about vouchers". I then went to see an extremely sceptical 
Nick Stuart 
who said the usual alarmist things'. Barnes interview. 
38 At the 1982 Party conference he reiterated his support. `I believe', 
he told the conference, with 
Mrs Thatcher `listening attentively at his side', that `if vouchers were combined with open 
enrolment, some of the least good state schools would 
disappear and increasing competition might 
galvanise the less good state schools to achieve better results'. 
Education, 8 October 1982. 
39 Education, 21 November 1983. 
40 Sherratt and Ribbins, Radical Education Policies, pp. 82-83. 
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At least one observer concurred that Keith Joseph had been disconcerted by the 
reaction the topic of vouchers could engender. `Keith Joseph was surprised at the 
depth of intellectual resistance there was to vouchers', recalled Peter Wilby, `and 
was daunted to find such a solid phalanx of opinion ranging against him' . 
41 The 
reaction from the neo-liberals was more straightforward. Arthur Seldon, long- 
time proponent of such a scheme, claimed that the reason was based not on 
`administrative impracticality, but official feet-dragging'. 42 
That Sir Keith was influenced greatly by the arguments of his Civil 
Servants over the practical difficulties involved with a voucher scheme is not in 
question. Whether this counts as obstructionism, or evidence of being `winged' 
by officials is more contentious. Joseph himself felt that `Civil Servants were 
sceptical about the panacea, but were totally honourable in examining the 
mechanics'. 43 The most telling verdict on the `mechanics' of the proposal itself 
comes from its strongest advocates within the irregular `inner cabal', Letwin and 
Sexton. According to the former: 
Although I had been hired by Keith Joseph to consider vouchers I always 
felt that he never really intended to implement a scheme. He was always 
lukewarm and officials sensed this very early on and thus fought and 
refought their own ground in this knowledge. They (Civil Servants) were 
not wild ideologues just simply fighting for the status quo in the face of 
the genuine and considerable administrative difficulty in implementing 
any scheme. If we had come up with a workable scheme the officials 
would have implemented it. 44 
Sexton, while never reluctant to denigrate the stance of officials, admitted that 
`To some extent the Civil Servants were right. The state system was too 
41 Wilby interview. 
42 Seldon, A. (1986) The Riddle of the Voucher. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, p. 97. 
43 Contemporary Record, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1987, p. 31. 
44 Letwin interview. 
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unorganised to introduce such a scheme'. 45 The intransigence of some of the 
voucher's keenest supporters and their unwillingness to accept anything less than 
a `pure' voucher system, was also a significant factor in strengthening the official 
argument regarding the `genuine and considerable administrative difficulties' 
involved. According to Sexton, `A step by step approach was available in 1981 
but we were forced to jump the gun. We went for the whole hog because of a 
request by Keith Joseph who was under pressure from certain advocates of the 
voucher such as Marjorie Seldon who wondered why it couldn't be done 
tomorrow'. 46 Oliver Letwin also described the `war-horse mentality' among those 
who wanted a voucher system `exactly as they had advocated it for 20 years but 
were unwilling to work out the details. They were likely to have overestimated 
the pressure behind it as no one had persuaded Mrs Thatcher that the plan or 
indeed any plan would work'. 47 The most succinct verdict on such an approach 
was provided by two American academics quoted, ironically, in Arthur Seldon's 
Riddle of the Voucher. `Insiders and intellectuals', they wrote, `saw vouchers as a 
solution to vague and abstract problems, such as monopoly power in education - 
not as the solution to the day-to-day problems of running a school system 48 
It is likely that Keith Joseph was also instrumental in apparently 
convincing Mrs Thatcher, if only briefly, of the same conclusion. `We simply 
cannot operate it', she said, `the administrative consequences would be 
colossal'. 49 Yet the decision not to go for a voucher scheme in 1983 only marked 
the end of one particular strategy. The `full frontal assault' on the educational 
establishment had failed. Despite the apparently formidable array of opposition, 
the irregulars had only lost a battle rather than the war. Letwin, Sexton, and 
others had already begun to develop new strategies, often without the support and 
often without the knowledge of the Secretary of State, and which would be more 
45 Sexton interview. 
46 Ibid. Marjorie Seldon was the wife of Arthur Seldon. 
47 Letwin interview. Ferdinand Mount, then Head of the Policy Unit, described how `Enthusiasts 
for reform at the IEA and the CPS were prodigal with committees and pamphlets, but were much 
less helpful when it came to providing practical options for action. This made it difficult for the 
Policy Unit's ideas to overcome the objections put forward by senior officials at the Department, 
notably W0 Ulrich'. Quoted in Davies-Griffith, `The development of education policy', p. 171. 
48 Seldon, Riddle of the Voucher, p. 2, f/n. The comments were made in relation to why vouchers 
had failed in some areas in the United States. 
49 TES, 24 June 1983. 
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subtle and pragmatic than prior to 1983. In 1984 Keith Joseph's continued 
insistence that `the idea of the vouchers is no longer on the agenda' only 
demonstrated how increasingly out of step he was with his colleagues. The idea 
of a `pure' voucher may have been officially dropped, but as an ideal it did not 
disappear. The irregulars had decided, as in Brecht's aphorism, that where there 
are obstacles, the shortest distance between two points is not necessarily a 
straight line. 
Different drummers 
Despite finally being given his ideal brief in 1981, the following two years were 
extremely frustrating for Rhodes Boyson, as he saw his cherished voucher 
scheme first stalled and then dismissed. After the 1983 election victory, he was 
moved to the Department for Health and Social Security. Despite apparent failure 
in government, Boyson had acted as a `booster rocket' for the New Right agenda. 
This was then taken up by his successor as Schools Minister, Robert Dunn. A 
close friend of Boyson and according to his own description, a Conservative 
`firmly in the Boysonian tradition', 50 Dunn's definition of those who opposed 
education reform was that of a `cafe society', consisting of, `a ragtag of left wing 
trade unions, left wing LEAs, do-gooders, people who eat brown bread, jaded 
academics and those who talk rather than act'. 51 Dunn would remain in the 
Department from 1983 until 1987. During this time he would often as not be 
voicing the opinions of others, such as Sexton and Boyson, but also representing 
his own particular brand of working class Toryism. 52 Like his friend and mentor, 
Dunn quickly became frustrated at the DES, complaining of `how little he could 
do. Indeed many a scheme had run through his head only to be stamped on by a 
50 Dunn interview 
51 Education, 23 December 1988 
52 At the time of his appointment, Dunn felt that `Any achievements from 1979 to 1983 were 
minimal. There was the Assisted Places Scheme and Open Enrolment, but the main gain was 
finally stopping the comprehensive juggernaut. There had been a failure to inflict our philosophy 
on the system and you could say that from 1980 we were treading water. Keith Joseph was 
bruised and no longer had the heart for a fight. He never knew just how mediocre the state system 
was and was shocked, latching onto the bottom 40%, steered away from other policies 
by his Civil 
Servants'. Dunn interview. 
88 
civil servant with a brisk "No, Minister"'. 53 Dunn's resentment of the influence 
of the Civil Servants was often matched by the opinion of officials regarding his 
ministerial abilities. According to one official, `Dunn was non-existent, a spot on 
the wallpaper. It was an embarrassment to wheel him out. He couldn't master a 
brief or read a speech'. 54 Stuart Sexton recalled that `Walter Ulrich really got 
under Bob's skin, indirectly reminding him that he was the bacon buyer from 
Sainsbury's, the secondary modern boy'. 55 Dunn's straight-from-the-hip, 
`Boysonian' approach was also reported `to offend Keith Joseph's own 
intellectual and philosophical outlook' and within a year there were reports that 
Dunn's ministerial career was about to be curtailed. 56 After 1983, Dunn would be 
aligned with Sexton, ostensibly in opposition to Sir Keith, on many issues. 
While Sir Keith was publicly pledged to make the comprehensive system 
work, his new junior minister clearly had other ideas. In October 1983 it was 
reported that the reintroduction of schools directly funded by the government was 
back on the agenda as the latest idea for extending parental choice. The idea, 
described only as `a hypothetical sketch', was set out in a paper by Stuart Sexton 
'in consultation with Dunn and Oliver Letwin'. 57 By this time, Letwin had 
transferred to the Prime Minster's Policy Unit to become her personal adviser on 
education, and would be an important avenue of communication and promoter of 
ideas for education reform directly to Mrs Thatcher. 58 After the 1983 election, as 
this course of policy formulation began, parallel and different to that on which 
Keith Joseph was had embarked, a number of other irregular actors began to 
make their presence felt on the course of education policy. One of these was the 
strongly neo-liberal Adam Smith Institute. Founded in 1977 by three graduates of 
St. Andrews University - Madsen Pirie, Eamonn Butler and Stuart Butler - 
it has 
53 Speech to annual conference of the Professional Association of Teachers. Education, 5 August 
1983. 
54 Saville interview. 
55 Sexton interview. 
56 Education, 10 August 1984. 
57 TES, 14 October 1983. 
58 Letwin described the aftermath of the 1983 election as one of `euphoria and shock. . . we won 
the election but had lost the policy. Post-1983 the term "voucher" 
had become a totem and the 
word could not be resuscitated. The problem was how to rescue the 
idea from the flames'. Letwin 
interview. 
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been described as the `youngest, most aggressively ideological and self-confessed 
enfant terrible of the British think tanks'. 59 For Pirie, 
The IEA was the nearest in conception to us but they had a different job 
that was to educate the next generation in sound economics. We went 
straight at policy but each policy had to be below the barricade threshold. 
60 
`Below the barricade threshold' was particularly apposite in Britain as the 
Thatcher government was `concerned to have a battery of policy techniques. . 
. which showed acute sensitivity to that which is politically acceptable'. 
61 The 
`stepping stones' policy towards trade union reform, which originated at the CPS, 
was a text book example of tackling large political problems through pragmatic, 
incremental steps. Education policy appeared to offer another similar arena and 
one in which the ASI could operate. The ASI proposals surfaced in the Omega 
Report, published in 1984.62 `The problems which beset state education', said the 
Report, `share a common origin with those that incapacitate the other 
nationalized service industries: the phenomenon of producer capture'. 63 The 
Report's proposals were aimed at breaking this `producer capture' of teachers 
and the local education authorities and included complete `open entry' to schools 
within the state sector, giving over the power to run schools to the governing 
body, and per capita funding or formula funding for schools. According to Pirie, 
`The voucher never really stood a chance. Bureaucrats will always kill it off as 
the opportunities for alarmism are immense. What we came up with was the 
59 Hames and Feasy, `Anglo-American Think tanks', p. 233. 
60 Pirie interview. 
61 Pirie, M. (1988) Micropolitics: The Creation of Successful Policy. Aldershot: Wildwood 
House, p. 51. 
62 The Report was modelled on Mandate for Leadership published by the Heritage Foundation 
in 
the United States in 1980. Mandate was the distillation of the work of 250 conservative 
academics, writers and activists, and intended to show the way forward for the newly appointed 
republican president, Ronald Reagan. The Omega Report also covered a range of policy areas, 
with the stated intention `to research new ideas, to develop new policy 
initiatives, to analyse the 
obstacles to change and to bring forward into public debate new options which could overcome 
the conventional difficulties'. Although nearly 100 individuals are acknowledged 
for their 
assistance, according to Pirie, the reports were written by `myself, Eamonn 
Butler and Peter 
Young'. Pirie interview. 
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tripod or virtual voucher - free choice of schools, school autonomy though 
control of the budget and per capita funding, these were the bones of the 1988 
Education Act. Of course there were bitter attacks from the Seldons for having 
sold the pass. Our proposals were seen the highest form of treachery'. 64 
The ASI also had strong connections with the No Turning Back Group of 
MPs formed in 1983. According to Michael Fallon, later a junior minister at 
Education, 
At that time Mrs Thatcher was beginning to wrestle with social reform. 
With Keith Joseph at Education there had been five years of intellectual 
agonising and in 1985 she (Mrs Thatcher) was increasingly aware that 
nothing substantial had been achieved in 6 years. Only at the margins. 
The lack of depth in education policy derived partly from Mrs Thatcher's 
own burning during '70 to `74. There was almost a sense of futility, of 
giving it a go but not expecting it to succeed. 65 
Seen by Bob Dunn as `Mrs Thatcher's nursery for the future', 66 this group of 
strongly ambitious and strongly Thatcherite MPs produced their first pamphlet in 
1985. Simply entitled, No Turning Back, its sole argument was for the ending of 
the state monopolies in public services. 67 Although it did not focus specifically 
on education, Mrs Thatcher was interested enough in their ideas to have a 
meeting with the group in November 1985 and ask them to work out their 
proposals for education in more detail. 68 
Details and practicalities were not something that appealed to another 
think tank that appeared in the early 1980s, the Social Affairs Unit (SAU). 
63 ASI (1984) Omega Report: Education Policy. London: Adam Smith Institute, pp. 1-2. 
64 Pirie interview. 
65 Fallon interview. 
66 Dunn interview. 
67 According to Michael Gove, the biographer one of the leading members of the Group, Michael 
Portillo, `No Turning Back was not the work of any one MP. All members had to submit a sheaf 
of papers to Forsyth who was asked to select and edit. He handed the contributions over to Pine 
who wove the mass of radical ideas into a simple and easily recognisable standard for the group to 
raise'. Gove, M. (1995) Michael Portillo, The Future of the Right. London: Fourth Estate, pp. 
137-8. 
68 TES, 25 July 1986. 
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Founded by Digby Anderson, `think tank' is probably a slight misnomer for the 
SAU in comparison to other similarly bounded organisations, in that it tends to 
be long on analysis, eschewing prescriptions in favour of perceptions. 69 Just as 
Anderson had contributed to the CPS Right to Learn, the second SAU 
publication, The Pied Pipers of Education, contained chapters from Anthony 
Flew, John Marks and Caroline Cox. Although these publications contributed in 
general directional terms to the education debate in the early 1980s, arguably the 
more influential ones were the later but more focussed The Wayward Curriculum 
and Who Teaches the Teachers? Like other irregulars, Anderson was more than 
slightly bemused with Keith Joseph and his approach at the DES. Not 
surprisingly, given the tenor of the SAU writings in this period, Anderson was 
asked to see Keith Joseph at the Department. `I and one or two others', recalled 
Anderson, `went along to the Department and met with Keith Joseph, and about 
18 Civil Servants'. 70 Joseph's cocooning by his officials and his decision to work 
for the most part with the grain of the official agenda appeared almost complete 
in the last two years of his time at the DES. In a 1987 interview, Joseph was 
asked, rather gingerly, whether he kept a broad perspective of his role, or was he 
kept `very departmentally engrossed at the DES? T 'I think all my Cabinet service 
including the DES was engrossing', Joseph replied, `to the extent that I don't 
think I left enough energy for the bigger issues'. 71 
The stirrings of a coup 
The extent to which Sir Keith had become `engrossed' with the official agenda 
within his department, and had diverged from many of his colleagues, and the 
Prime Minister, can be seen in the document Better Schools, published in 1985. 
Achievements since 1945 were praised, with no attacks on comprehensives, and 
if there were failings, they were nothing that better management, training, and 
69 Anderson, a former sociology lecturer from Nottingham University, 
described the models for 
the Unit as `the IEA and the Fabians. We don't get as near to policy nuts and 
bolts as the Adam 
Smith Institute might'. Digby Anderson interview, 29 July 1998. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Contemporary Record, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1987, p. 30. 
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teacher appraisal could not put right. 72 After a brief, but deafening, silence from 
Number Ten, Mrs Thatcher then proceeded to run up her colours in no uncertain 
terms. Echoing Sexton's earlier `hypothetical sketch', in a television interview in 
July 1985, she let it be known that she `would like to bring back what are called 
direct grant schools. `We are', she said, `looking at that'. She also gave the 
voucher a public kiss of life, saying that she was `very disappointed that we were 
not able to do the voucher scheme and I sometimes think that I must have another 
go'. 73 Later briefings suggested that consideration was also being given to what 
were described as `independently owned and run primary schools which would 
be of high quality and whose aim would be to stimulate schools in surrounding 
areas to raise standards'. 74 There was no attempt to refute the ideas in Better 
Schools. They were just simply ignored as Mrs Thatcher had more likely 
identified a more attractive agenda from other sources. 
While many of these would not appear until the following year, Dunn 
continued to provide a good public barometer of irregular thinking on education 
policy. Dunn believed that, after 1983, `the flavour of the voucher, certainly with 
the public, had gone', and the `new mode or strategy was to devise an alternative 
model, one with the same principle, where the money would follow the child 75 
Unlike his mentor, Boyson, who `stopped going to the meetings', Dunn, who 
would make no bones about not being an original thinker, decided to start having 
a few of his own in the trawl for ideas. He set up his own mini `think tank' within 
the Department, which met regularly from 1983 to 1985. It consisted of Dunn, 
72 The style of Better Schools was similar to that of a paper Keith Joseph had presented to the 
National Economic Development Council in 1983 on the theme of Education and Industry. `The 
paper', wrote Kenneth Franklin, `reflect(ed) many of the characteristics of papers emanating from 
the DES at this time and over the previous ten years. It offered no clear vision of a way forward. It 
gives the impression of a Department of State so immersed in the complexities of a long 
established system that it had neither the will nor energy to envisage how it might be changed. 
Len Murray summed up the paper neatly in the ensuing discussion when he said "he rated it more 
highly for its history than for its prescription"'. Franklin, `The MSC, the DES and the origins of 
the TVEI', p. 227. 
73 TES, 19 July 1985. 
74 The Times, 18 July 1985. 
75 Dunn maintains that despite her public pronouncements during 1983 and 1984 agreeing with 
her Secretary of State, Mrs Thatcher was never convinced that the idea of the voucher should be 
dropped, but was unwilling to publicly oppose her mentor and 'alter ego' since the 1970s. Dunn 
interview. 
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along with irregulars such as Robert Balchin, Caroline Cox, John Marks, Stuart 
Sexton and John Barnes. According to Balchin, 
We were known as "Dunn's dragoons" within the Department and we 
were basically trying to push forward some ideas from the right wing to 
Keith Joseph, with little success. During Keith Joseph's time we did 
nothing but think about ideas because Keith Joseph wasn't doing 
anything. 76 
Out of these and no doubt other meetings emerged an alternative vision for the 
education system to that being pursued by Keith Joseph. In August 1985, this 
vision was made public by Dunn in a speech that was one of the most significant 
signposts in the direction of the 1988 Education Act. The system he was looking 
for, said Dunn, was one that, by the year 2000, would give Britain a system of 
`independent, separate schools, directly accountable to parents and free to 
manage their own budgets'. This could be achieved, not by one massive step, but 
by diverse routes and in what he called `gentle evolutionary steps'. 77 Letwin, 
echoing Dunn's phrase, saw the way ahead as, `by slow degrees' giving schools 
this experience, and by combining this with a system where `money followed the 
child', effectively ending up with the same result as a voucher scheme. 78 From 
wherever it exactly originated, the notion of `gentle evolutionary steps' or `slow 
degrees' quickly came to dominate the tactics behind future proposals. Soon 
after, Dunn spoke to gatherings of the No Turning Back Group, the IEA and the 
CPS among others. As can be evidenced by Seldon's proposals in The Riddle of 
the Voucher and elsewhere, with calls for `stepping stones' and 'half-way houses' 
to a voucher system, the idea of the voucher principle delivered through discrete 
steps over a period of time was taken on board by the `network'. 
76 Balchin interview. During 1985 both Dunn and Rhodes Boyson (now at the DHSS), along with 
members of the No Turning Back Group also attended the `policy dinners' organised by the 92 
Group of MPs. According to the Group's chairman, their aim was to make `a positive response to 
the debate on education policy within the party and uniting both paternalist-right and market right 
views, with the common aim of fixing items for a future manifesto'. George Gardiner quoted 
in 
Knight, Tory Education Policy, p. 184. 
77 The speech was made at a conference called an `International Symposium on the Open Society' 
in August 1985. TES, 2 August 1985. 
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In pursuing his own course, Dunn had diverged sharply from the line 
being taken by Keith Joseph, who unsurprisingly passed over Dunn the following 
month to promote Chris Patten as his deputy. 79 According to his adviser, Dunn 
had been `going to the limit of what a junior minister could do and not get 
sacked'. 80 By late 1985, this was very unlikely to happen. Mrs Thatcher, who had 
already overcome her reticence about disagreeing with Keith Joseph in public, 
now decided to take an ever-closer interest in the education policies of her 
government. This was highlighted by the appointments of Letwin to the Policy 
Unit, followed by Brian Griffiths, and was partly due to the immense public 
concern over education that Sir Keith had been instrumental, both advertently 
and inadvertently, in engendering. There was also the pressing need to provide 
the Conservative Party with a coherent and radical education policy in the run up 
to the next election. This was something that Keith Joseph had singularly failed 
to do. 
Keith Joseph's Third Way 
While the moves towards encouraging more `choice' in education and devising a 
workable strategy to achieve this continued apace between 1983 and 1986, they 
were almost totally divorced from the work of the Secretary of State for 
Education, who found his time taken up with an altogether different agenda. The 
attempts since 1976 by some in the DES to impose greater central control over 
the curriculum ground on, but were eventually ground down, temporarily, during 
the early 1980s. There were a number of factors that contributed to this, including 
a failure on the part of LEAs to act, or to be made to act, a bureaucratic inertia 
within the DES itself, and the ideological opposition of the Secretary of 
State to 
extending state intervention. According to James Hamilton, the idea of some 
kind 
of a statutory national curriculum had `got a good way with Mark 
Carlisle but we 
78 Letwin interview. 
79 Patten, very much on the left of the Conservative Party, was as committed 
in his own way as 
Keith Joseph was, in trying to make the existing system work better, although 
he did not appear 
entirely confident that this could be achieved. `We must make this partnership work', 
he told the 
Assistant Masters and Mistresses Association conference in 1986, `or else we shall need 
to find 
some other way of organising and running the nation's schools'. 
The Guardian, 5 April 1986. 
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could not get over the opposition of LEAs to any kind of statutory intervention'. 81 
Within the Department, many officials remained `bewitched by the LEAs' and 
either agonised over or opposed pushing for greater intervention. Even such a 
strong character as Hamilton found that `Things can be debated to death in the 
Department and the system itself can steamroller over direct action by sheer 
inertia'. 82 Nor, as we have seen, was Keith Joseph, either in terms of his approach 
to running the Department or from his own ideological background, the man to 
overcome this inertia. 83 
The lack of some kind of direct intervention could hardly have been 
justified by the evidence provided by the LEAs themselves as regards their 
fitness in exercising control over what went on in their schools. Following the 
publication of The School Curriculum, in 1981, LEAs had been asked to review 
their policies and practices. In 1983, the Department issued Circular 8/83, 
requesting LEAs to report to the Secretary of State what progress had been made 
since 1981. Their responses could be seen as a pivotal piece of evidence as 
regards the advice Eric Bolton would later give Keith Joseph's successor, 
Kenneth Baker, over whether he should intervene in the school curriculum. 
Published in 1986, ten years after Ruskin, seven years after the 1979 Local 
Authority Arrangements for the School Curriculum which had highlighted the 
lack of knowledge and control LEAs exercised over the school curriculum, and 
five years after The School Curriculum, the reponse to Circular 8/83 should have 
made salutary reading for any supporters of LEAs. The replies themselves varied 
80 Sexton interview. 
81 Hamilton interview. 
82 Ibid. Hamilton's frustration was also evident in his address he made to the Science Association 
after he had left the Department. TES, 1 July 1983. Some officials were never enamoured 
to 
Hamilton's `outsider' status and his attempt to change the Departmental culture. `He 
[Hamilton} 
didn't have any significant influence really', was the verdict of one Under 
Secretary. `He had 
some ideas when he first came but they were unrealistic. He didn't make much 
difference for 
better or worse'. John Hudson, Deputy Secretary at the DES from 
1972 -1979, quoted in Quoted 
in Davies-Griffith, `The development of education policy', p. 164. 
83 When, in 1983, the Department published its summary of the curriculum debate so far, 
Curriculum I1-16, the Senior Chief inspector, Eric Bolton, wanted to include the phrase an 
`entitlement curriculum' in the main title. The Secretary of State would 
have none of it. `Keith 
Joseph would not allow the word "entitlement" to be used because of the 
implications it would 
have', recalled Bolton, `and I only managed to squeeze it in as 
"Towards a statement of 
entitlement"'. Eric Bolton interview, 3 August 1998. 
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widely `in form and in their degree of detail'. 84 As regards drawing up a 
curriculum policy, `many authorities had only recently produced a policy 
statement or were still in the process of doing so'. 85 With the Report concluding 
that, `As the Authorities themselves recognise, there is still much to be done to 
give their policies practical effect', it was not exactly a catalogue of confident 
advances on all fronts. According to one future Labour education minister, 
'LEAs simply didn't pick up the messages and were not prepared to 
compromise'. 86 A slightly kinder explanation for the LEAs lack of progress and 
ambition in the area of curriculum planning was offered by Denis Lawton. 'LEAs 
didn't know what to do', said Lawton, `Curriculum planning was left to 
professionals and, in the case of schools, often to the level of the individual 
professional. There had been a missed opportunity in the area of planning with 
the Schools Council, which had real power, real money, but were sidetracked into 
playing politics'. 87 
The lack of any kind of unifying central control of the curriculum by 
LEAs might have been slightly less worrying, had schools themselves shown that 
they were capable of exercising some kind of micro-control at institutional level. 
But the evidence here was also not very encouraging. In the wake of the Ruskin 
speech, HMI had produced the reports on primary and secondary schools, 
published in 1977 and 1979 respectively. In primary schools, criticisms included 
a lack of progression in planning work, low expectations in inner city schools, 
inappropriate teaching methods and teacher expertise. 88 The report on secondary 
schools echoed some of these criticisms, as well as the quality and breadth of the 
curriculum. `The curriculum', said the report, `has no nationally defined content 
84 DES (1986) Local Authority Policies for the School Curriculum. Report on the Circular 8183 
Review. London: HMSO, p. 3. 
85 As regards developing and managing their teaching forces, coherence, breath and balance, 
continuity and progression, links with industry and commerce, and relevance, `A number 
have 
formulated staffing policies which explicitly draw on objectives for the curriculum but they are 
not being put into effect... Some authorities, however, have little to say about coherence... 
although many authorities recognised in principle the importance of continuity between phases, 
relatively few described practical measures that would put it into effect... Some authorities 
reported the creation of working groups to investigate relevance and the practical content of 
the 
curriculum'. Ibid., p. 9. 
86 Tessa Blackstone interview, 27 August 1998. 
87 Lawton interview. 
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in this country', and went on to criticise the appropriateness of teaching styles, 
tied too closely as they were to the examination system, and the inadequacy of 
teachers' skills. 89 
Five years later, little progress appeared to have been made. One of the 
few neo-liberal steps that Keith Joseph had actually introduced to help raise 
standards was the publication of HMI reports from 1982. By making the reports 
public, Keith Joseph felt that, as with the publication of examination results since 
1980, parents-consumers would be better able to make informed choices about 
where they could send their children, always assuming that they did have an 
effective choice. In Education Observed 2, a review of reports written between 
January 1983 and March 1984, it was found that in primary schools, there had 
been little change since the HMI report in 1977.90 In secondary schools, there 
were similar findings with continued low expectations and inappropriate teaching 
methods `especially of pupils at the upper and lower ends of the ability range'. 91 
Still unable to bring himself to sanction either direct intervention into the 
curriculum, or to promote free market reforms, Keith Joseph initially felt that he 
could find a `third way'. Combined with exhortation, this included reforms such 
as publishing HMI reports, improving teacher training, introducing a more 
vocational curriculum or option for some students, and perhaps most 
significantly, reforming the examination system. 92 His Permanent Secretary at the 
time, although agreeing with the possibility of achieving change through exam 
reform, was less enthused by Keith Joseph's rationale for doing so. 
`Concentration in exam work was the philosophy of despair', said James 
Hamilton, `We couldn't get Ministers to impose their will on Local Education 
93 
Authorities so the only central power was in examination reform'. 
This 
88 DES (1977) Primary Education in England: A Survey by HM Inspectors of Schools. London: 
HMSO, Chapter 8, ii and passim. 
89 DES (1979) Aspects of Secondary Education in England. A Survey by HM 
Inspectors of 
Schools. London: HMSO, p. 266 and passim. 
90 DES (1984) Education Observed 2. A review of reports by HMI Inspectors in primary schools 
and 11-16 and 12-16 Comprehensive Schools. London: HMSO, pp. 
1-6. 
91 Ibid., 6-8. 
92 In an interview with Stephen Ball, Keith Joseph said that 
`short of going back to 1870, one is 
very limited in what one can do. Very limited. I tried to escape 
from that constraint by way of an 
examination reform'. Ball, Politics and Policy Making, p. 
174. 
93 Hamilton interview. 
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`philosophy of despair' was too much for Hamilton and he resigned from the 
DES in 1983, returning to industry. 94 His verdict on the previous seven years was 
that the DES and by implication the politicians had `erred on the side of safety'; 
there still was `an argument for the DES acting more directly in certain limited 
areas of the curriculum'. 95 
Although he shared many of the frustrations of those who worked with 
Keith Joseph, Hamilton's successor, David Hancock also observed that his 
Secretary of State was `not always totally indecisive' when the right issue arose. 
Chiming as it did with Joseph's concern for the low level of attainment of the 
bottom 40 per cent, the implementation of a single examination was one of those 
issues. By any criteria, the move toward a single examination, the GCSE as it 
became, should have not got past a determined Conservative administration. 
During Mark Carlisle's time, James Hamilton recalled the `great unease over the 
move to the new GCSE', especially from Boyson and Sexton. But there was a 
friend in the political camp in the guise of the Minister of State, Lady Young, 
who was `towards the liberal wing of the Conservative Party'. `She was very 
close to the Prime Minister', recalled Hamilton, `and it went ahead largely 
through her efforts to persuade Number Ten in favour of the GCSE, or at least 
not to oppose it'. 96 There remained a lot of persuading to do and David Hancock 
felt that the cause of the GCSE `still needed a strong Secretary of State to take it 
up'. 97 Surprisingly, that person proved to be Keith Joseph and as with many other 
things, the optimism of the opponents of the GCSE on his appointment, was soon 
dispelled in the face of his acceptance of the single exam. According to Eric 
Bolton, `The approval of the GCSE by Keith Joseph, the arch elitist, really shook 
Number Ten. The Oliver Letwins never could and never would accept the idea'. 
98 
Not only did it `shake' Number Ten, but a lesser figure than Joseph may not have 
managed to push it through. `There was pressure from Number Ten and the 
94 Hamilton's replacement was the more orthodox mandarin, David Hancock. When asked about 
the perception of his immediate predecessor as the `great centralist' in the light of 
his inheritance, 
Hancock could only manage the almost wistful comment that `If Hamilton was a great centralist, 
he didn't succeed very well'. Hancock interview. 
95 TES, I July 1983. 
96 Hamilton interview. 
97 Hancock interview. 
98 Bolton interview. 
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political right not to approve it', Sexton later said, `But in the end Mrs Thatcher 
couldn't stop him. After all, it had been her own mentor, Sir Keith Joseph, who 
had said we could no longer continue to have a well-educated elite and the 
lumpen remainder'. 99 
In approving the examination, Joseph no doubt felt that he could manage 
its development and implementation on his own terms. For one thing, there 
would be no Schools Council involvement. There would, in fact, be no Schools 
Council. The question of the Council itself had been unfinished business for 
some within the Department, notably Walter Ulrich, since at least the publication 
of the Yellow Book. In 1984 it was abolished, to be replaced by two bodies. In an 
experience to be replicated in turn by their replacements after the introduction of 
the National Curriculum, all the members to the Schools Curriculum 
Development Committee (SCDC) and the Schools Examinations Committee 
(SEC), were to be appointed by the Secretary of State. Keith Joseph clearly hoped 
that he could both cater for the full ability ranges, yet ensure the rigour of the 
examination through controlling the assessment criteria. The new SEC was to 
appraise the draft national criteria and advise the Secretary of State, with whom 
the final decision would rest. In this, however, Keith Joseph's reach vastly 
exceeded his grasp. John Marks recalled one instance when `Keith Joseph turned 
up at a meeting with the new GCSE criteria and pored over and agonised over 
which of these would be set in stone to lever standards up'. 10° The saga of 
devising and agreeing the new criteria may have been a mere novella compared 
with the later opus of the National Curriculum, but it was far too much for any 
Secretary of State to hope to monitor and control, especially for one as prone to 
indecision as Keith Joseph. His colleagues on the right were never reconciled to 
the GCSE, seeing it as yet another example of the educational establishment 
having pulled a `fast one' on Keith Joseph. Out of office, Joseph himself was 
inclined to agree with them: 
Stretching was my favourite word; I judged that if you lent on that much 
else would follow. That's what my officials encouraged me to imagine I 
99 Quoted in Phillips, All Must Have Prizes, p. 138. 
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was achieving... and now I find that unconsciously I have allowed teacher 
assessment, to a greater extent than I assumed. My fault. . . my fault ... it's 
flabby. 101 
Conclusion 
In many ways, with Joseph's legacy to his successor, the whole was greater than 
the sum of the parts. His own verdict was that, `I think what I can claim to have 
achieved is to have shifted the emphasis from quantity to quality'. 102 While there 
is a strong case for agreeing with Keith Joseph's own evaluation of his time at the 
DES, at a time of financial stringency, he may have willed the ends but he was 
unwilling to provide the means. His biographer's verdict on Keith Joseph's 
parsimony was that `There was also a point where Keith Joseph perhaps needed 
to be saved from his own financial conscience'. 103 Another blindspot, as it was 
with many of his successors, was his dealings with the teachers that led to the 
prolonged and bitter strikes of the mid-1980s. Despite his own protestations 
about how he frequently was willing to praise the work of the teaching 
profession, many felt that his heart was not in it. Nor were they incorrect. 
According to Hancock, `He (Joseph) had a violent prejudice against the teaching 
profession the nature of which I never understood. He was unreasonably tough 
and never understood or cared about the damage he was causing in the challenge 
to raise standards'. 104 
While his war of attrition with the teacher unions helped prepare the 
ground for Kenneth Baker's later steamrolling of the profession, like much of 
100 Marks interview. 
101 Ball, Politics and Policy Making, p. 174. Some officials were not too enamoured with how the 
GCSE had been devised and implemented. According to Clive Saville `The GCSE was a disaster 
that blew back on the National Curriculum'. Saville interview. 
102 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 83. 
103 Halcrow, Single Mind, p. 167. Sexton recalled that Mark Carlisle would come back to the 
Department `bleeding' from his bouts with the Treasury in his attempts to defend education 
spending. Eric Bolton's recollection of Keith Joseph was often how `in meetings with people he 
(Keith Joseph) would accept their case but finish by saying that he couldn't bring himself to go to 
the Treasury to ask for money. More surprisingly he often got away without any argument as 
he 
was so respected for his views'. Sexton in Denham, A. and Garnett, M. (2001) Keith 
Joseph. 
Chesham: Acumen, p. 368, and Bolton interview. 
104 Hancock interview. 
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Keith Joseph's legacy, it was unintended. The publicity garnered by the teacher 
strikes helped push education up the public and political agenda, as thoughts of 
the next election began to take hold in Downing Street. 105 His failure to pursue 
his market instincts, other than keeping public spending down, led to alternative 
policies for the introduction of market forces being developed within and around 
his own Party. The process by which these polices were developed, which 
effectively by-passed the existing policy community, would provide a template 
for future attempts at policy development. Prior to the 1983 election, the main 
focus for the irregulars had been the battle for the implementation of the long 
cherished education voucher. This battle was lost, primarily because there 
remained a large vacant space between the existing schools system and the 
gotterdammerung of a voucher system, a space - whether political, practical, 
educational or financial - that many felt was too far to cross. Following the 1983 
election, there was a tactical reappraisal by the irregulars of the methods by 
which greater choice could be introduced into the education system, with a type 
of voucher system as the lodestar rather than the immediate demand. While Keith 
Joseph remained in post, this strand of policy remained unloved and unexploited. 
While these developments took place out of public sight, Keith Joseph's 
decision to work very much within the grain of the regular agenda, concealed the 
danger to the influence of the traditional `partners' that was brewing off stage. It 
also concealed the growing divergence within that grouping itself, in particular, 
between the LEAs and the DES. In documents such as the HMI reports we can 
see the background context to Keith Joseph's chosen course of trying to raise 
standards in comprehensives, but also the continuing difficulty in achieving this 
primarily through exhortation. The LEAs' responses, and the evidence from 
schools, were demonstrating that the necessary coherence and relevance in the 
curriculum, and the competence in the classroom, were lacking. Yet here too, 
Keith Joseph's `this far and no more' exhortational stance to curriculum control, 
despite the evidence of the bankruptcy of this approach, also left this strand of 
105 Even before the prolonged teacher strikes, after the SAU published the very much tongue-in- 
cheek, Detecting Bad Schools. A Guide for Normal Parents, Digby Anderson recalled 
his surprise 
at being immediately asked `to appear on 19 TV and radio shows. What this 
demonstrated was 
that there was an enormous hunger for people to say unsayable things about schools and 
teachers. 
It legitimised the notion that "it is reasonable to give teachers a rough time"'. 
Anderson interview. 
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educational policy `in the air'. By 1986, among Keith Joseph's legacies to his 
successor were the parallel arguments between his irregular and regular 
advisers. The latter argued for more central and in particular, more curriculum 
control. The former insisted on the introduction of market forces into the 
education system. Keith Joseph never came close to reconciling either of these 
approaches. Michael Foot once described Keith Joseph as being like `a hapless 
magician-conjuror, who smashes a watch and then forgets the rest of the trick'. 106 
By 1986, with a general election looming, Mrs Thatcher decided that it was time 
to call on a more adept `magician-conjuror', one who might be able to fit all the 
disparate pieces together. 
106 Denham and Garnett, Keith Joseph, p. 363. 
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CHAPTER 5 
May 1986 - July 1989: Dash for Glory 
Introduction 
A tired and almost broken Keith Joseph resigned in May 1986.1 In his letter to 
Mrs Thatcher he indicated that `A fresh voice was needed at the DES to carry 
forward and develop our policies'. 2 The `fresh voice' that did follow Keith 
Joseph was to be that of Kenneth Baker, who did indeed provide a totally new 
sense of elan and urgency to education policy. Yet for someone who publicly 
appeared so dominant at the time, his contribution to the policy-making process 
was subject to dispute almost from the day of his appointment. A typical view 
was aired in Education. As regards Baker's contribution to the education 
proposals in the 1987 manifesto, it was said that `Despite months of careful 
grooming it is clear that his Party's manifesto was prepared in his absence with 
Mrs Thatcher calling the shots ... 
(Baker's) control seems to have been largely 
cosmetic and presentational'. 3 This chapter examines Kenneth Baker and his 
contribution to the policy process between 1986 and 1987. What was the 
immediate context in which the policy proposals emerged? Who else was 
involved in this process and what were their contributions and influence? What 
were the implications of this new process for future decisions and directions? 
Enter the Renaissance Man 
Whatever qualities other Secretaries of State brought to the job, none certainly 
seemed to have brought the same sense of fun as Kenneth Baker. John Caines, 
who worked with Baker at the Department of Trade and Industry and was later 
1 `By the end of 1985 Keith Joseph had run out of steam as anyone could see. He wanted out. 
He 
was tired and he was ill and a lot of things had gone wrong. He'd had a great battering'. 
Richard 
Bird, Deputy Secretary at the DES from 1980-90, quoted in Davies-Griffith, `The development of 
education policy', p. 145. 
2 Quoted in Lawton, D. (1992) Education and Politics in the 1990s. Conflict or Consensus? 
Lewes: Falmer Press, p. 42. 
3 Education, 29 May 1987. 
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Permanent Secretary during Baker's last weeks at the DES, described him as `an 
engaging character who operated on sheer bravado, a real high wire artist'. 4 In 
order to achieve Cabinet office under Mrs Thatcher, Baker had considerably 
trimmed his sails since working as Edward Heath's Parliamentary Private 
Secretary, and as organiser of Heath's unsuccessful campaign against Mrs 
Thatcher in 1975. In his memoirs, Baker claims that he had two watchwords, 
`standards and choice', 5 although `Kenneth and Baker' might have been more 
apt. It was unlikely that he ever was `one of us'. He certainly was never a neo- 
liberal, but he knew which script would play well with Number Ten. The 
education system, he would argue in words that echoed the Adam Smith 
Institute, had become `producer dominated', a `new vitality' had to be injected 
into it to `raise standards' and `extend choice'. 6 
Baker, the `supreme pragmatist', 7 could adopt such a mantle with little or 
no self-consciousness. He was someone with `an air of absolute certainty, not 
beset by any intellectual doubts as was his more thoughtfully and philosophically 
minded predecessor', 8 something he himself was happy to acknowledge. `I was 
not as intellectually distinguished as Keith', he later told a journalist, `but I was 
a doer'. 9 In terms of what exactly this `doer' was intended to `do', Baker 
recalled, 
I think Margaret appointed me to that job to do things. I inherited a series 
of crises. Fires had to be fought and fires had to be put out. Mrs Thatcher 
simply said "Get a grip". She didn't tell me to do anything at all, just talk 
to Keith Joseph to see what is needed. I am convinced that she did not 
have any agenda for reform. Perhaps some of her advisers had but she 
had not turned her mind to it. She was still full of angst and anger at her 
time at Education and just wanted someone to sort it out and not bother 
4 Caines interview. In an unmerited tone of condescension John Major described Baker as 
`political reflex made flesh. . . more suited to a 
different more fluid era of politics'. Major, John 
Major, p. 208,350. 
5 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 165. 
6 Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 123, col. 771,1 December 1987. 
7 Wilby, P. `Close up: Kenneth Baker', Marxism Today, April 1987. 
8 M. Morris and C. Griggs, `Thirteen wasted years? ' in M. Morris and C. Griggs 
(eds. ) (1988) 
Education - The Wasted Years 1973-1986. 
Lewes: Falmer Press, p. 21. 
9 `Why are you still smiling Kenneth? ' TES, 31 May 1996. 
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her to get it done. Then some of the debates triggered her own instincts 
and prejudices later on. '° 
Clearly eager for political success, he was not retiring about his political 
ambitions. After having interviewed him for a newspaper profile, one journalist 
reflected that `in his replies... there was little attempt to conceal the fact that he 
sees the Education Reform Act as a test of his qualities for the leadership when 
the time comes'. I i Few of his colleagues shared this belief. Mrs Thatcher's 
ungenerous verdict in her memoirs was that she simply hoped he would make up 
`in presentational flair whatever he lacked in attention to detail'. 12 Yet while 
Baker was ambitious, he was transparently so and it was this transparency, 
obvious to all and sundry, that contributed much to his charm. He was also 
capable of paying `attention to detail' when it suited his purposes. As someone 
whom one official described as `the consummate politician, never unaware of 
possible political outcomes', 13 prior to being appointed, Baker had been eyeing 
up how Education could provide just such an opportunity for advancement. `I 
was aware of issues stirring in the education world from my time as Environment 
Secretary', he recalled a decade later: `Keith Joseph had raised the issue of 
quality, an area that the education establishment did not want to see raised or 
interfered with and they saw him off . 14 Just how `aware' Baker had been of the 
opportunities the DES might provide, surprised even his closest colleagues. 
According to his adviser, Tony Kerpel, 
10 Kenneth Baker interview. 17 November 1998. 
11 `Playing a long game', The Independent, 23 September 1988. 
12 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 589. Nigel Lawson's verdict was that Baker was `a most 
civilised man with an agreeably sunny disposition but not even his greatest friends would 
describe him as a profound thinker or a man with a mastery of detail'. Lawson, N. (1992) The 
View from No. IL London: Bantam Press, p. 606. 
13 Owen interview. As a testament to Baker's political antennae, John Gaines described one 
incident during the early days of opting out, when there was `a big row' over a prominent Roman 
Catholic school that wished to go Grant Maintained. Basil Hume, the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Westminster, was insisting that the vote would not take place. According to 
Gaines, `Kenneth Baker insisted that it would. It was the law of the land. I advised Baker that he 
was in danger of creating a martyr, perhaps even sending him (Hume) to jail, this humble and 
serene man. Baker simply said, "This is not about humility. It is about power and Basil Hume 
knows as much about power as any of us. " Hume backed down'. Gaines interview. 14 Baker interview. 
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Although it was not much of a surprise that Baker was appointed as Keith 
Joseph's successor - he had been angling for it for a long time - what 
surprised me was how quickly he hit the ground running. Baker certainly 
had a greater knowledge of Education than I had appreciated. He very 
quickly had meetings with officials and put forward a raft of ideas. He 
had clearly been sizing up Education from his position at Environment. 15 
One aspect that had been exercising Baker was his Civil Servants at the DES. 
Through his own observations and discussions with colleagues, and in particular 
David Young at the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), Baker was aware 
of the nature of the senior officials and the perceived culture within the 
Department. 16 In his memoirs, Baker described the DES as `among those with 
the strongest in-house ideology'. 17 Singled out as the real locus of power within 
the Schools Branch was Walter Ulrich, whom Baker described as a purveyor of 
`formidable intellectual bullying' 18 and the `main intellectual seducer of Keith 
Joseph'. 19 The other `locus of power' in the Department was Nick Stuart, and 
after Ulrich's retirement in 1987, Baker would work closely with Stuart dealing 
with the 1988 Act. Baker described him as `very authoritarian, very autocratic 
and arrogant'. At the same time `He (Stuart) was also someone who serves his 
masters well if he thinks they will be winners'. The new Secretary of State 
certainly felt that the existing Permanent Secretary, the emollient David 
Hancock, who was later described as having `a managerial rather than a 
magisterial view of the education service'20 was not his ideal. Damning him with 
faint praise as someone who `took very seriously his role as Accounting Officer 
15 Kerpel interview. 
16 Baker interview. 
17 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 168. Baker's adviser also recalled how starkly the impression that 
education was `too insular, that it would benefit from outside influence' was brought into sharp 
relief on Baker's first day at the DES: `Kenneth Baker and myself were met on the steps of 
Elizabeth House by Nick Stuart whom I had known back in 1969 and this only reinforced the 
notion of the impenetrability of the Whitehall culture'. Kerpel interview. 
18 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 167. 
19 Baker interview. 
20 Education, 12 May 1989. When questioned by the Education, Arts and Science Committee 
(ESAC) of the Commons in 1988 about `productivity' in the DES, 
Hancock replied that 
`Productivity is almost impossible to measure in a policy department 
like the DES... but the 
Department has told me that they are working very much harder'. Lawrence, 
I. (1992) Power and 
Politics at the Department of Education and Science, London: 
Cassell p. 117. 
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for the universities, and the world of higher education', 21 Baker initially tried to 
have Hancock replaced as well as bringing in some `new blood' into the top 
echelons of the DES. According to Tony Kerpel, `Baker tried but was unable to 
get Geoffrey Holland over from the MSC. The appointment of people like Jenny 
Bacon (from the MSC) was part of a general reassessment of the role of 
education'. 
22 
Baker himself said that he `considered the appointment of Jenny Bacon in 
great detail with David Hancock. She was a breath of fresh air, a force for 
change'. 23 Bacon would later be responsible for producing perhaps the most 
contentious document of the period, The National Curriculum 5-16. She was 
certainly aware of the context of her transfer, both to Baker's immediate 
ambitions, and also to those within the Department who had been manoeuvring 
for greater DES control over the curriculum: 
I was seen by Walter Ulrich and Nick Stuart as useful for taking forward 
some of the things the DES lifers wanted. They needed a pair of hob nail 
boots. The MSC was for the fast stream Civil Servants who had a can do 
approach. We were more open and less intellectual that the DES Civil 
Servants who were very bright and tabled very erudite submissions to 
ministers. My submissions were far less erudite and agonised. They were 
more brutal and confronted Ministers with decisions to be made. 24 
Despite some early teething troubles, Baker felt that he soon `made it clear that I 
had an agenda which I expected officials to deliver. There was only room for one 
boss in my Departments'. 25 To a point, this was true. Like a dashing general, 
Baker led from the front. After the torpor and indecision of previous years, the 
Department was no doubt delighted to have a new dynamic figure in charge, 
someone unambiguously on the way up for a change. They were also very aware 
21 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 166. 
22 Kerpel interview. 
23 Baker interview. 
24 Bacon interview. A interesting comparison of the differing cultures within the DES and the 
MSC can be found in Franklin, `The MSC, the DES and the Origins of the TVEI'. 
See e. g. p. 343 
where the author provides a table of the contrasting institutional characteristcics. 
25 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 167. 
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that Baker's eyes were firmly fixed on possible political prizes somewhere down 
the line, and that he had neither the time, nor the inclination to bother about the 
logistics of his proposals. One education journalist described how, on one 
overseas trip with Baker, `the Civil Servants would bring great boxes of papers 
and his (Baker's) eyes would glaze over. The papers were soon put away and he 
would take out a poetry book'. 26 His adviser's assessment was that `Baker had a 
very quick intelligence. He could cut to the chase very quickly. But that did not 
ensure that all the nuts and bolts were tightened down before he embarked on a 
project. He was not intellectually fastidious, not a reflective person'. 27 As such, 
there developed almost a kind of Faustian pact between Secretary of State and 
his senior officials. They would work with him on delivering his preferred ideas, 
while he was happy to leave the nitty gritty to his officials, as, indeed, they were 
delighted to accept, knowing full well that the devil lay in the detail. This 
arrangement may have suited both parties at the time, but it only served to 
alienate many of Baker's erstwhile political colleagues and stored up trouble for 
his successors. 
If his former mentor, Heath, had his `dash for growth', Baker had his own 
`dash for glory'. 28 During his first year, he launched a series of education 
initiatives, leaving the Education world and his department reportedly 'huffing 
and puffing' to keep up as the ideas came `thick and fast'. 29 The immediate 
agenda, also key to Baker's already gestating plans for reform, was the issue of 
the ongoing union action. The prolonged industrial action under Keith Joseph 
had depleted both public goodwill and their members' morale. Baker was quick 
to capitalise on this. `You can't overestimate the importance of that strike', he 
later said, `I took away all negotiating rights from the union. It was quite brutal. . 
. 
It was absolutely extreme stuff . 30 After `dispensing' with the union problem, 
the first new policy was unveiled at the Conservative Party Conference in 
October 1986, the establishment of a series of City Technology Colleges (CTCs). 
26 Clare interview. 
27 Kerpel interview. 
28 Edward Heath's gamble in 1973 to reflate the economy was known as the `dash for growth'. 
See Campbell, J. (1993) Edward Heath. A Biography. London: Jonathon Cape, Ch. 28. 
29 Wilby, `Kenneth Baker'. Even his adviser was somewhat overwhelmed at the speed of 
developments. `Initiatives rather snowballed', said Kerpel, `In managerial terms, Kenneth 
Baker 
wanted a "big bang" rather than a piecemeal approach'. Kerpel interview. 
30 'How a political coup bred educational disaster', The Guardian, 16 September 
1999. 
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In December, he announced his intention to set up a national curriculum. The 
following month, at the North Of England Conference, Baker expanded on this, 
saying that he believed the `present system, locally administered' was `maverick, 
eccentric and muddled'. In April, he announced to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Education that the efficiency of the new National Curriculum 
would be measured by tests for pupils at ages 7,11 and 14. A few days later, at 
the Secondary Heads Association Conference, he announced plans to devolve 
financial control of schools to heads and governors. Finally, at the end of a busy 
April, he gave `the clearest hint' that a re-elected Conservative government 
would `allow schools to opt out of the Local Education Authority system', and 
that CTCs would `point the way ahead for many other types of schools after the 
election'. 31 
In this series of announcements, Baker had outlined the basis for the next 
Tory manifesto, and indeed the Education Reform Act of 1988. Some would 
interpret his proposals as part of some great educational master plan or 
conspiracy by the right wing of the Conservative Party, with Baker having 
`succumbed to the influence of such extremist groupings as the Hillgate Group 
and Institute of Economic Affairs'. 32 But Baker's approach, both by personal 
instinct and by political necessity was completely broad-brush. He was like a 
Jackson Pollock, splashing colours all over the education canvass, leaving others 
to read into it what they will. Perhaps the most accurate assessment of what 
happened was provided by Denis Lawton: `I don't think that there was a 
conspiracy among the right-wing groups, but there was enough of an agreement 
among them to get things through. There might have been a lack of coherence 
but there were several little messages'. 33 Only a consummate political broker or 
fixer, such as Baker, would have been able to find a settlement, which would 
keep the party and its allies united in the run up to the general election just over a 
year away. This he achieved with a political flair that his predecessor so 
singularly and uncompromisingly lacked. Yet the Baker `settlement' was a 
highly unstable edifice, unsurprisingly so given the range of `little messages' that 
31 For various reports on these announcements, see, The Independent, 7 October 1986; TES, 
16 
January 1987,10 April 1987,1 May 1987. 
32 Chitty, C. `Two Models of a National Curriculum: origins and interpretation', in Lawton and 
Chitty, National Curriculum, pp. 45-46. 
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were swirling around education policy at the time from the politicos, the regulars 
and the irregulars. 
Pragmatist under pressure 
Given the ongoing internal tensions and debates there would have been within 
the DES, and the very public onslaught of ideas that were being generated by the 
irregulars during 1986-87, it is little wonder that even as nimble-footed an 
operator as Kenneth Baker found himself under enormous pressure at this time. 
One commentator recalled that, `There were times when I think Baker was 
overwhelmed by the challenge of carrying so many people with him'. 34 Part of 
this pressure was obviously self-generated. With his own long-term ambitions 
firmly in mind, Baker saw this period as, in many ways, the key to his successful 
stewardship of Education: 
The critical element was the crystallisation of ideas prior to the 1987 
manifesto. The manifesto had several pages on education. Margaret 
wanted to get something done on social reform and I wanted to pin the 
party down. 35 
Like other ministerial colleagues from this era, Baker has dismissed any notion 
that the irregulars could have possibly influenced his policy decisions. `I was 
aware that they (outside advisers) were in the background, briefing Margaret', he 
recalled. `But they had no major effect on any changes that we brought in. I am 
absolutely sure of that'. 36 Baker also had to deal with an added element of 
pressure with which his predecessors did not have to contend. This was the 
willingness of a powerful Prime Minister to intervene in the detail of education 
policy, and who had a network of allies with whom she was very publicly 
33 Lawton interview. 
34 Wilby interview. 
35 Baker interview. 
36 Ibid. This view was backed by Kerpel: `I had little time for outside advisers but only as ginger 
groups. It did help to have some people on the outside with their own platforms and questioning 
the orthodoxies. The education establishment had their own platforms with which they would 
regularly attack the government. But you shouldn't read anything into having meetings with 
them. It was only good political sense'. Kerpel interview. 
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aligned. It was well known that the No Turing Back Group were very much her 
favourites and according to Michael Fallon, `We were all pushing very hard on 
education. We weren't beating up on Kenneth Baker but there was a rigorous 
amount of egging on'. 37 Mrs Thatcher's own creation, the CPS, was another 
source. Although John Marks recalled that he had to `fight like mad to get 
Kenneth Baker to come to the ESG meetings', 38 after one such meeting Baker 
was reported to have remarked in exasperation to Kerpel that, `these are the 
people setting the education agenda'. 39 
In July 1986, the NTBG had produced their proposals as requested the 
previous November. 40 The subsequent pamphlet was called SOS: Save Our 
Schools. 41 This proposed the creation of independent school boards dominated 
by parents; direct funding of schools by the DES on the basis of the number of 
pupils enrolled, with the schools free to spend the grant as they wished and LEAs 
becoming `vestigial' and advisory in most functions; and the right of parents to 
send their children to any school prepared to accept them. The Group was 
reported to believe that their ideas were in tune with those of Mrs Thatcher, who 
promised that the pamphlet would be required reading for her Education 
Secretary over the summer holiday. 42 According to Eric Forth, a member of the 
Group and later Baker's PPS, `Mrs Thatcher felt a bit guilty as very little had 
been done. Everybody woke up in the 1980s and ideas came tumbling out. We 
(the NTBG) were trying to create a more radical framework for the discussion of 
education policy'. 43 Baker, who was shown a draft copy, was equally reported to 
have been furious with its contents, insisting on changes prior to publication. 
37 Fallon interview. 
38 Marks interview. 
39 Wilby and Midgely, As the New Right wields its power. 
40 How their eventual proposals were shaping up and how much emphasis and importance was 
being placed on education reform, can be gauged from the fact that, in March 1986, the 
leading 
light of the NTBG, Michael Portillo, used a rare slice of Commons time allocated to 
backbenchers to press the case for greater parental choice in education. `Trust parents', 
Portillo 
urged the government, `give them responsibility and they will prove to be responsible. 
I would 
rather rely on the collective wisdom of parents than on the accumulated wisdom of 
Civil 
Servants, educationists, and dare I say, ministers'. Gove, Portillo, p. 143. 
41 According to Madsen Pirie the process described by Michael Gove in producing the 
first 
pamphlet was given a slightly different spin for the preparation of this second 
NTBG pamphlet. `I 
wrote every word of Save Our Schools', recalled Pirie, `and then wrote an editorial 
for the 
Telegraph praising the pamphlet. I actually charged £1000 and 
did it on the understanding that I 
didn't have to read any of the papers prepared by Forsyth'. Pirie 
interview. 
42 Sunday Times, 20 July 1986. 
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Although the main proposals remained unchanged, some of the Group's 
criticisms of the state education system that could have been considered as 
critical of the government, and some `fairly intemperate remarks' about officials 
and teachers, were toned down. 44 
At least Baker had the benefit of seeing these proposals prior to 
publication, as unbeknown to him at the time, his Cabinet colleague, Nigel 
Lawson, had decided to put his own personal proposals on education reform to 
Mrs Thatcher. Lawson believed that `it was hard to imagine that we would get 
from Kenneth the fundamental thinking about education reform that I am sure 
was needed'. 45 His proposals, variations of which would continue to surface 
throughout the 1990s, involved taking education finance `off the rates' and 
entirely out of the hands of LEAs (placing it of course into hands of the 
Treasury), a core curriculum, and devolved budgets. 46 Although Mrs Thatcher 
decided not to take on the LEAs to this extent in 1987, it was at this time 
according to Lawson that she set up a Cabinet Sub-Committee to deal with 
education reform. The sub-committee consisted of Mrs Thatcher herself in the 
chair, Brian Griffiths as Head of the Policy Unit, Baker and Lawson. Meanwhile, 
Bob Dunn, who had kept his position after Baker's appointment, was to take an 
increasingly-prominent role in the lead up to, and during, the election campaign. 
In July 1986, he made an uncompromising call to `privatise education', with the 
role of the state being confined to helping those who are not properly catered for 
in a free market system'. 47 Almost the same day, Sir John Hoskyns, former head 
of the Number Ten Policy Unit and then Director General of the Institute of 
Directors, urged the preparation of a radical Tory manifesto with education 
credits to be introduced in the longer term, and spending on welfare in general to 
be reduced to ensure that it targeted only those `in greatest need'. 48 This same 
call was reiterated in Stuart Sexton's Our Schools: A Radical Policy, published 
the following year. 
43 Forth interview. 
44 TES, 25 July 1986. 
45 Lawson, View from No. ]], p. 606. 
46 Lawson's over-inflated claims of influence were unanimously derided by officials and 
politicans interviewed for one study of the 1988 Act. See Davies-Griffith, `The development of 
education policy', pp. 159-161. 
47 TES, 4 August 1986. 
113 
One of Baker's first actions on being appointed was to replace Sexton 
with his own adviser, Tony Kerpel. Baker claims he sacked Sexton, though the 
latter claims he left. 49 Both men had known each other previously, at one point 
serving on the Sherlock Committee set up by Carlisle in 1981 to report on the 
then extant Inner London Education Authority. There was very little love lost 
between them. `I was uneasy with him', said Baker, `He was an uncertain person, 
an intriguer. Not the person to go tiger shooting with'. 5° With Sexton's departure 
also went the role of specialist education adviser within the Department. In a 
way, education as an issue had, or was about to achieve a political prominence 
that would outgrow any single adviser. None would subsequently find 
themselves in the position where, at one point, Sexton claimed he was writing 
questions for backbenchers to ask Keith Joseph at Ministers' questions, and then 
being asked by Joseph to write his reply at the despatch box. 51 Advisers from 
now on were entirely political creatures, and some would be better than others. 
Perhaps the most effective in this role was Sexton's successor, Tony Kerpel. 52 
From the outset, Kerpel saw his role as very different to that of Sexton: 
Keith Joseph's relationship with Stuart Sexton was not productive in the 
Department as there were too many antagonisms. The special adviser 
needs to be self-effacing and not a wannabe Cabinet Minister. He is more 
like a rock and roll manager keeping the show on the road rather than a 
professor. I was interested in the politics of policy - "How was it going to 
float? "- and not a supernumerary Civil Servant. Kenneth Baker's 
timetable was short term. His ideas were controversial and needed selling. 
48 Quoted in Simon, Education and the Social Order, p. 529 
49 Sexton tells a colourful story of Baker's first day at the DES, his own last. `Baker arrived early 
before I had cleared my desk', recalled Sexton, `Baker's secretary then rang to summon me to the 
new Secretary of State's office. As soon as I entered the room, Baker called over to him from 
behind that enormous desk, "I'm not a centraliser you know"; I said, "Oh but you are Kenneth", 
whereupon Baker just smiled and said, "Cheerio then"'. Exit Sexton. Sexton interview. 
50 Baker interview. 
51 Sexton interview. 
52 Kerpel had been Chairman of the Young Conservatives, after which he had a brief spell in the 
Press Office at the DES before leaving to join the British Board of Film 
Censors. He stood 
unsuccessfully as a Conservative candidate in Holborn and St Pancras 
in 1983 and then was co- 
ordinator of the Conservative groups on the rate capped London councils. 
He already knew Baker 
from meetings when the former was a junior Minister at the DoE 
before becoming his adviser in 
1986. Kerpel interview and profiles in Education, 30 May 1986, and TES, 28 
April 1989. 
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Keith Joseph had been damaged politically by not being sharp enough 
and decisive enough. 53 
It was a role with which the Department was equally comfortable. David 
Hancock described Kerpel as `very laid back, cynical, witty and very funny. He 
didn't have a personal agenda like Sexton and Letwin'. 54 Kerpel's replacement of 
Sexton left the latter at somewhat of a loose end. With the developing 
momentum of the education agenda it was clearly felt that Sexton's knowledge 
was too valuable not to be put to use. Brian Griffiths, Head of the Number Ten 
Policy Unit, perhaps on the prompting of Mrs Thatcher, asked Lord Harris to 
find a role for Sexton within the IEA. With his new title as Head of the 
Education Unit, Sexton published Our Schools, A Radical Manifesto. 55 In this 
pamphlet, Sexton outlined the by-now-familiar demands of the neo-liberals for 
market forces to create `a direct financial relationship between the provider and 
the consumer'. In line with the gradualist approach adopted by the New Right 
after 1985, there was support for a phased introduction of vouchers, or credits, 
after first adapting `the structure and finance of education so that a full education 
credit scheme, by common consent, logically and legitimately, springs from it'. 56 
While this neo-liberal onslaught was incessant, Baker also now came 
under increasing pressure from the neo-conservatives. The key body in this 
respect was the Hillgate Group, formed in 1986 and comprising of Caroline Cox, 
John Marks, Roger Scruton and Jessica Douglas Home. During the mid-1980s, 
they, and other `right thinking' colleagues, such Dennis O'Keeffe, had been 
increasingly concerned about what was actually being taught, or not being 
taught, in schools. In particular, they objected to what they perceived as a 
53 Kerpel interview. 
54 Hancock interview. Jenny Bacon felt that he was `bright and pretty helpful as a mediator. He 
was good and sensible and very much like a traditional political adviser'. Angela Rumbold, 
later 
to join Baker as Minister of State also saw that `Tony Kerpel was a good counter 
balance to 
Kenneth. He had common sense'. Bacon interview and Angela Rumbold interview, 
27 October 
1998. 
55 Sexton, undoubtedly one of the sources responsible for denigrating Baker's contribution to the 
education proposals, claims that Our Schools was simply a new draft of a 
document that he had 
already given to Mrs Thatcher in late 1985 after she had apparently asked 
him `Where should we 
be going? ' as regards education policy. She in turn supposedly gave the 
document to Baker on his 
apointment and said that this was what he had to implement. Sexton 
interview. 
5P Sexton, S. (1987) Our Schools: A Radical Policy. Warlingham: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
p. 30. 
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dangerous and pernicious left-wing bias. Scruton and O'Keeffe had already 
published Education and Indoctrination in 1985 and at Caroline Cox's request, 
O'Keeffe had then edited The Wayward Curriculum for the Social Affairs Unit, 
also in 1985.57 In 1986, according to Roger Scruton, they had been quietly 
encouraged by an adviser in Downing Street to create a pressure group that 
would toughen up Party policy. `We were told', Scruton said, `it would be much 
easier for the government to have a strong education policy if there was some 
outside pressure for it'. 58 
In collating and condensing previous arguments, the first Hillgate 
pamphlet, Whose Schools; A Radical Manifesto, published in December 1986, 
would play a similar role for the neo-conservatives to that which Sexton's Our 
Schools of the following year would play for the neo-liberal agenda. In sympathy 
with the neo-liberal agenda, Hillgate advocated transferring the ownership of 
schools to individual trusts, giving parents partial control over the financing of 
the schools their children will attend, and introducing educational credits. Where 
the neo-conservatives departed from the neo-liberals was over the question of 
curriculum control. Although the stance in Whose Schools was unequivocal - 
`We believe that a national curriculum is essential 59_ some, such as Caroline 
Cox, were reluctant advocates: `It was the lesser of two evils. The only reason I 
supported it was because we were really falling behind. It's a powerful tool in the 
wrong hands'. 60 Hillgate supported the introduction of a national curriculum, 
certainly in the short term as a means of eliminating the influence and ideology 
of the educational establishment, LEAs in particular. `Politicised Local 
Education Authorities', argued Whose Schools, `must be deprived of their major 
57 O'Keeffe interview. Pressure from sources such as these already had had an impact as 
evidenced by the proposals for the teaching of sex education in schools in the 1986 Education 
Act. 
58 Boyd, Voice for the Voiceless, p. 409. This was no doubt true but there were other tensions 
within the neo-conservatives that also contributed to Hillgate. In particular, the support that 
members of the Education Study Group at the CPS had been giving to Ray Honeyford, a former 
primary school headmaster in Bradford, who had become embroiled in a race dispute over an 
article he had written for the Salisbury Review. When the CPS published a paper criticizing 
Honeyford, Cox and Marks resigned temporarily from the CPS. Dr. Sheila Lawlor was then 
brought into the CPS as Director of Studies. According to Lawlor, `I was brought 
into the CPS by 
Brian Griffiths. The ESG was seen as out of control and needed to be reined in. The Hillgate 
Group was the ESG under a different guise as the Centre was reluctant to publish their pamphlet'. 
Sheila Lawlor interview, 26 February 1998. 
59 Hillgate Group (1986) Whose Schools? A Radical Manifesto. London: Claridge Press, p. 7. 
60 Boyd, Voice for the Voiceless, p. 410. 
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source of power and their standing ability to corrupt the mind and souls of the 
young' . 
61 Intervention and prescription were a justifiable means for Parliament to 
recover `the powers of wrongly constituted or abusive bodies', before power is 
devolved back to the consumer. This argument was echoed by Bob Dunn, who 
saw the National Curriculum as causing his `greatest philosophical doubt', but 
eventually supported its introduction in order to `break the power of the LEAs'. 62 
Even this was too much for some colleagues. `Although Caroline Cox asked me 
to write The Wayward Curriculum', recalled Dennis O'Keeffe, `I reacted with 
horror to the proposal for a National Curriculum, a socialist monstrosity. You 
had all the centralisation you needed with the examining boards'. 63 
These differing perspectives, which were never entirely reconciled, were 
nonetheless all a very from cry from Keith Joseph's Better Schools, published 
only two years previously. In May 1987, after the publication of the Conservative 
election manifesto, the TES lamented that while the opposition parties struggled 
to keep pace with Conservative education proposals, their arguments read `like 
an intelligent commentary on Better Schools ... only to 
find that the Tories had 
got bored with the nuts and bolts of Better Schools'. 64 Baker simply chose to 
ignore that document's insistence that there not be any direct legislative 
intervention in to the area of the curriculum. 65 This would also be accompanied 
by measures that were meant to restore a market-based vision of education, a 
voucher system in all but name. As one set of commentators concluded gloomily 
at the time, the New Right had `conquered the high ground', and, `any defence of 
the old orthodoxies now will be a damage limitation exercise fought on the terms 
of the New Right'. 66 The success of the irregulars in pushing their agendas to 
the fore was matched by a government which was so confident of its ability to 
crush all opposition, that there was no longer any need try to try and create any 
sort of consensus around the proposals. It was also a government led by a Prime 
Minister who was prepared to intervene in the detail of education policy to a 
far 
greater extent than anything previously experienced. 
61 Hillgate, Whose Schools, p. 18. 
62 Dunn interview. 
63 O'Keeffe interview. 
64 TES, 22 May 1987. 
65 DES (1985) Better Schools. London: DES, pp. 11-12. 
66 Wilby and Midgely, `As the New Right wields 
its power'. 
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The final links 
Given the personalised and incestuous nature of contacts and discussions, the 
contribution of the two individuals, Mrs Thatcher and Brian Griffiths, who, along 
with Baker himself, loom largest over the period from 1986 to 1988, is 
necessarily the most difficult to fully assess. Griffiths, former Professor of 
Banking and International Finance at the City University Business School, 
became Head of the Policy Unit in the crucial period of late 1985, with education 
policy as part of his specific remit. 67 Griffiths' views were clearly on the same 
wavelength as Mrs Thatcher's. He had long been associated with the IEA, 
contributing to its Hobart Papers series since 1970. His main role appears to 
have been a filter for all the information and policies now being generated by the 
various New Right groups. With hindsight, this development almost seems 
inevitable being, as it was, the culmination of a process of increasing interest and 
concern shown by Mrs Thatcher in education policy, and her use of the Policy 
Unit, rather than her Secretary of State, as the main line of communication. 
Until 1983, the Policy Unit had taken little or no overt interest in 
education policy. The first minor intervention came prior to the 1983 general 
election when the report from the Quality of Education group, chaired by Lord 
Beloff, was sent to Ferdinand Mount, then Head of the Unit. After the 1983 
election, Mrs Thatcher, who was originally dismissive of the notion of advisers 
within government, changed tactics and began to restructure the Policy Unit to 
shadow the Whitehall departments. Oliver Letwin was brought in to take 
responsibility for Education. This move took the irregulars a significant step 
nearer to the heart of the process. Dunn and Sexton, who clearly regarded him as 
`the first friend in camp', were now able to funnel ideas directly to Mrs 
Thatcher. 68 Letwin's arguments certainly would have played a part in 
undermining Mrs Thatcher's support for Keith Joseph. Letwin recounts that in 
1983 Mrs Thatcher asked Keith Joseph to have regular meetings with Ferdinand 
67 Sexton now also felt that his direct influence and access was'not as great as previously'. 
Sexton interview. 
68 Dunn and Sexton interviews. 
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Mount to discuss the direction of education policy. 69 Although these meetings 
were tentative, given Joseph's status within the party, they can be seen as a 
significant pointer to Mrs Thatcher's increasing willingness to intervene. John 
Barnes described education policy as `One of the little rhythms of the first half of 
the second Thatcher administration. There were frequent memos to Keith Joseph 
from Mrs Thatcher asking how the voucher thing was coming along'. 70 
What Letwin lacked, at this stage, was sufficient `clout' with Mrs 
Thatcher. He was simply another avenue - along with Dunn, Sexton, Cox, the 
NTBG and others - which Mrs Thatcher used, as was her preferred method of 
operation, to gather information. It would be Griffiths as Head of the Policy Unit, 
who would channel the energy and ideas of the various groups and individuals 
through to Mrs Thatcher. He was the consummate `back-room boy', 71 to whom 
Mrs Thatcher, clearly lacking faith in Baker as `one of us', devolved the 
responsibility to actually shape the policies into a politically acceptable format. 
By many accounts, Griffiths directed `all his influence and energy into achieving 
change'. 72 He was responsible for appointing the like-minded Sheila Lawlor as 
Director of Studies at the CPS, who would be a major thorn in Baker's side. The 
priority given to education policy at this time can be gauged from Lawlor, who 
recalled that she was `given the job to shadow the implementation of education 
policy and worked extremely closely with Brian Griffiths and Number Ten. I 
was brought over night after night for hours to discuss with him (Griffiths) 
papers and proposals coming from the Working Parties and Groups'. 73 
Such background machinations could not have gone unnoticed by Baker 
and his relationship with Griffiths must have been uneasy. John Barnes believed 
that `Brian Griffiths used His Mistress's Voice to put the fear of God into 
Baker'. 74 Cyril Taylor, whom Baker appointed Chair of the City Technology 
College Trust, recalled that `I worked closely with Brian Griffiths who had a 
69 Letwin interview. 
70 Barnes interview. 
71 Dunn interview. 
72 Letwin interview. According to Sexton, Griffiths was responsible for organising a number of 
`policy meetings' at No. 10 for particular groups during 1986 and 1987. 
He was also member of 
the Cabinet Sub-Committee on education, and Lawson records that during 1986-87 the `Number 
10 Policy Group was heavily involved' in formulating education policy with 
Griffiths `engaged 
in little else at this time'. Sexton interview, and Lawson, View 
from No. 11, pp. 610-611. 
73 Lawlor interview. 
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major role in developing some of the policies. This made Kenneth Baker very 
nervous'. 75 Baker himself, somewhat unconvincingly, was to describe Griffiths 
as `an ally, basically very supportive'. 76 In his memoirs, Baker wrote that they 
`worked very closely together' and rather cryptically added that Griffiths `helped 
me in brokering various settlements with Number 10'. 7 Angela Rumbold's 
recollection was somewhat different: 
Brian Griffiths only cared about two things, the economy and education. 
He was a nuisance and caused a lot of trouble. We would decide 
something. Margaret would then run it past Brian who would say the idea 
was completely mad. Margaret would then come back to us and say "You 
have gone completely mad because Brian says so", and we were forever 
having breakfasts with him (Griffiths) to iron out the situation. 78 
However exalted his position, the ultimate influence of Griffiths remained 
dependent like any adviser, on the closeness of his relationship with his Minister. 
In Griffiths' case, Mrs Thatcher herself. 
As regards what should actually be happening in schools, Mrs Thatcher 
(as indeed, would be the case with John Major), always seemed to find that the 
view through the rear-view mirror was clearer than that through the windscreen. 
Terms such as `direct grant schools', `pen and paper tests' and `the three Rs', all 
would surface and resurface in Mrs Thatcher's discussions about education. She 
also carried a torch for the voucher proposal. When other initiatives would 
appear to be bogged down in detail, or simply too bothersome to get to grips 
with, she would feel the tug on the thread of her voucher ambitions as a way 
through the impasse. Each of the above traits were evident in her interventions in 
education with the added twist that the DES was the only department than she 
had managed prior to becoming Prime Minister, a not entirely joyful 
74 Barnes interview. 
75 Cyril Taylor interview. 18 June 1998. 
76 Baker interview. 
77 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 169. 
78 Rumbold interview. 
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experience. 79 Her own instincts, as she exhibited in other areas of policy, 
straddled both the neo-liberal and the neo-conservative positions, tempered with 
political pragmatism. According to Peter Ridell, Mrs Thatcher's political 
approach was `Like that of the Black Papers and many of the subsequent 
pamphlets produced by the New Right. ... based on instinct, a series of moral 
values and an approach... rather than an ideology'. 80 From such an 
unsophisticated approach arose much of the intellectual snobbery with which 
many regarded Mrs Thatcher. David Hancock summarised the contempt of the 
mandarins, describing her with complete distaste as `a very simplistic woman' . 
81 
Yet, as John Hoskyns suggested, `Decision and action require a certain blindness 
to nuance'. 82 They also required, most certainly when dealing with education, an 
ability to cut through the almost impenetrable in-house jargon of the education 
establishment. 
Mrs Thatcher's preferred method of reaching policy decisions was the 
device of working with a small group of loyal followers, whether called ad hoc 
committees or `bi-lateral' meetings. 83 For her, these bodies were not designed to 
be consultative. They were designed to be `efficient', something that she now felt 
was required in education. The evidence from those meetings that dealt with 
education policy portrays a fierce struggle between the Prime Minister and her 
Secretary of State. Baker, reminiscing almost like an old soldier, recalled how 
`After the election everyone had a view. The Cabinet Committees that I attended 
were reported to be the liveliest of all. I was bullied remorselessly. They went on 
and on with endless acrimonious debates'. 84 Commenting on Nigel Lawson's 
79 In his memoirs, her Press Secretary Bernard Ingham wrote that `I do not know what went on in 
the Department of Education and Science between 1970 and 1974 when the Prime Minister was 
Secretary of State there. Nor had I the temerity to enquire. Suffice to say that in all my dealings 
with Mrs Thatcher the premium she puts on loyalty to herself as a Minister harked back to her 
first Cabinet post in the DES'. Ingham, B. (1991) Kill the Messenger. London: HarperCollins, p. 
171. 
80 Ridell, P. (1983) The Thatcher Government. Oxford: Martin Robinson, p. 7. 
81 Hancock interview. 
82 Harrison, B. (1994) `Mrs Thatcher and the Intellectuals'. Twentieth Century British History, 
Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 224. 
83 Kenneth Clarke later recalled that the collection of ministers in such groups `tended to be a 
selection of people most likely to agree with the Prime Minster's opinions on the subject... 
If you 
turned up at an ad hoc meeting and didn't agree with her, you were not 
invited to the next 
meeting on that subject'. Interview with John Barnes in LSE Magazine, Vol. 
11, No. 2, Winter 
1999, pp. 8-10. 
84 Baker interview. 
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account of Mrs Thatcher's `hand bagging' of Baker at these meetings, David 
Hancock concurred that `Lawson's description of the Cabinet committee was 
absolutely right. Lawson, Nicholas Ridley and Mrs Thatcher would tear his 
submissions to bits, send him away, but he came back and always saying the 
same thing'. 85 Arguably these were Baker's finest hours. He displayed tenacity 
and adroitness, in the face of almost implacable opposition and unsupportive 
colleagues, to argue for his preferred vision of what should be happening in 
schools. 86 Whether he was willing or able to sustain this level of commitment 
and guile in his dealings with the education establishment was another question. 
Conclusion 
As the `little rhythms' of education policy proposals, evident in the early part of 
the second Thatcher administration, built up to a crescendo after 1986, Mrs 
Thatcher decided that education policy was much too important to be left in the 
hands of the DES and its ministers. Choosing to ignore the traditional regular or 
establishment channels as far as practicable, it was the irregulars who provided 
the raft of policy proposals, from which Mrs Thatcher was intent on 
manipulating through the sub-committee structure of Cabinet, to push through 
her preferred proposals. Regardless of however congenial and `efficient' was 
Mrs Thatcher's preferred strategy, it would not prove to be a terribly efficient or 
effective manner for establishing a clear and workable rationale for Conservative 
education policy. A related legacy of this time, also latent under Keith Joseph 
but patent under Baker, was to be the willingness of Number Ten to intervene in 
education policy through the conduit of the Policy Unit. This had started in a low 
key, but systematic, way during Keith Joseph's time. After Baker became 
85 Hancock interview. Baker's tenacity and political bravery was later attested to by the Cabinet 
Secretary at the time, Richard Wilson. In discussing his time at the Department of Health and 
his 
`ferocious debates' with Mrs Thatcher, Kenneth Clarke recalled that `Richard Wilson scored each 
engagement on the Richter scale for turbulence. But he used to assure me that it was absolutely 
nothing to the similar discussions that had gone on between Margaret and Ken Baker on 
education'. Clarke interview with John Barnes in LSE Magazine, Vol. 11, No. 2, 
Winter 1999, p. 
11. In his memoirs, Nicholas Ridley, colourfully, if not entirely accurately, wrote of the 
`magnificent scenes as she (Thatcher) dragged him (Baker) inch 
by inch in the direction we all 
wanted to go'. Ridley, N. (1991) My Style of Government. London: 
Hutchinson, p. 94. 
86 Even someone as begrudging as John Major had to admit that `Ken cared a 
lot about education 
and in cabinet committee he handled the Prime Minister on the subject 
better than anyone else I 
ever saw'. Major, John Major, p. 103. 
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Secretary of State, much of the thinking of the irregulars would permeate 
through to the heart of the Conservative government, through the channel of the 
Policy Unit. This shifting of the focus of education policy making, if not strictly 
from the DES and its clients, to Downing Street, then, at the very least, to include 
Downing Street, would have a significant impact on the course of education 
policy over the next decade. The very occasional foray into education by 
previous Prime Ministers would now be replaced by regular intervention, 
initially by Mrs Thatcher, then by John Major, together with their respective 
advisers. This would be at both the macro and micro level in education policy, on 
a scale not experienced before, adding further confusion and uncertainty to the 
implementation of education policy. 
While the evidence for much of this remained in the future, what was 
needed initially was someone who could sell these new model policies. Baker 
fitted the bill perfectly, and there is no reason to doubt Mrs Thatcher's own 
explanation as to why he was appointed to succeed Keith Joseph. Did this make 
him simply a cipher for decisions taken elsewhere? Such an argument tends to 
underestimate the room for manoeuvre that Baker had, or was able to 
manufacture for himself, and also the personal imprint that he was able to leave 
on the subsequent legislation. The optimistic, if mistaken, view, of many of the 
irregulars on Baker's appointment was summed up by John Barnes: 
We saw Kenneth Baker as a very different creature to Keith Joseph. He 
didn't know anything about education. All Mrs Thatcher wanted was a 
bloody good publicist. We had some hope that something might happen 
as Baker, unlike Keith Joseph, was someone who owed everything to Mrs 
Thatcher. He was "leanable on" if she wanted to. 87 
The irony, of course, would prove to be that while his colleagues were aware of, 
and happy to harness, Baker's unquestionable political and presentational skills 
for their own ends, they never seemed to have anticipated his capacity to use 
these skills for his own ends. As regards the 1987 manifesto proposals and the 
subsequent 1988 Act, one could not but admire the artifice, but the unforeseen 
87 Barnes interview. 
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consequence of this was the instability of the edifice, whose construction Baker 
so deftly supervised. With versions of many of the policy proposals that had 
publicly appeared on the education agenda over the previous decade included in 
the Education Act, Baker's `dash for glory' contained intimations of salvation for 
all of those pushing for education reform, whether regulars, irregulars or 
politicos. What Baker did not do, and perhaps for his own political and personal 
reasons did not attempt to do, was to bring coherence to the direction of policy, a 
guiding voice. The 1988 Act codified these differences in approach to education 
policy without resolving them. The consequences of such obfuscation were to be 
felt when the proposals had to be turned into practicalities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
May 1986 - July 1989: Unforeseen ways 
Introduction 
Following the 1987 election, consultation papers covering the main proposals for 
the new Bill appeared before the end of July, with responses required two months 
later. The overwhelming majority of responses were critical. Baker ploughed on 
regardless. With only minor amendments made as it passed through Parliament, 
the Bill gained Royal assent on July 29 1988.1 For many of the irregulars, since 
Baker's succession, it appeared to have been a confident advance on all fronts. 
CTCs, Grant Maintained schools, Local Management of Schools, and the 
introduction of a national curriculum all appeared to herald a radical change in 
the direction of education policy. The `leanable' Baker may not have entirely 
convinced as a born again enthusiast for market forces, but he certainly displayed 
the expected political nous, albeit backed by a substantial Parliamentary 
majority, to push through the raft of policy proposals that had been gestating on 
the right for at least the previous decade. This `victory' would, however, prove to 
be somewhat hollow, with the subsequent development of both the National 
Curriculum and the Grant Maintained schools policy in particular, quickly 
subject to charges of `subversion' and sabotage by the `education establishment'. 
This chapter examines why, unlike the earlier stages of the policy process, Mrs 
Thatcher and her irregular allies were unable to exert greater control over how 
the policies developed. Was there was an equal and opposite cabal within the 
regulars, who had been shut out from the high politics of the reform proposals, 
but who found their opportunity when it became necessary to define how these 
policies would be put into practice? How much credence can be given to the 
charges of `subversion'? 
1 With little pretence that much consideration was given to the multitude of objections raised, 
Angela Rumbold, Schools Minister at the DES, decried any such course in typically combative 
fashion. `Ever since the first documents were issued', she told the House of Commons, `the 
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CTCs - beleaguered beacons 
In 1982, Keith Joseph, on the back of a suggestion from David Young, then head 
of the MSC, had toyed with the idea of establishing a new group of technical 
colleges. As well as addressing a particular aspect of English education that had 
long been neglected, Joseph also suggested that these new schools would be `a 
new type of provider'. They would be called `Crown Colleges', and would be 
`the direct agent of a Crown body'. 2 While this proposal appears to have become 
submerged in the subsequent Technical and Vocational Education Initiative 
(TVEI), following a conference at the CPS in 1985 on the topic of employment, 
Cyril Taylor published a report which called for `the setting up of one hundred 
technical secondary schools funded by central government on a direct grant basis 
to address the crucial need to improve training and vocational education' .3 
According to Taylor, `The 1985 conference was attended by Mrs Thatcher and 
David Young and Mrs Thatcher subsequently wrote to me saying how interested 
she was in the idea'. 4 Within the DES, Bob Dunn had also raised the issue in a 
paper prepared for Keith Joseph who typically `after a long debate decided not to 
proceed with it'. After Baker was appointed, Dunn thought, `Let's try this idea 
again, dusted it off, updated it slightly'. 5 
cohort of the education establishment and its camp followers have been gnawing away at the 
Bill... like rats in a cellar'. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 130, col. 828,28 March 1988. 
2 Franklin, `The MSC, the DES and the origins of the TVEI', p. 267. The memo quoted by 
Franklin was written by Keith Joseph in 1982. It is interesting to note how ideas can mutate over 
time. Young's original idea for technical schools, is first adapted by Keith Joseph into `Crown 
schools', which then surface publicly in 1986 with a report in the TES that Chris Patten and 
Walter Ulrich had put forward a plan to establish a network of government-controlled direct grant 
`Crown' schools in inner city areas, whose purpose was reportedly `to head off Conservative 
right wing pressure to introduce a voucher system for schools'. TES, 4 April 1986. 
3 Taylor, C. (1986) Employment Examined: the Right approach to more jobs. London: Centre for 
Policy Studies. 
4 Taylor interview. 
5 Dunn interviewed in Whitty, G., Edwards, T. and Gewirtz, S. (1993) Specialisation and Choice 
in Urban Education. The City Technology College Experiment. London: Routledge, p. 21. 
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So, into Baker's lap fell a germ of an idea for some kind of specialised 
technical school, which he was to make very much his own. 6 The proposal that 
eventually emerged was for the establishment of City Technology Colleges. 
These would be the first in the long line of Baker's policy proposals and their 
concept was probably the one with the greatest degree of originality, or at least 
an original synthesis, on Baker's part. The beauty of the CTCs was that they 
merged a number of different existing, as well as emergent, policy strands with 
the Conservative Party's approach to education. The new schools would be 
independent of LEAs, attract private sponsorship, have a 
technological/technically based curriculum to redress the skills gap for British 
industry, and be part-selective. Apart from some kind of voucher element, it had 
just about all the `little messages' rolled into one. 
City Technology Colleges: A New Choice of School was the title of the 
Green Paper which officially launched the CTCs. DES documents had not looked 
like this before. 7 Education described `the glossy brochure and sleek 
presentation' as `pure Baker'. 8 Yet, from the first day of their launch, the original 
ambitions for the CTC programme were in trouble, not least because Baker 
announced them in his speech at the Conservative Party conference in 1986. 
While the normally nimble Baker worked hard to reconcile all the political and 
policy options, not even he could reconcile all of them all of the time. There may 
have been a political imperative, both in terms of personal ambition and in 
staking out new Party policy for the forthcoming election, but these clashed with 
the need for the necessary groundwork to help such a new initiative on its way. 
Baker wrote that his officials had been `adamantly opposed to my announcing 
the CTC network at the Party conference and predicted that to do this would so 
6 Baker himself said that on being appointed `you could not say they (ideas about technical 
schools) had been worked up in any shape or form to any degree'. Ibid., p. 19. 
7 Baker had what could almost be described a dry run for the launch during his time at the 
Department of Environment during the early 1980s and his role in the early development of the 
Poll Tax. Paying for Local Government was the Green Paper he produced then. It was described 
as, `quite unlike any Green Paper that had gone before. Whereas government consultation 
documents had hitherto been dense and drab, not least those concerning local government 
finance, this one was racy and colourful. It came in large A4 format, with bright, glitzy graphs, 
pie-charts, and tables. Kenneth Baker's presentational hand was on every page'. Butler, D., 
Adonis, A. and Travers, T. (1994) Failure in British Government. The Politics of the Poll 
Tax. 
Oxford University Press, p. 89. 
8 Education, 17 October 1986. 
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politicize the policy'. 9 It was not just his officials who were wary of Baker's 
tactics. Bob Balchin was among a coterie of irregular advisers who applauded 
the principle of the new CTCs, yet were also uneasy. `We thought CTCs might 
be the answer to all our prayers', said Balchin, `but the way they were "born" 
was a tremendous error. It brought huge opposition from the LEAs and the 
education establishment. They were far too highly politicised, too much so to 
attract private sponsors'. to Although he had used the term `beacon' in his own 
pamphlet, given the highly-politicised context in which the CTCs were launched, 
Cyril Taylor, when interviewed for this research, said `I never liked the term. 
"Beacon" was a dangerous word. Did it imply everybody else was in the dark? ' 1' 
Taylor believed that the notion of private sponsorship for the new schools was 
`Kenneth Baker's crucial input', 12 but he (Baker) `had taken a flier in announcing 
the CTCs. The announcement at the Party conference was a mistake and 
provoked too much adverse comment. The great bugbear turned out to be one 
wretched sentence about capital costs'. 13 
Although, at the time, Baker told one interviewer of a `very strong 
response from industry' and hinted at a queue of eager backers waiting in the 
wings, these failed to materialise. Nor were local authorities very co-operative in 
providing sites for the new schools, which also greatly increased the capital costs 
of any building programme. 14 Enthusiasm within the DES for such structural 
changes within the schools system was also lacking. In his memoirs, Baker 
recalled that when the initiative was being developed, his own adviser, Tony 
Kerpel, complained that `DES officials were hijacking the CTC initiative and 
9 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 180. 
10 Robert Balchin interview, 28 July 1998. 
11 Taylor interview. 
12 Whitty et al., Specialisation and Choice in Urban Education, p. 21. 
13 Taylor interview. 
14 Whitty et al., Specialisation and Choice in Urban Education, p. 38. According to the authors 
there was no evidence of any consultation with relevant interests groups such as the CBI, the 
Industrial Society or the Engineering Council. Nor had there been consultation with major 
companies, like ICI and BP, already actively involved in `partnership' arrangements with 
schools. Ibid., pp. 38-41. 
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imposing their version, which simply represented a rehash of the very 
comprehensive schools we felt had failed'. '5 
Given the relatively small scale of the CTC initiative, these schools were 
never going to be more than a side-show, albeit with important `messages' for 
possible future policy directions. A greater concern was the lack of clarity in 
developing the policy, the character of Baker himself, and his temperamental 
inability or unwillingness to get to grips with the `nuts and bolts' of what he was 
proposing. The corner cutting and negligence that beset the introduction of CTCs 
provided an inauspicious start to the construction of what would become the 
1988 Education Act. The most succinct description of this was provided by 
Baker's Permanent Secretary, David Hancock, and his view of the CTC 
initiative. `The CTCs were a great wheeze', said Hancock, `but he (Baker) got 
ahead of himself. Typical of the man'. 16 The drawbacks of Baker's modus 
operandi were to be thrown into an even starker light with the biggest `wheeze' 
of all, the National Curriculum. 
The National Curriculum - `The creation of a new enterprise' 
In terms of their impact on schools, the National Curriculum and its attendant 
testing regime would prove to be the centrepiece of the 1988 Education Act. 
These two features would also directly curtail the careers of both John 
MacGregor and John Patten. Yet Baker's singular achievement was actually 
getting anything on the statute book related to a national curriculum, given the 
experience of previous. Secretaries of State for Education. According to one 
Deputy Secretary at the DES, `Without the political clout and chutzpah of 
Kenneth Baker it would have taken at least another five years, if at all, for the 
appearance of a national curriculum'. 17 On the plus side, Baker certainly had the 
advantage of surprise. The last major document issued by his Department, Better 
15 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 180. When he was later appointed as chair of the CTC Trust, 
Cyril 
Taylor described how `The Civil Servants wanted the CTC Trust located in the Department and 
were willing to provide an office. I spent a half day there and appeared to 
have stirred up "the 
forces of darkness". They (the Civil Servants) loathed the idea of advisers coming 
in and having 
the ear of the Minister'. Taylor interview. 
16 Hancock interview. 
17 John Hedger interview. 18 February 1999. 
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Schools, had categorically stated that `The Government does not propose to 
introduce legislation affecting the powers of the Secretaries of State in relation to 
the curriculum'. 18 The education establishment had every reason to feel safe from 
direct intervention during Keith Joseph's period of office. According to his 
Permanent Secretary, `Keith Joseph wouldn't have touched the National 
Curriculum and during this period we seemed to be issuing endless guidance'. 19 
The problem was, in the words of Denis Lawton, `Keith Joseph in a way lulled 
people into a false sense of security in that he would never have agreed to a 
national curriculum, and when proposals came out there was a feeling that it 
would never happen here'. 20 This was despite the almost whiggish inevitability 
of a move towards a national curriculum since 1976, and based on the reasonably 
objective evidence from the series of HMI reports which pointed to the need for 
more central direction. 
However much Baker may, or may not, have been aware, he had arrived 
in the Department at the critical juncture of a journey that began publicly with 
the Ruskin speech a decade previously. All the talking and exhorting had been 
exhausted. It was decision time, something his officials were certainly aware of. 
`What Keith Joseph left', said David Hancock, 
was a thorough analysis of the problem and the Sheffield speech was the 
culmination of his time at the Department. Better Schools, which Keith 
Joseph went through line by line, was really a professional analysis on the 
results of the inspection regime. Kenneth Baker concluded after reading 
Better Schools that things couldn't go on like this. 21 
Eric Bolton, HMCI, who had two years previously written of the `unstoppable 
momentum'22 towards a common core curriculum, was of the same opinion. 
`After starting, Kenneth Baker couldn't duck a decision', recalled Bolton, `All 
18 DES (1985) Better Schools. London: DES, pp. 11-12. 
19 Hancock interview. 
20 Lawton interview. 
21 Hancock interview. The `Sheffield speech' was Keith Joseph's address to the North of 
England Conference in January 1984. 
22 TES, 8 March 1985. 
130 
the analysis had been done. Either the government then shut up about it or it had 
to legislate. There was huge pressure not to. Baker asked me whether everybody 
would follow the guidelines. I told him "No"'. 23 
Despite his `soundings' over the state of education while at the 
Department of the Environment, Baker was surprised to discover that the notion 
of a national curriculum was well advanced. Indeed, he later recalled how 
surprised he was `to discover that the Department and HMI were in favour of a 
national curriculum'. 24 One can well imagine that this was welcome news to the 
ambitious new Secretary of State, anxious to leave his mark with a major piece 
of legislation. Yet there is evidence that Baker, on examining the evidence, was 
also motivated by a genuine desire to do something about the chaotic school 
curriculum. John Clare felt that `He (Baker) certainly developed the National 
Curriculum beyond what was given. He was genuinely appalled by what children 
were being taught and the gaping holes in their school experience'. 25 Baker 
himself would return regularly to this theme, highlighting in particular the failure 
of the LEAs to exert any unifying hand over what was being taught in schools. 
`Different parts of the country almost had a foreign education world', he later 
recalled, 'LEAs had been empire building while standards were declining. 
Although they (LEAs) were arguing that they knew what to do, there was no 
evidence that they did'. 26 When giving evidence to the Education, Arts and 
Science Committee in 1988, David Hancock alluded to this failure on the part of 
LEAs, when asked about whether power was shifting to the centre. `There will 
be a very significant change', said Hancock, `In the case of other LEAs who have 
not been very active in these matters it will be the creation of a new enterprise'. 
27 
A further push in the direction of a national curriculum, was, ironically, a 
legacy of Keith Joseph, and his willingness to open up and publicise comparisons 
23 Bolton interview. 
24 Baker interview. 
25 Clare interview. Michael Fallon also said that both Margaret Thatcher and Kenneth Baker 
`were struck by how you could go through the state system without really 
doing anything 
concrete, such as a Science or a Language'. Fallon interview. 
26 Baker interview. 
27 Lawrence, Power and Politics, pp. 118-19. 
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between the English and international schools systems. 28 Influential examples 
included the prominence given to Prais and Wagner's unfavourable comparison 
of mathematics standards in English and West German schools, published in 
1983.29 Further West German influence on the curriculum could be seen as 
comparisons surfaced once more in a HMI report on the West German schools 
system, that had been commissioned in 1984.30 Baker later admitted that `the 
HMI report on Germany was very important'. 31 David Hancock also recalled 
how `the National Curriculum was very influenced by the German system 
although this was not much talked about at the time'. 32 
Once Baker announced his decision to introduce a national curriculum, 
the big question was what shape it would take and it was here that the Secretary 
of State was able to impose his personal vision of what a national curriculum 
should resemble. There were at least three possible models from which he could 
have chosen, each with their own advocates. The first was a minimalist core 
curriculum approach that concentrated on the three main subjects, English, 
mathematics and science. Despite being the favoured model of his political 
mistress and the majority of her irregular advisers, the Renaissance Man would 
have none of it. `She believed basically that all one needed in the National 
Curriculum was English, mathematics and science', Baker later recalled, `It was 
28 When he was appointed to the Department of Industry in 1979 Joseph had famously presented 
his officials with a comprehensive reading list. During his first meeting with Civil Servants on 
being appointed to the DES in 1981, he recommended only a single volume, one that he himself 
had commissioned, Wilkinson, M. (1977) Lessons from Europe: A Comparison of British and 
West European Schooling. London: Centre for Policy Studies. 
29 Prais, S. and Wagner, K. (1983) Schooling Standards in Britain and Germany. London: 
NIESR. Stuart Maclure has suggested that the importance of the Prais and Wagner's report was 
that it moved the argument away from comparisons over time to comparisons of schools with 
those of other countries. Prais' explanations for the differences of performance between English 
and West German schools were the latter's `clearly defined, more sharply focused, programmes 
of study and fewer teacher led variations from school to school and area to area'. Maclure, S. 
(1988) Education Re-formed. London: Hodder, pp. 174-75. 
30 HMI (1986) Education in the Federal Republic of Germany. Aspects of Curriculum and 
Assessment, London: HMSO, p. 34. The report noted that in West Germany there was `wide 
agreement about education and its assessment (is) in itself an important message for English 
education where such agreement, undertaking and trust are lacking'. The report also contained 
what Eric Bolton described as other `sharp messages', including its comment on the curriculum 
where it was noted that `the imposed breath of they curriculum is attractive to English eyes used 
to the narrowness of out A-level studies'. Bolton interview, HMI, Education in the 
Federal 
Republic of Germany, p. 36. 
31 Baker interview. 
32 Hancock interview. 
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a sort of a gradgrind curriculum in my view, not a rounded one' . 
33 The 
Dickensian allusion was particularly apt for a man of Baker's tastes. According 
to Jenny Bacon 
Baker as an educator has to be set against Margaret Thatcher and the core 
curriculum. What Baker did was to in effect say. .. 
"I do want certain 
things which I, Baker, value, like a proper approach to history - kings and 
queens of England and English history - an intense nationalistic patriotic 
(view). I want poetry, I want literature, I want kids to enjoy learning 
English". 34 
Bacon's catalogue of Baker's curriculum preferences also provide one indication 
of why the second alternative, the HMI preferred `areas of experience' / cross- 
curricular themes approach, was also dismissed. But there were factors, other 
than personal preference, that were pushing Baker toward a more 
straightforward, traditional and DES-preferred subject-based approach. There 
was, of course, the advice of Baker's senior officials within the DES and the 
administrative preference for something concrete, neatly packaged. This was not 
necessarily just from a straightforward bureaucratic point of view. There were 
also the implications for how the legislation was to be drafted. Baker recalled 
that `the amount of detail that was in the Bill meant that it was like writing a 
constitution from scratch and the parliamentary draughtsmen had an important 
role'. 35 Eric Bolton also described the importance of `operational factors 
operating in the National Curriculum ... the 
influence of the parliamentary 
draughtsmen and the need to be legally unambiguous. They couldn't conceive of 
"Humanities" or "European Studies". 36 A further, more compelling argument 
was provided by the work of HMI itself. Weighing up the possibility of actually 
delivering an `areas of experience' type curriculum in the classroom, according 
to Bolton, the evidence in HMI's own reports since 1976 proved that the quality 
33 'Why are you still smiling Kenneth? ' TES, 31 May 1996. 
34 Quoted in Taylor, `Movers and shakers', p. 171. Bacon is referred to as `Stiles' in the article. 
Bacon interview. 
35 
Baker interview. 
36 Bolton interview. 
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of teaching was `the joker in the pack'. 37 The conclusion of officials within the 
DES was provided by Jenny Bacon: `The quality of teaching simply wasn't good 
enough to deliver on the "areas of experience" and the ten-subject National 
Curriculum was the policy side of the Department asserting itself over the 
HMI'. 38 
While Eric Bolton felt that, as a body, `HMI couldn't stop the DES'39 in 
imposing what was seen as its preferred version of the National Curriculum, the 
advice of Bolton himself also appears to have been influential in reinforcing 
Baker's preference for a subject-led curriculum. Baker was later to pay particular 
tribute to Bolton, saying how `I had a great deal of help from him'. 40 Denis 
Lawton, who subsequently got to know the ex-HMCI as a colleague at the 
Institute of Education, detected Bolton's influence in the decision to go for a 
subject-based curriculum: 
Baker's heart was in the right place but he didn't know enough about how 
to do it. "Areas of experience" might have worked. There were some 
positive soundings from the pilot areas but it would have taken time and 
money. Baker relied too much on Eric Bolton who was not one of the 
most informed people in the Inspectorate about curriculum planning. His 
views on the curriculum were very traditional, very much in terms of lists 
of subjects. He was not a curriculum thinker. Bolton and Baker shared 
what could be called a "common sense" view of the curriculum. 41 
Notwithstanding what the `positive soundings' actually were or meant, an 
endless quadrille in devising a new curriculum was not on Baker's own political 
agenda, or within his timeframe. According to David Hancock, `Baker was very 
keen that the effects would be apparent before the following elections, within 
five years. He was playing the political long game'. 
42 Even if Baker had been 
37 Ibid. 
38 Bacon interview. 
39 Bolton interview. 
40 `Why are you still smiling Kenneth'. TES, 31 May 1996. 
41 Lawton interview. 
42 Hancock interview. 
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sympathetic towards the HMI approach to the curriculum, he certainly would not 
have been able to convince Mrs Thatcher and her advisers regarding `areas of 
experience'. According to Bacon, 
Mrs Thatcher was being influenced by fundamentalist American thinking, 
reductio ad absurdum. Kenneth Baker was convinced that this was highly 
undesirable. The ten-subject approach was also to appease Mrs Thatcher. 
A compromise between Mrs Thatcher's minimalism and the HMI wishy- 
washy approach, while also getting something broader with meat on it. 43 
David Hancock concurred that this had been Baker's strategy. `Kenneth Baker 
was very tenacious and handled Mrs Thatcher very skilfully', recalled Hancock. 
`He disagreed profoundly with her on many things, most importantly on the 
nature of the curriculum. Baker was absolutely determined to have a broad and 
balanced curriculum and he had to placate her on this'. 44 Baker's tenacity in 
sticking with his preferred vision, was matched only by his disingenuity over his 
ten-subject `compromise' curriculum. He had managed temporarily to placate 
Mrs Thatcher on the basis that the ten subjects would be divided, or prioritised, 
into a `core' of English, mathematics and science, followed by the remainder 
`foundation' subjects. This was not what was to happen. According to David 
Hancock: 
We devised the notion of the core and the foundation subjects but if you 
examine the Act you will see that there is no difference between the two. 
This was a totally cynical and deliberate manoeuvre on Kenneth Baker's 
part. 45 
So, in the end, Baker would get his broad and balanced curriculum included in 
the Act, but at a cost to both him and his successors. Suspecting that the 
education establishment had once again pulled a fast one, Mrs Thatcher and her 
43 Bacon interview. 
44 Hancock interview. 
45 Ibid. 
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advisers sought to impose themselves on the future direction of the reforms 
through incessant intervention. So began a game of second-guessing and political 
manoeuvring, led by the right and from which Baker and his successors and 
everyone else at the sharp end of curriculum reform would suffer. 
In his `dash for glory', Baker had also earned the enmity of much of the 
education establishment. Once he had personally made the decision to go for a 
national curriculum, it did not appear that he had learned anything from his haste 
to announce CTCs. Following the election, one of his officials asked him, in 
what must have been a rather plaintive tone, `Are you going to consult with 
anybody before you introduce the legislation? "Oh", he said, "I never thought. " 
So between June and August we wrote seven (consultation documents), I 
think'. 46 This was a very different approach compared to previous `inclusive' 
efforts at policy making. The `loop' was constrictingly tight. One academic 
recalled that `HMI were telling me at the time that they had been completely 
ignored in this, that the consultation paper on the National Curriculum had been 
produced literally overnight by a senior civil servant. most people knew at the 
time her name was Bacon'. 47 There were predictable expressions of indignation 
from the education establishment whose disposition towards the government was 
not helped by the fact that the person who had a major role in defending the most 
contentious aspects of the Reform Bill, including the National Curriculum was 
the Schools Minister, Angela Rumbold. 48 
46 Taylor, `Mover and Shakers', p. 174. 
47 Ibid., p. 174. Bacon remained gleefully unrepentant about her role: `I went in there and 
produced the kind of brief that (had) been produced at the MSC... we were used to mucking 
around with what it was they ought to teach and train... (it was) written in English but it was "ball 
points"... some snappy things with headings. It wasn't glorious, continuous prose with half of it 
in Greek. Walter (Ulrich) was appalled by this but Baker said "That's just the kind of brief I 
want. "' Ibid., p. 183. 
48 A typically bruising encounter between Rumbold and the educationists was at a conference 
organised by the Schools Curriculum Development Committee on `aspects of curriculum 
change'. The editor of the conference papers wrote that `There can seldom have been an 
educational conference at which intellectual debate was so heightened by genuine anger and even 
bewilderment at the pace, direction and sheer clumsiness of the political process'. Rumbold's 
speech, which was fairly measured by her own standards, was met by a response that was 
described as `immediate and spirited', something about which her officials had warned her: `I 
was writing a speech for the conference and Jenny Bacon kept taking passages out of it, saying, 
"That won't go down very well minister, " and I kept putting them back in and 
insisted on writing 
the final draft. At the conference after I started speaking the audience turned their chairs away 
and started to read their papers in protest. I met Jenny Bacon after coming off the stage who said 
to me very sweetly, "That was brave of you indeed minister"'. Rumbold 
interview, and 
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Although knowledgeable about education through her former role as 
chairman of the Committee of Local Education Authorities, Rumbold's political 
background made her officials initially very wary of her. `On my first day', she 
recalled, `I was received with coolness and silence. (David) Hancock presented 
me with a history of the Department and a note on how it all worked' . 
49 As a 
former member of the right-wing 92 Club, PPS to Nicholas Ridley, and a 
member of the No Turning Back Group, Rumbold was not entirely incorrectly 
perceived as Mrs Thatcher's `minder' for Baker within the DES. 50 `I was very 
hesitant about the National Curriculum', recalled Rumbold, `It went against all 
our philosophy and I felt that the core curriculum was as far as you needed to go. 
Mrs Thatcher used to berate Kenneth Baker, calling it (the National Curriculum) 
"socialist interventionism"' 
.51 The proposals for a national curriculum that 
Rumbold had to defend highlighted what was the mix of `alliances' that had 
come into play over its introduction. There were some politicos and senior level 
regular advisers supporting one model - the ten subject model - while the 
majority of the education establishment and other politicos and irregular advisers 
found common cause in opposing that model, but without agreeing on an 
alternative. This mix would be shuffled again, with the second and arguably even 
more contentious phase of introducing the National Curriculum, that of deciding 
what was to be taught within each subject area and how it was to be assessed. 
Responsibility for presenting these proposals to ministers was to be given over to 
two new bodies, the National Curriculum Council (NCC) and the Schools 
Examinations and Assessment Council (SEAC). 
The National Curriculum Council - that `unhappy body' 
It was during the process of putting flesh onto the bones of the National 
Curriculum and its assessment that Baker in effect relinquished control over this 
O'Connor, M. (ed. ) (1987) Curriculum at the Crossroads: an account of the SCDC national 
conference on aspects of curriculum change. London: School Curriculum Development 
Committee, p. 45. 
49 Rumbold interview. 
50 According to Rumbold, Mrs Thatcher had told her `to go in there and make damn sure we get 
our changes through'. Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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aspect of the education reforms. While Mrs Thatcher may not have wanted the 
National Curriculum in the first place, if she had to have it, she certainly did not 
want anyone from the education establishment to have anything to do with 
drawing it up. Baker was also worried, but his anxieties centred on whether the 
subject content would be sufficiently rigorous. Baker further diverged from Mrs 
Thatcher in that he was prepared, if only for the reason that there appeared little 
viable alternative, to reach back into the education policy community to access 
the professional expertise needed to `write' the actual curriculum. The input of 
the professionals was to be channelled through two new bodies created by the 
1988 Act, described by Baker as `the twin guardians of the curriculum', the NCC 
and SEAC. 
In his memoirs, Baker wrote that the members of each of the National 
Curriculum working groups were appointed `in order to balance the various 
strands of thinking in each subject, as I wanted to gain as great a degree of 
consensus as possible'. 52 The problems with any such apparently sensible 
approach were manifold. From a party political point of view, it was almost 
beyond belief. `The Civil Servants just took control', recalled Angela Rumbold: 
They would present list after list of possible appointees, mostly left-wing 
teachers. If someone not on the list was suggested they would attack 
asking what credentials had he or she and do they know about this and do 
they know about that? 53 
Even Baker's special adviser, whose primary loyalty was always personal rather 
than political, balked when he saw the names of some of the people proposed for 
the NCC and SEAC. `I asked Kenneth Baker why are we turning to these 
people', recalled Kerpel, `who are the very ones responsible for the failures we 
have been trying to put right? '54 Baker's over leavening of the NCC and the 
52 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 202. Baker's evidence to a Commons Committee had a slightly 
different emphasis in that he had wanted `to involve professionals in the education system 
in 
shaping the National Curriculum' and that he had `taken advice from the inspectors and others to 
ensure that wherever possible we draw on the best brains in the country'. 
Hansard, House of 
Commons, Col. 255.17 December 1987. 
53 Rumbold interview. 
54 Kerpel interview. 
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subject groups with professionals saddled all of his Conservative successors with 
a knotty legacy, which none of them ever quite managed to untangle. This 
political misjudgement was primarily the result of a personal misjudgement. 
Baker was far too sanguine over the potential pitfalls of producing the various 
subject documents, assuming that the content might be relatively uncontroversial. 
It wasn't long before he realised that content was not as straightforward as had 
been supposed. `I thought you could produce a curriculum without bloodshed', 
Baker recalled rather disconsolately a decade later, `Then people marched over 
mathematics. Great armies were assembled over the ways of teaching algebra. 
Two reports were produced about English and could have been written about 
different things'. 55 
These ongoing problems were further compounded by conflict between 
the NCC and the DES, highlighted by the clash between Duncan Graham, the 
first chairman of the NCC, and Nick Stuart, who was the self-appointed 
departmental `assessor' to the NCC and also to SEAC. One commentator 
described the relationship between the two men as `hate at first sight'. 56 
According to Graham, Baker originally intended the Council to have a more 
distinctly partisan role, providing `a source of professional advice to balance 
against that of officials from the Department of Education and Science'. 57 Such a 
development was something that senior officials in the DES were not about to 
tolerate. Graham's account of the arrogant and `dictatorial manner' of DES 
officials is borne out by the recollection of Nick Tate, then the Professional 
Officer for History at the NCC. `When I joined there was a sense of great 
excitement', recalled Tate, `It was to be a great adventure, a great opportunity. 
(But) it was soon very obvious that the Civil Servants were very anxious about 
the NCC but the big culture shock was at the way the Civil Servants operated'. 
58 
Graham's indignation at the behaviour of Civil Servants carries slightly less 
weight when the management of his own staff is examined. One employee 
55 Baker interview. One official described how `The education world is full of people with 
staring eyes who will tell you that they are the sole proprietors of the "right" answer and totally 
refuse to compromise'. Owen interview. 
56 'How King Graham bit the carpet', Education, 19 July 1991. 
57 Graham with Tytler, Lesson for Us All, p. 12. 
58 Ibid, p. 15 and Nick Tate interview, 25 February 2000. 
139 
described the NCC as `run on fear. People were terrified of him. They were 
constantly being bawled out and would find abusive comments written on 
submissions'. 59 `Duncan Graham's account needs to be taken with a pinch of 
salt', was the opinion of one DES official, `He was a terrible manager of staff, 
terrible, a swine to work for'. 60 
Rather than personal antagonisms or other alleged misdemeanours, it was 
professional misjudgements over the role that Graham wanted the NCC to have, 
or to develop, that caused the greatest friction. 61 Nick Tate described the Council 
as `full of political innocents with limited experience' and at the apex of this was 
the chairman who `was inexperienced in handling Ministers'. 62 In Eric Bolton's 
description, 
The NCC was not a happy body. It had a clear remit. Its job was finite 
and unlike SEAC, it could end. This presented a very real difficulty with 
the Department and Ministers over planning and budgets. This was 
personified by the clash between Nick Stuart and Duncan Graham. There 
was a huge clash on the budget. The NCC still wanted to carry out its 
own research but Ministers wouldn't give a blank cheque and the 
Department assessor (Stuart) would not let large-scale projects develop. 63 
Even worse was that the `large-scale projects' that Graham initially wanted to 
develop included nothing other than the `whole curriculum'. Part of the problem 
was that Graham, frustrated at how limited his influence was over the main work 
of the NCC, sought to carve out his own niche. According to Jenny Bacon, 
`Duncan Graham was not in charge of the groups which were set up by the 
Department so he set up his own shadow groups. He was soon in deep trouble as 
59 Unattributed interview material. A flavour of Graham's lack of tact can be gleaned from his 
off-colour comment to one researcher that 'LEAs were picked on by Maragret Thatcher in a way 
like Hitler picked on the Jews'. Davies-Griffith, `Developments in the making of policy in 
education in the twentieth century', p. 182. 
60 Unattributed interview material. 
61 There was the infamous fracas over the cost of the carpet for the new NCC headquarters in 
York, and, as described in one profile, `journeys to the United States with his former secretary, 
residential weekends and the purchase of chauffeur driven cars'. `How King Graham bit the 
carpet', Education, 19 July 1991. 
62 Tate interview. 
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his people were more keen on areas of experience and a wishy-washy 
curriculum'. 64 Graham soon established a Whole Curriculum Committee and 
proposed to set up working groups to deal with the five themes of citizenship, 
environment, economic and industrial understanding, careers and health, with the 
intention that each group would publish non-statutory guidance for schools in 
each area. 65 This was a misjudgement of the highest order given the fact that this 
battle had only so recently been fought and lost at the most senior level. When 
the NCC's first annual report was published in late September 1989, an interim 
report on the progress of cross-curricular issues had still not been made public 
and the TES reported a `tense battle' between the NCC and DES Civil Servants 
over its publication. 66 Not long afterwards, according to Graham, `the roof fell 
in', with `a posse of Civil Servants' descending with strict instructions, in a letter 
apparently from Baker himself, that `nothing should go to formal meetings of the 
council for approval until it had been seen and approved by the Secretary of 
State' 67 . 
Conflict between senior officials within the NCC and the DES was 
simply one manifestation of other problems that were beginning to accrue in the 
implementation of the `new enterprise'. These were conspicuous and operated at 
many levels. The most gaping problem was the simple mathematical 
impossibility of fitting all ten subjects into the existing school timetable structure 
68 up to GCSE. While this conundrum did not have to be faced until the National 
63 Bolton interview. 
64 Bacon interview. One of `his people' was Martin Davis, Director of the NCC who had been 
Director of Education in Newcastle. Following the publication of the National Curriculum 
Consultation Document in 1987, Davis' `major criticisms of these proposals (were) that they are 
subject based many years after HMI had identified areas of experience as a more valid way of 
designing the curriculum... the government's proposals ... 
do not adequately address the problem 
of tackling the increasing number of cross curricular issues... '. Marshland and Seaton, The 
Empire Strikes Back, p. 4. 
65 Graham with Tytler, Lesson for Us All, pp. 19-20. 
66 TES, 29 September 1989. 
67 Graham with Tytler, Lesson for Us All, p. 20. Although Graham later thought he had Baker's 
support on the issue when they met in an almost surreal encounter, in a field in Wales with the 
Secretary of State dressed in running gear, the letter was never withdrawn and Graham would 
never manage to impose his vision or improve his standing with the officials and the politicians. 
Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
68 If the subject professionals may not have been that keen on the subject-based concept of a 
National Curriculum, once it became a fact, they all certainly warmed to the idea. The historian, 
Robert Skidelsky, from the libertarian right, perfectly captured how subject specialists, regardless 
of their political or ideological persuasion, wanted their specialism to have it's place in the sun: 
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Curriculum had worked its way through the earlier years of secondary schooling, 
of more immediate concern was how individual reports would spark off clashes 
between the `progressive' education professionals and their `traditional' 
opponents. The place of grammar in English, calculators in mathematics, and 
`facts' in history were particular flash points, with the Prime Minster and her 
advisers taking a close interest. 69 Another concern was the sheer unwieldiness of 
the proposals that the working groups were delivering. When Graham himself 
had joined the mathematics working party before being offered the top job at the 
NCC, the interim report had contained `a mere 354 attainment targets'. After 
replacing the original chairman of the group, during the course of one meeting 
Graham and a reconstituted working party `had whittled them down to a 
manageable 14'. 70 
Just as Baker had abrogated responsibility to his officials, so his officials 
by and large were content to allow the working parties their head, with a 
nonchalance and connivance among both politicians and officials about what was 
happening. John Hedger, then an Under Secretary at the DES, neatly summed up 
where and why the process was going off the rails: 
We (officials and Ministers) did not impose ourselves sufficiently on the 
subject groups to distinguish the platonic idea of a national curriculum 
and what the professional, the person at the chalk face, could actually 
deliver. 71 
If this was already becoming apparent with the subject content of the National 
Curriculum, it was as nothing as to what was brewing over the second `guardian' 
body, the Schools Examination and Assessment Council, SEAC. 
`A minimum prescription is in the national interest. It is in the national interest that people are 
literate and numerate. And as a personal belief, I would also favour that they know of British 
history. I would privilege History in that respect vis-ä-vis the libertarian argument'. Robert 
Skidelsky interview, 10 November 1998. 
69 Graham recorded how a civil servant passed on to him an example of `Mrs. Thatcher's single 
minded determination' : `Apparently in the morning after a great world crisis she was found 
sitting alone at breakfast altering the wording of the detailed proposals for English, while 
munching at her toast and marmalade. You might find that magnificent, frightening or both'. 
Graham, Education Racket, p. 176. 
70 Ibid., pp. 146-7. 
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TGAT -'the wrong trade off' 
While Duncan Graham was very much an unknown quantity when he was 
appointed to the NCC, and as such did not initially generate much controversy, 
Baker's choice as chairman of this second `guardian' body was called into 
question from the start. According to Angela Rumbold, `One morning, without 
any consultation, Baker announced that Phillip Halsey was to be Chairman of the 
SEAC. Of all the people who shouldn't have been appointed! '72 Whereas 
Graham would prove to be too idiosyncratic, too independent minded, in trying 
to carve out a distinct and continuing role for the NCC, Halsey's failings 
appeared to have been in the opposite direction. A profile in Education described 
how, 
Mr. Halsey's credentials are in one way impeccable; he pretty well 
invented the GCSE and guided DES policy on examinations for nearly 
ten years through both Labour and Conservative governments-his 
leadership of the 12 member Council will not stray too far from the DES 
policy. . . 
he will march his council in step with the traditional music of the 
mandarins rather than the wilder rhythms of the party politicians. 73 
Halsey's poisoned chalice, as in some respects was Graham's, was the legacy of 
another Baker `wheeze', this time in the form of the report of the Task Group on 
Assessment and Testing (TGAT). In his memoirs, Baker is noticeably coy about 
this crucial document, whose recommendations would dominate much of the 
following five years. In fact, he does not actually mention TGAT at all. 
74 Baker 
had commissioned the Group in 1987 to report on how a national curriculum 
71 Hedger interview. 
72 Rumbold interview. 
73 Education, 27 March 1988. 
74 Baker's omission of TGAT in his memoirs could be likened to an Irish historians's recent 
comment on the almost total absence of the term `IRA' from Gerry Adams' biography: 
`It is 
rather like reading a biography of Field Marshall Montgomery that leaves out the 
British army'. 
Foster, R. F. (2001) The Irish Story. Telling Tales and Making It Up in Ireland. London: Allen 
Lane, pp. 177-8. 
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might be assessed. The original brief was to devise a workable scheme of 
assessment, with the unwritten brief that it had also to produce something that 
would satisfy Mrs Thatcher's preference for pen and paper tests, over the 
preferred professional model of teacher assessment. In appointing the 
membership of TGAT, Baker initiated the same strategy as with the subsequent 
National Curriculum working groups. Education professionals were drawn back 
into the loop regarding the nuts and bolts implementation. The experience of 
TGAT highlighted the same problem that would recur when the matter of subject 
content was given over entirely to subject specialists. As described by Peter 
Wilby, `Baker had handed the National Curriculum back to the education 
establishment and coked it up politically. He then handed testing over to a group 
of people who made their living out of testing'. 75 
One of those people who `made their living out of testing', was Professor 
Paul Black, who would chair the Group. 76 Given six months to complete the task, 
a first report duly appeared in December 1987, with three supplementary reports 
at the end of March 1988. While there was an element of testing, it was not in the 
rigorous spirit that many on the right preferred and the idea of `traditional' 
pass/fail tests was rejected. The main thrust of Black's proposals was a formal 
attempt to assimilate assessment much more with teaching. There was to be a 
system of Standard Assessment Tasks (SATs) that were to be integrated into 
classroom teaching and a new scale incorporating ten `levels of attainment' . 
77 
The TGAT proposals were nothing if not ambitious. The normally supportive 
Guardian, very tentatively, and with almost a foreboding of `it might all end in 
tears', described the report as `an ingenious and innovative set of proposals, if 
75 Wilby interview. 
76 One right wing critic later described the appointment of someone like Black to design a 
`simple to administer, understandable by all... cost-effective' system of testing was `as Nikita 
Khrushev might have said - like asking a goat to 
look after the cabbages'. Flew, A. (1994) 
Shephard's Warning. Setting Schools Back on Course. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 111. 
77 The latter were seen as a major innovation although both the HMI report on the 
West German 
system (HMI, Education in the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 37) and the experience of 
the 
GCSE criteria had pointed the way, something to which the attention of members of the group 
was clearly drawn. Eric Bolton spoke of the need `to establish an overarching assessment system 
and outcomes you could trust. The GCSE criteria showed what 
happened if you let loose 
academics on individual subjects. You end up in assessment chaos as everybody would so 
it 
differently'. Bolton interview. 
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highly complex). 78 Mrs Thatcher, who may not have known much about 
assessment, certainly knew what she didn't like. In her memoirs, written half a 
dozen years later, this time with some justification, she remained scathing about 
her Secretary of State's acceptance of the Report. `Ken Baker warmly welcomed 
the report', wrote Mrs Thatcher, `Whether he had read it properly, I do not know: 
if he had it says much for his stamina'. 79 One forgotten side effect of the TGAT 
report was the ditching of the proposed reform of the A Level system, contained 
in the Higginson report. According to Jenny Bacon, 
Higginson wanted to go for something which was much more like an IB 
(International Baccalaureate) 
... so anyway the political trade-off was 
Higginson got ditched and our A levels remained the jewel in the crown, 
the gold standard and we got TGAT. In retrospect it may have been the 
wrong trade 0 ff. 80 
The `trade off was necessary because Mrs Thatcher would not countenance both 
TGAT and Higginson, but in typical fashion, then proceeded to try and claw 
back the ground given in accepting Black's report. According to Baker, almost 
immediately `Mrs Thatcher started using guerrilla tactics from the sidelines and 
there was a tremendous attempt to pull the wool over my eyes over testing'. 81 It 
was soon put about that Mrs Thatcher and her Policy Unit were unhappy. `On 
TGAT we were constantly aware where Brian Griffiths, who was feeding 
fundamentalist right wing thinking to Mrs Thatcher, was coming from', recalled 
Jenny Bacon, `We adapted the presentation to meet his main concerns. Griffiths, 
Sheila Lawlor and John Marenbon, these were the principal thorns in Baker's 
side'. 82 This conflict became very public with the leaking to the Independent, in 
March 1988, of a letter from Mrs Thatcher's Office to Baker, highlighting some 
78 The Guardian, 29 March 1988. 
79 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 595. 
80 Taylor, `Mover and Shakers', p. 177. 
81 Baker interview. 
82 Bacon interview. 
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aspects of the report that the Prime Minister's found `disturbing'. 83 The same 
month, it was reported that Sheila Lawlor's Correct Core was bedtime reading 
for Mrs Thatcher. 84 It was certainly brief enough and contained simple, 
straightforward examples of what pupils could have been expected to know at 
various ages. Such contributions were derided in typical fashion by the education 
establishment, while the TGAT proposals remained revered. Yet as the balance 
between what TGAT proposed and what was actually possible in the classroom 
shifted over subsequent years towards the original view of Mrs Thatcher and her 
supporters, so the distance between those in charge at the time and responsibility 
for what subsequently happened has also shifted. In his memoirs, Baker wrote 
rather disingenuously that `Little was actually agreed before I left the 
department, but I had a feeling that this elaboration would cause trouble in the 
schools'. 85 The Civil Servants, distant from a classroom, had little concept of 
what the implementation of Black's report might involve and took little trouble 
to find out. Some thought and have remained convinced that it was an 
`intellectually pleasing' document. 86 Like the `platonic idea' of a national 
curriculum, one Under Secretary felt that `Officials were, I think, carried away 
by the beauty of the structure and must take some of the blame'. 87 
The TGAT proposals would have been difficult to implement at any time. 
Not only was a new national curriculum to be established with agreed subject 
content for ten subjects, something those at the NCC would have found 
challenging in itself, but this was now to be combined with an over-arching 
83 These included the fact that `The Committee seem to have designed an enormously elaborate 
and complex system. . . tests are only a part of assessment, and 
that the major purpose of 
assessment is diagnostic and formative, rather than summative ... the major role envisaged 
for 
LEAs... the general impression is that (the costs) would be very large... as a result of the 
complexity of the proposals, the new assessment system could not be introduced in less than five 
years. The Independent, 10 March 1988. 
84 The Guardian, 29 March 1988. 
85 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 200. 
86 Bacon interview. 
87 Saville interview. Although anyone with a pocket calculator at the time could have been 
foreseen what the `beauty of the structure' would mean in practical terms for teachers although 
it 
only became apparent at the pilot stage in 1990 when the assessment of mathematics, English and 
science. These alone would have involved, `a total of 32 "attainment targets" for Key Stage 
One 
(Years 1 &2) alone. There were to be 227 "statements of attainment" for mathematics, science 
and English, which meant that for a class of thirty 7 year-olds, a teacher would need to grapple 
with as many as 6810 "statements of attainment"'. Chitty, C. (1992) The Education 
System 
Transformed. Manchester: Baseline Book Company, p. 59. 
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system of assessment. This new system superimposed a linear scale of ten 
different levels of attainment on each subject, with the attainment at each level 
also needing to be defined and assessed. Nick Stuart, the Deputy Secretary in the 
DES with overall responsibility for schools within the Education Act, was 
reported as describing the `clash of horns on the fourth floor (of Elizabeth 
House)' between Jenny Bacon and David Forrester, his Under Secretaries 
responsible for the Curriculum and Testing respectively. 88 Forrester, responsible 
for SEAC, was concerned with trying to simplify the demands on the assessment 
structure, where some requirements were almost untestable. Bacon, responsible 
for the NCC, was only concerned with what pupils should know and learn. These 
conflicts between the curriculum bodies needed to be resolved in the face of a 
disinterested Secretary of State, and a Prime Minister who had wanted neither. 
Moreover, Mrs Thatcher's own cherished, and potentially, the most radical 
proposal within the Education Reform Act, Grant Maintained schools, also 
appeared to be subject to `hijacking' by perfidious officials and a complacent 
Secretary of State. 
Grant Maintained schools - Unforeseen ways 
In a phrase which goes to the heart of many of the neo-liberal proposals that 
would be contained within the 1988 Act, Mrs Thatcher described them as going 
`as far as we could towards a "public sector voucher"'. 89 Proposals for increased 
powers of management for schools, increased delegation of school budgets, 
formula funding for pupils, open enrolment and changes to the powers and 
composition of governing bodies were all intended to lay the groundwork for a 
voucher-type system, as well as provide schools with the experience they needed 
prior to becoming fully self-governing institutions. Although each of these 
measures, in turn, would generate their own level of contention, the greatest 
controversy would be over the proposed mechanism by which schools became 
self-governing, through `opting out' of LEA control to become, in the new 
parlance, `Grant Maintained' schools. According to Robert Balchin, the irregular 
88 Forrester interview. 
89 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 591. 
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who would be most identified with the initiative, and who had opposed the 
introduction of a voucher scheme under Keith Joseph because of the 
unpreparedness of schools, 
Grant Maintained schools were nothing new. No one thought them up. 
There are very few new ideas in education; groups sit down and look at 
old ideas and try and revive the good bits. Most of these had been 
cooking away in the CPS during the 1970s. I suppose the germ of an idea 
was born with E. G. West and his great little book, Education and the 
State. It was thought at that time, the idea of LEAs relinquishing 
authority, to be beyond stupidity. I saw the scenario when all schools 
were outside LEA control. LMS was the first step, a gateway through 
which all schools could be released. 90 
Much more so than their first cousins, CTCs, Grant Maintained schools had the 
potential to radically alter the structure of education had they been as successful, 
as originally envisaged. By effectively turning schools into mini businesses, 
competing individually in the market place for students, they would also herald 
the end of the LEAs, whose primary raison d'etre would also have been 
removed. The original policy emerged in the wake of the failed efforts with the 
voucher, coupled with Mrs Thatcher's increasing interest in education policy and 
Oliver Letwin's appointment to the Policy Unit. Stuart Sexton described how 
`Oliver Letwin organised seminars at Number Ten as part of a series of policy 
meetings at one of which John McIntosh presented a paper on autonomous 
schools'. 91 Just as Cyril Taylor had been personally encouraged by Mrs Thatcher 
following the CPS conference on technical schools, `Mrs Thatcher was most 
90 Balchin interview. Balchin was robust about the pioneering role of Grant Maintained schools 
within the state system. When it was suggested during John Patten's time that Grant Maintained 
status could be extended to private schools, Balchin was scathing. `Independent schools', he said, 
`should stand on their own two feet. The Grant Maintained idea is not to prop up ailing boarding 
schools who should be responsive to the market'. TES, 5 June 1992 
91 Sexton interview. McIntosh was headteacher at the London Oratory School and a member of 
the CPS. `The LEA represents a tier of bureaucracy that is quite unnecessary', he would tell two 
American academics in their study of British education reform. `It absorbs a disproportionate 
share of the resources. And I found myself spending a disproportionate amount of my time 
dealing with it. I wanted full autonomy'. Chubb, J. and Moe, T. (1992) A Lesson in 
School 
Reform from Great Britain. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, p. 31. 
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impressed by his (McIntosh's) clarity of thought and he was invited back 
informally on several occasions'. 92 Variations on the idea of `autonomous 
schools' spread throughout the network of irregular groupings prior to finalising 
the 1987 manifesto, as evidenced in the pamphlets of the Hillgate Group and the 
No Turning Back Group. According to Angela Rumbold, `The stress was on 
schools to be more independent. At some meetings of the NTBG, "mother" (Mrs 
Thatcher) would come along and listen and take away what she wanted'. 93 Yet 
even more so than with the National Curriculum, the ability of officials to 
manipulate the outcome was established on the back of what Balchin described 
as `the political obfuscation and confusion that clouded the initiative at birth and 
played against it later on'. 94 Just as officials within the DES had sensed early on 
that Keith Joseph had severe reservations about a voucher scheme and played on 
these, so the same tactic would be used with Baker. It probably was not difficult 
to gauge Baker's stance. Angela Rumbold certainly felt that 
Kenneth Baker didn't think it could ever work but put it in the Bill on the 
basis of "It's what she (Mrs Thatcher) wants". He appeared happy to put 
all his energy into raising money for City Technology Colleges and left 
the rest to subordinates. 95 
Whatever rationale Baker tried to make later on, he was sold very early on the 
notion that regardless of their role, there could not be very many of them. `You 
could not let all schools go Grant Maintained', he later explained, `There would 
have been chaos and this was brought home to me very early'. 
96 Even those very 
strong irregular advocates of Grant Maintained schools were also worried about 
how they could be introduced and it appeared that the nearer one was or the more 
involved in education policy, the more cautious the approach. According to 
92 Sexton interview. 
93 Rumbold interview. 
94 Balchin interview. 
95 Ibid and Rumbold interview. Rumbold's own stance was almost as ambivalent. When 
it was 
later suggested during John MacGregor's time that LEAs should simply be abolished, she was 
publicly scathing. `It is a complete nonsense', she was quoted as saying, `We would 
have to 
reinvent local departments of education'. Education, 20 October 1989 
96 Baker interview. 
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Stuart Sexton, `I was not in favour of all schools being forced to opt out. There 
was a danger of incompetent schools opting out and staying there but giving the 
policy a bad name'. 97 The most powerful supporter of Grant Maintained schools, 
Mrs Thatcher herself, never bothered with the nuances or possibilities of what 
opting out and Grant Maintained schools might entail, as opposed to the 
simplicities of what had gone before. According to Baker, Mrs Thatcher had a 
straightforward `hankering in the back of her mind for Direct Grant Schools and 
blurted it out during the 1987 campaign'. 98 In fact, several times during the 
campaign and subsequently, but most prominently three days after the launch of 
the 1987 manifesto, when, as described by Baker, the Prime Minister `plunged 
the policy into confusion'. 
Baker described Mrs Thatcher's failure to rule out the possibility of Grant 
Maintained schools charging fees and setting their own admissions policies as 
`simply wrong'. 99 Yet he was either being disingenuous in his description, or 
genuinely bemused by the `obfuscation and confusion' at the time. As regards 
admissions policy, far from Mrs Thatcher being `simply wrong', Sheila Lawlor, 
who wrote the manifesto briefing for Ministers, recalled that `it clearly said that 
GM schools could set their own admissions policy. Baker went off message and 
spent all the time fighting Mrs Thatcher'. 100 As regards fees, it would also appear 
that the issue, far from being resolved, hung in the balance even during the 
campaign. During the first Sunday of the 1987 election campaign, one senior 
member of the CPS described how 
Kenneth Baker rang five times for clarification regarding charging for 
Grant Maintained schools. Mrs Thatcher, at the height of her powers, 
with never less than ten per cent of a lead in the polls, gave in. It was 
97 Sexton interview. John Marks was also cautious: `I never thought that it was the right thing for 
all schools to opt out. There was the need for consent, to achieve the policy through proving it 
was worth doing it. But we underestimated the power of LEAs to disrupt and pressure schools. 
You needed a core of GM schools to have a knock on effect on other LEA schools. ' Marks 
interview. 
98 Baker interview. 
99 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 194. 
100 Lawlor interview. 
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deliberately left vague in the manifesto and in fact the 1988 Act made it 
actually more restrictive than was previously the case. 101 
Following the election, the confusion continued, this time regarding the pace and 
extent of opting out. Baker, referring to an interview Mrs Thatcher gave to the 
Independent in September 1987, before the Bill was even published, described 
how `Margaret said, "I think most schools will opt out". Yet again, as regards 
education policy, Margaret had rather strayed from the script'. 102 As with the 
National Curriculum, there were now in effect two opposing scripts, as once it 
became necessary to work out the details, the controlling hand was again firmly 
with DES officials. In the hands of the non-committed Baker, the spirit of the 
original intentions was emasculated by the decision that Grant Maintained 
schools were not the future of state education but rather `a halfway house' 
between the state and the private sector. As with CTCs, their number would be 
limited and their function was to act as a type of beacon for state schools. Even 
this limited vision was too much for his department. 
While discussions about the National Curriculum may have been 
rumbling away for at least a decade within the Department, one official remarked 
that as regards Grant Maintained schools, `My impression is that this is very 
much a policy which came from the politicians which the Department was asked 
to develop'. 103 According to one study on how the Grant Maintained policy was 
implemented, `it was at this point in the history of opting out that the 
considerable influence exerted by officials on the education policy making 
process was most in evidence'. 104 In the authors' wonderfully understated 
description, the officials were able to develop `the original policy proposals in 
ways unforeseen by its early advocates'. '05 According to the authors, `DES Civil 
Servants had to reconcile the philosophy and differing ambitions of the advocates 
of opted out schools, while securing the smooth running of the system. What 
101 Unattributed interview material. 
102 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 220. 
103 Quoted in Fitz, J. Halpin, D. Power, S. (1993) Grant Maintained Schools, Education in the 
Market Place. London: Kogan Page Ltd., p. 26. 
104 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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emerged was a policy framework that enabled, rather than encouraged, schools 
to opt out of LEA control'. 106 Schools were `enabled' to opt out, in perhaps the 
same way that horses are `enabled' to go around the Grand National course once 
the race is started. All that remains is the small matter of the fences. And fences 
there were aplenty, as an apparently straightforward proposal eventually took 52 
sections of the Reform Act to achieve. Among those sections, it was perhaps the 
question of a ballot, the need for `consent', that proved to be the most significant 
hurdle that schools had to cross, and the main bone of contention between those 
on the right as the debate continued over the following years. According to 
Balchin 
The idea of the ballot was sold to Kenneth Baker on three grounds: there 
would be no `avalanche' as it would be an effective limit on the number 
of applications; it would add some degree of democratic legitimacy; it 
would be difficult for a later government to go back to the status quo 
ante. Baker was aware how revolutionary his move was and every 
possible reason was given to Kenneth Baker why there should be a ballot. 
The Cabinet was worried about it. It was originally suggested that 75 per 
cent of parents were needed. At least Kenneth Baker kept it at a plain 
majority. 107 
At the time, few on the right could argue against the need for a ballot as `power 
to the parents' had long been a tenet of new right sloganeering. But the `nitty 
gritty' of what this should mean in practice was never satisfactorily defined. Did 
it mean that parents had the power to decide on a school-by-school basis whether 
the school should be Grant Maintained? Or should it mean that parents had the 
right to choose which type of school they wanted for their children, within a 
school system laid down elsewhere? All in all, the policy as it emerged from the 
DES was a brilliant sleight of hand. Point by point, it was entirely defensible on 
the grounds of either practicality, or even ideology. The effect was, however, that 
105 Fitz, J. and Halpin, D. (1991) `From a `Sketchy Policy' to a `Workable Scheme': the DES and 
grant-maintained schools. International Studies in the Sociology of Education, Vol. 1, p. 129. 106 Fitz et al., Grant Maintained Schools, pp. 26-27. 
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`the market principle (was) severely constrained in operation' and `the details... 
preserved a great deal of the character of educational provision which existed 
prior to the introduction of GM policy'. 108 It was a legacy that Baker's successors 
unsuccessfully struggled to overturn. As with the introduction of the National 
Curriculum, it appeared that Baker had allowed his officials to exert a key 
influence on the outcome of a key policy area, prompting further accusations of 
`subversion' of government policy by the education establishment. 
Conclusion 
To coin a phrase, the Baker stewardship of education was really a game of two 
halves. Baker's political agility and drive in sweeping up all the different strands 
of policy proposals and then getting them through in a single omnibus Bill, was 
impressive. The challenge, as well as the political opportunity that presented was 
something he clearly relished. According to David Hancock, Baker was at the top 
of his game during this period. `Up to 1987 he was very good indeed', Hancock 
recalled, `We crawled through every line of the Bill with Baker chivvying 
officials with cries of "eyes down" when attention began to slip'. 109 Once the 
situation moved past the point of grand political gestures and manoeuvres, into 
the messy and frustrating minutiae of actually putting flesh on the bones of the 
various proposals, Baker's attention moved elsewhere. After the Reform Act had 
passed through Parliament, in the words of Angela Rumbold, `Ken went out to 
lunch'. 11 
With it's 238 clauses and 13 schedules the Act itself was described in the 
Independent as `a gothic monstrosity of legislation'. 
"' With at least four major 
changes to the existing structure of schooling alone - the National Curriculum, 
local management of schools, CTCs and Grant Maintained schools - it is 
arguable how much control or oversight any Secretary of State, however 
107 Balchin interview. 
108 Fitz and Halpin, `From a "Sketchy Policy"', p. 145. 
109 Hancock interview. 
110 Rumbold interview. Baker was no doubt contemplating springboards new on the back of 
newspaper reports that he was now the Conservative backbench favourite to succeed Mrs. 
Thatcher. `Tory MPs favour Baker as next leader', The Independent, 12 October 1987. 
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committed and knowledgeable, could have exercised. Baker was neither. His 
ambivalence towards the role of Grant Maintained schools, in a similar manner 
to Keith Joseph's ambivalence towards education vouchers, allowed officials to 
undermine the original spirit of the proposal. Did this entail a deliberate 
`subversion' of the original proposals? There was an element of hostility towards 
the concept of Grant Maintained schools, whereby officials were certainly not 
unhappy that a restrictive model for opting out could be developed. According to 
David Forrestor, `There was a tendency towards ideological hostility towards a 
market system from people who had spent their lives working with the state 
system'. 112 Yet this undermining was part deliberate and part involuntary, in the 
sense that there was also a genuine conceptual `blind spot' on the part of 
officials. Having been reared and immersed in the state system, they simply 
could not conceive of an unplanned, market-driven alternative: `Schools have got 
to remain part of the fabric of the state system. We had to ensure that schools that 
opted out were able to discharge their responsibilities. The principle was that 
money could follow the child but that was within a planned system'. 113 A lack of 
common purpose among the proponents of Grant Maintained schools as to 
exactly what they should be, resulted in a highly restrictive planned model for 
their introduction. This, in turn, was fought and refought over almost as soon as 
it was introduced and its consequences became apparent. Almost every supporter 
of Grant Maintained schools agreed that the original policy was too restrictive, 
but there was no agreement on how to overcome this. Should the terms of the 
ballot be changed? Should schools be simply forced to opt out? Should LEAs be 
abolished? 
The same, or perhaps an even greater, degree of confusion was apparent 
in relation to the introduction of the National Curriculum, where there were a 
number of possible models on offer. In this case, rather than any ambivalence on 
Kenneth Baker's part, it was his personal determination to go for a 
comprehensive ten-subject model, with the support of his officials, that directly 
contradicted the political wishes of much of his Party and his Prime Minister. 
1I1 The Independent, 28 July 1988. 
112 Forrestor interview. 
113 Ibid. 
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Without Baker's determined preference for a subject-led curriculum model, it is 
unlikely that officials could have resisted any alternative proposal. It was a 
decision his successors since 1988 have gradually tried to unravel, often to their 
political cost. Their travails were further exacerbated by Baker's lack of 
mangement and control over how his preferred model was to be implemented. 
With more than a passing nod in the direction of Baker, according to Clive 
Saville, `The National Curriculum went disastrously wrong. Politicians think that 
passing a Bill through Parliament is the job done because it is something they 
could do. Ministers were impatient and only intermittently paid attention to 
details' 
. 
114 Nowhere was this more apparent than with Baker and indeed much of 
the blame for Duncan Graham's discomfort and the direction that the National 
Curriculum was to take, lay at Baker's door. 
Baker himself later acknowledged that he `never envisaged it would be as 
complex as it turned out to be', 115 yet at the time made little effort to exercise 
control. Given the nonchalance with which he made the appointments to the 
working groups, it was little wonder that he took even less time with what they 
would produce, with the exception of his personal favourites. `Apart from the 
English and History reports', recalled Jenny Bacon, `Kenneth Baker wasn't 
interested in the nitty gritty and this was part of the problem with the 
Councils'. 116 It would be stretching credulity to suggest that Baker's support for 
his preferred curriculum model, any more than his opposition to a radical 
restructuring of the schools system, was based on strong ideological or political 
principles. Baker himself described his contribution. `I was always trying to take 
the politics out of it', he recalled a decade later, `I am a practitioner. I would like 
to think I brought executive thrust to the job, a hands-on driving force'. ' 17 Even 
the sceptics admired his drive. Balchin saw that `Baker was enamoured by the 
idea of controlling the curriculum' and `an entirely broad-brush guy. But at least 
he had the guts to take the ideas forward'. ' 18 
114 Saville interview. 
115 Baker interview. 
116 Bacon interview. Baker's approach was described by Nick Tate as `affable but remote. He 
didn't trouble his mind with Attainment Targets. He was resting on his laurels'. Tate interview. 
117 Baker interview. 
118 Balchin interview. 
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The remaining question is why were the attempts by Mrs Thatcher and 
her irregular allies to exert greater control over this stage of the policy process so 
unsuccessful? According to Dominic Morris, then at the Cabinet Office and later 
to join the Number Ten Policy Unit, 
The Prime Minister's ability to sack people for not quite doing what you 
want them to is limited. You can stop them doing things if it is a binary 
decision, like interest rate rises. But for flow processes or project 
management, they are in a poor position. 119 
Given the scale and the structure of the education project that they themselves 
had set in train, and the number of processes and people involved, subsequent 
interventions by Mrs Thatcher and others could be never more than, as Baker 
himself described, `guerrilla tactics'. They were able to wound, but not to kill, as 
the `binary decisions' taken within ad hoc sub-committees about what policy 
proposals to include or not include in a manifesto, were replaced by an almost 
unimaginable welter of details and minutiae, diffused among a whole variety of 
groups and interests. 
Baker no doubt sensed that such a proposition was not conducive to his 
upwardly mobile career path. At the 1987 Conservative Party Conference, Baker 
had said in a typical poetic flourish that `I have put my hand to the plough of 
education reform and I will carry it through to the end of the furrow'. 120 After 
three years at the DES, with the `end of the furrow' still a long way off, but with 
the both the details and the acrimony, beginning to pile up, Baker had clearly had 
enough and in July 1989 he became Conservative Party Chairman. 121 Although 
Baker's desire for this post had been trailed in the press to the point of tedium, 
his adviser was not so keen. `I did not want him to move', recalled Tony Kerpel, 
`I argued that he should stay and let the reforms bed in. It would also help to lose 
his reputation of not seeing things through and might stand him in good stead 
119 Dominic Morris interview. 27 October 1998. 
120 The Guardian, 8 November 1987. 
121 So had his Permanent Secretary, who left a few weeks prior to Baker. `After 1987', recalled 
David Hancock, `he (Baker) became increasingly arrogant and impatient, and by 1989 I had had 
enough although I didn't know he was going'. Hancock interview. 
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later, politically, if he could make them Work'. 122 Baker himself reacts 
indignantly to the charge of `not seeing things through'. `I was accused of always 
leaving things undone which I resent very much indeed', he said. Nor should 
there have been any problem about making the reforms work. `If I could change 
anything', said Baker, `I would have simplified the tests, increased the 
administrative help to schools and extended the school day'. 123 Such a nice 
straightforward list disguised the multitude of problems that Baker's politically 
driven reform package bequeathed his successors, who, according to one 
observer had an added handicap: `Baker at least had a game plan. His successors 
had none'. 124 
122 Kerpel interview. 
123 Baker interview. 
124 Mike Baker interview. 13 August 1999. 
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CHAPTER 7 
July 1989 - November 1990: `The worst job in government? ' 
Introduction 
It is reasonably safe to assume that, in replacing Baker, Mrs Thatcher wanted 
someone to put the reforms back on the right track in the face of what she already 
knew was a powerful and entrenched education establishment. Even if it had been 
clear what exactly was the agreed `right track', John MacGregor was clearly not the 
ideological gladiator who was needed. He was always more a technician than an 
ideologue, one of those politicians for whom the term a `safe pair of hands' could 
have been invented. Indeed, this was exactly what many people felt was needed after 
the roller coaster of the Baker years. Demitri Coryton, chairman of the Conservative 
Education Association, wrote in the TES that `What our school system now needs 
more than anything is a period of consolidation, with as little organizational change 
as possible. John MacGregor has a reputation as a "doer", a man who tries to solve 
problems. That is exactly what is now needed at the Department of Education and 
Science'. 1 
This chapter examines how well MacGregor dealt with the problems he 
inherited. `Under constant pressure from me, (MacGregor) did what he could', was 
Mrs Thatcher's assessment, before she finally ran out of patience with her fourth 
Education Secretary since 1979.2 How was it that this highly competent and well- 
liked politician found himself moving on after the shortest tenure at education since 
Patrick Gordon-Walker in 1968? Was this due to personal, policy or political 
factors? Apart from managing the reforms, was there a further and much trickier 
predicament facing MacGregor in terms of just how highly politicised the area of 
education policy had become? 
1 `MacGregor's tangle of loose ends', TES, 22 July 1989. 
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`Signs of greenness' 
It probably says something about the level of compartmentalisation of modern 
government, and/or the lack of Cabinet discussion, that MacGregor seemed to 
wander in from a distant part of government, blissfully unaware of what had been 
happening in the world of education. He was certainly unaware of Baker's 
increasing discomfiture and eagerness to move from the DES: 
I don't think Kenneth Baker's departure was that well trailed. It was certainly 
a surprise to me. I was on the way to a meeting in Brussels about sheep meat 
on the Friday evening. It was a critical meeting and I was on my way to 
Heathrow when Mrs Thatcher rang and told me she wanted me to be 
Secretary of State for Education but I was to go to Brussels and close the 
meeting first. So I had two jobs for that weekend. 3 
Looking back over his time as Education Secretary, MacGregor later recalled that 
`The world of education is full of people who wish to propagate their own views. It 
means that you constantly move into a maelstrom of argument'. 4 Yet in his initial 
dealings with education, there was also more than a hint of arrogance and insularity, 
terms not often associated with MacGregor, that made his ability to survive in this 
`maelstrom' even more difficult. Through the political network MacGregor had 
clearly been warned against his new Department. `The DES was a little bit isolated 
and tended to regard itself as itself, he later recalled, `There were some weak links 
and different aspects were causing me concern. Every educationist and lobbyist, 
including those within the Department wanted everything. I didn't want to be 
beholden to officials'. 5 He certainly had an uneasy relationship with Her Majesty's 
Chief Inspector, Eric Bolton. According to MacGregor, `Eric Bolton was very 
2 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 597. 
3 John MacGregor interview, 15 November 2000. 
4 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 139. 
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woolly and did not have a huge impact, certainly not with me. He was far from being 
a Chris Woodhead'. 6 For Bolton's part, he in turn felt that MacGregor treated HMI 
as `a consultancy to use when and where he wanted. Soon after he was appointed I 
tried to persuade him to be in London for the publication of the annual report of 
HMI but he didn't take the advice with the result that Jack Straw stole all the 
headlines. There was a kafuffle in No. 10 as to why he (MacGregor) wasn't there. 
Signs of greenness of a new Minister'. 7 
Equally unimpressed with the approach of the new Secretary of State was his 
predecessor's adviser, Tony Kerpel: 
I was in my office at the Department (for DES) for two weeks after Kenneth 
Baker moved to the Home Office. John MacGregor never asked to see me 
which was very foolish. He was not equal to the poison chalice and obdurate 
officials were able to reopen debates. 8 
The obvious point of contact for MacGregor to `sound out' the previous regime 
would have been his own political adviser, Eleanor Laing. The choice of Laing, a 
Scottish lawyer with an eye on a safe southern seat and little experience of education 
issues, would prove too much of a luxury for MacGregor as he grappled with his 
`poison chalice'. `Mine was a political appointment', Laing herself told the TES, 
`I'm not an educationist but when I heard the job would probably involve working in 
education I was delighted'. 9 MacGregor appeared to have briefly considered 
appointing a more specialist adviser, but in the end chose to rely on his own 
experience. `There wasn't an obvious person I could appoint from education', he 
said, `And in any case, I didn't feel I needed one'. 10 Laing echoed her minister's idea 
that his `lay' experience was more than sufficient for his new job. `John MacGregor 
5 MacGregor interview. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Bolton interview. 
8 Kerpel interview. 
9 TES, 3 November 1989. 
10 MacGregor interview. 
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already had extensive political experience and knowledge', recalled Laing, `His own 
connections in education would tell him what was going wrong, what was 
1 happening. He was also a constituency MP and knew there were worries'. ' 
MacGregor's intention to rely on `his own connections' was apparent in his first 
dealings with his new Department. John Caines, his Permanent Secretary recalled 
how, over the choice of Press Officer, 
Jim Coe came from MAFF. MacGregor called me at a Buckingham Palace 
garden party to let me know what had happened. He insisted that Coe come 
with him. Coe was from the Government Information Service and officials in 
the Education Department were vehemently opposed to someone from the 
GIS operating in the Department. But MacGregor insisted. 12 
Like Laing, Coe was someone unacquainted with education and joked on taking up 
his new posting about `still having mud on his wellies'. 13 Caines himself, 
MacGregor's most senior official, was relatively new to the Department, having 
replaced David Hancock the previous May. He was almost as wary as MacGregor of 
his new Department: 
It was a disadvantage being parachuted in to the Department. Although I 
wouldn't say it was anything like the caricature, there was an element in the 
Department that was inward looking. It had been shaped by enormously 
powerful influences and strong characters whose influence was still apparent. 
There is always the danger of abdicating power and influence to the Deputy 
Secretaries. Tony Kerpel noted that I sat directly in front of the Ministers, 
whereas David Hancock used to sit off to the side. 
14 
11 Eleanor Laing interview, 5 March 1998. 
12 Gaines interview. 
13 Education, 3 November 1989. 
14 Gaines interview. 
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Caines had worked with MacGregor at the DTI and both men had got on well 
together. Surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly, it was the Civil Servant, Caines, 
who was much more attuned to the political requirements of MacGregor's task and 
who sensed that MacGregor's talents were perhaps not the best suited to the 
immediate job in hand. `I had worked with John MacGregor in the DTI', recalled 
Caines, `but Education had a level of interference in details on a quite different scale 
from the DTI. He was a conciliator by temperament, a listener, and increasingly 
more cautious than Kenneth Baker. He was a details man. Perhaps too much so with 
earnest debate over details'. 15 Whereas other officials were able to use the adviser as 
a sounding board for their Minister, Caines felt that possibly due to her inexperience 
of education and lack of experience in working with MacGregor, `Eleanor Laing 
made very little impression. I was never quite sure of his other sources of advice'. 16 
Eric Bolton was scathing about MacGregor's `other sources'. According to Bolton, 
MacGregor `fell in with the "Scottish mafia" such as Eric Anderson (headmaster of 
Eton) and Canon Pilkington who aimed at the best preservation they could get of the 
old classical standards'. 17 Peter Watkins at the NCC also felt that `there was a 
powerful independent schools lobby to which John MacGregor appeared to be in 
thrall' . 
18 
It is probably inaccurate to say that MacGregor was as completely in thrall to 
a `Scottish mafia', any more than he totally ignored his own officials. His dilemma 
was that, neither acting on, nor ignoring, advice from either of these sources would 
have been sufficient in itself to make a success of his job. Other than using his own 
instinct, MacGregor had no blueprint or clear rationale to prioritise the reforms 
which he inherited. Lacking the lodestar of either burning ambition like Baker, or 
the fiery ideology of Mrs Thatcher, he quickly became bogged down in details. A 
significant and related problem was his failure to grasp the `hidden curriculum' he 
had inherited, the politicisation of education policy. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bolton interview. 
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Into the `maelstrom' 
What critics and friends alike agreed on was the magnitude of the task facing 
MacGregor. His in tray was full of items that carried the burden of different 
ambitions for different groups that were involved in their introduction. Eleanor 
Laing explained how 
As to whether "the worst job in government" was to be Kenneth Baker's 
successor, that description would be a good starting point for any discussion 
of the problems facing his successor. His (MacGregor's) brief was to make 
the thing work. Kenneth Baker's work was highly commendable but was also 
massively bureaucratic. He was good at the basics of getting the Bill through 
but totally unpragmatic. 19 
The problem was that for Mrs Thatcher `making the thing work' meant hacking back 
to a core or minimalist curriculum, pen and paper testing, while driving forward 
opting out to get rid of LEAs and `freeing' schools. MacGregor, who could not have 
been fully aware of, and did not take the trouble to discover, the bitter ideological 
controversies over many of the reforms in the Education Reform Act, took his brief 
literally, that is, to try to make Baker's reforms `work'. Very soon after his 
appointment, a senior DES official was quoted as saying that `he (MacGregor) sees 
the agenda as already having been set and his job is to get on and do it as effectively 
as possible'. 20 It was apparent that MacGregor very quickly prioritised the 
gargantuan task of introducing the National Curriculum. In his defence, MacGregor 
argued that other issues were to be dealt with later on as `Mrs Thatcher told me that 
she expected me to be there until the next election. And I think she meant it. I then 
planned on that basis and that was how I approached my new job' . 
21 
18 Peter Watkins in Headlines, 1993,11, p. 66. 
19 Laing interview. 
20 Education, 6 October 1989. 
21 MacGregor interview. 
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In tackling the National Curriculum, MacGregor was probably at one with 
his senior officials and one certain instance of where he also agreed with their advice 
was the need to get teachers `on board' if the initiative was to succeed. When Keith 
Joseph handed over to Kenneth Baker in 1986, his parting advice was `Don't make 
the same mistake I did in attacking the teachers'. 22 For his own reasons, Baker had 
little choice but to continue to ride roughshod over the teaching profession, to the 
extent that at the time of his departure, aside from everything else that was 
happening, David Hancock felt that his `great worry' was `a demoralised 
profession'. 23 This priority he passed on to John Caines. Caines characterised the 
situation as it had developed whereby 
Kenneth Baker in his effort to soften up the ground for his attack had 
bombed out and demoralised the profession. MacGregor fell victim to the 
relics of this bombing campaign. He wanted to recreate a sense of purpose 
and went into listening mode. He was talking to the victims, talking to people 
whom others wanted to be kicked in the loins. 24 
Early on, letters were sent out to headteachers praising them for their hard work. At 
the Party Conference, he informed the gathering that he was taking personal charge 
of appraising the outflow of `bumf to schools. 25 Meetings were arranged with other 
interested parties. Meeting Kenneth Baker was described as `never much fun' by one 
of those involved. According to the description by Michael Barber, then with the 
NUT, `He (Baker) managed to appear to be listening without ever seeming terribly 
interested, still less moved'. 26 With MacGregor, the listener par excellence, the 
mood changed. After one meeting on schools funding, Steven Byers, then chairman 
of the Labour- controlled Association of Metropolitan Authorities emerged to 
22 Baker, Turbulent Years, p. 161. 
23 Hancock interview. 
24 Gaines interview. 
25 Education, 13 October 1989. 
26 TES, 31 May 1996. 
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describe the Secretary of State as `someone we are happy to work with', a remark 
that was surely one of the first of a long line of nails in MacGregor's coffin. 27 
While taking an emollient approach in his public utterances and actions on 
policy may have been within MacGregor's own gift, the more intractable problem 
remained the National Curriculum itself. `It was certainly true that Kenneth wasn't a 
details man and he would be the first to admit it himself , recalled MacGregor, `and 
I spent a very considerable amount of time, almost too much time getting the 
National Curriculum into shape. I didn't expect to be wading through enormous 
tomes. Neither did we realise that these huge unwieldy bodies (the NCC and SEAC), 
probably set up at the instigation of someone like Nick Stuart, would result in 
massive bureaucracies'. 28 Very early on he also discovered how documents could be 
fought over between irregulars, regulars and politicos like a fox between hounds, as 
one of his first decisions relating to the curriculum had to deal with the report of the 
history working group. 
The chair of the group, chosen personally by Baker was Michael Saunders- 
Watson, a retired naval officer and stately home owner. Saunders-Watson was no 
match for the professionals on his group. The interim report, which went to Baker in 
June 1989, was far too `progressive' both for Baker and the right to swallow. The 
attainment targets on which assessment would be based, focussed almost exclusively 
on `understanding and skills', rather than any body of historical knowledge. Baker 
told Saunders-Watson that this was not acceptable. More facts had to be included. 
This was the situation when MacGregor replaced Baker. It fell to MacGregor to 
write to the group with the entirely sensible observation that the existing approach 
ran the risk `that pupils' grasp of the substance of history will not be clearly 
established or assessed'. To the professionals, this was heresy. Any suggestion in 
favour of `traditional' aspects of learning in whatever subject was immediately 
branded as right wing. 29 MacGregor asked the working group to look again at ways 
27 TES, 9 November 1990. 
28 MacGregor interview. 
29 Robert Skidelsky, always more of a historian than a politician, resented how the 
desire to promote 
or reinstate a greater degree of factual knowledge in history had become associated with right wing 
165 
of including essential historical knowledge in the attainment targets. It was to little 
avail. The final report went to MacGregor in March 1990. According to Duncan 
Graham, `nothing had been altered. . . as the working group's conclusions were 
unarguable' . 
30 
Mrs Thatcher and her advisers were not pleased. Two months later, the report 
remained unpublished. The TES reported that 'Thatcher's disapproval holds up 
history report' following a `top-level meeting between Mr. John MacGregor. . and 
the Prime Minister'. 31 MacGregor's exasperation at the situation in which he found 
himself and his attempts at `holding the ring' between conflicting interests remained 
palpable years after the event: 
There was a problem about history and frankly, I started to get pretty sick of 
it towards the end... Brian Griffiths had a bee in his bonnet over history. And 
she (Mrs Thatcher) agreed... (Griffiths) felt very strongly about history and I 
spent a good deal of time trying to take him along with how we were trying 
to find a solution to the history issue. 32 
The key player in the `solution' was Nick Stuart, who persuaded MacGregor to 
publish the original report, while announcing at the same time that he (MacGregor) 
would conduct his own investigation into history. According to Graham, this 
`investigation' was conducted `largely (by) Nick Tate, NCC's history officer with 
help from myself. . the Civil 
Servants, and sotto voce from HMI... By some inspired 
arrangement we persuaded MacGregor that, while facts could not be included in the 
attainment targets, they were nonetheless an integral part of the course'. 33 When the 
Council's report went back to MacGregor, his only suggestion was changing the 
name of one of the attainment targets and giving it more weight in the assessment 
scheme, but without 'strangely.. . adjusting the statements of attainment which go 
to 
thought: `To immediately equate "knowledge" with a political position was totally crass'. Skidelsky 
interview. 
30 Graham and Tytler, A Lesson for Us All, pp. 64-6. 
31 TES, 30 March 1990. 
32 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 140. 
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make up each attainment target'. 34 Delay and obfuscation had proved to be on the 
side of the education establishment, with Duncan Graham calling the revised report 
`a little gem.. . with some "magic words" to appease the right'. 
35 
MacGregor's indecisiveness in dealing with the issue and his willingness to 
accept the `little gem' certainly blotted his copy book with the right, a situation that 
was further exacerbated by his inept handling of its eventual publication in August 
1990. By that time, further damage had already been done. In March, it was reported 
that MacGregor was `ready to slow down the assessment juggernaut before it is too 
late to stop it careering out of control. . . 
by announcing a decision in the name of 
simplification and easing of the overload'. Such a decision, which was presumably 
to be welcomed by teachers, was also greeted with suspicion by the education 
establishment. Moving, as it did, back towards the much more straightforward model 
originally preferred by the right, the announcement was seen as `a victory for the 
hawks". 36 The following month, MacGregor told a teacher union conference that the 
plan was to drop testing for seven and 11 year olds in all nine compulsory subjects. 
He said that formal tests would now only cover English, mathematics and science. 
The following week, Mrs Thatcher decided to publicly force the pace on the scope 
of the compulsory curriculum. Her frustration at the slow progress of the Secretary 
of State in tackling the issue, was revealed in an interview with the Sunday 
Telegraph, in which she openly questioned the direction the National Curriculum 
was taking. In an interview with the TES during May, MacGregor `made no secret of 
the fact that further school reforms are now firmly off the agenda'. The `highest 
priority' was `making the National Curriculum work' and with reference to Key 
Stage 4, he used what the interviewer described as an `intriguing phrase', this being 
`how do you get the whole of that quart (the 14-16 curriculum) into a curriculum 
pint pot'? 
In relation to opting out, although his `enthusiasm' was `undiminished', he 
said he was `a great believer in letting people make their own decisions and 
33 Graham and Tytler, A Lesson for Us All, p. 66. 
34 Ibid., p. 69. 
35 Graham, Education Racket, p. 186. 
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judgements'. 37 The following month, Mrs Thatcher intervened once again. Her own 
instincts were much more in tune with the neo-liberal view. The key to standards 
was in the structure of the schools system and she was unhappy about her Secretary 
of State's laissez-faire attitude towards opting out and what was felt to be the 
obstructionism of local authorities. In an option that was to reappear on may 
occasions over the next decade, Mrs Thatcher said that she was looking into the 
possibility of using legislation to make it easier for schools to opt out of local 
authority control. These remarks reportedly `left the Education Secretary stuttering a 
bit so it would be safe to say that the DES has not yet turned a thought as to what 
such legislation might say'. 38 
Amidst looking nervously over his shoulder at Mrs Thatcher, and under 
pressure from his friends in the independent schools lobby over the curriculum, there 
was also the constant argument from the NCC not to drop subjects from the 
compulsory curriculum. Duncan Graham was quoted as saying that the dropping of 
some subjects would be `a backward step'. MacGregor, with evident frustration, 
replied that `there is not much point in having an arrangement if schools in practice 
decide they cannot use it'. 39Neither did it help that the NCC continued to show its 
preference for the whole curriculum approach. Curriculum Guidance 3, issued in 
1990, stated that `In due course it is likely that schools will throw all the attainment 
targets in a heap on the floor and reassemble them in a way which provides for them 
the very basis of the whole curriculum'. 40 The most galling and ridiculous aspect of 
all the criticisms was that, while MacGregor was coming under increasing pressure 
from the leader of the Conservative Party in Downing Street for not being radical 
enough, he had also to try and deal with was the criticism that he was being too 
radical. These criticisms emanated from Conservative Central Office and the newly- 
installed Chairman of the Conservative Party, Kenneth Baker. 
36 TES, 2 March 1990. 
37 TES, 16 May 1990. 
38 TES, 29 June 1990. 
39 See e. g. Education, 21 September 1990,3 August 1990,12 October 1990. 
40 Quoted in Marsland and Seaton, The Empire Strikes Back, p. 3. 
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In June, the TES noted that `according to reports Kenneth Baker is not best 
pleased to hear of MacGregor's modifications on some of his more unworkable 
instant reforms. ). 41 Within the Department, John Caines felt that `Many of the knives 
were thrown at him (MacGregor) by his own party. Kenneth Baker also had a lot to 
answer for the whispering campaign. He didn't like what he saw as MacGregor's 
"trimming'". 42 The view of John Clare was that `MacGregor started to hack back 
the curriculum but Baker chopped him. MacGregor understood quite quickly what 
was happening but he didn't have the political clout to take on Baker who saw any 
tinkering with his National Curriculum, any clawing back, as a personal attack on 
his achievement'. 43 MacGregor did not have the `political clout' nor the political 
nimbleness or the brio to put his case across effectively. One correspondent 
described the difference between MacGregor and his predecessor in the following 
terms: 
Whereas Baker always arrived for a television interview with a pre- 
masticated "sound bite", MacGregor would chew on and on for ages, 
singularly failing to deliver something pithy and short ... He also 
did not have 
44 Baker's finesse in the political art of minding your back. 
Even the TES was slightly adrift after the Baker years. Having been used to `the 
glossy up-front grin' of his predecessor, it now found it `rather baffling not to have 
every decision conveyed to us by Kenneth Baker's public relations mac ne'. 45 
MacGregor was regarded as so anonymous that the satirical television show, Spitting 
Image, portrayed him as the Minister with a bag over his head. Too late, his advisers 
seemed to have realised the damage that MacGregor's lack of public dynamism was 
doing. In May, it was reported that he was taking public relations advice on his 
image and presentation. While not denying the stories at the time, his adviser said 
41 TES, 29 June 1990. 
42 Gaines interview. 
43 Clare interview. 
44 Baker, M. (1994) Who Rules Our Schools? London: Hodder & Stoughton, p. 128. 
45 TES, 29 December 1989. 
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the reports were `greatly exaggerated. This is a real mountain out of a molehill story. 
Mr. MacGregor is more concerned about policy than presentation and doing the best 
for children than putting on a glitzy, glossy media front'. 46 Looking back on the 
episode, Eleanor Laing suggested that, 
It was all got up by Kenneth Baker. But there was a hidden truth in that he 
had taken over from an enormously successful self-publicist and was left 
standing in terms of the profile stakes. I did try to convince him to heighten 
his profile considerably after three months, but he was not into personal 
aggrandisement, not interested in sound bites. 47 
Mrs Thatcher's eventual justification for replacing MacGregor was that she `wanted 
a new face at Education, where John MacGregor's limitations as a public spokesman 
were costing us dear in an area of great importance'. 48 The writing was certainly on 
the wall during the spring and summer of 1990, and any sense of isolation 
MacGregor may have had must have increased with the appointment of Tim Eggar 
as Minister of State and Michael Fallon as the Parliamentary Under Secretary in 
July. 
Getting the balance wrong 
The appointments of Eggar and Fallon were interpreted in the Daily Mail as Mrs 
Thatcher taking `a personal grip on the schools crisis. . . she moved two new 
ministers into a department under siege from parents, teachers and irate independent 
school chiefs and effectively put Education Secretary John MacGregor himself 
under notice to get on with it or else'. 49 Like others before and after them, the new 
46 Education, 4 May 1990. 
47 Laing interview. 
48 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 835. 
49 Fallon and Eggar were replacing Robert Jackson and Angela Rumbold. 
Jackson had been 
particularly ineffective and had botched the introduction of student 
loans, while rumours had been 
circulating in the press that that Rumbold was to `move onto higher things' 
having blotted her copy 
book with the right. (See e. g. Education, 27 July 1990) Rumbold 
herself was aware that `In the rows 
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junior ministers felt that they had been subjected to the personal `laying on of hands' 
by the Prime Minister. According to Fallon, 
MacGregor did not have a strong team. There was no political drive. Mrs 
Thatcher was in despair saying that something had got to be done about those 
councils, about our reforms. I was in no doubt that I was being sent in to help 
6 sort it out'. 5° 
Eggar was later described as `being told forcibly by No. 10 that the Education Act 
was fine structurally, but that the practical implementation of it was going wrong, 
and that MacGregor was not robust enough to ring the changes'. Both men were 
extremely ambitious and, at the risk of understatement, highly combative. But it was 
Fallon, described in Education as `possibly the most right wing Education minister 
ever', who earned lasting opprobrium for his aggressiveness. John Clare's 
description of Fallon is particularly apposite: `Fallon was a right wing ferret. Mrs 
Thatcher liked him. He never troubled in private to disguise his contempt for 
MacGregor and, indeed, his contempt for most people'. 51 Those on the right found 
Fallon's no-nonsense style and accessibility a welcome change. John Marks 
described Fallon as `very dynamic'. `He (Fallon) would ask to see me in the House 
of Commons', recalled Marks, `ask three things and then ask if anything else should 
be raised. He was very businesslike. It was obvious why he got on well with 
someone like Kenneth Clarke'. 52 Fallon himself described the circumstances of his 
appointment: 
The Civil Servants ran the end game. Kenneth Baker never lifted his head 
above what was going on. The lobby groups were ferocious and the pressure 
over the introduction of GCSE, the reform of A-levels and so on, I was accused of being `wet' behind 
the ears and fell out of favour'. By this time in any case she felt that she had enough of her boss, 
recalling that `John MacGregor was a nightmare to work for. He would not do the work, would not 
open his boxes and you couldn't get a decision out of him'. Rumbold interview. 
56 Fallon interview. 
51 Clare interview. 
52 Marks interview. 
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was enormous. The distance between the core and foundation subjects was 
quickly lost. I assumed that I was being given higher education after the 
sacking of Jackson. I fought to be given responsibility for LMS. Angela 
Rumbold had introduced LMS rather gently, with a leisurely timetable. The 
Civil Servants argued that you couldn't do LMS for primaries, that the 
governors would misuse the money and so on. The Civil Servants seemed in 
thrall of the LEAs who were threatening legal action. 53 
With Fallon and Eggar in post, there began an almost-constant challenge to the pace 
and direction of the reforms, with the NCC and SEAC the obvious targets. Duncan 
Graham described the first encounter with Eggar as `extremely difficult', with the 
minister `visibly prejudiced against the council and what it was doing. . . 
Fallon also 
intervened although he had little to do with the curriculum. He nonetheless kept 
turning up at the meetings with MacGregor where he was overtly hostile. Natural 
courtesy was not Fallon's strong point. We once met on a train from York and he 
was not even prepared to exchange the time of day'. 54 The style and thrust of his 
new junior ministers obviously threw the `softly softly' approach of MacGregor into 
sharp relief. Despite Mrs Thatcher's assurance on his appointment, MacGregor 
himself began to feel the pressure from the right and tried to adjust his rhetoric 
accordingly, if unconvincingly. `I am not a cautious consolidator', he told one 
interviewer at this time, `I am a radical politician'. 55 But two incidents in quick 
succession further highlighted his deficiencies in this area. 
The first was the eventual publication, at the end of July 1990, of the final 
report of the history working group. A return to facts, events and traditional teaching 
was the version MacGregor's advisers in the DES were trying to place on the report. 
Despite this, simple assertions could not disguise the relatively cosmetic changes 
that had been made. According to the TES, `Far fewer changes to the final report are 
called for by the Education Secretary than were generally expected. .. And although 
53 Fallon interview. 
54 Graham and Tytler, A Lesson for Us All, pp. 110-11. 
55 TES, 9 November 1990. 
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Mr. MacGregor wants more weight on the knowledge attainment target. . . he has 
moved further from prescribing key names, dates and events than traditionalists on 
the Conservative Right wanted'. So much so, that the professionals, in the shape of a 
spokesman for the Historical Association, said that MacGregor's proposals offer `a 
balanced and realistic way forward for the teaching of History, giving little comfort 
to the sectarians who continue to perpetuate the sterile debate over skills versus 
content' . 
56 The failed attempt to spin the revised report of the history group was an 
amateurish miscalculation. In the judgement of the right, if MacGregor believed he 
had met the original objections to the interim report, he had been easily blinkered by 
the education establishment. If he didn't believe he had met the objections, but was 
willing to accept the final report, then he was not to be trusted. 
Almost exactly the same set of circumstances arose in early August with the 
first changes that were to be made to the composition of the curriculum bodies, the 
NCC and SEAC. Disquiet about how Baker had managed the original appointments 
had been rife, something that MacGregor was aware of, and he was sympathetic to 
the criticism levelled at Baker's choices. `The balance on the bodies wasn't right', 
he recalled, `He (Baker) hadn't spent enough time thinking about who was 
appointed to the bodies. He left it to officials and didn't think through what he 
wanted the bodies to do. For the first year I was unable to replace anybody to try and 
get the balance better by putting on people more in tune with our way of thinking'. 57 
But, once again, inflated reports in the weekend press of `the night of the long 
knives' at the curriculum bodies proved less than accurate. Rather than the 
anticipated wholesale changes to the composition of the NCC and SEAC, only five 
changes were made, which marginally altered the political balance on the councils. 
58 
The whole exercise was subsequently described as more of `a mouse rather than a 
rottweiler', with `red faces at the DES over the manner in which the changes had 
been flagged up as evidence that MacGregor meant business'. According to a 
spokesman at the DES, `Someone decided to put a political spin in the 
56 , MacGregor fails to ruffle history critics', TES, 3 August 1990. 
57 MacGregor interview. 
58 TES, 10 August 1990. 
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announcement', adding that the forewarning in the weekend press was `a bit of a 
flam'. 59 
Mac the knifed 
The political pressure on MacGregor began to mount as the October Party 
Conference approached. From the perspective of many in the education world, 
MacGregor was still very much seen as the man with whom they could do business. 
According to the TES, `Many of the recycled lobby whispers of dissatisfaction with 
MacGregor's performance can safely be discounted. . . 
he is in fact performing with 
considerable political skill, tact and common sense'. 60 Despite MacGregor's steady, 
if unspectacular, progress on nudging the National Curriculum towards workability, 
the political impression had been created of someone not quite up to the job, lacking 
rigour in driving Conservative policies forward. `MacGregor was very vulnerable', 
recalled one observer, `You got the sense that he really cared. There was a 
whispering campaign with stories being generated by the political rather than the 
education correspondents'. 61 The sources of this `whispering campaign' were hinted 
at by MacGregor's wife, when she was interviewed in Education in September. `He 
had never enjoyed a job so much', she said, 'He's really putting his heart and soul 
into it and I have never seen him so fulfilled'. However, she maintained a discreet 
silence when she was asked about his views about his predecessor and his 
ministerial colleagues. 62 With opting out, the keystone policy for many on the right, 
also showing serious signs of flagging, MacGregor's earlier hands-off approach only 
further added grist to the whisper mill. Despite his protestations of enthusiasm for 
opted-out schools, MacGregor had only tinkered at the margins. `I was extremely 
keen on Grant Maintained schools', he said, `The Department was not so 
enthusiastic and tried to see them off. DES officials were afraid of the lack of 
control. I kept pushing GM schools and had to set up the Grant Maintained 
59 Education, 10 August 1990. 
60 TES, 17 July 1989. 
61 M. Baker interview. 
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Foundation to act as a clearing house for information and publicity'. 63 In September 
1990, he wrote to Conservative constituency activists, urging them to do more to 
promote opting out in their area, a move that appeared as a rather forlorn attempt to 
pre-empt criticism from Tory right wingers at the Party Conference. 64 If so, he was 
unsuccessful. At the Conference during the following month, he found himself 
having to deal with the return of that old panacea from the early 1980s, vouchers. 
`When things go adrift as during MacGregor's tenure', said John Clare, 
`weird things pop up, for example vouchers reappeared again near the end'. 65 Under 
attack at a fringe meeting at the Party Conference, MacGregor ruled out vouchers for 
education, saying that local management of schools, with money following pupils 
was `quite close to the voucher concept'. He also ruled out any new changes to allow 
Grant Maintained schools to opt out of the National Curriculum. 66 Stuart Sexton 
replied with the faith of a true believer that reforms like local management of 
schools were `only a staging post to a full blown system of vouchers'. 67 Two days 
later, in her keynote speech, Mrs Thatcher distanced herself from her Secretary of 
State, when she hinted that vouchers could be a manifesto commitment. Speaking in 
praise of a new voucher scheme for school leavers planning to take up training, she 
said, `These give real motivation to young people. It is the first voucher scheme we 
have introduced, and I hope it won't be the last'. When questioned about Mrs 
Thatcher's speech, MacGregor agreed that `vouchers were a good idea', but, `I think 
that we have a lot more other reforms that we are carrying through' . 
68 
MacGregor later described the incident as `a brief bit of fun in the press. 
Someone at the Number Ten Policy Unit slipped a mention about vouchers in at the 
last minute into Mrs Thatcher's conference speech but they never really surfaced 
after that. The objective of vouchers was being achieved in another way'. 
69 While 
62 Education, 21 September 1990. 
63 MacGregor interview. 
64 TES, 29 September 1990. 
65 Clare interview. 
66 Education, 12 October 1990. 
67 Education, 19 October 1990. 
68 TES, 19 October 1989. 
69 MacGregor interview. 
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many on the right, including Michael Fallon, basically agreed with MacGregor's 
line, as noted by John Clare, the re-emergence of vouchers was more symbolic than 
realistic, a indirect criticism of MacGregor's stewardship. Others were more direct. 
Prior to the Conference, the Daily Mail had run an article headlined, `The man 
betraying Thatcher's children', in which Ray Honeyford said MacGregor should be 
replaced because he was unwilling to take on the vested interests in education. In an 
editorial, the paper said a more `combative spirit' was needed. 70 With his 
Conference speech, MacGregor had perhaps one last opportunity to display the 
`combativeness' that the Daily Mail was calling for. The centrepiece of the speech 
was the compromise reached between MacGregor and Number 10 over how best to 
revive the opting out policy. Rather than moving towards forms of compulsion, 
MacGregor announced a series of measures that were intended to kick start schools 
into applying for Grant Maintained status. These included allowing all schools, 
including primary schools, to opt out, along with a series of financial incentives, 
described by one research team as `a blatant financial bribe aimed at bolstering the 
policy's flagging fortunes' . 
71 There was, or should have been, enough red meat there 
for MacGregor to throw to the Party faithful to establish his 'radicalism'. Mike 
Baker wrote that MacGregor needed to make `a zealous, ranting attack. . . to re- 
establish his Party Conference credentials'. To his credit, MacGregor could no more 
have managed `a zealous, ranting attack' than `Kenneth Baker could have shunned a 
television camera'. 72 The speech was described as `lacklustre' and it did not go 
unnoticed that `Kenneth Baker, Tory Party chairman and architect of the reforms Mr 
MacGregor had tried to put into practice, led the standing ovation -and ended it 
almost immediately, by sitting down first'. 73 Nor did the Prime Minister choose to 
be on the platform during the speech. MacGregor's exit appeared to be only a matter 
of time, as however much he tried to cling on, there appeared to be too many people 
ready and willing to jump on his fingertips. 
70 Baker, Who Rules Our School? p. 130. 
71 Fitz et al., Grant Maintained Schools, p. 30. 
72 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? pp. 130-1. 
73 TES, 9 November 1990. 
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The following month witnessed headlines such as `Education jumps to the 
top of voters' worries lists', and with a 25 point Labour lead, MacGregor was 
`summoned' to a meeting with Mrs Thatcher. According to Downing Street, the 
meeting was to discuss the proposed Standard Assessment Tasks (SATs) being 
prepared by SEAC for seven-year-olds in 1991.74 Although the arguments between 
MacGregor and the NCC had been gaining the greater coverage, the issue of pupil 
testing had been rumbling along on a parallel course, with the same concerns over 
`unworkability' coupled with the desire for simple `pen and paper' tests. According 
to John Marks, who had been one of MacGregor's new appointments to SEAC the 
previous September, 
The Civil Servants who dominated the Committee (SEAL) told us that it was 
a legal requirement to test all the statements of attainment that were written 
in the Act. I read the Act and didn't think that was right. It was just their 
interpretation. But the officials - Nick Stuart, David Forrester and Eric 
Bolton - told me I was wrong and that they had a legal opinion to back them 
up. I asked to see it but they told me it was confidential to ministers. 75 
MacGregor had already met with members of SEAC to discuss his suggestions as to 
what he wanted to see included. SEAC's proposals were sent to him in early 
November 1990 and he brought these along to his meeting with Mrs Thatcher and 
her advisers. It was not a success. According to Michael Fallon, `All this stuff which 
we had asked for was coming back at him (MacGregor) and he got bogged down in 
the testing arrangements. He soon had Brian Griffiths gunning for him. Mrs 
Thatcher finally lost patience when he was called to her to explain the arrangements 
and went with mountains of paper'. 76 It was the last straw. Whether Mrs Thatcher's 
dissatisfaction would have, or could have, led to MacGregor's dismissal is arguable. 
74 MacGregor claims that he in fact asked for an `urgent meeting' to discuss his concern over the 
question of vouchers that the Prime Minister had raised at the Party Conference. Suffice 
it to say that 
both sides agreed to have a meeting, to which MacGregor brought the proposals 
from SEAC. TES, 2 
November 1990. 
75 Phillips, All Must Have Prizes, p. 165. 
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In the end, it was Geoffrey Howe's resignation that provided Mrs Thatcher with the 
opportunity to move MacGregor to the post of Leader of the House in a reshuffle 
that saw him replaced by Kenneth Clarke. The `listening man' was to make way for 
the `lager lout'. 
Conclusion 
If Keith Joseph was characterised as a `hapless magician' who forget the second half 
of the trick, then Kenneth Baker was surely the `reckless magician', a great 
showman who was only concerned with milking the applause for the second half of 
the trick. As a member of the Magician's Circle, John MacGregor really was a 
magician, but only in real life, not in politics. And it was politics that dominated 
MacGregor's time at education. In one sense, MacGregor's undoubted technical 
skills and competence made him the right man, in the right job, but at the wrong 
time. The space that had opened up between those who devised policies and those 
who had to implement them became a no-man's land for MacGregor. His 
inheritance from Baker also included such a level of distrust between the participants 
that even such an adept listener and conciliator as MacGregor was unable to 
reconcile the demands from both sides. 
It is debatable whether anyone could have done better. Even his critics 
acknowledged that `He did have a difficult patch. The job was to ease off and easing 
the load while also making things work'. 77 MacGregor's undoing was that he was 
too dedicated to this narrow approach. Unlike his immediate predecessor who had 
been consumed by the `political long game', the bigger picture, MacGregor may 
have fallen victim to what one historian has described as The Bridge on the River 
Kwai syndrome, `a narrowing of vision to essentially professional or technical 
concerns, at the expense of the wider picture'. 78 The `wider picture' included his 
failure to fully appreciate the political dimension of the job he inherited. The 
76 Fallon interview. 
77 Bolton interview. 
78 Burleigh, M. (2000) The Third Reich. A New History. London: Macmillan. p. 476. 
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circumstances in which his successor, Kenneth Clarke, would soon find himself, 
following the replacement of Mrs Thatcher by John Major, ensured that this was 
unlikely to be repeated. 
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CHAPTER 8 
November 1990 - April 1992: The `uncomplicated bloke' 
Introduction 
Kenneth Clarke's unambiguous remit from Mrs Thatcher was to `get tough' with the 
regulars who were seen to be subverting the course of the education reforms. In 
some respects, he did not disappoint. During his relatively brief tenure at Education, 
Clarke presided over the removal of the heads of both NCC and SEAC, two top 
ranking Civil Servants in charge of teacher training, and much of Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate. The contrast with John MacGregor could not have been starker. 
According to Michael Fallon, junior minister under both Secretaries of State, `John 
MacGregor was one of the nicest men in politics but he was not a man to sack 
anybody. In the end he selected himself as Leader of the House. Kenneth Clarke was 
dripping wet but absolutely ruthless. He had a right-wing gallery to play for and he 
did'. ' Despite the contrasts, one thing that the two men did have in common was that 
Clarke, no less than MacGregor, came to the job with a limited knowledge of 
education policy. The Times would refer to the `phalanx of unofficial advisers'2 on 
whom Clarke relied, along with his own instincts, to help fill that space to an even 
greater extent than other Education Secretaries either before or after. His own 
instincts were very much what he would have seen as basic `common sense', 
unconstrained by any knowledge, sympathy or understanding of educational theory 
or practice. The same could be said of John Major, who replaced Mrs Thatcher 
within four weeks of Clarke taking up post. This chapter examines the impact of 
both of these appointments on the already complex and sensitive area of education 
policy. It was also noticeable in this period that there was less conflict between the 
politicos and irregulars about the course of education policy. Why was it that, for 
perhaps the one and only time between 1979 and 1997, the Education Secretary, 
I Fallon interview. 
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Downing Street and the Policy Unit, and other advisers were by-and-large at one? 
Was this a testimony to the coherence of their approach to education policy? Or was 
it more a testimony to the power of political ambition? 
'The uncomplicated bloke' 
The move to the DES was made reluctantly by Clarke. According to John Clare, 
who interviewed him soon after his appointment, `Kenneth Clarke deeply resented 
being moved from Health and for the first six months thought more about it than 
Education. He was bored and angry'. 3 At Health, Clarke had resisted the demands of 
the right for more radical reforms, such as introducing an American style private 
insurance system. After having fought and won this battle with Mrs Thatcher, Clarke 
ensured from the start that he would not have to re-fight a similar battle at 
Education. According to his adviser, Tessa Keswick, 
In his meeting with Mrs Thatcher he told her that he was not going to 
introduce school vouchers. "I'm not going to ask you", Mrs Thatcher replied. 
When offered the job he said he would think about it. He thought it was a 
demotion. I worked on him and convinced him that Education was an 
increasingly important issue. 4 
2 TES, 10 February 1992. 
' Clare interview. When Clarke was trying to avoid being transferred to Education, he asked the 
Prime Minister whom she wanted to appoint at his place at Health. `When she told me it was William 
Waldegrave', Clarke told one of his biographers, `I said, "Marvellous! Ideal! Fellow of All Souls! 
Born to be Secretary of State for Education! " And she said, "Kenneth, you can't have an old Etonian 
as Secretary of State for Education! " On the strength of that I conceded'. Baien, M. (1994) Kenneth 
Clarke. London: Fourth Estate, p. 202. 
4 Tessa Keswick interview, 7 May 1998. When questioned about vouchers on television the weekend 
after his appointment, Clarke had intimated that they were not on the government's agenda. Sensing 
the lack of agreement on the issue, at Prime Ministers Questions the following Tuesday, Mrs 
Thatcher was challenged to confirm her support for Clarke's position. Forever the dog with a bone, 
she could not quite let something as dear to her heart as the voucher concept go so easily. Quoting her 
previous utterances on the issue, Mrs Thatcher's unconvincing reply was that `The Secretary of State 
said almost precisely what I did'. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 180, col. 444,15 November 
1990. 
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Sensing a disagreement between Clarke and Mrs Thatcher on vouchers, at Clarke's 
first session at the dispatch box, his Labour shadow, Jack Straw, raised the issue. 
Clarke's response was forthright. `The idea of vouchers for schools', he told the 
Commons, `is not on the Government's agenda'. 5 The price, we can only assume, 
that Mrs Thatcher would have been willing to pay for having the powerful figure of 
Clarke at Education, was to allow him the run the Department in his own fashion. 
While there may have been some relief in the education establishment at Clarke's 
explicit rejection of vouchers, the respite would prove brief. A spokesman for the 
British Medical Association warned those in education that `his (Clarke's) idea of 
reform is to do things his way'. 6 According to John Barnes, `Kenneth Clarke has a 
fast mind. He really was an uncomplicated bloke. There was not much discussion. 
He listens. Then he goes away and makes up his mind'.? Clarke described his own 
philosophy in a revealing interview with Walter Ellis in the Sunday Times: 
I am a strong manager and I'm not inclined to accept sloppy thinking. 
Ministers are not there to be a pretend surgeon or a pretend vice-chancellor. 
They are there to impose a political policy and the skills they possess are 
transferable. In my case, for example, a lot of the principles underlying the 
reform of the health service apply equally to education. The concern in each 
case is for standards. The public services are combative - red in tooth and 
claw - and those who stand in the way of change, whether 
it be the BMA, 
NUPE or the NUT, have to be approached in the same manner. 
8 
5 Mansard, House of Commons, vol. 180, col. 471,15 November 1990. Maybe Clarke 
had been 
emboldened by the fact that sandwiched in between Mrs Thatcher's equivocal support of 
his position, 
and his own response to Straw, had been Geoffrey Howe's powerful `conflict of 
loyalty' resignation 
statement. 
6 Education, 9 November 1990. 
7 Barnes interview. His more fastidious colleagues were less than enamoured with 
Clarke's 
freewheeling style. The most fastidious, John Redwood, found him sloppy, arrogant and mischievous, 
`a lazy scholarship boy who thinks he doesn't need to do any homework'. 
Williams, H. (1998) Guilty 
Men. London: Aurum Press. Williams, p. 154. 
8 Ellis, W. `Man With a Mission'. Sunday Times Magazine, 9 February 1992, p. 
40. 
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Omitted from Clarke's list was, of course, the DES itself. Clarke was to tell an 
interviewer in 1990 that he had `more trouble on that front in the Department of 
Education than any other Department I have ever been in'. 9 His opinion of officials 
can be gleaned from that of his adviser, Tessa Keswick. `Working in Education was 
like walking in treacle', she recalled, `The Civil Servants were terrible, very cynical 
and deliberately obstructive. Tim Eggar would almost be crying in frustration while 
waiting on papers from his Civil Servants. Kenneth Clarke would ask them to say 
one thing at the Councils but they would change the intent if the instructions didn't 
suit. Some of them were simply lying'. ' 0 Part of Clarke's antipathy towards officials 
was clearly inherent in his political outlook. This was also exacerbated by the fact 
that officials did not have a productive relationship with Keswick, one of the 
important avenues to any minister. The opinion of one senior official was that, 
Tessa Keswick was disastrous. She probably thinks the same about me. I sat 
beside her at meetings, listening to her saying preposterous things, simply 
rubbish, absolute rubbish. She had a very different agenda, very 
traditionalist, very authoritarian, very right wing and wasn't prepared to 
l listen. I never found any evidence that Kenneth Clarke listened to her at all. 
It is possible that his officials underestimated the influence of Keswick on Clarke, if 
not necessarily directly on policy. According to Dominic Morris, `Tessa Keswick 
was not bright, but shrewd. She judged policy through people and she had a good 
partnership with Kenneth Clarke'. 12 On reflection, John Caines further highlighted 
the difficulty of dealing with the bullish and sceptical Clarke: `Perhaps Kenneth 
Clarke was badly handled by us. The trick was to never box him into a corner, to 
never trap him or make him feel trapped. Show him where there was a door but 
9 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 163. 
to Keswick interview. 
11 Unattributed interview material. 
12 Morris interview. The opinion of John Barnes was that `although I never quite 
knew what Ken got 
from her or didn't get from her, he valued her advice very highly'. Barnes 
interview. 
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never look at that door, and never let on you noticed when he walked through'. " 
However much Clarke may have felt detached from, or unengaged with, the issues 
he had inherited at Education, the one issue that was inescapable during his time at 
the DES was the leadership of the Conservative Party. 
The Major factor 
One of the ironies associated with John MacGregor's travails with Mrs Thatcher was 
that the degree of influence she was able to exert on the direction of education policy 
was almost in inverse proportion to her influence in other parts of Whitehall. 
Working in the Cabinet Office during the late 1980s, Dominic Morris dated the 
beginning of the end to 1989: 
There was a preoccupation with survival, a fin de siecle air about the place; 
Whitehall certainly sniffed it after Anthony Mayer's challenge (in 1989). 
About 1988-89 Brian Griffiths lost the plot and got enmeshed in the 
Broadcasting Act, and all that evangelical stuff; the Unit was not strong or 
influential as it had been. The power of Brian Griffiths waned in 1989 and 
came to a grinding halt in 1990.14 
Following Geoffrey Howe's resignation, events moved remarkably quickly to place 
John Major in Downing Street. This brought a significant new variable to bear on 
education policy. Major's elevation should also be seen in the context of a long line 
of personnel changes that would affect education policy in terms of continuity and 
coherence. Starting in May 1989 with a new Permanent Secretary at the DES, this 
was followed in July 1989 by a new Secretary of State; in June 1990 by a new set of 
junior ministers; in November 1990 by another Secretary of State; in December 
1990 by a new Prime Minister and a new set of advisers accompanying him into 
Downing Street; and in July 1991 by new heads for both the NCC and SEAC. 
13 Gaines interview. 
14 Morris interview. 
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Although there was a brief respite until after the 1992 election, when yet another 
new set of personnel would be put in place, the demands of an already-complex and 
politically sensitive area of policy were now to be further exacerbated, as education 
now became inextricably linked with the personal political imperatives of the new 
Prime Minister as he attempted to establish a domestic agenda for himself. 
This was nothing new and a relatively similar situation had already prevailed 
during 1986-87. What was new was that, as the scale of the task facing John Major 
was even greater than that which faced Mrs Thatcher, so the scale of intervention 
increased proportionately. Whatever deliberate degree of calculation Mrs Thatcher 
may have been guilty of during her `asides' into education policy, these remained 
relatively ad hoc interventions. Major, however, was the Prime Minister who would 
deliver set piece speeches on education policy, often setting out new priorities, while 
deliberately avoiding his regular advisers in the DES and elsewhere. Whatever the 
degree of instinctive antipathy towards education officials Major had brought to his 
new post, it was certainly bolstered by his closest advisers on education for much of 
his premiership, John Mills, Nick True and Dominic Morris. In Morris' opinion: 
There was the malice and sheer out-of-touchedness of the DES officials. The 
Department was activist in support of the liberal establishment pedagogy 
with a "hands off' view towards everything else. It had an innate ability to 
bureaucratise everything. The MacGregor and Clarke periods were very 
dangerous ones indeed. Previously the Civil Servants had been ideologically 
unsound but powerless. Now they were even more unsound but had their 
hands on some power. 15 
Major's personal interventions would prove to be on a scale and mode not seen 
before, leading Education to the conclusion that `He (Major) has had more to say 
about education, and has exerted more direct influence on education policy than any 
other Prime Minister in living memory'. 16 What appeared to remain consistent, 
15 Ibid. 
16 Education, 12 August 1994. 
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however, was one of the sources of that influence, with one academic describing `the 
capture of John Major and former Secretary of State for Education Kenneth Clarke 
by the Centre for Policy Studies'. 17 
`Capture' was probably an inappropriate description, implying, as it does, 
some kind of reluctance on the part of the captives. Clarke may have been slothful 
and simply prepared to regurgitate the nostrums of his `phalanx of advisers' where 
they chimed in with his own prejudices. But at least he had managed to carve out 
some kind of political niche for himself during his time at the Department of Health 
and elsewhere. Not so with Major. `One looks in vain for a statement of his political 
beliefs before 1990', was the verdict of one study published in 1994.18 This was 
certainly the case with education, an area that Major identified early on as one in 
which he wanted to be involved. In an interview with The Times on 30 January 
1991, he was keen to talk about education, but readily admitted that his ideas were, 
`not yet fully worked up'. In a telling comment on the confused state of 
Conservative education policy after the Party had been in power for 11 years, he also 
stated that, `I approach this issue (education) with the instinct that something needs 
to be done and we are trying to determine exactly what it is'. 19 
The undoubted influence of the CPS also gives a clue to the political 
imperatives that Major had for focussing on education, and also why the CPS was so 
active in this area during the early 1990s. The issue of Europe, that divided Major 
from much of his Party during the 1990s, also caused ructions within the CPS 
between those who wished the Centre to take an independent eurosceptic line, and 
those who did not want to rock the Party boat. The latter view prevailed. With Major 
becoming a patron of the Centre, its focus turned very much on domestic issues and 
education policy in particular. This also provided Major with the opportunity to 
occasionally provide some red meat to the right of his Party. With the departure of 
17 Ball, S. (1993) `Education, Majorism and "the Curriculum of the Dead"'. Curriculum Studies, Vol. 
1, No. 4, pp. 195-6. 
18 Kavanagh, D. `A Major Agenda? ' in Kavanagh, D. and Seldon, A. (eds. ) (1994) The Major Effect, 
London: Macmillan, p. 3. 
19 The Times, 30 January 1991. Although he would have pressing political reasons to get involved 
in 
education policy, Major does appear to have had a genuine interest. Madsen Pirie recalled 
how `John 
Major's eyes would light up when discussing education. He was passionate about 
it, the little guy 
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the immanent Mrs Thatcher, `a fixed point within a kaleidoscope of informal (New 
Right) groupings', 20 inevitable rumblings soon followed. `Mrs Thatcher was the 
touchstone for reform', said Balchin, `Would the policy be compatible with "one of 
us"? Would it wear with her? '21 From the very start Major could never inspire the 
same certitude. `Sections of the Tory right are grumbling, edgy and suspicious', 
reported The Times in February 1991, `the Tory establishment does not feel 
comfortable with a Prime Minister proclaiming the classless society. "We do not 
know who we are, " said one member of the No Turning Back Group'. 22 Nor did 
Major's `big idea', that of the Citizen's Charters -a rehash of the Reinventing 
Government model in the United States - prove very convincing in its effort to graft 
some kind of governing philosophy onto someone who was, transparently, a 
straightforward political operator. His sympathetic political biographer, Anthony 
Seldon, described Major as `neither a conceptual nor a strategic thinker - rather he 
was a tactical operator'. 23 Sean Williams, a member of the Policy Unit who would 
hold the education brief from 1995, further echoed this lack of philosophical 
anchorage: `During the Thatcher era there was a strong framework of ideas. Major's 
time was much less structured. Perhaps John Major set far too much stall by policy. 
It was about politics. He couldn't persuade people of anything'. 24 
While Major's political difficulties only became fully pronounced following 
the 1992 election, between 1990 and 1992 the most productive ministerial 
relationship he had was with his Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Clarke. 
They had much in common in regard to their views, or lack of views, about 
education. Each preferred a `common sense' approach, neither had much time for 
the DES and they also shared a desire and a need to build bridges and establish 
made good'. Pirie interview. 
20 Harrison, `Mrs Thatcher and the Intellectuals', p. 209. 
21 Balchin interview. In describing the meetings he convened with other special advisers during the 
early 1980s, Stuart Sexton described how, although, `We worked for our individual Secretaries of 
State... we all worked with an almost intuitive knowledge as to what Mrs Thatcher would and would 
not expect'. The Times, 17 September 2003. 
22 The Times, 28 February 1991. 
23 Seldon, A. (1997) John Major: A Political Life. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 133. Peter 
Owen certainly felt that during John Major's time, `The opinions in the Daily Mail and the Mail on 
Sunday appeared to have an inordinate influence on government policy'. Owen interview. 
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political credentials with the right of the Conservative Party. For Clarke, this need 
arose from the strong possibility that Major would lead the Conservatives to defeat 
at the next general election. In such circumstances, it was entirely conceivable that 
Clarke himself might be in line for the leadership of the Party. In his article, Walter 
Ellis had described Clarke as `undoubtedly ambitious, calculating and clever' and 
noted how since his arrival at the DES, `He scattered the opposition with 
consummate ease and reinforced his position alongside the eternal dauphin, Michael 
Heseltine, as the top Tory to watch'. 25 John Barnes, a friend of Clarke's, felt that `He 
(Clarke) expects Major to stand down after the next election. But he's shrewd 
enough to know that he can't be seen as the assassin'. 26 Clarke himself probably 
preferred to project his studied air of diffidence and live up to his nonchalant 
`laddish' image, rather than actively pursue the leadership. His adviser, Tessa 
Keswick, recalled that, `Although he was to the right in education terms, he was 
extraordinarily unstrategic. I tried to push him to the right but he would deride what 
he called "pure Daily Mail politics"9.27 But Clarke was not averse to allowing others 
to make the running for him and a clue as to Clarke's ambitions lay in his choice of 
Keswick as his political adviser in 1989. 
Clarke's previous adviser, Jonathan Hill, once remarked that `Kenneth 
Clarke doesn't really need an adviser. He needs a mate. Someone to have a curry 
and a pint with'. 28 Keswick, daughter of the seventeenth Lord Lovat, once married to 
the fourteenth Lord Reay, and subsequently married to one of the richest men in 
Britain, Henry Keswick, therefore appeared a strange choice. From Clarke's point of 
view, it was an astute choice. Despite their difference in backgrounds, Keswick's 
views on education were not dissimilar to his own, `very down to earth and very 
right wing'. 29 What Keswick, well connected and instinctively more right wing than 
Clarke himself, was also able to offer was a personal bridge to the right. Robert 
24 Sean Williams interview, 17 October 2000. 
25 Ellis, `Man With A Mission', p. 40. 
26 Balen, Clarke, p. 263. 
27 Keswick interview. 
28 Kerpel interview. 
29 Clare interview. 
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Balchin felt that, `In her own way Tessa Keswick was very good. She was a very 
good conduit to her Minister and was never afraid to voice ideas from the right'. 30 
John Barnes thought that `Tessa Keswick's great gift was knowing who to ask' 31 
After the insularity of MacGregor, Keswick herself recalled that `Bob Balchin, Cyril 
Taylor, John McIntosh all got in touch with me as they had had no access before' . 
32 
With Clarke very much in agreement with much of the advice he would receive from 
sources such as these, the added bonus of his time as Education Secretary was that 
he could win plaudits from the right simply by pursuing his own personal instincts. 
`Boot them out' 
Ten days after Clarke arrived at the DES, a press release was issued by the 
Department naming the latest Grant Maintained schools, the first such 
announcement for almost a year. 33 This was the first signal that Clarke was prepared 
to diverge from his predecessors in his approach to this area of policy, with Grant 
Maintained status moving towards being seen, and advocated as, the future norm for 
state schools, or `the natural organisational model', as he described it. 34 Schools run 
by LEAs, HMI, and teacher training colleges, all became subject to the Clarke world 
view. `He was keen to remove all schools from LEA control', recalled John Caines: 
Deep down I believe he wanted to free up any organisation which had a 
strong professional or producer ethos. He found the education world was 
30 Balchin interview. 
31 Barnes interview. 
32 Keswick interview. 
33 Education, 11 January 1991 
34 Speaking at the North of England Conference in January 1991, Clarke described how'. . -the 
initiative and creative thinking that I wish to see pervading the whole education service is exemplified 
above all by those schools that go on to seek and achieve grant-maintained status.. . the parallel model 
in the health service is the NHS Trusts.. . the 
`natural organisational model'. Quoted in Fitz et al., 
Grant Maintained Schools, p. 9. Clarke later referred to impetus of this speech as `the need to 
accelerate the process of moving over to grant-maintained status.. . My predecessors 
had been much 
more cautious, and there was an inclination to regard grant-maintained status as a cautious 
experiment which would be tries out in a few schools and then eventually, perhaps, moved onto 
others. I, personally, had no doubt that moving to grant-maintained status was desirable... 
So I made a 
189 
inward looking, that it had lost sight of its purpose and set about breaking up 
the professional orientation. 35 
One of the main obstacles to this `natural organisational model' remained that of the 
ballot which officials had built into the process. `If I'd been Secretary of State in 
1988', he told Brian Sherratt, `I would not have put in this balloting system'. 36 His 
original instincts were predictably bullish. `Kenneth Clarke asked why we were 
messing about with a ballot', recalled Robert Balchin, `Just "boot `em out" he mused 
aloud. He started to believe me and others and began to suggest that Grant 
Maintained would be the mainstream way for schools to go'. 37 This belief was 
further strengthened with the arrival of John Major. 
After expressing his early desire to have education at `the top of my personal 
agenda for the 1990s', in May 1991, Major publicly took the lead during the launch 
of two White Papers dealing with higher education - Education and Training for the 
21st century and Higher Education: A New Framework. His advisers now felt that, 
to maintain momentum, Major needed to make a big education speech. According to 
Anthony Seldon, `A forum of "sufficient educational gravity" was sought on a par 
with Callaghan's choice of Ruskin'. 38 The Policy Unit suggested the Centre for 
Policy Studies and Brian Griffiths, its new head, happily obliged. Major approved, 
seeing it as a way to build his credentials with the right and showing them 
`continuity with Thatcher'. 39 With some initiatives, such as the proposals to `hive 
off HMI, held back for the launch of the new Citizen's and Parent's Charters, the 
focus of the speech was to be Grant Maintained schools. This was, reportedly, `a 
particular source of disagreement within the government', with the Chancellor, 
Norman Lamont, and the Party Chairman, Chris Patten, in particular giving a `frosty 
reception' to Clarke's initial desire to `boot' schools out of LEA control. Major 
deliberate point of seeking to drive up the number of schools opting for grant-maintained status... ' 
Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 154-5 
35 Caines interview 
36 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 155. 
37 Balchin interview 
38 Seldon, Major, p. 184 
39 Ibid., p. 186 
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himself felt that automatic and compulsory opting out would be `too far ahead of 
public opinion' and in flat contradiction to the rhetoric of choice. 40 Clarke did not 
push the issue. His Permanent Secretary felt that Clarke had `accepted the argument 
that forcing all schools to opt out was not practical at that time'. 41 Robert Balchin 
probably had a slightly more accurate take on Clarke's decision: 
As soon as John Major took over we started fighting an election campaign. 
Although the manifesto group consolidated the idea of Grant Maintained 
becoming the norm, Kenneth Clarke may have been made ineffably cautious 
by officials on forcing all schools to opt out. He wasn't about to pin his 
colours to a controversial mast, something that might blacken his chances 
later on. 42 
In the speech, delivered at the Cafe Royal, Major promised `a special future for 
Grant Maintained schools. . . 
(to) smooth the path to Grant Maintained status' and 
`another new kind of school ... 
(with) existing schools to transform themselves into 
Grant Maintained technology colleges, incorporating the key characteristics of the 
CTCs'. 43 Right-wing irregulars, such as Sir Cyril Taylor and Caroline Cox were 
reported to be delighted, which Education took to indicate `the degree to which the 
right wing of the Conservative Party believes they have won the battle for Major's 
ear on education policy'. 44 
Education regulars were less pleased. The level of distrust and suspicion was 
such that there was no consultation with the DES on the contents of the speech. The 
final draft was actually sent to Clarke's home rather than his office, and only `at 
some point fairly late on it was sent to DES officials for comment' . 
45 John Caines 
was appalled. `The Cafe Royal speech took us by surprise', he recalled, `It is 
40 Ibid. 
41 Caines interview 
42 Balchin interview 
43 'Education - All Our Futures'. Speech 
by the Prime Minister at Cafe Royal, 3 July 1991. London: 
CPS 
44 Education, 12 July 1991 
45 Education, 5 July 1991 
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normally taken for granted that the Prime Minister would consult the people whom 
he pays a lot of money for advice before making a speech on your policy area. It was 
unusual to find out from the papers what it is you will be doing. It's not terribly good 
government' . 
46 In the TES, Stuart Maclure wrote that `It really is deplorable that the 
Prime Minister of this country on a rare excursion into educational policy, should 
reduce a critically importance discussion to a few tendentious slogans', and he 
(Major) should `not consult beyond the coteries of the radical right' . 
47 These were 
only minor pinpricks. What particularly struck Major was the reaction of papers 
such as the Guardian. In an editorial it praised the Cafe Royal speech as `a trenchant 
diagnosis of what was wrong with the system and as such it pressed the right 
buttons'. 48 Major was reported to have been `flabbergasted' at this response. 49 It 
gave him a sense that he was on sure domestic ground when dealing with education 
policy, scoring points left and right as it were. It gave him even more reason for 
direct intervention and as his political fortunes ebbed during the 1990s, it was an 
area to which he kept returning in an attempt to recapture some of this early 
`success' . 
What the speech also marked was another significant shift in emphasis in 
relation to education policy. Similar to the National Curriculum, within three years 
of the Education Bill being passed in 1988, the original policy was now being 
reworked by new hands who disagreed with the original conception, yet had 
remained silent when sitting in the same Cabinet as Baker. Indeed, they could have 
been in a different Party. Gone now, even, was any pretence that Grant Maintained 
schools had to compete on equal financial footing with LEA schools. In an interview 
with the Guardian, in February Major had said that, 
We are concentrating on building up the Grant Maintained sector and when 
we get successful applicants they are currently enjoying the experience of 
having the Department of Education looking particularly at their capital 
46 
Gaines interview 
47 TES. 12 July 1991 
48 The Guardian, 4 July 1991 
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requirements. . . 
If they have gained an advantage, they have gained it as a 
result of their courage. 50 
Later on, during August, in a letter to the National Union of Teachers he was happy 
to admit that `We have made no secret of the fact that grant-maintained schools get 
preferential treatment in allocating grants of capital expenditure' . 
51 The future did 
appear bright for Grant Maintained schools and their supporters, even if much of the 
inspiration behind the new support was from immediate political calculations as 
much as for educational ambitions. There was also optimism as regards changes on 
the `second front', that of the National Curriculum. After John Major's Cafe Royal 
speech, Clarke declared that SEAC and the NCC `are, as you know, not my 
favourite organisations', 52 and it soon became apparent that he was prepared to 
apply the `boot `em out' strategy to more than just schools. 
NCC, SEAC and the `happy retirements' of Graham and Halsey 
While the irritation over how the Opting Out/Grant Maintained policy had 
developed was apparent in Clarke's actions, at least he was supportive of the policy 
in general. In dealing with the NCC and SEAC, irritation gave way to impatience 
and anger. Eric Bolton felt that, after Clarke's appointment, `It soon became clear 
that he - Kenneth Clarke - was immensely frustrated by having to spend time 
implementing the policies of a predecessor, in the face of what seemed to him to be 
the self-interested opposition of "the education establishment'". 
53 At the NCC, 
Duncan Graham was soon under no illusion that Clarke viewed both the NCC and 
SEAC `rather quaintly as the creations of an opposition Government, certainly not 
his own'. 54 Clarke himself was typically forthright: 
49 Seldon, Major, p. 187. 
50 The Guardian, 19 February 1991. 
51 The Guardian, 7 August 1991. 
52 Education, 26 July 1991. 
53 Bolton, E. (1998) 'HMI - the Thatcher Years'. Oxford Review of 
Education, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 52. 
54 Graham and Tytler, A Lesson To Us All, p. 109. 
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I had trouble with them (NCC and SEAC) from the start... The composition 
of the bodies surprised me... He (Baker) had set up all these bloody 
specialist committees to guide the curriculum, he'd set up quango staff who 
as far as I could see had come out of the Inner London Education Authority, 
the lot of them ... I never got the sense out of them that they were wholly 
committed to the policy they had agreed to deliver by accepting service on 
the bodies. 55 
When he arrived at the Department, Kenneth Clarke was told by Nick Stuart, by then 
a Deputy Secretary, that he had `one man' on each of the Councils. Clarke's show- 
stopping riposte to this news was "Why have I only got one? " Stuart reportedly 
replied that the Minister had the Department. 56 It is unlikely that Clarke was 
impressed. Within a few days of MacGregor's departure, Clarke went to York for 
the official opening of the NCC's new headquarters. According to Duncan Graham, 
`Clarke listened (to concerns about Key Stage 4), asked questions, and said he could 
not see any particular flaws in the argument. But I knew from his face he was not 
going to have it'. 57 It probably didn't help that Graham was reported to have 
described the KS4 problem as the Schleswig-Holstein of education. 58 Whether the 
new Secretary of State understood the analogy is unclear, but in an interview with 
The Times a few days later, he said, 'It is not instantly apparent that they have taken 
in what has been said. The curriculum must not become prescriptive and exclude the 
whole variety of options that people want to exercise'. 
59 In March it was reported 
that 
Mr. Clarke and the DES have also fallen out over the NCC, over 
appointments and over the latest National Curriculum working group reports, 
5$ Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, pp. 152-3, and Balen, Clarke, p. 220. 
56 Marks interview. 
57 Graham and Tytler, A Lesson To Us All, p. 93. 
58 TES, 16 November 1990. 
59 Graham and Tytler, A Lesson To Us All, p. 93. 
194 
which he saw as too woolly and too technical. . Perhaps more seriously for 
the NCC, Mr. Clarke has been briefed on a day to day basis by his servants at 
Elizabeth House not York at a time when relations with Duncan Graham 
have deteriorated and personal abuse has leapt off the pages of their mutual 
correspondence. 60 
Hinted at in that report was the continued personal animosity between Nick Stuart 
and Duncan Graham, a factor that meant Graham's position at the NCC was under 
threat before Clarke took over at Education. By this time, Graham seemed to have 
only enemies left and personal animosities probably contributed almost as much to 
his eventual sacking as did professional disagreements. 61 While Graham's position 
was undoubtedly under further threat from his ambitious and well-connected deputy, 
Chris Woodhead, it was David Pascall, one of MacGregor's appointees to the NCC, 
who had quickly become `the focus for discontent among the Council members'. 
Pascall had led a delegation from the Council to ministers `to protest at the arbitrary 
and cavalier way in which they thought the council was being run'. 62 
Unlike the situation at NCC, over at SEAC `there were excellent relations 
between senior officials'. 63 Too much so for Clarke and his advisers. The feeling 
was that Phillip Halsey, the ex-Deputy Secretary and headmaster, was too much the 
creature of professional and bureaucratic interests. While Duncan Graham was 
`aware of the growing misgivings of ministers', he complained that he was never 
called in for a discussion of the main sticking points with ministers. 64 The same 
could not have been said about Halsey at SEAC where, in Clarke's expression, 
`those wretched SATs' 65 were the subject of many meetings and much 
correspondence, none of which appeared to have been very pleasant. Clarke presided 
60 Education, 29 March 1991. 
61 The view of some officials was that Graham was simply `not getting on with the job in good 
order', and in Graham's personal and professional dealings with his own staff `there was a 
breakdown of trust and confidence'. Unattributed interview material. 
62 `How King Duncan bit the carpet', Education, 19 July 1991. 
63 Tate interview. 
64 Graham and Tytler, A Lesson To Us All, p. 112. 
65 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 156. 
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over the meetings, allowing his junior ministers the latitude to snap aggressively at 
the heels of Halsey and his team. As described by Nick Tate, by then Assistant Chief 
Executive at SEAC, `The meetings between Kenneth Clarke and Phillip Halsey were 
dreadful, depressing meetings. Clarke was disdainful, Michael Fallon was bullying, 
Tim Eggar was arrogant. They were all visibly contemptuous of everything' . 
66 
Halsey had clearly annoyed ministers by `not reading the political messages' he was 
getting on a range of topics. These included the results of the KS 1 trials; on A levels 
where SEAC seemed to be going in the opposite direction to the Secretary of State 
by wanting to him to endorse their list of core skills required to broaden Sixth Form 
studies; and then Halsey's request that Clarke rethink his demand that the following 
summer's GCSE cohort should be penalised for poor spelling in most subjects. 
These `messages' were further bolstered by the feedback he was getting from his 
advisers. John Marks recalled how, 
At SEAC, Nick Stuart, David Forrester and Eric Bolton would come to the 
meetings and Halsey would defer to them. I went along to one meeting to the 
Minister with the SEAC delegation, as a dissident over the Maths tests. I 
argued that they were nonsense. Clarke picked up the main points very 
quickly and later described them as `elaborate nonsense'. 
67 
Aside from Marks, Nick Tate was also `very conscious of the key role of Tessa 
Keswick'. 68 At one meeting, Keswick raised the point that some teachers were 
saying that the assessment system was unworkable. According to Marks, `She 
(Keswick) was shouted down by the SEAC council. Halsey tried to calm things 
down by saying "This was the type of vigorous debate we have at the Council". 
There were changes to the Council soon after'. 
69 
Whereas Duncan Graham was perceived as going beyond his remit at the 
NCC, as ministers saw it, Halsey was in the dock for sticking too closely to 
his at 
66 Tate interview. 
67 Marks interview. 
68 Tate interview. 
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SEAC. Matters appear to have come to a head during March when members of 
SEAC presented their pilot proposals to the Secretary of State. The meeting was not 
a success. `It was outrageous what Halsey allowed to be presented', recalled Tessa 
Keswick, `I don't know why he did it. The tests were given to Kenneth Clarke for 
approval within three days". 70 Clarke himself described how `These tests were 
presented to me and my junior ministers as far as I can see with our comments going 
in one ear and out the other. They were hopelessly over elaborate' .71 There was more 
than a strong suspicion that this was deliberate on the part of officials, who, it was 
feared, were deliberately trying to sabotage or discredit the entire policy. In an 
interview with The Times in the same month, Clarke's exasperation was obvious. `A 
short written examination is manageable', he told the interviewer, `but some people 
go to ridiculous lengths to avoid them because it has not become proper in modern 
education. Most schools do not shy away from them as much as some of the experts 
who advise me'. 72 Following the meeting, Clarke wrote to Halsey in blunt terms to 
say that what he had seen was `not an acceptable model for the future'. He made it 
clear he wanted `more straightforward and sharply focused' tests, whose purpose 
was to provide a rigorous and objective measure of pupils' attainments, not to 
promote particular approaches to the delivery of the curriculum. `This was clear in 
the original specification', he continued, `which my predecessor agreed for the 
development contracts. It has seemed to me, however that it has been lost'. In a very 
public slap down to Halsey and SEAC, the letter was published. In a terse reply, 
Halsey denied that SEAC had `lost sight' of the specification and accused Clarke of 
emphasising a few aspects of the requirements rather than the whole range. 73 
Here again was the ambivalence and obfuscation that surrounded the 
introduction of the National Curriculum thrown into sharp relief. The regular line, to 
which SEAC was adhering, remained that provided to John Marks, when he 
questioned whether all aspects of the Attainment Targets had to be tested and was 
69 Marks interview. 
70 Keswick interview. 
71 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, pp. 157-8. 
72 The Times, 23 March 1991. 
73 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? pp. 153-4. 
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told that this indeed was the legal requirement. 74 This was in direct confrontation 
with the demands of the politicos and irregulars. Halsey was in the middle and 
given his background, he stuck with regular line. He could do no other. Nick Tate 
felt that this very much displayed `a lack of judgement. Phillip Halsey was much 
more thorough (than Duncan Graham), much more methodical but naive. We should 
have gone earlier to Ministers to explain what we were trying to do. There should 
have been a political decision'. 75 This `political decision' over what to test or what 
not to test would only emerge via Sir Ron Dearing after the boycott debacle in 1993. 
In the interim, Halsey's doggedness in pursuing the regular line would cost him his 
position. Education was soon reporting that the `Axe (was) raised above NCC and 
SEAC' and during July it finally fell, in what Clarke later described as the `happy 
retirements' of Graham and Halsey. 76 Graham was replaced by David Pascall, ex- 
member of the Downing Street Policy Unit, and Halsey by none other than Brian 
Griffiths, newly ennobled as Lord Griffiths of Fforestach. 77 
According to insiders, Griffiths' arrival transformed the atmosphere at 
SEAC. `To say that a climate of fear exists in Newcombe House would not be an 
exaggeration', one is reported to have said. 78 Almost immediately, Griffiths acted to 
remove what had been perceived as the undue influence of DES officials on the 
deliberations of SEAC by banning them from meetings. According to Clive Saville, 
`There was a great row with Nick Stuart when officials were banned from the SEAC 
but he really brought it upon himself by the way he lectured committees. The right 
really hated him'. 79 Griffiths, whose main occupation since leaving the Policy Unit 
was as International Adviser to Goldman Sachs, did not believe that his job at SEAC 
required his full-time attention and acted as such, leading even some supporters to 
later complain that he was `part-time and often abroad pursuing his banking 
74 See Ch. 7, p. 177. 
75 Tate interview. 
76 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 157. 
77 John Marks described how on the day of Griffiths' appointment, `I knew nothing of the changes 
and went to Newcombe House (SEAC headquarters). The atmosphere was absolutely desperate. 
Halsey made a venomous speech against Brian Griffiths'. Marks interview. 
78 `The right tightens its grip on education'. The Independent on Sunday, August 
1992 
79 Saville interview 
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interests'. 80 It was an inauspicious start for the new regime at SEAC, that would 
soon find itself in the midst of some very testing times. While arguments continued 
to rumble on at the NCC, after the 1992 general election the public focus shifted 
very much towards SEAC and the imminent Key Stage 3 tests in 1993. 
Cutting the Gordian knot 
Despite Clarke's actions over the NCC and SEAC, they were hardly of the calibre 
that both he and John Major would have wished to trumpet too much as heralding a 
new domestic policy. What both had been working towards since the start of 1991 
would be published as the Parent's Charter in October of that year. The emphasis 
was on a new form of independent inspection and the provision of information with 
school reports for parents, the publication of schools results - not just for exams but 
on other measures such as truancy levels. 8' How the traditional role of HMI was 
largely superseded by the creation of the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) 
deserves a special mention, if only to highlight what can be achieved when ideology 
and policy formation coalesces with the necessary personal and political will, a 
combination of factors that was so singularly lacking since 1976. 
The question over what to do about HMI had been unfinished business for 
many on the right. Rhodes Boyson regarded HMIs as `dilettantes on the fringes, who 
were semi-detached from the Department'. 82 Bob Dunn described HMI as a `self 
perpetuating oligarchy' that `constantly recruited from within the profession of 
people in their own mould. They represented the interests of the providers, not the 
consumers'. 83 Although HMI had escaped criticism from the Nick Stuart penned 
Rayner scrutiny in 1983,84 it was Keith Joseph's decision to publish HMI reports 
80 Griffiths, All Must Have Prizes, p. 166 
81 Major and his team perceived education as such a key area that the Parent's Charter was published 
after the Citizen's Charter had been launched to amplify the educational components. Hill, 
J. and 
Hogg, S. (1995) Too Close to Call. London: Little, Brown and Company, p. 98. 
82 Dunford, Turbulent Priests, p. 144 
83 Education, 17 May 1991 
84 Instigated by Derek Rayner, Mrs Thatcher's efficiency guru, the reports were meant to examine 
departmental functions and ask `radical questions': `Why is this work done at all? 
Why is it done as it 
is? How could it be done more efficiently at less cost? ' (Hennessey, Whitehall, p. 
596) On the central 
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from January 1983 that left the Inspectorate exposed to political pressure. Not long 
after this decision, the Thatcher government decided to become much more publicly 
involved with education policy. According to Eric Bolton, `All Ministers were 
greedy for the information provided by HMI but the fact that the reports went public 
was a real sticking point'. 85 Prior to this, HMI would have been reporting on a 
schools system effectively run and organised by other people. As seen in previous 
chapters, it may have been difficult to say exactly who those other people were, but 
they certainly were not ministers. As the government increasingly took more 
responsibility and intervened to an unprecedented extent, then HMI was in the 
position of reporting almost directly on the effects of government policy, some of 
which was bound to make uncomfortable reading for ministers. 
The twin advent of the National Curriculum and the prominence of parental 
choice also appeared to make some kind of change in the structure of HMI 
inevitable. For Bolton, 
The main plank of the reforms had been that control and standards could be 
maintained by better-informed parents. So how could parents know what 
their child's school was like during the time their child was there? You 
needed a report for parents on schools. One possibility was to increase the 
numbers of HMI, which nobody wanted, especially with the powerful 
suspicion of HMI. 86 
In a speech to the National Association of Inspectors and Educational Advisers 
during June 1988, David Hancock had given some indications of what was being 
envisaged. Local authority inspectors and advisers would be expected to play a key 
question of measuring the `value of HM Inspectorate', the authors of the Report, who relied `heavily 
on the advice of senior HMI' (Dunford, Turbulent Priests, p. 82) simply ignored its brief with the 
bland assertion that `We have not found it possible to construct a method for assessing the overall 
effectiveness of HM Inspectorate in terms of measuring the value that it adds to central government 
or to the education service as a whole. ' Nevertheless, the report did nod towards a door it chose not 
to open. `It might be argued', said the authors, `that in the end the value of HM Inspectorate can only 
be judged in terms of the results achieved in maintaining and improving standards within the system. 
DES (1983) Study ofHMlnspectorate in England and Wales, London: HMSO, p. 87, p. 
89. 
85 Bolton interview 
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role in the implementation of government policy. `The inspection function', said 
Hancock, `already developing in many l. e. a. s will need to be given an even higher 
profile and priority'. 87 According to Bolton, this would have meant `Stiffen(ing) the 
sinews of the LEAs' inspectorate with a smaller, national HMI. We were already 
working on national pilot schemes when Kenneth Clarke cut the Gordian knot of 
debate'. 88 Given Major's, and also especially Clarke's, antipathy to local authorities 
in general and the education establishment in particular - this time in the guise of 
advisers and inspectors - it is not hard to see that regardless of any pilot schemes, 
any suggestion that included a `higher profile and priority' for them was always 
going to be a non-runner. While HMI had always liked to see themselves almost at 
arms' length from other members of the educational establishment, the introduction 
of the National Curriculum had inevitably drawn them into a closer embrace with 
the DES in particular. According to one observer, in dealings with the curriculum 
quangos, it did not go unnoticed that `Nick Stuart and Eric Bolton were hand in 
glove. They would come up to the NCC on the same train. The days of the 
independent HMCI were long gone before the advent of Chris Woodhead'. 89 
Whether events would have moved as fast as they did without the domestic 
imperatives and ambitions of Major and Clarke is questionable. John Hedger, 
Deputy Secretary in the DES at the time, felt that, 
Officials were divided over the abolition of HMI, although there was a 
strengthening view that HMI should be more judgemental, tougher in their 
judgements. But it (the abolition) would not have happened as quickly as it 
did if it had not got caught up in the political fight. 90 
Dominic Morris echoed this view. `The debate over the future of HMI was timely', 
recalled Morris, `Although its abolition was dressed up in the Charter, it was part of 
86 Ibid. 
87 TES, 24 June 1988. 
88 Bolton interview. 
89 
Tate interview. 
90 Hedger interview. 
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the long-running ideological battle and Kenneth Clarke was up for it'. 91 Indeed, 
almost as soon as Clarke had taken over, the pressure on HMI had begun to build up 
with the irregular network firing off regular public missives at the Inspectorate. 92 In 
May 1991, Clarke announced `a thorough internal review of the structure and role of 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate', 93 the progress of which John Major instructed he `was 
to be fully consulted' . 
94 Although it was reported that the result of the internal 
review, as well as that of another Treasury led inquiry, had praised the work and 
efficiency of HMI, the `real' result could never have been in doubt. According to 
one account, the final decision was `clinched' as early as 1 July, in `a meeting 
between Kenneth Clarke, Francis Maude and Nick True'. 95 
In September, at the prompting of Sheila Lawlor, John Burchill, chief 
inspector for the London Borough of Wandsworth had published a pamphlet that 
advocated a series of competing inspectorates, operating as consultants and licensed 
by a reformed and streamlined national Inspectorate. 96 While Clarke reportedly 
`walked around for three months with the book in his briefcase before deciding to go 
ahead', 97 given the closeness of the CPS to Downing Street during these months, the 
pamphlet could have been seen more as an unofficial White Paper. 98 Indeed 
Burchill's `proposals' found their way almost verbatim into the Parent's Charter, 
published in October and the subsequent Education (Schools) Bill the following 
91 Morris interview. 
92 In November 1991, John Marks complained in the TES of the `Dogs that never bark'. `In the 
debate on standards', wrote Marks, `an important voice is rarely heard, that of HMI... given HMI's 
enormous privilege, access to every school, classroom and teacher in the country, is this good 
enough? ' (TES, 23 November 1990) In March the following year Stuart Sexton followed in a similar 
vein and challenged the government to `Take these inspectors to task'. (Education, 17 March 1991) 
In May, several Conservative MPs, led by Dunn and Boyson, signed a motion in the House of 
Commons calling on the government to abolish HMI and give the Audit Commission the task of 
monitoring the work of schools and colleges. Dunford, Turbulent Priests, p. 192. 93 Ibid. 
94 Major, John Major, p. 249. 
9 Hogg and Hill, Too Close To Call, p. 98. 
96 6 Lawlor interview and Burchill, J. (1991) Breaking the Monopoly, London: Centre for Policy 
Studies. 
97 TES, 30 May 2003. 
98 An October 1991 editorial in the THES suggested that `public debate was in effect conditioned and 
dominated by the right-wing think tanks ... 
linked to 10 Downing Street `by threads of steel"'. THES, 
25 October 1991. 
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month. 99 Eric Bolton may have been moved to describe the proposals as `sinister', 100 
but once the decision had been made, with a united front between education 
ministers and Downing Street and a clear unambiguous remit, officials had little 
scope for `subversion'. `The view was that HMI were the bastions of inward 
professionalism and needed to be shaken up', said John Caines, `I told Kenneth 
Clarke of the very high risks but he was someone who had the courage of his 
convictions and, once instructed, we began to dismantle the Inspectorate'. 101 With 
the equally committed Chris Woodhead appointed as the new HMCI, Ofsted was 
established and the first inspections took place in 1995 with Ofsted itself likely to 
remain a fixture on the educational landscape for the foreseeable future. 
Conclusion 
Like many of Clarke's initiatives during his time as Secretary of State, it was hard to 
see the join between political expediency and personal conviction. Clarke's 
decisiveness as a `strong manager' was widely admired both by advisers and 
officials and his tenure marked a significant shift in the public tone and approach to 
both the National Curriculum and Grant Maintained schools. His impact at 
Education, as was John Major's, was certainly judged a success by his erstwhile 
colleagues on the right. The verdict of Dominic Morris was that `Kenneth Clarke 
was a powerful, determined and smart Secretary of State. In 1988 you could say 
there had been a score draw with the forces of evil. By the end of Kenneth Clarke's 
sojourn, it was perhaps three to two to our side'. 102 Yet this apparent decisiveness 
and bluster also concealed his weakness as Secretary of State for Education. While 
99 The decision making `loop' had been so rapid and furtive that when the plans were first unveiled in 
the Parents' Charter, it was reported that `HMI was astounded. There had been no hint previously 
from the DES that such radical changes were afoot'. TES, 15 November 1991 
100 The Guardian, 3 October 1991. 
101 Caines interview. The Department has never been fully reconciled to Ofsted. In a recent speech to 
the National Grammar Schools Association, the current Director General of Schools attacked Ofsted 
as a waste of time and money. `I am not persuaded', said Peter Housden, `that the current 
Section 10 
inspections (regular school inspections) and the public expenditure on Ofsted really delivers 
for us'. 
Apparently Mr Housden `intended the remarks for a private audience and was not aware journalists 
had been invited to the conference'. `Top civil servant attacks Ofsted', news. bbc. co. uk, 
12 June 2003. 
102 Morris interview. 
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Andrew Roth's Parliamentary Profiles could describe Clarke as `a rare Minister 
who can reply without a visible brief, what the Guardian saw was someone who 
was `treating the job like a barrister - mugged up on the run and then as eloquent 
and challenging as possible, with a generous sprinkling of sound bites, very little of 
it underpinned by knowledge of facts'. 1o3 Over the questions of the National 
Curriculum, the verdict of one study was that `It is difficult to escape the impression 
that the complex issues raised by the introduction of the National Curriculum and its 
accompanying tests bored him'. 104 In terms of addressing the underlying problems 
carried over from Baker and MacGregor, the rhetoric belied the fact that he took 
neither the time nor trouble to make any sort of real engagement with the issues in 
his department. 105 As with John Major, other than a superficial brush with some of 
the more intractable problems, it was clear that much of this energy was expended in 
pursuing political objectives, rather than making an earnest attempt to deal with the 
ongoing and deepening policy concerns. `He (Clarke) successfully diverted attention 
from the growing problems of the national curriculum and testing', said one 
commentator, `but he did nothing to deal with the fundamental contradictions, 
particularly over testing, which were to cause problems for his successor. He had 
also driven teachers nearer to the point where even the more moderate of them were 
ready to resist'. 106 
103 Roth, A. (1988) Parliamentary Profiles, A-D. London: Parliamentary Profiles, p. 233 and The 
Guardian, 4 February 1992. 
104 Kavanagh and Seldon, (eds. ) The Major Effect, pp. 338-9. `Clarke simply didn't care about the 
issues', opined one of the Civil Servants who had been at the wrong end of Clarke's `decisiveness'. 
Saville interview. 
105 On one occasion, presaging the wonderful later admission when he was Chancellor that 
he hadn't 
bothered the read the Maastricht Agreement, when education correspondents had gathered to 
be 
briefed about the Alexander report into teaching methods in primary schools that Clarke 
had 
requested, they were told, `Don't bother to read the document. You will find all the bullet points 
in 
öyy press release'. Simon, B. Education Today and Tomorrow, Spring 1993. 
Mike Baker quoted in Balen, Clarke, p. 223. 
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CHAPTER 9 
May 1992- July 1994: `Crisis, disorder, confusion and mismanagement' 
Introduction 
Despite polling evidence to the contrary, almost up the date of the election, in May 
1992 the voters showed that they were still not quite ready for a Labour government. 
Referring to education in his speech to the first Party Conference after the election, 
an emboldened John Major pledged to confront those responsible for `not putting 
children first.. . 
Yes it will mean another colossal row with the education 
establishment. I look forward to that. It's a row worth having'. ' In the new Major 
administration the education portfolio was taken over by John Patten. Despite initial 
optimism over his appointment, Patten managed to preside over one of the strangest 
and most disastrous interludes in education policy of any era. The consequence was 
the most public failure of any Minister between 1979 and 1997, with Patten exiting 
from his only Cabinet post direct to the backbenches and political obscurity. 
What was the cause of Patten's meteoric descent? When he arrived at 
Education, Patten had the distinct advantage over many of his predecessors in that he 
probably carried the least amount of political baggage. He was not perceived as 
belonging to any particular wing of the Conservative Party. Nor could much 
`significance' be read into his appointment, unlike say that of Keith Joseph or 
Kenneth Clarke. His predecessor's combativeness and aggression may have angered 
many in the education world, but this was something Patten could possibly have 
turned to his advantage, with a fresh approach in an area of public policy in which 
he himself felt he was a `specialist'. 2 Probably in anticipation of such a 
development, the verdict of the TES on his appointment was that `The education 
1 Education, 16 October 1992. 
2 The former Oxford don told an interviewer in 1994 that `The one job for which I might 
have 
thought myself suited was this one, and I never, therefore, thought that I would ever 
be appointed to 
this job because it is axiomatic in government that you don't normally appoint a 
"specialist"'. Ribbins 
and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 170. 
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establishment is likely to find him an affable minister to deal with'. 3 In trying to 
disentangle the sequence of events that led to his departure, there are a number of 
strands that need to be examined. Was he simply the unlucky inheritor of an 
unmanageable morass of policies from his predecessors that were neither 
ideologically coherent nor practically workable? For many of the irregulars and 
politicos, much of the blame, particularly for the debacle over the testing regime, 
could be laid at the door of officials, who, it was claimed, deliberately sabotaged the 
tests. For the regulars, it was the continued, and ultimately, destructive political 
interference and arrogance by those on the right that was the primary cause. After 
his sacking, Patten himself was more inclined to suggest that he had been let down 
by lack of support from John Major and his advisers in Number Ten. The strand that 
runs through all these explanations is, of course, the contribution of Patten himself, 
and the degree to which his management of the policies and personalities was a 
contributory factor both to his departure and policy failure. 
`A chemical reaction' 
John Patten arrived at Education with the reputation as the longest-serving junior 
minister in the previous two Conservative administrations. After being elected in 
1979, he was the first of the new intake to reach ministerial office when, in 1981, he 
became a junior minister in Northern Ireland. In 1983, he moved to the DHSS under 
Kenneth Clarke. In 1985, he moved to the Department of the Environment, before 
moving again, in 1987, to be Minister of State at the Home Office, where he 
remained until 1992. After being tipped for promotion and then passed over during 
several reshuffles, it appeared that Patten's reputation as a `wet' weighed heavily on 
his prospects. Yet it had not stopped colleagues of similar disposition, such as 
Kenneth Clarke and Chris Patten, from reaching the Cabinet. While Mrs Thatcher 
and her advisers possibly harboured other concerns over John Patten's suitability for 
promotion, Major's election victory heralded the end of the long wait for `the nearly 
man'. 
3 TES, 17 April 1992. 
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One of the few brushes he appears to have had with those involved with the 
education reforms was recorded by Duncan Graham. Graham and his deputy, Peter 
Watkins, had gone to the Home Office to meet with the Home Secretary, David 
Waddington and his junior minister to discuss the NCC document on citizenship. 
According to Graham, 
After the NCC presentation Waddington turned to Patten for his comments. 
After a cringing support of Waddington's views, he complained about the 
lack of prominence given to car theft in our document! ... On the way out, 
Patten took my deputy, Peter Watkins aside, and suggested that they have 
dinner together and see how they could sort out that awkward bastard 
Graham! He picked the wrong man in Peter, but amply demonstrated the lack 
of sensitivity which was to endear him to teachers a couple of years later. 4 
So it was to prove, and not just with teachers. By the end of his time in office Patten 
had managed to antagonise just about everybody in education outside a close group 
of supporters. He had even succeeded in the Herculean task of uniting the teacher 
unions. Part of this was due to Patten's personal style. According to Lady Blatch, his 
Minister of State, `John Patten was misunderstood. He had a throwaway style of 
speaking and there was a buildup of hostility egged on by a bad press. Much of it 
was self-inflicted. We did a lot of finger wagging. There was a chemical reaction 
between the Secretary of State and the outside world'. 5 Elements of this `chemical 
reaction' were captured by one backbench diarist: 
There's a flouncing quality to John Patten that infuriates his enemies and 
disconcerts his friends. Everything he's saying about standards in schools 
and the need for these tests is spot on, but the way he says it is alienating 
people on all sides. He sat in the tea room today, ramrod back, head held 
high, being waspish and witty like a camp old thing, not realising that it's 
his 
4 Graham, Education Racket, p. 180. 
5 Emily Blatch interview, 28 October 1998. 
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manner not his policy that's driving supporters away. We should be scoring 
in this area and we're not. 6 
Patten's `throwaway style' appears to have been used to disguise a deep sense of 
insecurity over whether he himself felt up to the job. This, in turn, fed an 
exaggerated need to prove to everyone around him that he was. Officials who had 
worked with him in the past found a marked change in Patten when he arrived at 
Education. One, who had worked with Patten in the Central Policy Review Staff in 
the early 1980s, felt that, `At the Think Tank he (Patten) had been engaging and 
refreshing, but at Education he was vain and insecure and not an easy man to deal 
with'. 7 Another official, who had worked with Patten at the Department of 
Environment, said that he had found him `pleasant in personal dealings' but `At 
Education he was uncharacteristically sneering and defensive in public. He had been 
kept in the Home Office for a long time after his colleagues had been promoted and 
this had a corrosive effect on his self-confidence. He was over-eager in his new post 
and always felt that the eyes of his colleagues were very much on him'. 8 
Arguably, Patten's failure in office was due to the fact that he defined 
himself almost entirely by what he felt to be other people's expectations, rather than 
being his own man, never taking the time or trouble to stake out his own positions. 
The BBC education correspondent, Mike Baker, noted how Patten `had a habit of 
stopping in mid-answer and asking, very politely, "Would you mind asking me that 
question again? " He sometimes did this half a dozen times in an interview. The 
fundamental problem was that he was trying to regurgitate a memorised answer 
rather than engaging with the question'. 9 Some commentators doubted whether 
Patten was capable of taking a position on anything. One such was John Clare, 
Education Editor of the Daily Telegraph. Soon after his appointment, Clare had met 
with Patten and had been unimpressed. `John Patten was a personal and political 
6 Brandreth, G. (1999) Breaking the Code. Westminster Diaries. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
ý. 166. 
Unattributed interview material. 
8 Unattributed interview material. 
9 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? p. 140. 
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failing of the most extraordinary kind', said Clare, `He was promoted over his 
capacity and in no time at all it became apparent that he didn't have a clue. He had 
no natural grace and showed a crass inability to handle an audience. I met with him 
for two hours in his room in the Commons after he was appointed and felt like an 
Oxford don who had spent a two-hour tutorial with a superficially bright student 
who was unable to grasp the issues'. ' 0 
Although Clare's subsequent article gave away few of his misgivings, " he 
would return to the question of Patten's suitability with damaging consequences 
early in 1993. In the interim, Patten's team at the Department would have had the 
opportunity to make up their own minds regarding their new boss. Their conclusions 
were similarly damning. Rather like the `chemical reaction' between Patten and the 
outside world, there was similar experience between Patten and his team of ministers 
and advisers within the Department. The lack of trust and empathy between Patten 
and his team left them collectively ill-equipped to deal with the challenges they 
faced during the next two years. 
`A rich mixture' 
Albeit for differing reasons, Kenneth Clarke was as difficult an act for Patten to 
follow as Baker had been for John MacGregor. Neither of the Johns ever quite 
managed to come to terms with their inheritances, although MacGregor was the 
more fortunate in having been able to leave education with much of his dignity and 
status intact. At a policy level, the actions of Clarke and Major had altered the nature 
of the balance between the groups of irregulars, regulars and politicos. While there 
were always some grey areas in the distinction between these groups, the 
appointment of figures such as Brian Griffiths and others to SEAC and the NCC, 
often against the wishes of the regular officials and advisers, was always going to 
be 
difficult to manage. With education also a relatively more important area of policy 
for Major than it was for Thatcher, the importance and influence of his irregular 
10 
Clare interview. 
11 Daily Telegraph, 12 July 1992. 
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advisers would also be likely to proportionally increase, creating further discomfort 
for the new Secretary of State. 
At a personal level, Angela Rumbold felt that Patten particularly `admired 
Ken (Clarke). He was friends with him and wanted to emulate him'. 12 The robust, 
self-confident Clarke was probably the worst role model imaginable for the more 
fragile Patten. Geoffrey Holland, who would replace John Caines as Permanent 
Secretary, described the difference between the two Secretaries of State, and the 
consequences. `There are the Kenneth Clarkes of this world who don't give a 
tinker's cuss what anybody thinks', said Holland, `They make decisions and get on 
with it. Patten was very insecure and was endlessly looking over his shoulder. This 
made officials very nervous'. 13 Patten's mistrust of his officials was also apparent 
very early on. Peter Owen certainly felt that `Kenneth Clarke warned John Patten 
that the Civil Service would get him, that his cards had been marked'. 14 The 
combination of insecurity and apprehension with his brief at Education, made for 
very uneasy relationships between Patten and his senior officials. John Caines 
described how, 
He (Patten) was punctiliously correct in dealing with top officials and he 
expected them to be on parade at all his meetings. You were left in no doubt 
about your role and it was made quite plain why you were there, to give 
advice and not to make policy. He insisted that I attend every meeting. He 
needed his hand held. 15 
Within four months, Caines decided that he had had enough. Although he had only 
joined the Department in 1989, Caines had worked with four different Secretaries of 
State. His replacement was Geoffrey Holland, a highly respected and senior figure 
within Whitehall, with a hinterland of his own outside of the Education Department. 
With much talk of merging the Education and Employment Departments, Holland, 
12 Rumbold interview. 
13 Holland interview. 
14 
Owen interview. 
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with his background at the MSC and Employment, was the obvious successor. 16 
Someone of Holland's stature would also be able to provide some ballast and know- 
how for the new and untried Secretary of State. With regard to his new Secretary of 
State, Holland was wary, if slightly optimistic: 
John Patten was a complex character, a very sensitive soul. I knew his 
reputation for being difficult but had also been told by someone at the Home 
Office that they had the best discussions about the nature of crime and 
punishment with John Patten and told me that I would like him. '7 
Patten himself was reported to have been elated at Holland's appointment. His junior 
minister, Eric Forth, was less sanguine. `Geoffrey Holland had his own agenda', said 
Forth, `I was quite surprised that he had been appointed. John Patten was delighted 
saying that "We have got a `big beast' to run education". I was astonished and knew 
it would end in tears'. 18 Relations between the new Permanent Secretary and his 
Minister soon soured. According to Emily Blatch, it became obvious that `There 
were severe tensions between Mr Patten and Geoffrey Holland, who was not the 
greatest admirer of the Secretary of State'. 19 One immediate source of these 
`tensions' was Patten's extreme and, for Holland, tiresome punctiliousness in 
dealing with his senior officials, something that had already led to the premature 
departure of one Permanent Secretary. According to Holland, `There were long, 
wearying meetings and he (Patten) wanted the Permanent Secretary in his room for 
15 
Gaines interview. 
16 According to Holland, who described himself as `an outrider for a merger between Education and 
Employment', a group of Permanent Secretaries, including Robin Butler (Cabinet Secretary), had 
prepared a paper which concluded that a merger was desirable. `Quite a number of us', said Holland, 
` were expecting the merger to be announced along with the Cabinet changes straight after the 
election. There was great surprise when it didn't. I was disappointed the merger did not go through 
but I wasn't consulted. With Mr. Patten there was no great chance of it going through. Maybe some 
right wingers felt that Education would be forever sullied if joined to Employment'. John Caines felt 
that there was a suspicion Major had put the merger on hold partly to try and make a substantive 
Cabinet post for William Waldegrave who had not been a great success at the DHS. Waldegrave's 
post-election brief was The Office of Public Service and Science. Holland and Caines interviews. 1 7' Holland interview. 
18 Forth interview. 
19 Blatch interview. 
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every discussion. Policy was for politicians and delivery was for Civil Servants -) . 
20 
This was not a role Holland was used to, or was willing to play. Watching from the 
side, the perspective of Patten's adviser, Cliff Grantham, was that `Holland was a 
big cat in the Whitehall jungle. He came with a very clear training agenda and gave 
undue weight to those issues. He was out of the Department a lot and would often 
not be at meetings but giving a speech somewhere'. 21 In Eric Forth's more pithy 
description, `He (Holland) was too grand to be the office boy'. 22 
Another major source of tension was what Holland perceived to be Patten's 
lack of character. `He really was a weak man', recalled Holland, `and not the sort of 
person you needed to be strong in two directions: someone to stand up to Number 
Ten and the Policy Unit on the one hand, and also dealing with all the bodies in a 
decisive manner on the other'. 23 For someone like Kenneth Clarke, the close interest 
in his Department taken by Number Ten and the Policy Unit was not seen as a 
threat, but to be welcomed. For the less-robust Patten, who felt himself under 
scrutiny after his long `apprenticeship', it was more of a double-edged sword. As 
seen in the previous chapter, the work of the Department had already been drawn 
much closer into the orbit of Number Ten. This trend continued, almost without 
respite, after 1992. `During John Patten's time', said one official, `channels of 
communication (between Number Ten and the Department) were clogged with 
traffic in education which was obviously a particularly sensitive area. Consequently 
he (Patten) didn't have much room to manoeuvre'. 24 The key adviser on education 
within the Policy Unit at this time was Nick True. Whereas Major himself might 
have lacked strong ideological convictions, this was not case with True. One of his 
colleagues within the Policy Unit described him as `an ideologue, not an 
administrator', 25 while officials who had dealings with him found him `a powerful 
20 Holland interview. 
21 Cliff Grantham interview, 18 February 1999. 
22 Forth interview. 
23 Holland interview. 
24 Owen interview. Patten had blotted his copybook early on when he argued what the Policy Unit 
saw as the DFE line on offering the abolition of the Assisted Places Scheme as an economy measure, 
a move that `particularly angered Major'. Seldon, Major, p. 399. 25 
Morris interview. 
212 
character with strong personal views (on education)'. 26 Patten was well aware of the 
influence of True, to the extent of almost subordinating some decisions to True's say 
so. Cliff Grantham spoke of Patten's insistence on `always keeping Number Ten 
informed so that nothing would take it by surprise' and `the sheer effort of keeping 
Nick True in the loop'. 27 This did nothing to endear him to his senior officials who, 
regardless of political or policy preferences, always like to feel that that their 
minister is able to hold his own among colleagues. Eric Forth described how, `On 
one occasion John Patten said he had to ask Nick True at the Policy Unit something. 
Nick Stuart said, "You don't have to ask Nick True anything. We can do that. You 
are a Minister of the Crown"'. 28 The consequences of Patten's insecurity were often 
felt. According to Geoffrey Holland, `We could work for a week on a policy and go 
home on Friday thinking that the job had been done only to come back on Monday 
and find that someone on the political network had got at John Patten and everything 
had to be adjusted'. 29 In some ways it was a neat reversal of the times when officials 
such as Ulrich and Stuart were able to undermine political decisions taken with 
Keith Joseph and his ministers. With Patten, it was the administrators who found 
themselves undermined. 
Whether Patten needed to be so punctilious in trying to keep Number Ten 
`within the loop' is arguable, given the fact that his Minister of State was Emily 
Blatch, whose presence within the Department could only have exacerbated Patten's 
nervousness. Lady Blatch was a member of what was described as the `East Anglian 
mafia' that surrounded John Major. One of the constituency party activists that had 
originally selected Major for his parliamentary seat in Huntington, their families 
were close friends and lived near each other. The Prime Minister referred to her 
frequently as `my dear Emily'. 30 On her appointment, the TES described the new 
Minister of State as `one of the inner circle of advisers relied on by the Prime 
Minister, John Major, and she has firm views on the way schools should run. . . with 
26 
Owen interview. 
27 Grantham interview. 
28 Gaines interview. 
29 Holland interview. 
30 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? p. 143. 
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friends in high places, Baroness Blatch will not be a person to cross'. 31 Angela 
Rumbold, who could have been said to have held a similar position under Kenneth 
Baker, had some sympathy for Patten's predicament: `When a Prime Minister allies 
themselves with the Number Two it makes life incredibly difficult for the Secretary 
of State to run the ship. I would know when to back off from Kenneth Baker. Emily 
didn't know when to or wouldn't back off . 32 The combination of Blatch's 
determination and her forthright views would certainly have made her exposure to 
Patten's prevarications very frustrating. `Mr. Patten was a most collegiate person', 
she said, `He liked shared risk taking'. 33 
Within the Department, the tension between the Secretary of State and his 
junior minister, no more than the tension between the Secretary of State and his 
Permanent Secretary, did not go long unnoticed. `Patten did not have a strong 
ministerial team', recalled Geoffrey Holland, `with at least one non-team player in 
Baroness Blatch. She personified the right wing and had considerable access to Mr 
Major. There was an extremely uneasy relationship between Baroness Blatch and 
John Patten. It made for an unsettling and uncomfortable berth'. 34 Peter Owen 
described what he saw as `a "two nations" culture within the Department, one nation 
represented by Baroness Blatch and the other by Patten. Baroness Blatch was pretty 
unreasonable in the mould of Mrs Thatcher, tough as steel'. 35 Lady Blatch certainly 
shared Number Ten's views of the Department describing it as `one of the worst in 
Whitehall'. `There was hostility between Mr. Patten and the Department', said Lady 
Blatch, `The Civil Servants were sluggish and obstructive. They had an agenda that 
31 TES, 24 April 1992. 
32 Rumbold interview. At the height of the Monica Lewinsky scandal in September 1998, President 
and Mrs Clinton were visiting Ireland. The body language between Bill and Hilary apparently was 
extremely cool. During one appearance Clinton diverged from his speech to `salute the women of 
Northern Ireland'. At that point, one reporter noted that `Hilary's eyes opened and closed like a 
lizard's'. (The Irish Times, 5 September 1998) This portrays something of the flavour of Baroness 
Blatch's reaction when the name of John Patten is brought up, or `Mr. Patten' as she generally 
referred to him during an interview. 33 Blatch interview. 
34 Holland interview. 
35 Owen interview. 
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was not Kenneth Baker's, not John MacGregor's, not Kenneth Clarke's and not John 
Patten's'. 36 
Neither was the `hostility' just between `Mr Patten and the Department'. 
Lady Blatch's forthright views on the place of religion and morality in the 
curriculum finally brought to a close one of the most distinguished and influential 
careers at the Department, that of Nick Stuart. The 1988 Education Act had owed 
much to Stuart's oversight and determination. But his close personal involvement 
with the policies appears to have left him bereft of sufficient professional 
detachment in dealing with successive retrenchments, as well as making him an 
obvious target for right-wing hostility. According to John Caines, 
Nick Stuart was an extremely capable man, intellectually very powerful. But 
people took "agin" him. He argued with great force and tenacity but was very 
proprietorial about the reforms in which he had been involved and the 
question was whether he was still fighting Baker's battles or the new 
Minister's agenda? 37 
Lady Blatch was typically more forthright: 
Nick Stuart had an agenda and we were not on it. He had an enormous hold 
over staff. He almost was the Department. The crunch came when I was 
savaged by him in a meeting over the RE curriculum. John Patten said 
nothing until Nick Stuart had left the room and then he turned to John Caines 
and said that that must never be allowed to happen again and he (Stuart) was 
to be moved. 38 
Patten himself would not have needed much encouragement. He was well aware of 
Stuart's influence and according to one official, `There was a progressive lack of 
36 Blatch interview. 
37 Gaines interview. 
38 Blatch interview. 
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trust between John Patten and Nick Stuart with a big blow up over the White Paper. 
Patten felt that Nick was deliberately rewriting parts of it against the Minister's 
wishes'. 39 Stuart's subsequent departure to the Department of Employment was to be 
engineered with no loss of face and was announced at the same time as Geoffrey 
Holland was announced as John Caines' successor. 
Aside from Lady Blatch, the other prominent member of Patten's team, 
which was described by one official as `a rich mixture of different sections of the 
Conservative Party', 40 was Eric Forth, the by then almost obligatory junior minister 
from the No Turning Back Group. Although he had a reputation for combativeness, 
within the Department Forth proved to be a great disappointment to his right-wing 
colleagues, and was perceived as going almost entirely `native'. As Major's 
difficulties rapidly accrued after the 1992 election, Forth, at that time an unabashed 
supporter of Michael Portillo's claims to the leadership of the Conservative Party, 
would find himself bracketed with John Patten as an unreliable supporter of the 
Prime Minister. 41 Patten's loyalties may not have been so obvious as Forth's, but 
they were also in question through his choice of friends. According to Lady Blatch, 
`His (Patten's) friends outside Westminster were right-wing writers and journalists 
like Simon Heffer who absolutely loathed John Major and Major became convinced 
that Patten was being disloyal' . 
42 
Another consequence of Patten's insecurity was his deliberate aloofness from 
even the most innocuous contact with the `education establishment'. His adviser felt 
that `he (Patten) was anxious not to fall into the trap of John MacGregor and be seen 
to be captured by the establishment. He felt that a cosy relationship was unhealthy so 
he tried to disassociate himself, to show how he was not a soft touch. Perhaps he 
39 Unattributed interview material.. 
40 Saville interview. 
41 At the beginning of his acceptance speech for Political Book of the Year at the Channel 
4 Political 
Awards in 2000, John Major took time out to congratulate Forth, who had earlier received his award 
for Backbencher of the Year. After a slight pause, Major continued with the quip that, 
it was `a role 
for which he (Forth) had been rehearsing for many years'. Channel 4 Political Awards, broadcast on 
12 February 2000. Forth carried on his intriguing in opposition. Recently, as shadow 
leader of the 
Commons, he `was someone who has struggled to conceal his lack of respect for 
Mr Duncan Smith' 
and was the only member of the Shadow Cabinet not to sign a letter in support of 
his leader. Daily 
Telegraph, 30 October 2003. 
42 Blatch interview. 
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tried too hard' . 
43 While he was avoiding speaking engagements, all contact with the 
teachers' unions and the educational press, Patten contributed what were described 
as `bible thumping' articles for the Spectator magazine and the Roman Catholic 
Tablet newspaper. He also appeared in a series of `softer' features. There was `John 
Patten's weekend' for the Sunday Express, `John Patten's cats' for the Daily 
Telegraph, and a photo-story for the Daily Mail of him taking his daughter to school 
and in which he claimed that she would be the `inspiration behind what happens next 
in Britain's schools'. 44 All of these traits eventually contributed to a full-frontal 
assault on his stewardship of education that appeared in the Daily Telegraph in 
January 1993. After nine months of what he felt was Patten's posturing, John Clare 
`went public' with his opinion on the Secretary of State and his record to date. The 
Education Secretary, he wrote, is beginning to provoke derision among his enemies 
and cause concern among his friends, he (Patten), 
contributes little. . . 
lacks initiative, does not do his homework and devotes 
disproportionate energy trying to charm parents. Lacking the energy of a 
Kenneth Clarke, he has made a series of stuttering starts. . . 
interspersed with 
confusion and bad-tempered bickering. 
Singled out for criticism was the new Education Bill with which Patten had staked a 
huge degree of personal capital and in particular its approach to Grant Maintained 
schools. 45 
`Hamstrung' 
The Conservative manifesto for the 1992 general election had promised a bright 
future for Grant Maintained schools. In a Guardian interview before the election, 
Kenneth Clarke said that his aim was for all secondary schools to have opted out by 
43 
Grantham interview. 
44 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? pp. 139-40. 
45 TES, 29 January 1993. 
217 
the end of the next parliament. 46 Following their election victory, the reality of 
another five years of Conservative rule appeared to set the stage for what the TES 
described as `mass opting out'. 47 It was a policy that had the very public backing of 
the Prime Minister. After the election, Major held a reception in Downing Street for 
Grant Maintained headteachers, to which all previous Secretaries of State were also 
invited. The Prime Minister stressed his attachment to Grant Maintained schools and 
his support for expanding their numbers. 48 The opportunity to realise Major's 
ambitions lay with John Patten, whose main challenge appeared to devise a new 
administrative and financial structure to cope with the transfer of schools from LEAs 
to Grant Maintained status. Reflecting on the chequered history of support by his 
predecessors for the policy, Patten's adviser recalled that his boss was `in an 
awkward position. The mechanisms for opting out and dealing with Grant 
Maintained schools were underdeveloped even though Grant Maintained status was 
such a flagship policy'. 49 According to David Forrestor, Kenneth Clarke had in mind 
the idea of Regional Funding Councils, which was also the preference of his senior 
official in charge of schools, Nick Stuart. In his 1992 Education Act, Clarke had 
even included the establishment of Regional Committees for Higher Education as a 
`feeler' for what might later develop at schools level. 50 Patten was not impressed 
with the idea. According to his adviser, Patten, already wary of the influence of 
some officials, felt that Regional Councils `were simply reinventing LEAs, creating 
super LEAs'. 51 Work had already started on a White Paper prior to the election and 
Patten had been presented with a copy for signing on his first day in office. Patten 
took it away to add his own preferences, letting it be known to the newspapers that 
he was writing large chunks of the White Paper himself. It would be a `radical and 
interesting document', he told the papers, which would be the `final piece of the 
46 Education, 20 March 1992. 
47 TES, 24 April 1992. 
48 Balchin interview. 
49 Grantham interview. 
50 Forrester interview. 
51 Grantham interview. 
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jigsaw', setting the organisational framework for schools for the next ten to 25 
52 
years. 
The eventual framework that emerged in the White Paper in July was the 
Funding Agency for Schools (FAS). Patten's choice, as indeed the Regional Council 
alternative, was predicated on an assumed increase in the number of Grant 
Maintained schools in the wake of the 1992 election. The omens had appeared good. 
Soon after his appointment, his officials had presented him with an optimistic 
indicator of the growth of Grant Maintained schools, based on previous trends. 
Patten's Permanent Secretary at the time, John Caines, recalled that `There did 
appear to be a gathering momentum of Grant Maintained schools and the 
extrapolation from that momentum led to the belief that there would be a flood'. 53 
But, according to David Forrestor, the presentation also included the proviso that 
there were certain specific factors that had led the first wave to opt out that would 
wane or had already began to wane, and which meant that the extrapolations might 
be suspect. Patten only heard what he wanted to hear, with unfortunate 
consequences. `Grant Maintained schools could have been presented as a triumph of 
policy', thought Peter Owen, `if it stuck with the idea of it as a ginger policy to 
shake up the others. But it became triumphalist and got caught up in the numbers 
game, which was the wrong spin'. 54 For Patten, desire was to be the father of the 
expectation and, from his first days in office, he had a numerical counter on his desk 
set to the number of Grant Maintained schools. It was to be adjusted each time 
another school was went Grant Maintained. As the numbers moved only slowly 
upwards, and then days, weeks would pass with no movement, Patten's frustration 
increased in inverse proportion. 55 Even the appointment of more sympathetic 
officials within the Department failed to boost the policy. When the unremittingly 
hostile Stuart was eventually moved to Employment, John Vereker replaced 
him as 
Deputy Secretary in charge of Schools. Vereker was described as a `zealous 
supporter of opting out and reducing the power of LEAs' and, according to one 
52 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? p. 145. 
53 Gaines interview. 
54 Owen interview. 
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unidentified former Labour minister with whom he served in the 70s, was `a 
Thatcherite before his time'. 56 Vereker's `zealotry' to do his master's bidding in 
pushing up the numbers of schools opting out did not impress his colleagues. One 
fellow official felt that, `John Patten was letting through crap schools. There was a 
total dishonesty about the whole process including the officials involved who 
became totally taken over by the policy'. 57 The Assistant Secretary, David Forrester, 
also become closely involved with pushing Grant Maintained schools, to the extent 
that he was eventually moved to other responsibilities by Holland's replacement as 
Permanent Secretary, Tim Lankester, for being to closely associated with the 
policy. 58 
Publicly, much of the blame for the lack of numbers opting out was put at the 
door of the LEAs. According to Lady Blatch, `The degree of hostility to GM schools 
was unbelievable. I offered to meet any headteacher who had lost the ballot. There 
were many in tears. They had played the game, been neutral and had lost'. 59 Cliff 
Grantham also recalled `daily reports of campaigns being undermined at a local 
level' and suggested that Patten himself `was in favour of a phased introduction of 
all schools into the Grant Maintained sector'. The problem was that he, Patten, `was 
hamstrung by the ballots'. 60 The ambiguity over `parental choice' paralysed Patten, 
much as it had done his predecessors. Even the more gung-ho Clarke, prior to the 
election, had explicitly ruled out legislation compelling headteachers and governors 
to cut their ties with the LEAs. 61 Whether Clarke would have held this line after a 
successful election victory, if he had remained in Education, is arguable. Robert 
Balchin did not think so and felt that John Patten could have done better. `Ministers 
ought to have been more brave', he said, `I was unable to persuade Number Ten not 
to build policy on other people's decisions, to do away with the ballot. John Patten 
55 Forrester interview. 
56 Education, 5 November 1993 
57 Unattributed interview material. 
58 Forrester interview. 
59 Blatch interview. 
60 Grantham interview. 
61 Education, 20 March 1992. 
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never listened' . 
62 As regards the framework outlined in Patten's 1993 Education Act, 
Balchin was equally dismissive, rating it no better than the original `sleight of hand' 
devised during Baker's time. `In the end the Civil Servants devised a package to 
appear to make things easier', said Balchin, `but it was another sleight of hand. They 
made it more difficult. Schools now had to be regulated into coming out. What utter 
nonsense' . 
63 
Patten, ever anxious not to offend possible allies on the right, continued to let 
it be known that he was not ruling out radical change. At a private conference 
organised by the Conservative Political Centre, in January 1994, it was reported that 
he was `considering pushing all secondary schools into the Grant Maintained sector 
and scrapping parental votes on opting out after the next general election... counter 
to all previous ministerial assertions that opting out will be determined by parental 
choice'. 64 Yet without unequivocal support from Downing Street for a radical 
change of policy, Patten never managed to square the circle of leaving one flagship 
policy, opting out, in the hands of parents and another, the National Curriculum, in 
the hands of the `education establishment'. Within the Number Ten Policy Unit, the 
feeling was ambivalent towards mass opting out. This was not from any ideological 
standpoint, or even as regards the primacy of parental choice in the process. It was a 
more political calculation as to what some of the consequences might be. According 
to Dominic Morris, `You could not cut schools loose as the infrastructure wasn't 
there to intervene when the school was going wrong'. 65 In the absence of anything 
much other than a strong desire to see more schools opting out, the process simply 
stalled. 
Whether the lead for what would have been a very radical change in policy 
should have come from Downing Street, or whether the Secretary of State himself 
should have been `more brave', is a moot point. After his departure, Patten certainly 
let it be known that despite the very public promises of support from John Major 
after his appointment, he felt that that support had not been forthcoming. Yet 
62 
Balchin interview. 
63 Ibid. 
64 TES, 28 January 1994. 
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Patten's constant need to try and keep Number Ten `in the loop', instead of taking 
the initiative himself, only led him into ever decreasing circles. `The Policy Unit was 
being unhelpful was a common cry', Dominic Morris remembered, `But Nick True 
was holding the whole thing together. John Patten was going to True asking him for 
support and advice, and then complaining to John Major that there was too much 
interference'. 66 Despite the conspicuous failure of Patten to fulfil his overly 
optimistic rhetoric on boosting the number Grant Maintained schools, this was only 
one contributary factor to his eventual sacking. By the summer of 1994, in the wake 
of numerous `minor' gaffes and the major disaster of the test boycott during the 
summer of 1993, he appeared a thoroughly discredited and increasingly distraught 
figure. 
Testing Times 
When the White Paper, Choice and Diversity, was published in July 1992, the main 
emphases were on the creation of the Funding Agency for Schools and the 
government's wish for greater emphasis on diversity in school provision, with more 
schools offering specialisation in different aspects of the curriculum. Despite this 
oblique reference to the curriculum, the dog that did not bark in the Secretary of 
State's grand designs, and had not really barked since Patten's appointment, was the 
expression of any concern or strategy for dealing with the forthcoming round of 
testing. Nor did Patten probably feel that there were any concerns. He later told one 
interviewer, in 1994, that `there was no feeling in the Department from the most 
senior of officials that we were heading towards the great row that we had this time 
last year over testing ... 
it was a major problem, but it is interesting that no one at the 
centre was really aware that these great problems were coming' . 
67 Geoffrey Holland, 
who arrived as Permanent Secretary at the DfE less than three months after Patten, 
65 
Morris interview. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 184,185. This is backed up by 
Cliff 
Grantham's recollections that `When he started there was no suggestion by officials that there were 
any problems over testing. Nobody raised their head or anticipated any degree of concern'. 
Grantham 
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had a different recollection. `When I arrived it was clear that we were heading for a 
bust up on the curriculum which was off-the-wall in terms of realities', said Holland. 
`I told John Patten that parents will support the teachers and not the government and 
the government will not win'. 68 In the absence of any awareness or recognition in 
Patten's mind of the `great problems' that were coming, he had neglected the 
cultivation of those bodies - teachers, parents and governors - whose support would 
be necessary to make the testing regime a success. Not only did he not cultivate their 
support, he appeared to go out of his way to alienate them, entrenching in the 
process a fatal atmosphere of mistrust and paranoia that had been slowly building up 
over the previous five years. 
If any group may be singled out among those that played a major part in the 
test boycott, and whom Patten had almost tirelessly managed to alienate, it was 
teachers of English. The demand for a test boycott would be led by this group, 
which, according to one commentator, `had lost over the GCSE, were losing on the 
national curriculum and now felt the time had come to take a stand'. 69 Since his 
appointment, Patten reopened the arguments over the content of the English National 
Curriculum Orders and had also intervened in the question of the English tests. 
When Kenneth Clarke had replaced Phillip Halsey with Brian Griffiths the previous 
year, Griffiths had replaced the Agency that had been sub-contracted to draw up the 
English tests for SEAC. In the summer of 1992, Patten now rejected their latest 
proposals and a further new specification for the tests was to be drawn up, a task that 
was to be undertaken primarily by an inner cabal of recent sympathetic appointments 
to SEAC. Suspicion over SEAC's political motives had been hardening since John 
MacGregor had begun the policy of `parachuting' government supporters onto both 
the NCC and SEAC. This had continued under Clarke and even more so under 
Patten, leading the TES to complain that `Every week sees the appointment of 
another bogeyman to a key committee' . 
70 All of these disruptions and distractions 
interview. 
68 Holland interview. 
69 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? p. 157. 
70 TES, 18 September 1992. In July 1992, John Marks, already on the SEAC, was appointed to the 
NCC. Later the same month, John Marenbon, Anthony Pelligrini, and Robert 
Skidelsky were 
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were taking place with less than a year to go before the first round of compulsory 
tests in English. In September, Patten had been asked by the National Association of 
Teachers of English (NATE) to make the English tests voluntary, which was no 
more than had happened in mathematics and science the previous year, and 
considering the continuing changes to the specification, was not entirely 
unreasonable. Patten refused. 
At the start of the New Year, the TES was predicting that `opposition to 
national curriculum testing could lead to a showdown with the government in the 
Spring'. 71 The pace quickened the same month, as an NUT ballot revealed that 90 
per cent of its English members were willing to join a boycott. Soon after, all six 
unions issued a statement condemning the introduction of the English tests. The 
same month, a member of SEAC English committee, Phil Harding, resigned. 
Writing in the TES, Harding accused SEAC of being obsessed with secrecy, verging 
on paranoia. The Council had failed to seek advice from its English committee, with 
members preferring to conduct business in an ad hoc sub-committee, chaired by 
John Marenbon. According to Harding, `SEAC is an extremely political organisation 
dominated by those whose sympathies lie with the Centre for Policy Studies'. 72 As 
the warning signs increased, with groups of headteachers now publicly stating that 
they would not administer the tests, Patten relented slightly, announcing that the 
results of the English tests would not be reported in league tables. It was too late. 
The NASUWT, on the grounds of increased workload, had successfully balloted its 
members on a boycott of all the national tests, not just those in English. Patten 
insisted that teachers were bound by the Education Reform Act to carry out the tests 
and against the advice of many colleagues, encouraged the Tory-controlled London 
appointed to SEAC. Marenbon was an English don at Cambridge, writer for the CPS and husband of 
its deputy director, Sheila Lawlor. Pelligrini was a traditionalist Headteacher in the mould of John 
McIntosh, while Skidelsky was a Professor of Political Economy at Warwick University who had 
become involved in the National Curriculum debate during the controversies over the History orders. 
(TES, 17 and 31 July 1992) The attempt to `pack' the key committees was not without its farcical 
aspects. Skidelsky recalled how he was `sounded out' by Brian Griffiths before the 1992 election: 
`He (Griffiths) didn't want to be seen to be packing the Council with only Conservatives so I was a 
good choice in that I was or had been in the SDP. When Griffiths told me of his intentions, I had to 
tell him that I had just taken the Conservative whip. "Oh dear", he replied'. Skidelsky interview. 71 TES, 1 January 1993. 
72 TES, 15 January 1993. 
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Borough of Wandsworth to challenge the union's position in court. 73 The eventual 
judgement in favour of the NASUWT left Patten and his officials `dismayed'-74 Not 
only was the boycott a legitimate trade dispute, `wholly or mainly about working 
load or working hours', but the judge also indicated that teachers were under no 
legal duty to administer or mark the tests. Under the provisions of the Education 
Reform Act, this duty apparently belonged to local authorities, head teachers and 
governors. 
With the number of options fast receding and no movement by the teaching 
unions, Patten then announced a major concession. A `visibly nervous Education 
Secretary' announced to the Association of Teachers and Lecturers conference that 
Easter that there would be a review of the curriculum and testing by Sir Ron 
Dearing, the chair elect of the new School Curriculum and Assessment Authority, a 
single body that was to replace the NCC and SEAC in October. 75 The announcement 
was welcome news to teachers, even if it looked suspiciously like a deus ex machina 
designed to get the government off the hook. But it also begged the question as to 
why, if a review was necessary, should the tests for 1993 continue in their present 
format? Without a coherent answer to this, the boycott remained in place. Despite 
threats and exhortations from Patten to all and sundry, including full-page 
newspaper advertisements, the NASUWT boycott was eventually joined by the NUT 
and the ATL. In May, two of Patten's erstwhile allies on SEAC, Lord Skidelsky and 
John Marenbon resigned. This was caused, partly one suspects, to avoid charges of 
ineptitude by association, but primarily due to principled objections to the limited 
remit for Dearing's review, which did not encompass a complete rethink of the 
National Curriculum and assessment. 
The final ignominy followed on the heels of a disastrous set of election 
results in May, when the Conservatives only managed to win 27.8 per cent of the 
vote in the local elections, while also losing the simultaneous by-election in 
Newbury, the largest by-election defeat since 1972. Education described `the central 
73 Balchin interview. 
74 Owen interview. 
75 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? p. 161. 
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problem' for the Party as `the competence issue'. This was a factor across a whole 
range of areas, but as regards education policy, `John Patten did not create most of 
the problems he has faced but he has completely failed to deal with them'. 76 The 
intervention of Downing Street was heralded when weekend lobby briefings to The 
Times and Daily Telegraph indicated that the Prime Minister had ordered a retreat 
over school tests. On 11 May, in a statement to the Commons, Patten announced that 
tests for seven- and 14-year-olds from 1994 would be limited to English, 
mathematics and science, with the tests themselves `streamlined, with some 
substantial changes to coverage and style'. 77 For seven-year-olds, the requirements 
for teacher assessments in Technology, Geography and History were lifted, while 
the proposed assessments in Music, Art and PE would not be introduced. Other 
changes included delaying the introduction of tests in History and Geography at 14 
and delaying the mandatory tests for 11-year-olds until 1995. By pre-empting much 
of the ground Dearing might cover, Patten's announcement partly stripped away any 
pretence that what had happened was nothing less than a humiliating climb down by 
Patten and the government over education policy. 
The runaway train set on its merry way by Kenneth Baker in 1987 had finally 
hit the buffers. At the controls was John Patten, for whom it was a very personal 
failure. Following his statement at the Dispatch Box, Dennis Skinner berated the 
Secretary of State in uncompromising terms. `Nobody has exuded more arrogance 
and contempt for his colleagues than he has', said Skinner. `He has strutted round 
the Dispatch Box like a puffed-up peacock on heat. Today, he has come in like a 
bedraggled battery hen that has laid its last egg. His intellectual elitism has 
overwhelmed his common sense, and the people in the country know it'. 
78 One 
sympathetic backbencher who also witnessed the Secretary of State's predicament 
wrote that `He (Patten) looked wounded and, unfortunately, a little absurd. . . 
he 
came away a broken reed'. 79 
76 Education, 17 June 1994. 
77 Hansard, col. 651,11 May 1993. 
78 Hansard, col. 656,11 May 1993. 
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None to bless 
The testing debacle was something from which few of those closely involved really 
emerge with much credit. As in Roy Jenkins' description of the Lloyd George 
coalition government of 1919, `There was something of a miasma about it, so that all 
who dwelt for long within the atmosphere came out a little polluted'. 80 Nick Tate felt 
that the boycott was the result of `a combination of factors. There were unresolved 
technical issues, a lack of political clarity, ineptitude and simply the inexperience of 
managing the exercise'. 81 The overarching issue was, indeed, the lack of political 
clarity, not only at a micro level in terms the actual tests themselves, but also at a 
macro level, in terms of policy objectives and priorities stretching back to Baker's 
time. Ineptitude and inexperience then compounded this lack of clarity and 
consistency over the pursuit of priorities. This was not just in relation to Patten, but 
also to the chair of SEAC, Brian Griffiths, whose contribution in some eyes rivals 
that of Patten's. Griffiths only spent two days per week at SEAC. He was seen very 
much as `an absentee landlord', 82 someone who, according to Skidelsky, was `away 
too much and members did not have enough time or knowledge to establish 
authority over the permanent officials'. 83 Griffiths' broad brush interventions from 
the Olympian heights of the Policy Unit were not necessarily a good preparation for 
the detailed work required at SEAC. Even his allies felt that, while Griffiths `had a 
broad vision', he was `not tough enough, not good enough at details'. 84 Griffiths' 
shortcomings had been pointed out to Kenneth Clarke, who nevertheless went ahead 
and appointed him to SEAC against all the advice of his officials. 85 Geoffrey 
Holland, was of a similar opinion: 
79 Brandreth, Breaking the Code, pp. 171-72. 
80 Jenkins, R. (2001) Churchill. London: Macmillan, p. 345. 
81 
Tate interview. 
82 TES, 16 April 1993. 
83 Skidelsky interview. 
84 
Morris interview. 
85 John Caines, Permanent Secretary at the time and in many ways an admirer of Clarke 
felt that 
Clarke `was let down by his judgement of people. Appointments such as Brian Griffiths at 
SEAC 
were made against all official advice and were a disaster. He (Griffiths) could not and 
did not spend 
the time required on getting the assessment right and it went off the rails. He would not 
let the 
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SEAC was a shambles. Brian Griffiths had his head in the clouds in terms of 
practicalities and realities. His staff was an even more shaky collection of 
people and there was a terrible game of trying to second guess what they 
were up to. The Department was having to stick its finger in the air with 
views varying between no tests will get done at one extreme to everyone will 
do them at the other. 86 
Within SEAC itself there was increasing disquiet over where the tests were heading. 
As early as October 1992 there was a strong recognition of the dangers that could 
arise if the opposition of NATE was not neutralised. Officials, in particular, saw 
justification in the teachers' complaints that, because of ministerial interference and 
the changing test specification, there was inadequate time for the teachers to prepare. 
`Brian Griffiths was urged to go to Patten and put the case for postponing the tests', 
recalled Nick Tate, `but whether he ever put it as forcefully as he should have I'm 
not sure'. 87 This view is borne out by the recollections of Patten's adviser, who also 
pointed the finger at Griffiths. `John Patten felt badly let down over testing', said 
Cliff Grantham. `He had a number of tense meetings with Brian Griffiths at which 
he expressed his anxieties. John Patten laid his concerns on the line and Griffiths 
gave assurances. Patten kept going back to get assurances and Brian Griffiths was 
unambiguous that they (the tests) were going to be fine'. 88 
Griffiths' political `seniority' and influence within Conservative right-wing 
circles made for an uneasy relationship between him and the Secretary of State. 
89 
Griffiths' was perhaps the one voice whose unambiguous opposition to the tests 
going ahead might have swung the opinion of Patten. But whatever doubts Patten 
may have harboured as to the assurances he was getting from his chief examinations 
assessors sit on the committees and it had gone off the rails before we knew what was 
happening'. 
Caines interview. 
86 Holland interview. 
87 Tate interview. 
88 Grantham interview. 
89 89 According to Nick Tate, `Brian Griffiths didn't know a great deal, but John Patten was 
frightened 
of him'. Tate interview. 
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adviser, he was probably happier to discount them. `Emotionally and 
temperamentally, Patten didn't want to give in', was Eric Forth's view. 90 The testing 
issue had coalesced all the personal issues related to Patten's leadership. Peter 
Owen, who was in the Cabinet Office during the summer of 1993, recalled that `It 
was pretty clear that John Patten had been ordered to tough it out and he did it too 
well. His back may have been a bit too stiff due to the presence of Baroness 
Blatch'. 91 Patten continued to `tough it out', even as his allies began to sound the 
alarm bells. `We knew the English tests were a mess', recalled John Barnes, `SEAC 
by this time was very friendly to John Patten. Over half the Council were good 
friends of the Party and for him not to take their advice he had to be absolutely 
crackers'. 92 Robert Skidelsky was one of those who went to see Patten. `I said these 
tests will not run, that he should cancel them and start a review', said Skidelsky, `By 
this time he was visibly under great stress. He shouted, "That is defeatist talk. They 
will go ahead"'. 93 Pressure of events later forced Patten to concede a review of the 
curriculum and testing arrangements, in the hope of somehow saving the tests in 
1992. Not only was he thwarted in that hope, but in the process Patten managed to 
lose support from the right through his sanctioning of the appointment of Sir Ron 
Dearing as chair elect of SCAA, the combined NCC-SEAC replacement. 
The appointment of Dearing, a career Civil Servant and about as apolitical a 
figure as one could imagine, was a clear rebuff to the right, as well as an implicit 
criticism of previous appointments. The obvious right-wing choice and someone 
who appeared to have been groomed for the position, was David Pascall, but a 
weakened and weakening Patten was unable to press Pascall's appointment, much to 
the fury of Lady Blatch. `The appointment of Dearing was unforgivable', said 
Blatch, `John Patten was weak. David Pascall had been touched on the shoulder by 
him (Patten) but he was bullied by Geoffrey Holland. I came as close to resigning as 
94 1 ever did'. Dearing's subsequent appointment to head the enforced review into the 
90 
Forth interview. 
91 
Owen interview. 
92 
Barnes interview. 
93 Skidelsky interview. 
94 
Blatch interview. 
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curriculum and testing led directly to the damaging resignations of Skidelsky and 
Marenbon, both of whom had grown weary of SEAC and were happy to return to 
their respective ivory towers. 95 
Dearing's appointment provided another clear signal that the government, or 
whoever was in charge, was not going to opt for a radical re-think. As described by 
Eric Forth, `Sir Ron Dearing, respected, knowledgeable, consensual, and all of these 
in unlimited quantities. He was almost impossible to criticise. The trouble was that 
you never got anything very radical. If you did want something radical you wouldn't 
ask Dearing to do it'. 96 With the remit of Dearing's review restricted to advising on 
the manageability of the testing and assessment structure, Skidelsky resigned from 
SEAC, accusing the DfE of being happy to `stage manage' the testing crisis. `I am 
disappointed that the committee is of insufficiently high calibre', he said, `and the 
remit unsatisfactory ... 
The concern is to get the problems of the state system 
coherently discussed but this has been frustrated by the bunker mentality of the 
DfE' . 
97 
Even at that late stage, Patten could have salvaged something, as the 
announcement of the review could have been a defining or re-defining moment of 
the crisis. Geoffrey Holland, who had indeed been instrumental in getting Dearing 
appointed to SCAA and then in getting Patten to agree to a review certainly thought 
95 Skidelsky, in particular, had a very formidable intellect but it also made him a very loose cannon in 
political terms. His support for Conservative education policy was certainly not unqualified. The 
main quandary remained the imposition of the original Ten level scale from TGAT onto the whole 
range of subjects, something that Skidelsky as a historian felt was entirely inappropriate. Soon after 
his appointment to SEAC, Skidelsky and others had attempted to drastically revise the assessment 
format inherited from TGAT: `We had a big bash at radically refashioning the TGAT model and I 
spent the weekend with 6 colleagues in Eastbourne with 2 officials. We pushed the model through 
committee and through the Council and sent it off to John Patten. We never received a reply. 
Six 
months after I resigned Emily Blatch approached me and said she had been looking 
for my paper on 
Assessment but no one seems to know where it is. Just goes to show'. Skidelsky 
interview. 
96 Forth interview. 
97 Education, 7 May 1993. In one of the many ironies thrown up by the testing episode, 
Clive Saville, 
who along with another senior official had been moved from the Department at 
Kenneth Clarke's 
insistence in a row over teacher training in 1992, was now brought back 
in to help with the Dearing 
review. The irony was not lost on Saville himself, who described his return as 
`the man who couldn't 
be trusted with ministers was brought back to help sort out the National 
Curriculum'. Nor was he 
very impressed with the context of Dearing's review which was in effect a 
life line for the 
government's whole curriculum policy thinly disguised as an independent review. 
`Dearing could 
have been sorted out in house by Civil Servants', was Saville's opinion, 
`It was a product of 
intellectual dishonesty'. Saville interview. 
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so. 98 Like many in the Department, up to that point, Holland had been strongly in 
favour of pressing ahead with the tests for fear that much of the new ground gained 
by the Department might be lost. `I thought the tests might work', said Holland, `and 
we were right to press on or else the whole work on outcomes, if not pressed might 
be dented so severely that it might not recover. The employers were also saying to 
keep going'. 99 With Dearing in place, Holland, somewhat belatedly, felt that `Patten 
should have pulled back', something that Major and his advisers now began to 
contemplate. But Patten had simply invested too much personal and political capital 
in insisting that the tests go ahead to allow himself to pull back. Lady Blatch 
described how, 
At the Cabinet Committees John Major was very well briefed and asked very 
incisive questions about how this was going and how that was going. I think 
John Patten felt he had to prove himself, that he could run his own 
Department and pooh poohed everything saying they were all right. '00 
As the political and electoral costs began to mount, and with Patten appearing less 
and less in control of events, Number Ten finally intervened. The original briefings 
on the weekend of 8 May appeared to intimate that Major had personally intervened 
to order a climb-down on the tests which would become 'consultative'. 10 1 On 
hearing this, Patten reportedly went `ape' and only `Back me or Sack me' calls from 
Patten to Number Ten at 4.00 a. m. the Monday morning resulted in the continued 
insistence that 1992's tests remained compulsory, albeit, as announced by Patten in 
the Commons, with `substantial changes' in future years. 102 That summer, only 150 
schools nation-wide administered the tests and completed their returns to SEAC. It 
was an ignominious finale to an ignominious chapter in education policy. 
98 `My main achievement', said Holland, `was getting Ron Dearing into the frame'. Holland 
interview. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Blatch interview. 
101 The Times, 10 June 1993. 
102 Education, 14 May 1993; Brandreth, Breaking the Code, pp. 171-72; Hansard, col. 651,11 May 
1993. 
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The supreme irony of the entire episode of course was that the government, 
against which the teachers were taking action, never really wanted to be where they 
were in the first place. Both Mrs Thatcher and John Major would have been quite 
content if there had been an even slimmer version of the Dearing compromise in 
place from the very start. They, in turn, had been thwarted by the representatives of 
the very people who were now taking action against the government. When Lady 
Blatch was asked about the slimmed-down curriculum, she replied that `This is how 
we envisaged the system to work. Unfortunately the early architects of the 
implementation plan introduced too much bureaucracy, too much convolution and 
the exercise today is all about getting back to where we wanted to be in 1988'. 103 
However much truth there was in this assertion, in political and personal terms it 
was pretty thin gruel after all that had happened. Interviewed on Radio Four only 
weeks prior to this, Lady Blatch had been insisting on the importance of the testing 
regime and its results not just to education policy but also its role in the whole 
Charter project. 104 `I suspect that underlying all this is that teachers and teacher 
unions do not want public information', she said, `and we must have public 
information'. In similar vein, Patten himself had been insisting that the tests must go 
ahead, because, 'without a testing regime or the publication of results then neither 
the government not the public not the taxpayer can know what is happening in 
schools'. 105 It rang uncannily similar to Major's defence of membership of the 
exchange rate mechanism in the days leading up to Black Monday. Following the 
testing debacle and Number Ten's intervention, the same criticisms are equally 
pertinent. The Independent had described Black Monday as `one of the most 
grotesque days in the history of British finance, a day of crisis, disorder, confusion 
and mismanagement', 106 while the Labour leader, John Smith, provided the 
withering description of John Major as `a devalued Prime Minister of a devalued 
103 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? p. 180. 
104 See Ch. 7. 
105 Baker, Who Rules Our Schools? pp. 98-99. Skidelsky told the BBC that the proposals 
to drop 
league tables for test results for seven and fourteen-year-olds was like 
driving `a coach and horses 
through the government's education policy'. Ibid., p. 178. 
106 The Independent, 17 September 1992. 
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government'. 107 Following the testing debacle, the same description was equally 
applicable to John Patten, a devalued Secretary of State presiding over a devalued 
education policy. 
Breaking the camel's back 
Patten's health broke down in the summer of 1993 and, while he was on sick leave, 
Lady Blatch took control of the Department. Sir Ron Dearing, meanwhile, shimmied 
his way through the morass of the school curriculum, something that taxed even his 
notable composure. 108 Dearing would produce what had been asked for, a slimmed 
down, more manageable version of what had gone before. Subject orders were to be 
reviewed, again, while the TGAT model was to be retained, with the number of 
statements and targets reduced. The greatest sleight of hand, however, was a new 
interpretation of the assessment requirements as outlined in the 1988 Act. John 
Marks, who had been rebuffed in Halsey's time when he queried the necessity for 
testing all the statements of attainment, raised the issue again with Dearing during 
the summer. Dearing then produced, presumably from a top hat, a letter from John 
Vereker, the Deputy Secretary in charge of schools and curriculum. `It is perfectly 
possible', said the letter, `to redefine the attainment targets to accommodate a 
different approach to graduating achievement without amending the primary 
legislation. 
. . 
In short, our advice is that the primary legislation allows a significant 
measure of flexibility'. 109 In lay persons terms, this meant that not every full stop 
and crossed `t' on every statement of attainment had to be tested. According to 
Marks, `A gasp went around the room at this. They (officials) had come up with 
another interpretation to allow Dearing to slim the whole thing down'. 
"° When the 
Dearing review was published in September, its proposals, described by Skidelsky 
107 Hansard, vol. 212, col. 12,24 September 1992. 
108 On one occasion Geoffrey Holland met Dearing at York train station. 
`I never realised what a can 
of worms this is', Sir Ron told him, `I've had people shouting at each other! 
' Holland interview. 
109 Phillips, All Must Have Prizes, p. 353. 
110 Ibid., p. 165. 
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as `an exercise in neatly balanced compromises', 111 were accepted with alacrity by 
the acting Secretary of State, Lady Blatch. 
Patten returned to the Department in the autumn, rested, but apparently none 
the wiser. 112 As regards policies, with the curriculum effectively off limits to the 
government, certainly for the short term, Patten turned his attention to other areas. 
While the issue of Grant Maintained schools bubbled along, the area of teacher 
training now came into the spotlight. The question of where and how teachers should 
be trained had run alongside the debate over curriculum reforms, with the debate 
split along similar lines. For those on the right, it was the teacher training 
establishments who were the villains of the piece. They were left wing, spent too 
much time on the philosophy and sociology of education and not enough time giving 
trainees the subject knowledge and practical skills they needed to be effective 
practitioners in the class room. The preferred solution was a variation of `on the job' 
training, with trainees spending much more time in schools and less, or ideally, no 
time in teacher training institutions. These moves were strongly resisted by officials 
who felt they were wildly impractical. In late 1991, Kenneth Clarke had, in effect, 
sacked the two senior officials within the Department responsible for teacher 
training, Clive Saville and John Wiggins, whom he felt were misrepresenting his 
views to the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE). When, in 
September 1993, Patten proposed further changes, including abolishing CATE and 
setting up a new quango, the Teacher Training Agency, this was already on the back 
of his earlier proposals for a `mums army' of untrained staff in schools. `The only 
conclusion to be drawn from John Patten's destructive and half baked teacher 
training proposals', fulminated the TES, `is that.. . 
having being roundly defeated on 
the curriculum and testing front in schools, he has returned to the DfE determined to 
impose his will elsewhere in the system'. 113 It was too much for Geoffrey 
Holland. 
`Teacher training was the straw that broke the camel's back', he recalled. 
`It was a 
III TES, 24 September 1993. 
112 At a fringe meeting at the Conservative Party conference soon after 
his return, Patten described 
Professor Tim Brighouse, Chief Education Officer in Birmingham, as a `nutter', which 
in turn led the 
Secretary of State being sued by Brighouse. 
113 TES, 10 September 1993. 
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tragedy of distrust, manifested and exacerbated by John Patten and Emily Blatch 
who distrusted one group of people, the teachers, and one group of organisations, the 
higher education establishment, who were felt to be running substantial resistance to 
everything the government was trying to do'. 114 
Holland resigned in November to be replaced by Tim Lankester, Patten's 
third Permanent Secretary. It appeared only a matter of time and opportunity before 
Patten himself was removed. In June, a leader in the Sunday Times denounced the 
government as `A tribe of exhausted pygmies', with the observation that the 
Education Secretary had become `a sad symbol of the little that is right and the much 
that is wrong with the Major government'. 115 In the reshuffle of the following 
month, the axe finally fell. 
Conclusion 
On his removal, Patten delivered what was described as `a terse and brief letter of 
farewell' to John Major, believing that he had been let down by Downing Street, and 
letting it be known that he saw himself as the scapegoat for difficulties not of his 
own making'. 116 It is tempting to view Patten's downfall solely as the nemesis of 
Conservative education policy as pursued since 1979. As seen in previous chapters, 
there was certainly a sufficient lack of clarity, coherence and continuity in education 
policy to trip up any unwary Secretary of State. Patten had inherited a series of 
initiatives that were flawed, both politically and practically, in their conception, 
something that had been further compounded by the idiosyncrasies and 
inconsistencies of his three predecessors as Secretary of State for Education since 
1988. Their actions, and those of Thatcher and Major, had contributed to the 
fragmentation of the traditional policy community, leaving the Secretary of State to 
try and mediate between the competing groups of irregulars, regulars and politicos. 
Such was the level of antagonism and mistrust between and within these groups, that 
114 Holland interview. 
115 Sunday Times, 29 May 1994. 
116 Seldon, Major, pp. 477-8. 
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without firm leadership, it was always likely that the conflict between these various 
political, bureaucratic and ideological interests, would become as much the issue as 
the actual policies. It was a difficult inheritance. 
Yet there was also no overwhelming or inevitable reason why education 
policy should have gone so completely off the rails during John Patten's time, 
without the added specific ingredient of the personality of the Secretary of State. The 
difficulties he inherited may not have been of his making. The calamitous manner of 
his approach to them certainly was. There was the almost gratuitous alienation of 
many in the education world. This alienation started off slowly and gradually 
gathered pace. There was the early and growing sense of ridiculousness engendered 
by Patten's self-imposed purdah; the hubris surrounding his trumpeting of Choice 
and Diversity; his denigration of the GCSE results for 1992; his description of the 
representatives of parent groups who were concerned over the new schools tests as 
`Neanderthal' and the Secondary Heads Association's `antiquated and Luddite trade- 
union attitude'. Yet even this, in itself, might not have been sufficient cause for the 
policy failures, had Patten been surrounded by, or able to lead, a cohesive and united 
Department. It was the sheer disfunctionality of Patten's `team', the lack of personal 
and professional trust between almost all of those involved in managing education 
policy at the time, that combined to push an already teetering set of policies over the 
edge. 
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CHAPTER 10 
July 1994-April 1997: Leaden evening 
Introduction 
For those who recalled John Major's belligerent speech at the Conservative Party 
Conference in 1992, his speech two years later, with yet another new Secretary of 
State beside him on the platform, was noteworthy for `a stark change of tone and 
content'. In what was described as a `humble speech', Major admitted not only that 
his government had made a meal of some recent education reforms, but that those in 
education, specifically teachers, were right to have opposed them. `We have 
listened', said Major, `and we've changed our minds'. ' The most obvious example 
of Major's apparent new willingness to listen could be seen in the person of his new 
Secretary of State for Education, Gillian Shephard, and the new tone she had hoped 
to set for education policy in her announcements made the same week. With a deep 
intake of breath, the government expressed a desire to take a `new approach' to 
raising standards, an approach that would rely on working in partnership with all 
agencies involved in education, and using the `best brains. . . the collective talents' of 
all involved in the education service. 2 
On Shephard's appointment, the TES maintained its record of optimistic, if 
erroneous, predictions on the arrival of another new Secretary of State. While John 
MacGregor, of similar disposition to Shephard, `could make no headway with his 
reforms against a Prime Minister who was constantly undermining him', Gillian 
Shephard was `in any case a more gifted communicator and more knowledgeable 
about education and will have Mr. Major's backing all the way'. 
3 It was not an 
unreasonable expectation, given that Gillian Shephard's appointment must 
have 
been a source of personal relief and satisfaction for Major. She was one of the 
`East 
Education, 21 October 1994. 
2 Education, 2 June 1995. 
3 TES, 21 October 1994. 
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Anglian mafia', a personal friend of the Prime Minister, and after the unfortunate 
Patten, someone with a reputation for competence. Given such a promising start, this 
chapter examines why it was that relations between the offices of Prime Minister 
and Secretary of State for Education probably reached their lowest ebb than at any 
time since 1979. Why was it that, once again, those in charge of education policy 
appeared to be reading from entirely different scripts? In a similar manner to Mark 
Carlisle's period at Education, why was there an almost palpable sense of drift with 
regard to education policy? 
`Mrs Municipal' 
The new Secretary of State's strengths were well known in advance of her 
appointment. According to Eric Forth, `Gillian Shephard was very good at stroking 
people. Her remit was peace in education and she had been appointed to make sure 
that there was not further conflict with the unions'. 4 The fact that she followed John 
Patten made it easier for her to fulfil her remit. Peter Owen, who had been closely 
involved since the previous January in trying to find a way out of the impasse with 
the unions recalled how `Patten made it possible for Gillian Shephard to become the 
great conciliator. There had been a strange labyrinthine discussion with (Doug) 
McAvoy, (John) Bangs and John Patten to try and find a way out of the impasse so 
that neither side would lose face. It was nearly complete when Gillian Shephard 
breezed in and took all the credit. A small, non-threatening, knowledgeable woman, 
she wowed the education establishment'. 5 As part of the final package, Shephard 
announced that the results of the tests were not be used to construct league tables 
in 
1995. While Shephard was quickly able to use her style and approach to 
diffuse the 
testing question, the problem remained that, once the immediate short-term needs 
had been addressed, previous strengths became weaknesses. 
In an interview soon after her appointment, Shephard described 
how `We've 
got to do a lot of listening, we have got to devote a fair amount of time to 
4 Forth interview. 
5 
Owen interview. 
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consolidation, to stability, to getting the reforms thoroughly bedded ... as far as 
schools are concerned, I believe that we want a period of consolidation and 
stability'. ' Shephard's newly-adopted `corporate' approach to education policy 
certainly paid dividends in the short term. According to those regulars who worked 
with her, it was a style with which she was comfortable, and at which she excelled. 
Some of her political colleagues had their reservations. With a background as an ex- 
teacher, lecturer, education officer and schools inspector, many on the right needed 
little encouragement in their suspicions of the new Secretary of State. `Mrs 
Municipal' was how Angela Rumbold was heard to describe her. 7 Rumbold, newly 
re-radicalised once `freed' from office, went to see Shephard. Despite the initial 
successes, Rumbold felt that `Gillian didn't know what she wanted to do. I urged her 
to be more brave and said that inviting everyone back in again was a recipe for 
nothing to get done'. 8 These doubts were further reinforced, when, in her initial 
pronouncements, Shephard went further than simply proclaiming `peace in her time' 
and appeared to cast doubt on the wisdom of market-driven education philosophy. 
She told journalists that many parents have no choice of school at all. Reflecting her 
own experiences of representing a large rural constituency, her view was that, `If 
you have to travel 10 miles to the only school or GP in your area, the word `choice' 
doesn't have much meaning, does it? ' 9 
For a brief period, it appeared that Shephard might provide a different 
philosophy, or a different vision, for education policy than that of her predecessors. 
But it was not to be. While John Patten allowed himself to be defined by his support 
for other peoples' policies, Gillian Shephard was defined by her opposition to other 
peoples' policies. Reflecting on Shephard's period as Education Secretary, John 
Clare felt that, 
I can see why the original appointment was made but I was 
dismayed by the 
lack of initiative and interest she (Shephard) showed. She appeared 
to have 
6 Ribbins and Sherratt, Radical Education Policies, p. 204. 
7 Williams, Guilty Men, p. 62. 
8 Rumbold interview. 
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no idea other than managing the service and didn't appear all that interested 
in making things better. Maybe she thought it was not possible, that she was 
too cynical that things could ever be changed. ' 0 
In her defence, Geoffrey Holland, a friend and ally of Shephard, pointed the finger at 
her predecessors and Patten, in particular. `Gillian Shephard arrived too late to pull 
anything off, said Holland. `John Patten's time so entrenched bad feeling and so 
infuriated people that only so much healing could be done'. 11 A weary cynicism 
certainly seemed to pervade the actions, or inactions, of Shephard, while her 
inability to convince her colleagues of her case occasionally spilled into her public 
pronouncements. `Of course there is still much that will need to improve in our 
schools', she told Education in March 1996. `But there is also much that is already 
good. Sometimes I feel frustrated, as you must see that the critics, the carpers and 
the sceptics make it difficult to get a positive word in edgeways'. 12 
Yet the core of many of the criticisms directed at her was that there was no 
constructive alternative vision in her disagreements with Major, such as Kenneth 
Baker had in aspects of his dealings with Mrs Thatcher. She appeared a competent 
technocrat, no more. Her metier was at the Department of Employment, which she 
compared favourably to the DfEE and its officials. 13 Employment, said Shephard, 
was 6a hands on department, with excellent officials used to running their own show 
and devising real solutions for specific problems'. 14 The flip side to dealing with, 
and preferring to deal with, `specific problems', was a lack of grasp for the bigger 
picture. While Shephard may have been successful in defusing the testing issue, she 
appeared to lack a sense of ambition for her policy area. `She's smart, very smart, 
but not a good conceptualiser', one official was quoted saying, `She's good on the 
9 TES, 9 September 1994. 
10 Clare interview. 
11 Holland interview. 
12 Education, 15 March 1996. 
13 The Education and Employment departments were merged in July 1995 to create 
the Department 
for Education and Employment (DfEE). 14 Shephard, Shephard's Watch, p. 21. 
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incremental approach but there comes a moment when you have to take a view'. 15 
Whatever their regular advisers may have thought of their policy decisions, there 
remained a strong undercurrent of respect and admiration for ministers such as 
Clarke and Baker who were willing and able `to take a view', whether it ran contrary 
to regular opinion, or that of the irregulars or other politicos. Shephard's apparent 
pusillanimity left them frustrated. `There was a great intellectual superficiality about 
Gillian Shephard', said one official, `and she was as intellectually dishonest as 
Shirley Williams. She was someone who wanted to be liked but simply wasn't up to 
the job' . 
16 
Despite the antipathy that grew between Sanctuary Buildings and Number 
Ten, the personal friendship between Shephard and Major remained strong on a one 
to one level. One adviser described how, `At their bilateral meetings Gillian 
Shephard and John Major got on like a house on fire'. 17 This made it awkward for 
Shephard's critics to attack her directly and personally. Rather, there were 
'mutterings'. Examples of this included an anonymous source quoted in the 
Independent on Sunday, that Shephard was `not scoring runs'. The Daily Telegraph 
reported that Brian Mawhinney, the Conservative Party chairman, was urging John 
Major to appoint an aggressive right winger to the DfEE, as Mrs Shephard lacked 
the rottweiller instinct. The Telegraph also bemoaned the fact that Shephard had 
only given `lukewarm support to Chris Woodhead... the outstandingly brave chief 
inspector of schools', 18 who was proving to have the rottweiller instinct as HMCI. 
Another tactic was to attack those close to Shephard, and in particular her special 
adviser, Elizabeth Cotterell. 
The attacks on Cotterell were symptomatic of how internecine the conflicts 
over education policy had become during Shephard's time. No other ministerial 
special advisers, not even Sexton at his most active, had been subject to public 
attacks, least of all by their erstwhile political colleagues. Described as `The strong 
woman behind the Shephard throne', Cotterell had been an author for the CPS 
15 TES, 5 April 1996. 
16 Saville interview. 
17 Williams interview. 
241 
during the early 1980s but had subsequently moved back to the centre ground. Like 
all good converts, she aggressively disowned her past sins and misdemeanours. 
`Why I ditched the grammars and betrayed the Right' was the title of one article she 
was to write. 19 Reportedly viewed with `a mixture of awe and suspicion by right- 
wingers in the Party', Cotterell made no secret of the fact that she regarded the 
`lunatic right' as she called them as a top priority educational problem. 20 According 
to Dominic Morris, Cotterell very much `reinforced Gillian Shephard's prejudices 
and would poison her against various people. The `bandits' club' (of right-wing 
advisers) was frozen out'. 21 The heart of the matter, however, was that while 
`Elizabeth Cotterell stopped any radical ideas, any virus of radicalism, filtering to 
Gillian Shephard', Balchin and other irregulars in the `bandits' club' recognised 
fully that `Gillian was pretty well proofed against them anyway'. 22 
`Painfully embarrassed' 
The alarm bells for Major and his Policy Unit started to ring quite early on during 
Shephard's tenure. What Shephard managed to do, unlike John Patten, was to 
capitalise on the dislike of her predecessor, to re-build bridges with the education 
world. The problem for her more radical colleagues was that this appeared to be the 
end of her ambitions. Dominic Morris, who took over the education brief from Nick 
True in 1995, remembered how the feeling within the Policy Unit was that, `Gillian 
Shephard had a good year as a conciliator but, by early 1995, the feeling was, "Oh 
God, we are back with John MacGregor"'. 23 It was from the Policy Unit that most of 
the new and controversial initiatives that were attempted during Shephard's time 
emanated. Peter Owen, who had joined the Department as Deputy Secretary from 
the Cabinet Office, described how he `hadn't experienced the degree of intervention 
18 TES, 14 June 1996. 
19 TES, 26 September 1997. 
20 Daily Telegraph, 13 August 1996. 
21 Morris interview. 
22 Balchin interview. 
23 Morris interview. 
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by the Policy Unit in other areas'. Partly to avoid some of the misunderstandings 
that had arisen under Patten, but also as a clear acknowledgement of the degree of 
intervention and influence of the Policy Unit, Owen `instituted regular meetings with 
Nick True, then Dominic Morris and then Sean Williams on the basis that it was 
much better that they know what is going on and early rather than otherwise'. 24 The 
problem was that while Morris felt that the meetings with Owen were `a useful touch 
base', they were also a very mixed blessing, as `the contents would often be 
swamped by political imperatives'. 25 
The first instance when Major's `imperatives' were to `swamp' his Education 
Secretary, was on the question of nursery vouchers. Even as Shephard was wooing 
the education establishment with her pronouncements at the Party conference, Major 
had also announced a plan to provide nursery places for all four-year-olds whose 
parents wanted them. In her response, Shephard, who had little inkling of this new 
policy proposal, said that this was `terrific news' and promised to get started right 
away. 26 Yet almost immediately, in an interview with the Independent, she appeared 
to pour cold water on anything radical, suggesting that `the unwieldy nature' of 
vouchers ruled out legislation on nursery education. 27 The idea of the introduction of 
a `voucher' element into the education system, even if on the absolute periphery, 
held such a strong attraction to those on the right that Major would not be deterred 
from pushing ahead. The idea itself had been taking shape within the Policy Unit 
during the previous year, although not everyone in the Unit was supportive. 
According to Dominic Morris, `Vouchers were a prize right-wing lunacy cooked up 
by Nick True and Norman Blackwell (Head of the Policy Unit from February 1995) 
over the dead bodies of the Civil Servants. It was a nice thing to do to appease the 
right wing and it played well with the Daily Mail. A lot of people thought 
it would 
be a vote winner but I was dead against it'. 28 Robert Balchin described nursery 
vouchers as having been `crept out of the Policy Unit by Nick True and gained 
24 
Owen interview. 
25 Morris interview. 
26 TES, 21 October 1994. 
27 Ibid. 
28 
Morris interview. 
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enormous support inside the Party. John Major believed in them but not with the 
iron assurance of Mrs Thatcher. He thought they would appeal to the right, the 
`bastards'. Gillian Shephard was fundamentally opposed'. 29 
On the prompting of the Policy Unit, early in 1995 the Adam Smith Institute 
published a pamphlet, Preschool For All. A Market Solution, calling for all nursery 
education to be run by the private sector, supported by means-tested vouchers. 30 In 
March, the author of the pamphlet and founder of one of Britain's largest groups of 
private nursery schools, David Soskin, joined the Policy Unit. When asked about his 
appointment, Shephard's tight-lipped reply was that it would be `helpful'. 31 Having 
overtly declared her opposition, Shephard then failed to make a sufficient case for 
any alternative, leaving herself open to public discomfort and a loss of credibility as 
the implementation of some kind of voucher became almost inevitable. As Major, in 
effect, steamrolled his Education Secretary into pushing ahead with a nursery 
voucher scheme, it was clear to observers that Shephard was `painfully embarrassed' 
over the issue. 32 
It was only the first in a long line of embarrassments, as John Major and his 
Policy Unit waged a guerrilla war against the DFE in a similar fashion to which the 
`bastards' were waging against him over Europe. So severe did this become that 
Peter Owen said that he `felt that there was a completely separate political agenda 
being pursued in opposition to and outside of the Departmental policy'. 
33 There was 
even a number of lesser `fronts' that Shephard had to deal with 
in this guerrilla war 
over education policy. John Redwood's political adviser recalled that, when 
Redwood was Secretary of State for Wales in 1995, `He and 
I were. . . urged 
by 
Nicholas True, the (Policy) Unit's Deputy Director, to pursue in Wales policies 
that 
were presumed to be closer to the Prime Minister's true views. 
This would also be a 
good way of bringing pressure to bear on Shephard.... The 
Prime Minister had 
created institutional conflict, and signals from Number Ten undermined 
Shephard's 
29 Balchin interview. 
30 
Pirie interview. 
31 TES, 7 March 1995. 
32 
Clare interview. 
33 
Owen interview. 
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authority'. 34 Of perhaps more import was the presence of the hawkish Chris 
Woodhead as HMCI and head of Ofsted. Just as criticisms of Elizabeth Cotterell 
were indirect barbs aimed at Shephard, so praise for Woodhead fulfilled the same 
function. 
Prior to his appointment, Woodhead was already solidly plugged into the 
network of irregular advisers on education policy. Although his direct links as 
HMCI should have been through the DfEE, similar to when he was Deputy Chief 
Executive at the NCC under the ill fated Duncan Graham, Woodhead was not averse 
to cultivating direct contacts at higher levels and bypassing Shephard. He was `a 
regular visitor' to the Policy Unit, where his views on issues such as the publication 
of league tables of examination results were much more in tune with those of Morris 
and True than Gillian Shephard's. 35 The publication, or non-publication of league 
tables, had originally been part of the post-Dearing `settlement' with the teaching 
unions. But as the next election neared, Major became increasingly desperate to be 
seen to regain some control of his policy agenda. `John Major did not want trench 
warfare in the run up to the election', said Eric Forth, `but the political imperative 
ruled against it'. 36 The `political imperative' also meant that the authority of Gillian 
Shephard was to be undermined as badly as it had been over nursery vouchers. In 
January 1996, Shephard asserted that the results of the primary SATs would not be 
published until the tests had `bedded down', only for the TES to report the following 
month what it described as `a startling reversal of previous policy'. `In an apparent 
concession to the Conservative right-wing', reported the TES, Gillian Shephard was 
forced to announce that the Key Stage 2 SATs taken by 11-year-olds were to be 
published `school by school in January 1997'. 37 The extent to which Shephard's 
views on education policy diverged from Major's would be thrown into even starker 
relief over the question of Grant Maintained schools. 
34 Williams, Guilty Men, pp. 62-3. 35 
Morris interview. 
36 Forth interview. 
37 TES, 9 February 1996. 
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Making policy by speech 
While Shephard was pragmatically opposed to the promotion of `choice' where none 
in fact existed, as indicated in her comments about her own constituency, she was 
also politically wary of the whole issue of Grant Maintained schools. Robert Balchin 
felt that `Gillian Shephard was easily persuaded that her predecessor was grossly 
embarrassed by Grant Maintained schools and she reverted to the view that Grant 
Maintained schools were only one of the strands of a multi-facetted system. She had 
no ideological view of the way forward and did not want to endanger herself 
politically'. 38 In the autumn of 1995, it was reported that there was a `Cabinet split' 
on the future direction of the Grant Maintained policy with the, by then, old chestnut 
of all schools being compelled to opt out under 'consideration'. 39 Later that same 
month, Major intervened directly with a speech to Grant Maintained headteachers 
and governors in Birmingham, where he announced a '12 point plan' to raise 
educational standards, including new incentives to entice schools to opt out. 40 After 
the Prime Minister's speech, Shephard, already `seething' at the role of the Number 
10 Policy Unit, was reported `to have thrown a full scale tantrum at the way she was 
being sidelined'. 41 
The speech, written by Dominic Morris, was, indeed, a deliberate snub to 
Shephard, prompted by her inactivity and intransigence. `With education policy you 
tended to make policy by speech', said Morris, `As regards Birmingham, Gillian 
Shephard might have seen it a bit late'. 42 By this time, the antagonism that 
differences over education policy had generated, introduced an element of personal 
animosity in the relationship between Major and Shephard. The previous summer, 
when Major's leadership was subject to intense criticism, he had resigned the 
38 Balchin interview. 
39 TES, 1 September 1995. 
40 These included the relaxation of admission procedures with Grant 
Maintained schools free to select 
children; church schools that wished to opt out would no longer require parental 
ballots; new 
borrowing arrangements for Grant Maintained schools would be put 
in place; and schools would 
be 
able to retain the full proceeds of any property sales. TES, 15 September 
1995. 
41 TES, 5 April 1996. 
42 
Morris interview. 
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leadership of the Conservative Party to force an internal election. When potential 
replacements were being canvassed in the months leading up to Major's surprise 
decision, a possible candidate who `was putting herself about a lot, and who let it be 
known in the months leading up to June that she would be interested in being a 
compromise candidate', was Major's Education Secretary, Gillian Shephard. Major 
was reportedly `extremely surprised' when he learned of his friend's aspirations 
which came as `a particular hurt ' . 
43 
Whatever the cocktail of motivations behind the Birmingham speech, the 
issue that would cause greatest internal friction was that of selection, which had been 
seized upon, almost in desperation, by Major and his advisers, as a potential vote 
winner. It may have played well with the core Conservative voters, but the problem 
was, as described by Demitri Coryton, Chair of the Conservative Education 
Association, `Selection was rather like unilateral nuclear disarmament for Labour; it 
appeals only to activists'. 44 The Conservative manifesto would eventually propose 
that schools should be allowed to select half their pupils, a suggestion that was 
derided even by many on the right. The proposal for `half a grammar school in every 
town' as it became known, was described by Robert Balchin `as ill-thought-out a 
proposition that ever came out of the Policy Unit'. 45 Such was the acrimony caused 
by the selection issue that Shephard was later reported to be `locked in a fierce battle 
with Downing Street over plans by John Major to allow state schools to select half 
their pupils by ability'. Relations between the Department and Downing Street were 
so poor that Shephard was `allegedly refusing to send crucial paperwork to the 
Cabinet Office or to the group of advisers working on proposals for the Conservative 
manifesto'. 46 
Although Major's political biographer, Anthony Seldon, wrote that the 
Birmingham speech marked `a nadir' in the relationship between the once-close 
friends, it arguably had a bit further to go before it actually touched rock 
bottom. 47 
43 Seldon, Major, p. 564,574. 
44 TES, 9 May 1997. 
45 Balchin interview. 
46 Sunday Times, 9 June 1996. 
47 Seldon, Major, p. 598. 
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Two days after the speech, Major had arranged a Political Cabinet at Chequers to 
discuss the Conservative's Party's policies up to and beyond the next election. All 
was going well until a message was received before lunch about a damaging 
education leak. According to the then editor of the TES, prior to the meeting, a copy 
of the Education Secretary's briefing paper, probably written by Cotterell but 
undoubtedly approved by Shephard, arrived in the offices of the TES in a plain 
brown envelope. 48 Its contents were uncompromising and the leak was timed to 
cause maximum political embarrassment. In a direct counter-argument to Major's 
emphasis on Grant Maintained schools, the paper argued that `the need to improve 
standards must not be overshadowed by arguments about the mechanics through 
which education is delivered'. The clear message to the Prime Minister was `to stop 
placing such stress on political initiatives such as vouchers and opting out and 
concentrate instead on standards and resources in all schools'. 49 As so often with the 
Major government, long-term strategy became subject to short-term fire-fighting and 
Shephard had to return to London to do the tour of television news studios. 
The absolute nadir of the personal relations between Major and Shephard 
was the incident over the issue of corporal punishment in schools. Despite calls from 
the right, the government had refused to include an option in the 1996 Education Bill 
allowing schools to restore corporal punishment. It was an omission that Major 
himself strongly supported. However, during a radio interview Shephard let it be 
known that she was personally in favour of corporal punishment in schools. On 
hearing this Major was reportedly livid. Shephard recalled how later on the same day 
while visiting a school, `I was actually in mid-speech, and on the point of pulling the 
cord to unveil the statutory plaque, (when) an overawed school secretary appeared to 
say that she had Number 10 on the phone . 
50 Sub-editors had a field day with 
headlines about Shephard being 'slapped down' on the issue with journalists 
being 
briefed by Downing Street. As the story was seized upon as another damaging 
example of a government at odds with itself, a very public and heavily staged 
48 TES, 11 August 2000. 
49 TES, 22 September 1995. 
50 Shephard, Shephard's Watch, p. 85 
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rapprochement was arranged at a Grant Maintained school between Major and 
Shephard for the following day. Although Shephard claimed that the `visit' to the 
school by both her and the Prime Minister `had been long arranged', 51 the 
recollection of Robert Balchin, who was in Paris at the time of the incident, was 
somewhat different. `Elizabeth Cotterell rang me in a panic over the row about 
corporal punishment', said Balchin, `and asked me to arrange a "love in" between 
Gillian Shephard and John Major in a Grant Maintained school. I had to fly back 
from Paris to make the arrangements and afterwards flew back again'. 52 
This episode over corporal punishment in some ways marked the end of the 
very public disagreements between Shephard and Major, partly, one would suppose 
through sheer embarrassment, but mainly through political necessity. The next 
election was by then less than 12 months away, and there was a sense that perhaps, 
something could be salvaged. The change in tone was also marked by a change in 
personnel in the Policy Unit. Sean Williams took over the education brief from 
Dominic Morris. Williams' view of relations between Number Ten and the DfEE 
were not dissimilar to those of his colleagues. `There was a tension between the 
Department and Number Ten as education was a particularly active area of policy', 
said Williams. `There already had been a lot of intervention due to the weight of 
policy development in Nick True's time'. Much of the `tension' was due to 
Shephard's inaction: `She was a very shrewd cookie and had lowered the 
temperature of that policy area. But there were some blindingly obvious things to us 
that were not being done'. 53 Although the circumstances had not altered a great 
deal, 
the appointment of Williams marked a distinct change in tone in relations 
between 
Major and Shephard. Williams described how, `My remit was very 
different to 
Dominic Morris or Nick True. There was been a lot of friction between 
Number Ten 
and the DfEE and my job was to make peace between Number Ten and 
the 
Department'. 54 
51 Ibid., p. 85 52 Balchin interview 
53 Williams interview 
54 Ibid. 
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It was a thankless task. Shephard's attempt to woo the right with her stance 
on caning was as clumsy as her boss's attempts to woo anybody. Even where Major 
had forced an issue and got his way, such as on nursery vouchers, the actual 
outcome was almost farcical. `The real story', according to Williams, `was how well 
intentioned policy development got ruined in implementation. With the nursery 
voucher scheme we ended up nationalising the last year of pre-school education. It 
was the law of unintended consequences'. 55 The consequences may have been 
`unintended', but for many on the right, the blame lay in the conflict between the 
Prime Minister and his Education Secretary. According to Robert Balchin, `Nursery 
vouchers were the only attempt at radical reform of the Shephard era but it was 
subverted by Civil Servants in a way that was laughable and we ended up shutting 
down large numbers of private nurseries creating an area thick with regulations. 
They (nursery vouchers) were a microcosm of what happened during that time, of 
the complete and disastrous relationship between the Prime Minister and Gillian 
56 Shephard' 
. 
On the issue of Grant Maintained schools, contradictory messages left the 
numbers slowing almost to a halt. Major could only provide arms length support 
from Downing Street while no clear push or interest was shown by the Department 
or by the Education Secretary. With further moves to devolve more money to 
schools, but no movement on areas other than financial reward, such as the 
relaxation of the demands for Grant Maintained schools to follow the National 
Curriculum, LEAs in turn were able to say to schools considering opting out, `Why 
bother? ' The 1997 manifesto, with its emphasis on selection and grammar schools, 
largely conceded defeat on any hopes of rejuvenating the original Grant Maintained 
concept. Its proposals for education, very much focussed on the `structures' 
approach, were certainly very radical, but facing an almost inevitable 
Labour 
landslide, the Conservatives could afford to go out on a limb. Nobody was 
listening. 
`The pressure for clear blue water', wrote Coryton after the election, 
`led us to 
ss Ibid. 
56 Balchin interview. 
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develop a policy to distance us from Labour - and it turned out to be the deep blue 
water in which we promptly sank'. 57 
Conclusion 
In his Great Contemporaries, Churchill described the trajectory of Lord George 
Curzon's career: `The morning had been golden; the noontide was bronze; and the 
evening was leaden'. 58 Major's premiership, as indeed his attempts at education 
policy, had followed a similar trajectory. After he succeeded Mrs Thatcher, an 
optimistic and increasingly self-confident John Major was able to work closely with 
his bullish Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Clarke, to use education policy 
as one the main planks of his personal political agenda. After some apparent initial 
success, the problems of education policy, no less than other areas of policy, proved 
beyond the competence of the Major administration. 59 Clarke was fortunate in that 
during his time at education, he was able to share in the brief `glad confident 
morning' of Major's premiership. Gillian Shephard arrived very much on the down 
slope of Major's political fortunes. It could be argued that the changing personnel of 
irregulars holding the education brief in the Policy Unit marked the tapering 
ambitions of the Major government. First there was Nick True, the ideologue, who 
tried to establish some kind of coherent, principled, right-wing approach to the 
development education policy, something that Major's other advisers had tried but 
failed to do. He, in turn, was followed by Dominic Morris, much smaller `p' 
political, more intent on tactical manoeuvrings. Lastly there was Sean Williams, 
whose brief was as a conciliator, to see if something, even dignity, could be salvaged 
from the tail end of the Major administration. 
Although the ambition and confidence of Major's early months was long 
gone, the political priority remained constant, the ongoing and thankless task of 
57 TES, 9 May 1997. 
58 Churchill, W. (1937) Great Contemporaries. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1941 reprint, p. 
251. 
59, John Major governing', wrote Edward Pearce, `is like Edward Scissorhands trying 
to make 
balloon animals'. The Guardian, 10 November 2001. 
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trying to provide Major with some kind of domestic platform for an upcoming 
election. Shephard, at best a `consolidator' in the mould of MacGregor, was 
confronted by an increasingly-desperate and frustrated Major, who still hoped that 
further education reforms could provide a distinct political agenda for his 
increasingly-beleaguered administration. Neither could reconcile the conflict 
between these positions, leaving Major dependent on his own personal preferences 
and the advice of a small band of irregular advisers. 
Gillian Shephard, surveying the ruins of her Party on election night observed, 
`There's no doubt that being divided and squabbling amongst ourselves didn't 
endear us to the electorate' . 
60 `Divided and squabbling' could, indeed, have provided 
a suitable epitaph, not just for the Major-Shephard relationship, but for many of 
those involved during the previous two decades, something that was almost the 
inevitable consequence of the politicisation and personalisation of education policy. 
60 TES, 9 May 1997. 
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CHAPTER 11 
Conclusion 
This thesis attempts to make a substantial contribution to the understanding of 
education policy during a unique period of educational reform in three important 
respects. First, it is the first extended study of the period covering the 
Conservative administrations from 1979 to 1997. In so doing, the thesis weaves 
together a wide variety of the available secondary documentation, with informed 
primary oral sources, to provide an original account of the politicisation of the 
policy-making process, and the consequences of that politicisation on key areas 
of education policy. Second, its emphasis on the impact of individuals challenges 
existing accounts or perceptions. Third, it raises questions about the complexity 
of policy-making at central government level. 
`High frequency activity' 
A unique aspect of the period was the nature and scale of the reforms that were 
introduced. In his 1971 study of Anthony Crosland and Edward Boyle, Kogan 
echoed elements of Braudel's observations on different kinds of historical `time'. 
Ministers, wrote Kogan, bring with them `high frequency activity which can 
initiate, change, strengthen or condemn a whole policy', while the making of 
policy was continuously in the hands of the Civil Servants who create `low 
frequency policy waves'. ' When one examines what Kogan describes as `the 
main events' of Crosland's and Boyle's time at education, their `high frequency' 
activities, we are left primarily with a list of announcements and anonymous 
incremental initiatives. These emerged from within the existing policy 
community, and, arguably, did not greatly disturb or threaten the previous 
drift of 
educational developments. 2 A chronicle of the `main events' from, say, 
1986 to 
1994 would tell a very different tale. This would not just be 
in terms of their 
scope and ambition, but also with regard to how they were 
developed and 
I Kogan, Politics of Education, p. 42. 
2 For Boyle's and Crosland's `main events' see ibid., pp. 
66-68 and pp. 146-7. 
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implemented, and the impact of the individuals associated with them. Whatever 
their long-term impact on the course of education policy, the three distinct 
groupings that emerged - the politicos, the regulars and the irregulars - 
certainly managed to disturb the `tides of history' in ways that are incomparable 
to previous periods of education reform. 
In focussing on particular aspects or qualities of politics and personalities 
and their impact on policy, this thesis provides a powerful corrective to what 
Stephen Ball described as `those analyses of policy and policy-making that 
rationalize and reify policy or look for simple relationships between ideology and 
structure'. 3 Too often, as described by McPherson and Raab, individual policy- 
makers have been portrayed as `caricature creatures of a "role", or an "interest", 
or some other abstraction'. 4 An example of this may be found in how Ball 
himself deconstructed the replies of some of his interviewees for his Politics and 
Policy Making and subsequent articles in Halpin and Troyna, (eds. ) Researching 
Educational Policy and Walford (ed. ) Researching the Powerful in Education. 
The actions, or inter-actions, of individuals are viewed and analysed through the 
prism of policies or assumed ideological positions. This thesis explores the 
reverse relationship, where the course of policies is not studied through `abstract 
generalities' but through the concrete experiences of individuals', 5 the personal 
and political contingencies they faced. 
A typical example of this was the experience of John Patten, whose 
policy failures can be interpreted as the culmination of misplaced ideological 
hubris and dogmatism. Yet, on examining his relationships with colleagues, 
different explanations can be suggested. When Geoffrey Holland, his most 
experienced and senior Civil Servant resigned, it was reported that the Secretary 
of State and his Permanent Secretary had `not enjoyed a close relationship'. 
6 
While both men may have had genuine policy differences, the primary reasons 
3 Ball, `Political interviews and the politics of interviewing', p. 106. Ball's comment was a 
reflection on how Keith Joseph, whom he interviewed for Politics and 
Policy Making in 
Education, had responded to a question on policy-making with `a powerful 
image of 
policy... resting on particular qualities of personality and things 
like courage and instinct'. As an 
interesting aside to the different approaches to broadly similar topics, 
Keith Joseph's response did 
not make it into Ball's finished text, which was based around the theories of writers 
such as 
Althusser and Foucault, but was reproduced in the later article. 
4 McPherson and Raab, Governing Education, p. xiii. 
5 Ibid., p. x. 
6 TES, 19 November 1993. 
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why they did not enjoy a `close relationship', and the consequences of this on 
policy, were over questions of professional status and power relationships within 
the Department. A similar conclusion could be reached when examining the 
perception that Kenneth Baker was swept along by, or merely a cipher for an 
education agenda set elsewhere; or whether John Major and Kenneth Clark were 
`captured' by a right-wing agenda. Politicisation of policy was simply not 
confined to the injection of a highly-ideological element into the character of 
policies. Within the new politicised `space' that emerged from 1976 onwards to 
displace the traditional policy community, policy became increasingly subject to 
the vagaries of personal and political, as well as ideological, ambitions, with the 
former more often than not winning out over the latter. It was the conflict and 
mistrust generated over issues such as these that was the determining factor in 
the success or otherwise of policy issues. 
It is not difficult to trace the gradual, albeit largely submerged, 
encroachment of politics and politicisation into the area of education policy, 
which culminated in the very public eruption from 1986. The resurgence of right- 
wing thought in education and elsewhere was part of a broader international 
rejection of the post-war social democratic landscape. While some of the initial 
criticisms may have been based more on instinct than on hard evidence, the right 
had tapped into some real, and some imagined, weaknesses and discontent 
relating to the schools system. During the 1970s it was increasingly not 
just 
instinct, nor anecdote, nor ideological hostility that led to a questioning of the 
system. The blunt conclusion of the HMI report on secondary schools 
in 1979 
was that `Thirty five years after the 1944 Act the education system 
is still seeking 
to give effect to the commitment of that Act to secondary education 
for all, suited 
to the age aptitude and ability of every pupil'.? As the 
divisions continued to 
widen between the traditional partners in the policy-making process, 
but without 
any effective means to resolve these differences, 
it was unlikely that the political 
detachment that characterised much of the post-war period could 
have been 
sustained for much longer. As it was, the breakdown of 
the post-war political 
settlement in general was hastened by a resurgent strand of 
Conservative politics, 
DES, Aspects of Secondary Education, p. 265. 
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one that was intensely political or ideological in its outlook, and from which the 
world of education could not have indefinitely remained aloof. 
Yet the process by which the rhetoric of the New Right became translated 
into policy proposals throws into relief just how important was the role of 
committed individuals or groups. This was particularly true for the neo-liberal or 
market aspects of the education reforms. One member of the IEA recalled, how, 
during much of the post-war period, `To argue for the use of the market (or for 
the price mechanism as it was more usually called) was to put yourself outside 
serious discussion into an archaic and isolated no-man's land where, incidentally, 
few British academics were to be found, even as explorers'. 8 With regard to the 
introduction of market forces in education, as Robert Balchin has recalled, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, this was felt `to be beyond stupidity,. 9 Yet, by late 1986, 
just such a set of policy proposals, that largely emanated from a small group of 
neo-liberals, were poised to take their place in the 1987 Conservative manifesto. 
Although Ball suggests that `Joseph provided legitimation within the apparatus 
of the Conservative Party of the radical-right think-tanks', thus providing his 
successor, Kenneth Baker, with 'possibilities. . . very 
different from those faced 
by previous incoming Secretaries', the irony was that it was very much Joseph's 
lack of practical response when Secretary of State for Education to that self same 
radical-right agenda, which provided the impetus for more radical policies to be 
developed. lo 
While the neo-liberal proposals were clearly also part of the zeitgeist for 
free-market influenced reforms, they were also formulated in reaction to the 
unwillingness or inability of the `partners' in the extant policy process to address 
the concerns that were raised about the schools system, independent of any right- 
wing critique. In McPherson and Raab's study of the Scottish education system, 
they were able to describe the testimonies of their interviewees as constituting, 
among other things, a unique set of perspectives `on the way 
in which a wider 
"policy community" was formed and maintained'. 
" Much of the testimony in 
8 Quoted in Salter and Tapper, Power and Politics, p. 169. 
9 Balchin interview. 
10 Ball, `Researching Inside the State', pp. 113-114. Whether Baker in 
his turn found this 
legitimation of the radical-right think tanks as offering him additional 
`possibilities' in a positive 
sense is also a moot point. See Ch. 5, pp. 111-118. 
11 McPherson and Raab, Governing Education, p. xiii. 
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this study details how the wider `policy community' south of the border was 
fractured, primarily through the intervention of the politicos such as Mrs 
Thatcher and irregulars such as Stuart Sexton. Yet it also fractured partly 
through the inability or unwillingness of the established policy community to 
adapt and address the concerns that had been raised regarding the schools 
system. Unable to make any impact within or through the existing policy 
community, the milieu in which new proposals were developed was one of 
almost complete self-sufficiency within an extremely tight knit community of 
like-minded individuals. With only the very distant lighthouse figure of Mrs 
Thatcher, giving off the occasional beam of encouragement, individuals such as 
flalchin, Sexton and Letwin simply outflanked the existing policy machinery. 
In a way, this methodology almost reflected completely the modus 
operandi of Mrs Thatcher herself, relying on small groups of committed and 
like-minded individuals. `We were advisers with no executive powers', Sexton 
wrote, but `We all worked with an almost intuitive knowledge as to what Mrs 
Thatcher would and would not expect'. 12 Such a strategy could not be sustained 
successfully over a prolonged period. In his memoirs, Geoffrey Howe 
reproduced a letter of complaint from John Hoskyns, Head of the Number Ten 
Policy Unit between 1979 and 1981. Writing in February 1980, Hoskyns 
provided a concise overview of the central problem that was to plague the course 
of education policy. `The conclusion that I am coming to', he wrote 
is that the way in which [Margaret Thatcher] herself operates, the way her 
fire is at present consumed, the lack of a methodical mode of working and 
the similar lack of orderly discussion and communication on key issues, 
means that our chance of implementing a carefully worked out strategy - 
both policy and communications - is very low indeed. 
13 
The consequences of such an approach - the overuse of an ad 
hoc system, over 
reliance on what was basically `cronyism' for outside advice, and 
too much 
dependence on sheer force of personality - were not just as regards 
the disruption 
12 The Times, 17 September 2003. Sexton was commenting on the role of special advisers 
during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
13 Howe, G. (1994) Conflict of Loyalty. London: Macmillan, p. 
249. 
257 
caused to the education system, but also in terms of making a success of the 
government's own intentions at reform. This was compounded between 1986 and 
1989 by Baker, whose instincts were not in line with those of his Prime Minister, 
and whose own similar `lack of methodical mode' further exacerbated the drift 
towards confusion and conflict. 
Despite their apparent success, particularly up to 1987, the dilemma for 
the irregulars appeared at the point within the policy process when the detail of 
their proposals had to be elucidated. They had lobbied extremely successfully as 
a self-contained `issue network' to by-pass the existing policy machinery in 
formulating their proposals. Yet, as James Hamilton discovered in 1976 with the 
follow up to the Yellow Book, while it might be possible to largely control the 
initial input to the policy process, it is much more difficult to control the process 
itself and its subsequent output. Here, some of the traditional partners were able 
to reassert some control over the output, albeit within the broad policy 
framework which the 1988 Reform Act represented. The other major problem for 
the irregulars as a group was that they were always easier to categorise by what 
they were against, rather than what they were for. Whitty suggested that the 
success of the New Right lay in submerging what could be called short-term 
contradictions in support of a project which, in the long term, could satisfy 
both. 14 Arguably, the opposite was the case. During the crucial period from 
appointment of Baker to the election of 1987, the irregulars - both neo-liberal 
and neo-conservative - were content to ignore the long-term contradictions 
inherent in their positions in support of the short-term gain of ensuring the short- 
term political triumph of the 1987 manifesto proposals. Subsequently, although 
they would remain united in their distaste for the education establishment, they 
were never able to reconcile their diametrically-opposed views on policy. 
Neither, after 1987, would the irregulars retain the same 
degree of 
latitude in devising policy with the much more interventionist and aggressively 
ambitious Kenneth Baker, as described by David Hancock, at 
`the top of his 
game'. `Education policy', reflected one Permanent Secretary who worked with 
four successive Secretaries of State, `was more 
driven by political egos than a 
14 Whitty in Willan, `The National Curriculum', p. 36. 
258 
concern for the educational needs of children'. 15 Baker was the extreme example 
of the primacy of politics. According to Eric Forth, Baker's PPS at the DES, 
even with all the initiatives beginning to pile up, `At the morning "prayer 
meetings" of his team the main issue was media handling'. 16 A small, but 
enormously significant and symbolic development after Baker's appointment 
was his replacement of Stuart Sexton by Tony Kerpel as his special adviser. This 
was not so much in the sense of the individuals involved, but it signified the 
replacement of a specialist education adviser with a completely political figure, 
whose loyalty and expertise was in furthering his minister's career. '7 This was 
equally true for advisers at whatever level in government. Acting as advocates 
for their minister, they exacerbated the tendency towards political and personal 
egocentricity when dealing with policy. As described by Sexton: `Now they 
(advisers) have evolved into political back-watchers, who go from department 
from department with Ministers, both facing problems they are unfamiliar with. 
They are now part of the problem they were meant to help overcome in the first 
place'. 18 
When the sheer scale of what Baker eventually proposed is examined, 
one cannot but admire the personal artifice, but the unforeseen consequence of 
this was the instability of the edifice whose construction he had so deftly 
supervised. Nowhere was this more evident than with the National Curriculum. 
While its eventual form and content owed much to Baker, the idea of a national 
curriculum had much less far to travel than that of Grant Maintained schools in 
order to reach centre stage. `The arguments of the right and the contributions of 
parents to the education debate', said one Deputy Secretary, `all stacked up very 
well with the political impetus, while the Department embraced strongly the 
15 Caines interview. John Gaines joined the Department in 1989 while Kenneth Baker was still 
in 
post. He left in 1992, early into John Patten's term, having served under 
John MacGregor and 
Kenneth Clarke in the interim. 
16 Forth interview. 
17 Special advisers have gone on to achieve a notoriety all of their own under 
Labour since 1997. 
`Their role is no longer to defeat the Civil Service but to see off other ministers 
and their 
proxies', wrote the late Hugo Young, `As a class they've 
become a self-justifying, yet also 
mutually destructive, excresence'. The Guardian, 7 July 1998. 
1$ Sexton interview. In terms of their actual advice, Peter Hennessy 
described their role as too 
often merely acting as `comfort blankets', expressing what 
their minister wished to hear. Peter 
Hennessey interview, 27 November 1998. 
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centralising tendencies of the 1980s'. 19 While Baker was keen to disparage the 
contribution his fellow Cabinet members might have made to education policy, 
one irony was that Baker allowed himself to be swayed by his own personal 
preferences as regards what he thought students should be studying, as opposed 
to what the system could actually stand. While Baker always saw the National 
Curriculum as his main legacy, the supreme irony in all of this may well be that 
the Baker National Curriculum will soon be seen as a colossal waste of time, an 
aberration. With the steady roll back of compulsory subjects, combined with the 
attempted introduction of a strong vocational element into the curriculum in 
secondary schools, it may be the `third way' of Keith Joseph that will be seen as 
the one nearest to addressing the needs of the majority of students. 
If Baker's longer-term legacy remains ambiguous, the immediate legacy 
to his successors was much more apparent. It was Baker who provided the 
template for the high-profile, publicity-conscious and interventionist minister. It 
was also Baker who was willing to ignore, or not to ignore, the previous policy 
`partners' for his own political ends. The contrast with previous landmark 
education legislation, such as that of 1944, could not have been starker. `There 
was a very elaborate consultation procedure', said Jenny Bacon of the 1988 Act, 
`but it happened after the Bill had become law and not before'. 20 Baker was 
fortunate in that he was able to preside over the initial period of reform during 
which he could ride roughshod over the education community. While this could 
not continue indefinitely if the reforms were to be implemented, he did not 
remain long enough at education to suffer the consequences of his ambitions. 
None of his Conservative successors, except possibly Kenneth Clarke, came 
close to managing their brief, their officials, and their careers with same degree 
of success and brio. Not that Baker's successors ever felt much ownership or 
commitment, ideological or otherwise, to his reforms. 
While ideological ambiguities and practical difficulties were certainly 
factors in the difficulties experienced by successive Secretaries of 
State, the 
nature of their appointments and their political background were 
the more potent 
factors. The appointment of Secretaries of State for 
Education after 1979 
appeared to follow a fairly unsophisticated pattern whereby each new 
incumbent 
19 Hedger interview. 
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was appointed on the basis of the main weakness of the previous incumbent. 
Thus, Carlisle, thought to be lacking in gravitas and ideological commitment, 
was followed by Keith Joseph. The politically maladroit Keith Joseph was 
succeeded by Baker, who was succeeded by the more pragmatic and hands-on 
MacGregor. He, in turn, was followed by the robust and combative Clarke. The 
`specialist', John Patten, then succeeded Clarke, to be followed in turn by the 
emollient and unthreatening Gillian Shephard. From start to finish, it was hard to 
discern any sense that they were engaged in a common endeavour with their 
political predecessors, let alone the educationists. Their regular advisers 
struggled to implement what they had been asked to by one set of ministers in the 
face of assaults from different sets of ministers, who thought and behaved as if 
they were `outsiders', whose misfortune it was to have inherited someone else's 
folie de grandeur. 
In some respects, successive Secretaries of State were representative of a 
particular historical culture within the Conservative Party. For much of its 
history, the Conservative Party was perceived, and operated quite deliberately, as 
the non-ideological Party. It saw itself as the natural party of government and 
was quite happy to adopt its stance to accommodate electoral success. 
Dogmatism was an alien creed, whereas traditional Conservative principles or 
approaches, such as pragmatism, scepticism or the `one nation' tradition were 
traits to be cherished. Mrs Thatcher, as described by William Keegan, may have 
successfully `hijacked' the Party during the 1970s with her brand of `economic 
evangelicalism' and `populist authoritarianism', but her acolytes remained a 
minority within the Party and were never numerically strong enough to make the 
hoped-for difference across the broad swathe of government policies. John 
Hoskyns had sensed this quite early on during the first Thatcher administration 
and resigned from the Policy Unit in 1982, frustrated at working 
in Whitehall. 
`Difficult problems', he argued, `are only solved - if they can 
be solved at all - 
by people who desperately want to solve them'. 
21 Conservatism by itself was not 
enough and if the Conservatives really wanted to be a radical, reforming 
20 Bacon interviewed in Davies-Griffith, `The development of education policy', p. 
184. 
21 Hoskyns, J. (1982) `Whitehall and Westminister: An Outsider's 
View', Fiscal Studies, Vol. 3, 
No. 3. p. 145. 
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government, `I am convinced that the people and the organisation are indeed 
wrong'. 
22 
Prior to the 1987 election, a small minority of committed activists, drawn 
from across the irregulars and politicos, displayed the fervency to which 
Hoskyns referred, and proved highly effective in providing the broad outlines of 
policy proposals. But they failed to convince the majority of their own Party, 
never mind the broader political and professional support necessary to translate 
those proposals into effective policies. With the ironic exception of Keith Joseph, 
no Education Secretary since 1979, could remotely have been described as 
`Thatcherite'. All would have fitted quite comfortably into any of the post-war, 
pragmatic, Conservative administrations, and some, such as Clarke and Baker 
were overtly hostile to the more extreme tenets of Thatcherism. Although they 
may have inherited policies that were ideological in their origins, successive 
Secretaries of State relied more on their personal instincts, ambitions and 
prejudices than any ideological lodestar. 
In commenting on how some ministers were increasingly referring in 
speeches to their personal educational experiences, McCulloch described this 
development as the `privatising of the past'. It was a process that `has exerted an 
increasing influence on education policy in the 1980s and 1990s', and, the author 
suggested, was used to buttress various ideological arguments for education 
policies. 23 Part of the argument in this thesis was that, for much of the period, the 
reverse relationship held true, with personal experiences and personal ambitions 
playing the primary, and not the subsidiary, role in the course of policies. The 
clashes and inconsistencies that this engendered were the rocks on which 
Conservative attempts at reform floundered, with the end result being, in the 
words of one of those practitioners of `literacy to a fault', a set of reforms that 
were `well conceived, poorly designed and appallingly implemented'. 
24 
Not that the officials themselves were entirely blameless over accusations 
of, at the very least, selective sabotage. Many were as eager to gather more 
power to the centre as they were to thwart what they felt were any 
hostile or 
22 Hoskyns, J. (1984) `Conservatism is not enough', Political Quarterly, 
Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 4. 
23 McCulloch, G. (1997) `Privatising the Past? History and Education 
Policy in the 1990s. ' 
British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 45, No. 
1, March, p. 69. 
24 Owen interview. 
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threatening initiatives. In so doing, many Civil Servants like to see their role as 
some sort of `constitutional ballast', steering the direction of policy toward the 
`middle ground', as well as a straightforward defence - or expansion - of their 
departmental fiefdoms. That the Civil Service has any right to try and guide 
governments away from the path of radicalism and towards a `common ground' 
is highly questionable. As one Whitehall watcher has remarked, `If political 
polarisation or radicalism is a fact of political life, then seeking the "common 
ground" is not a non political position'. 25 It was also not very edifying to 
compare and contrast the zeal some officials applied to stifling those aspects of 
policy - such as the voucher and Grant Maintained schools - with which they 
were not in sympathy, with their over zealousness in pursuing their own 
preferred policies, such as the National Curriculum. 26 Michael Barber, then with 
the National Union of Teachers, described how `In the old days before the 
National Curriculum... [the DES] was staffed, or so it seemed, by serious, 
pragmatic, generally grey-haired, sober, career Civil Servants'. But when the gift 
of a national curriculum at long last fell into their laps, a `new breed' emerged 
who were `young (or maybe I had just aged) and ideologically committed to the 
government agenda. At meetings they turned up and ended debates not through 
the quality of their argument, but by saying `Ministers could not countenance'. 27 
For a variety of personal, political and professional reasons, there was an 
almost complete absence of trust between Baker's successors and their regular 
advisers. In a colourful comment that could have applied at several times during 
the course of the reforms, when the reformers felt that their ideas were being 
sabotaged, Dominic Morris recalled that `There was a feeling that the Civil 
25 G. Fry, The Changing Civil Service (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 27. 
26 One particularly unsavoury episode involving Nick Stuart was the rubbishing of the 
National 
Council for Educational Standards report, Standards in English Schools, authored by John 
Marks 
and Caroline Cox. An editorial in The Times concluded that `this example of a commitment 
by 
Civil Servants to particular policies that brook no dissent has lately pushed position-taking 
beyond the bounds of acceptability'. The Times, 8 December 1983. For 
Cox and Marks' version 
of events see Cox, C. and Marks, J. (1988) The Insolence of Office; 
Education and the Civil 
Servants. London: Claridge Press. 
27 Barber, M. (1996) The Learning Game. Arguments for an Education Revolution. London: 
Gollancz, p. 167. In his study of the origins of the binary system and 
the role of officials, Godwin 
suggests that Barber's contemporary observations of officials merely recorded a 
difference of 
style rather than substance: `One may admire the intellectual 
brilliance and word-skills that were 
the hallmark of the old-style civil servant; but their modus operandi was no 
less arrogant than that 
of the new breed'. Godwin, C. D. `The Origins of the Binary 
System', History of Education, 
1998, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 189. 
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Service bastards were doing it deliberately. They were intelligent people so they 
must know what they are doing'. 28 Nor was this lack of personal trust confined to 
ministers and officials. Ministers within the Department often did not trust each 
other. Rarely did the Prime Minister trust his or her Secretary of State. Nobody 
trusted the teachers. This milieu of paranoia, this `poisonous politics of 
education'29 as described by one official, reached its apotheosis under John 
Major with damaging consequences for both John Patten and Gillian Shephard. 
Over-dependent, as it was, on the strength of individual personalities, the 
ambitious edifice of reform was over-hastily constructed and became a veritable 
Babel of conflicting views, loyalties and shifting priorities with personal 
prejudices and professional ambitions often clashing with and overriding 
ideological or educational priorities. The end result was, appropriately, the same 
as John Major's description of what was happening in the Conservative Party at 
large, with the participants `forming a circular firing squad and opening fire'. 30 
`The Paris writ' 
Some issues merit further study. Former HMCI, Eric Bolton, told one researcher 
how `Towards the end of my time a group of senior people moved into the 
Department who had no previous history in education. They didn't mind what 
the policies were as long as the ministers wanted them to work'. 31 In chapter nine 
we saw also how one senior official was moved for being too closely associated 
with the Grant Maintained schools policy. As the official papers are released, it 
would be interesting to revisit aspects of `power and politics' within the 
Department and examine to what degree it became politicised internally over the 
course of the Conservative administrations, and how this may have effected the 
approach of the Labour administrations since 1997. 
The lessons which the new Labour team may have learned from the 
Conservative administrations between 1979 and 1997 are also worthy of 
further 
28 Morris interview. One official who joined the Department with no previous 
involvement in 
education found that `I was seen (by ministers and their advisers) as a member of 
the "education 
establishment" five minutes after joining'. Owen interview. 29 
Owen interview. 
30 Seldon, Major, p. 383. 
31 Quoted in Davies-Griffith, `The development of education policy', p. 237. 
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investigation. For a relatively long period, there was a conscious and determined 
effort by the Labour government to present a much more united and committed 
front to the public. Within education, one Deputy Secretary described how 
`There is immense control of presentation, not to let stories break, and there is 
enormous pressure to keep the lid on'. 32 In terms of personalities, the 
appointment of a senior figure such as David Blunkett also negated against the 
suspicion and mistrust of the Conservative years. 33 The intervention and 
influence of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit was something that only gained in 
significance under Labour. According to Blunkett's special adviser, Conor Ryan, 
of key importance was the `close working relationship with Number 10 
especially between myself and David Miliband (Head of the Policy Unit), and 
between Blunkett and Blair'. 34 
Within Labour's education policies since 1997, there remain strong 
under-currents from both wings of the Conservative reformers. While any clear 
model or even a distinctive rationale for policy-making at the centre remains 
elusive, alongside the obvious and increasing centralisation, there is also the 
continued emphasis on standards, choice and specialisation. As regards the 
former, one dilemma associated with this strategy is that, as described by 
Rhodes, the policy networks that tend to characterise policy making can exhibit a 
`dynamic conservatism' when confronted with change, acting as a brake on 
radical proposals. Writing in 1992, Rhodes had characterised the `all too 
common experience' of the Conservative administrations across a range of policy 
areas as `A pattern of authoritative pronouncements followed by policy slippage 
in implementation. 
.... 
'35 As with the Conservative attempts at reform, Labour 
may find that their reach may also far exceed their grasp. A British general told 
32 Owen interview. Nick Tate, by then chair of the QCA, discovered his freedom to speak out 
sharply curtailed by the arrival of Labour. `There was a powerful media manipulation machine', 
said Tate. When the QCA advised ministers not to cut back the primary school curriculum and 
defended the decision publicly, he was taken aside and told he had blotted 
his copybook: `From 
then on the quango was effectively muzzled. We were more cautious about giving advice 
that 
they didn't want to hear'. Interview in TES, 27 July 2001. 
33 According to Peter Owen, `Blunkett is a powerful icon in Labour. While it 
is plausible that 
Baroness Blatch was a minder for John Patten it is not at all plausible that someone 
like Stephen 
Byers was one for David Blunkett'. Blunkett was also supported 
by the effective relationship he 
had forged with Conor Ryan, his special adviser: `Conor Ryan 
is a very effective operator, a 
Praetorian Guard, and would not allow anyone to undermine 
Blunkett'. Owen interview. 
34 Conor Ryan interview, 23 January 1998. 
35 Rhodes, `Changing Intergovernmental Relations', p. 74. 
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Lloyd George regarding the deliberations of the peacemakers in the Quai 
d'Orsay after WW1 that, `The root of evil is that the Paris writ does not run'. 36 
While Labour was willing to be much more interventionist than the 
Conservatives, a tendency which saw the centralisation evident since 1976 
become even more rampant post-1997, they may also inevitably discover that 
`the Paris writ' will not run. 
As regards the latter, more-market orientated aspects of policy, these, in 
particular, are likely to continue to be highly contentious. Such proposals go 
against the grain of much of traditional Labour. 37 While the Conservatives could 
draw from the `sheltered pools' of economic liberalism within their tradition to 
help buttress a free-market stance to schools, there are no such `pools' available 
in Labour. Yet Hoskyns' analysis of the problems that faced the Conservative 
reformers are equally applicable to those within Labour. Arguably, the Labour 
`modernisers' hijacked the Party to the equivalent degree that the `Thatcherites' 
had hijacked the Conservative Party. As Labour now prepares the groundwork 
for its tilt at a third term, with the memories of the wilderness years in opposition 
fading from memory, the search for new, radical policies can only exacerbate the 
latent conflict between `old' and `New' Labour. 
The fact remains that the process of successfully implementing reforms in 
education is so diffuse, and relies so heavily on a myriad of individual and 
collective decisions and perceptions, taken at various levels in the system, that no 
diktat from the centre can succeed unless there is some sense of agreement or 
some sense of joint venture between those involved. Heclo and Wildavsky's 
verdict on the `supreme skill' of those individuals they met when examining the 
Treasury, was that it lay `in personal relations. When they succeed where others 
fail, it is because they recognise the overriding importance of giving and getting 
a personal commitment. Bringing colleagues along with you makes 
sense. . . British 
Treasury men know that their desires cannot prevail unless they 
36 Macmillan, M. (2001) Peacemakers. The Paris Conference of 1919 and 
Its Attempt to End 
War. London: John Murray, p. 7. 
37 When Gordon Brown pointedly referred only to `Labour' and not once 
to `New Labour' is his 
Conference speech in 2003, it was as much a coded criticism of 
Blair and his preferred policies, 
as had been the attacks of old Tories such Ian Gilmour and 
Francis Pym during the Thatcher 
years when they spoke of the `One Nation' tradition. 
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maintain a community to support them' . 
38 This was something with which few of 
those determined to reform the schools system between 1976 and 1997 ever 
managed to engage. 
38 Heclo and Wildavsky, Private Government of 
Public Money, p. lxiv-v. 
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APPENDIX 
Sample interview schedules 
1. Interview with Tessa Keswick at offices of CPS- special adviser Clarke, and now Director of CPS 
How did you become an adviser? 
What did you feel the job entailed prior to becoming an adviser? How if at all did 
that differ from your experience as an adviser? 
What might the `job specification' be for the post of adviser? 
On joining a new department, how do you and obviously the Minister as well, 
start about briefing yourselves on the issues unless you rely entirely on 
permanent officials, which may not be ideal or desirable? 
You described your time at Health as like being `in the trenches'. How would 
describe your time at Education? 
Throughout the period at which I am looking at, there did appear to be occasions 
when there was a misunderstanding of what was expected from a new Minster. 
John MacGregor and Gillian Shepherd's apparent conflicts with No. 10 were 
cases in point. That did not happen with Kenneth Clark. Was this because he 
was, politically, in a very strong position, or did he have clear brief on being 
appointed? What did you see as his brief? 
In your article in the Daily Telegraph in June 96, you were pretty scathing about 
the role of the civil servants within the DES, describing them as `saboteurs', and 
being `ideologically driven'. What would you say was the ideological position of 
the civil servants? 
Where would you locate `power' within the dept among the civil servants? You 
mentioned the permanent secretary in your article, but some accounts have the 
deputy and under secretaries as the chief protagonists within the department? 
In terms of policy making during Kenneth Clark's time at the DES, some 
initiatives were ongoing, some appeared to come through quite quickly 
during 
his time there. Of the main issues - reforming HMI, teacher training, primary 
teaching methods, reforming the curriculum and examination councils, 
publication of results, the parents charter - how would you characterise 
how 
these issues became important or prominent? 
Who would you see as having a significant impact on 
discussions about these 
policies within and also outside the DES, e. g. Anthony 
0 Hear was perceived to 
be particularly influential on teacher training, John 
Marks on the reform of the 
NCC, etc. 
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One of the key roles of advisers during the period appears to have been as a 
conduit for alternative advice. Speaking to Dr. John Marks recently, he suggested that if someone such as himself wants to try and have an input into policy discussions, unless they can contact the minister directly, they need someone 
such as an adviser to let them know what is being talked about, what is one the 
agenda, and also feed alternative views and opinions back to the minister. How 
important was this aspect of your role in the light of the opposition of civil 
servants? 
Duncan Graham recently wrote that although he was aware that Kenneth Clark 
was unhappy with the work of the NCC, he was never called in for `a rational 
discussion' with the Minster about the problems. Clive Saville, one of the civil 
servants who was moved sideways because of conflicts over the reform of 
teacher training said something similar in that he knew Kenneth Clark was taking 
outside advice but he was not given the chance to discuss or debate that advice 
with the advisers or the minister. The implication is that `official' advice was not 
being sought or ignored, or both, in favour of more overt political advice. Is this 
accurate or are they being entirely disingenuous in their interpretation of events? 
Kenneth Clark is perceived as having moved to the `right' during his time at 
Education. Was there a happy marriage between political expediency in terms of 
positioning himself favourably with the right of the party, and his own personal 
convictions and approach? 
Despite the political prominence given to education between 1979 and 1997, it 
can appear that there were many slogans but little practical depth to Conservative 
education policy in that individual Secretaries of State had enormous scope to 
focus on the bits that they thought needed mending at the time? Is this a fair 
representation? 
Was this a strength or a weakness? Would some of the reforms, such as grant 
maintained schools, have gone deeper if there had been stronger and continuous 
central direction, as appears to be being attempted by the present administration? 
You were appointed to the CPS is Oct 95. What did you see as the CPS' role at 
the time? 
What do you see as the CPS' role now? 
With regard to education, it appeared that the CPS and others were 
left out of the 
loop and John Major took an intensely personal interest in education policy and 
policy tended to be formulated with the Policy Unit, the SMF/Robert 
Skidelsky, 
and very few others. There was distrust and antagonism 
between him/them and 
Gillian Shephard and her adviser Elizabeth Cotterell? 
Why do you think Barber et al were able to do quite quickly so many 
of the 
things Conservatives talked about? 
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2. Interview with Peter 
Zestie A 
"1 1 
Head of 
- . rvrvivýul W 1Llj 
responsibility for School Curriculum and Teachers 1994-5- Director General for Schools 1995-98) 
Were you involved in education as part of the Cabinet Office?.. 
, as part of back to basics? 
How much did education get caught up in the J Major's need to establish a 
political agenda for himself? Someone like E Bolton would argue that the coup de grace for HMI was prompted by the Citizens Charter? 
What was your impression of the department from outside it? Often maligned as 
being separate from mainstream of Whitehall-full of lifers... people with very 
strong positions of their own? 
How did you find the department when you moved? G Holland said it had plenty 
of people who could write very high class briefs but knew very little or had little 
experience on the ground as it were which in many ways led to the furore over 
the testing arrangements the previous year? 
Is there a `brief as it were on being appointed in Whitehall in general and in 
education? You took over from John Vereker... he was reported to have badly 
underestimated the mood of teachers ... was described as `thatcherite before his 
time'? 
You joined at an interesting time. Geoffrey Holland had recently left after 
disagreements with John Patten. Nick Stuart had been moved. Clive Saville and 
John Wiggins before that. There was a new Permanent Secretary, Tim Lankester 
who was unfamiliar with education. What were the main policy issues/priorities? 
With responsibility for schools, what were the main priorities of flashpoints 
when you joined? 
J Patten's last six months appeared to have been used in fighting unloved and 
unwanted policy proposals such as curbing of the NUS and Teacher training ? 
How did you find working with J Patten? 
Who do you think he was listening to, taking advice from outside the 
dept? 
MacGregor had the `Scottish mafia', K Clarke had O'Hear, J Marks etc..? 
One of the main tensions within department appears to be 
between junior 
ministers, who held the ear of the Prime Minister, and the 
Secretary of State. 
This was a feature under Mrs Thatcher and also with regard 
to Lady Blatch and J 
Patten? 
There didn't seem to be that problem with G Shephard and 
her ministers 
although it was almost like the middle man was cut out and 
the tension was 
between the dept. and No 10 direct as it were? 
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G Shephard appeared to have a clear brief from J Major to calm things down 
which she managed to do very quickly. How is that kind of shift in gear conveyed to senior officials... do you know in advance. . . what signals are sent out? 
Very quickly stories appeared that G Shephard had fallen out of favour... was too 
much of a consolidator... and there were some very public rows and set backs 
over vouchers, publication of results etc... What were her options? 
Who do you think she listened to? What is your opinion on the role of special 
advisers? 
How much do you feel she was undermined by the Policy Unit and J Major in 
that there was the Birmingham speech that she clearly wasn't aware of although 
Chris Woodhead was? 
Do you feel or did you feel that the role of the policy unit is in initiating policy 
e. g. was someone like Nick True or Dominic Morris or Sean Williams making 
proposals, or is the role of the Policy Unit more of a conduit? 
It is easy to get the names of the prominent people from the papers such as True 
etc., but they only say a very influential person was so-and-so. How does their 
influence manifest itself? Do they visit the dept and have discussion with 
officials? Do you have any contact? 
In working on policies whatever they are when such clear political signals are 
coming out of No 10 for one course, how difficult does that make the dept 
officials' job? 
How much did you feel that the administration had simply run out of steam, lost 
its way? 
As a senior official in the dept. did you feel that any coherent education policy or 
agenda had revealed itself by 1997? 
The manifesto was a real tug of war and was very retro looking, with grammar 
schools, increased selection and so forth. There was also rumbling on in the 
background talk such as from the SMF about getting more private money 
into 
education? 
The Policy unit currently appears to be a key player but there appears 
to be 
certainly until now a greater degree of harmony and co-ordination 
between 
Blunkett, Barber, Ryan, Miliband now Adonis? 
Is very wide of the mark to say that policy advice has 
been institutionalised to 
large degree in the Standards and Effectiveness Unit inside the 
dept? 
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There still appears to be murmurs of discontent in that Blunkett has said that 
officials are not doing all they should be and despite the reprieve for LEAs, 
Michael Bichard has said that they are also not up to speed yet? 
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3. Interview with Michael Fallon in House of Commons -: Under-Secretary at the DES, 1990-92. Member of the No Ti 
The NTBG... what was the political context behind the founding of same. ... IEA reported involved... other groups putting forward policy suggestions at the time? 
It was reported that the group went to see Mrs. Thatcher with your original paper 
and she asked you do something specific on education. Why do think that was 
and not on any other areas? 
How was Save Our Schools prepared and where did the ideas originate? How 
were they formulated e. g. with the ASI, IEA, individual contributions etc? 
What was your role within the ASI? 
Along with yourself, several members of the NTBG went on the become junior 
ministers at Education - Forth, Rumbold, Howarth - how do you think they 
performed in the light of where they were coming from? 
You were the only one who really `walked it like you talked it' when you went to 
education? 
Who else would you rate as influential in framing the education proposals in the 
88 Act? 
How close a contact did you keep with what happened between 86 and 90 when 
you were appointed to the DfE, and what was your perception as to what 
happened? 
The supply side proposals - lms etc - were implemented to a certain extent but it 
appears that Baker and civil servants were able to stamp their own imprint on the 
curriculum? Was this due to a lack of clear or distinct Conservative policy on 
education or the curriculum in particular? 
MacGregor appears on the one hand to have been sold a bit of a pup in that the 
talk at the time was all of consolidation and bedding down and so forth, but very 
quickly he was totally adrift from what certainly the PM was thinking and the 
right and centre right of the party. Do you think he misinterpreted 
his brief, or 
there was ambiguity in what he was expected to do? 
What was the role of the NCC? SEAC? 
Clearly when you and T Eggar were appointed you were there 
to put some 
backbone some rigour in the implementation of the policies. 
Was that how the 
job was offered to you? 
Why is it that apart from perhaps Keith Joseph, Education 
Secretaries have never 
really been `one of us' and always had to be 
balanced by more sympathetic 
junior ministers? 
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What were the main obstacles you found in your time in the dept.? 
How were the civil servants? 
Apart from your own instincts and beliefs, ministers seem to draw on outside 
advisers of their preference. In K Clarke's time people like 0 Hear and Sheila 
Lawlor had quite a contribution to make. How did you find policy or advice was 
being taken? Were civil servants outside the loop? Or part of.. 
Eleanor Laing was MacGregor's adviser and Tessa Keswick was K Clarke's. 
What did you perceive their role as advisers to be and what kind of contribution 
do you think they made? 
John Major seem to take or have the time to take a more personal interest in 
education but seemed to have confined his advice to a very small group of 
people, much more so than Mrs. Thatcher. Was that your impression? 
Robert Skidelsky / the SMF was one source, the CPS another, but J Major never 
really seems to have found anyone with his set of preferences. Skidelsky wasn't 
keen on grammar schools etc. People at the Policy Unit appeared from the 
outside to have the sympathy of the PM but was that their contribution or do they 
say what the PM wants to hear? 
While there was a preference for market forces and a antagonism towards the 
education establishment, was there a coherent Conservative education policy? 
Were successive Secs. of State allowed to plough their own furrow which led to 
rows and confusions e. g. Baker and Mrs. Thatcher, G Shephard and J Major? 
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